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SUMMARY
This dissertation explores how and to what extent rationality can provide guidance 
for human action -  individual and collective, private and public -  particularly under 
the conditions of modernity. The theme is approached through an examination of 
Habermas’s various pertinent contributions.
In both the pre-communicative and the communicative phases of his work, 
Habermas has been concerned to show the one-sided and distorted nature of 
modern, instrumental rationalization, and to invigorate the “unfinished project of 
enlightenment”. Thus he has endeavoured to develop and philosophically justify a 
complementary, communicative practical rationality. Communicative rationality 
would be employed for rationalizing social interaction, whereas instrumental 
rationality would be restricted to human beings’ interchange with nature, 
concerned with securing their means of material reproduction.
One exception to this supposed exhaustive dichotomy is the case of human 
interaction that is entwined so closely with the means of material reproduction that 
if it were conducted communicatively, rather than instrumentally, it would be so 
inefficient as to threaten material reproduction itself. Fields of social interaction 
that, for the sake of material reproductive efficiency, need to be coordinated 
instrumentally -  as “subsystems of strategic action” -  are the economy and state 
administration.
This study identifies and mainly concentrates on a lacuna common to Habermas’s 
pre-communicative and communicative conceptual frameworks, one that results in 
an effective veto on the possibility that human agents can communicatively pursue 
their own ends by means of other agents. In this way, the vast range of social 
interactions in which the ends of human beings must inevitably be satisfied 
through the active involvement or consent of other human beings -  not only in the 
economic and state-administrative areas but also in “lifeworld” domains such as 
family life, education and politics -  are a priori ceded to strategic action, contrary 
to Habermas’s own intentions.
To remedy this problem, my study sets out to develop and provide philosophical 
justification for a revised conception of practical rationality centred on the notion of 
communicative negotiation. This conception, which remains broadly within the 
framework of Habermas’s communicative paradigm, makes the communicative 
rationalization of all areas of social interaction in principle possible.
Finally, the study tentatively explores ways of extending the practical applicability 
of the revised conception to all fields of modern social activity, including those 
closely entwined with the modes of instrumental action concerned with society’s 
material reproduction.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1. THE THEME AND ITS RATIONALE: PRACTICAL RATIONALITY AND 
HABERMAS
The present study is intended as a small contribution to the theoretically and 
practically important, as well as long-standing, debate on the capabilities and 
limitations of practical rationality, that is, of rationality in its capacity as a guide to 
action. The study’s overall theme can be broadly defined in terms of the question 
“To what extent and in what ways can human beings today justifiably rely on the 
exercise of their universal rational faculties for deriving guidance for their actions, 
individual and collective, private and public?”. This general theme is being 
specifically approached through the critical exploration of Habermas’s uniquely 
insightful, rich, practically pertinent and influential lifelong contributions on the 
subject. The many strengths as well as the shortcomings of Habermas’s work on 
practical rationality are considered, with a view to offering constructive proposals 
for remedying some of the latter.
The post-medieval western world, and through its global influence also large 
sections of the rest of humanity, have increasingly come to rely on rationality both 
for acquiring theoretical knowledge about reality and for answering questions of 
the form “What should I/we do?”. Time-honoured alternative sources of knowledge 
and action-guidance such as sacred texts, divine revelation and tradition have 
gradually been losing their unquestioned authority and social dominance. In an 
ongoing historical process that culminated in the 18th century “Age of 
Enlightenment”, rationality has become the core of modernity and the foundation 
of modernity’s promise of humanity’s continuous progress towards freedom, 
justice and happiness. This process had its roots in ancient Greece, and in some
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respects can even be traced in the midst of the theocratic Middle Ages. Thus, in 
Greek philosophy we have perhaps the first systematic attempts to establish 
rational foundations for knowledge and action. Plato, notably, considered the 
forms of Good and Justice as parts of the rationally knowable objective reality, on 
a par with the forms of mathematical and natural objects; while Aristotle grounds 
his social-contextualist virtue ethics on a teleological conception of human beings 
as rational and social animals. The European Middle Ages, on the other hand, 
predominantly considered God’s Wisdom and Will, as mediated by the Church, to 
be the unquestioned authority on matters of truth and falsehood as well as on 
issues of right and wrong. Human reason was dismissed not just as an inferior 
way of approaching those questions but as totally inappropriate for them. 
Nonetheless, as early as the 13th century, an (Aristotelian) Christian theologian 
such as Thomas Aquinas felt the need to show that human reason can in fact 
arrive at conclusions (in the form of Natural Law) which are identical to the divinely 
revealed precepts.
With the advent of the Renaissance there was a considerable shift in attitudes 
towards rationality, evidenced, for example, in Machiavelli’s political writings and 
Francis Bacon’s advocacy of an empiricist-inductivist method for science and his 
simultaneous understanding of scientific knowledge as a form of power. That shift 
brought to an end the long centuries of religion’s unchallenged supremacy over 
rationality, or of the harmonious coexistence between the two. With rationality’s 
subsequent assertiveness -  above all in the form of the 17th century Scientific 
Revolution and radical philosophical developments such as those represented by 
the work of Descartes and Hobbes -  modernity had dawned. Now reason could 
challenge the authority of religion, though the balance of social power was still not 
in its favour, as cases such as those of Galileo and Giordano Bruno amply
8
demonstrate. In fact, it was only with the Enlightenment that rationality would take 
root and become a social force to be reckoned with.
However, in the two centuries since the Enlightenment, rationality and modernity 
have been severely challenged both on persisting pre-modern grounds and 
(beginning in the very Age of Enlightenment and increasingly since) on the basis 
of standards and ideals grown on the soil of modernity itself. Thus, there is 
considerable disappointment with rationality’s performance so far, and growing 
skepticism concerning its ability to fulfill its promises. Extreme poverty, exploitation 
and inequality are still widespread on the planet, while international, inter-cultural 
and other conflict is still largely dealt with through the use of force. On the other 
hand, the impressive advancement of science and technology does not seem to 
be delivering what had been expected.
In addition, rationality is held responsible for new, specifically modern problems. 
These include the serious and perhaps irreversible damage to the natural 
environment, both globally and locally, new sophisticated forms of domination and 
exploitation, the alienating conditions of modern city life and meaninglessness.
At the same time, just as rationality’s action-guiding abilities are being challenged 
in these ways, our immensely complex, pluralistic and fast changing world 
demands more action-guiding capacity than ever. It can therefore be argued that 
contemporary humanity is suffering from an action-steering deficit. It is of course 
also obvious that such pre-modern or other alternative action-guiding principles as 
religion, unreflective traditionalism, authoritarian political rule or the use of naked 
power cannot meet today’s challenges.
Thus, we cannot but turn even more decisively to humanity’s capacity for 
rationality. We must make all the necessary effort to gain a better understanding of 
the nature of rationality, bring to light its hitherto unrealized potential and devise
9
means of realizing that potential in full; and for joining this effort one can hardly 
think of a better way than through critically exploring Habermas’s relevant 
contributions.
Habermas himself sets his work in the context of the Enlightenment/counter­
enlightenment debates, starting off by settling accounts with the “Dialectic of 
Enlightenment” thesis of his Frankfurt School mentors. This is precisely the 
context in the light of which his work can best be seen.
2. THE ENLIGHTENMENT I COUNTER-ENLIGHTENMENT CONTEXT OF 
THE DEBATE ON PRACTICAL RATIONALITY
2.1 Reason and the Enlightenment
That important part of modern history known as the Age of Enlightenment is 
geographically located in Western Europe -  above all France, England, Scotland 
and Germany -  and North America. Temporally, it is normally demarcated by the 
dates 1688-90 and 1776-90. Its beginning is marked by the English Revolution 
and Bill of Rights, and by the publication of Newton’s Principia and Locke’s Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding and Two Treatises of Government; its end, by 
the American and French Revolutions (with the accompanying Declaration of 
Independence and Declaration of the Rights of Man, respectively) and the 
publication of Kant’s Critiques.
At the core of the Enlightenment -  in the sense of the intellectual-cultural 
movement that prevailed in the “Age of Enlightenment” -  is a thoroughly positive 
and optimistic view of human reason, both theoretical and practical. 
Accompanying it is a belief in the essential goodness of human nature and a this- 
worldly concern for human well being. According to this view, reason has the 
unique capacity to put humanity on a path to continuous improvement towards
10
greater freedom and happiness. When applied resolutely, systematically and 
publicly to natural as well as to cultural (social, historical, political, legal, moral) 
phenomena, reason will furnish humanity with true, reliable and useful knowledge 
concerning these phenomena: it will thus emancipate us from prejudices and 
superstitions about them and enable us to attain mastery over them. Human 
beings will stop being at the mercy of forces they do not adequately understand 
and become autonomous agents in control of their own destiny.
The Enlightenment refuses to accept anything uncritically -  “on faith”. It considers 
reason to be the final judge of all beliefs and practices, including beliefs about 
reason's own nature, powers and limits, and practices involving its own 
employment. The Enlightenment is thus a fierce and uncompromising opponent of 
any other authority, such as tradition, divine revelation, sacred or other revered 
texts, or despotic political power.
This reason-centered conception of the Enlightenment is famously captured by 
Kant in his influential essay “An answer to the question: ‘What is 
Enlightenment?” ’ published in 1784, near the close of “The Age of 
Enlightenment". Approaching the question from the point of view of the subject and 
emphasizing the subjective conditions for enlightenment, Kant maintains:
Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed 
immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's own 
understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is 
self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in 
lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. 
Sapere Aude! "Have courage to use your own understanding" -  that 
is the motto of enlightenment (Kant, 1983: 41).
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Thus, for Kant the essence of enlightenment lies in human beings mastering the 
necessary courage to think for themselves; to use their understanding, their 
reason, without guidance and follow wherever it leads (Kant in this essay uses the 
terms “understanding” and “reason” interchangeably).
Kant does not think that enlightenment comes easily. On the contrary, he is 
convinced that, whereas “it is easy to be immature”, “it is difficult for any individual 
man to work himself out of the immaturity that has all but become his nature" ( 
ibid.: 41). Individuals who have for long been relying on others for guidance do not 
have either the necessary mental skills or the will to pull themselves, by their own 
efforts, out of that state and start thinking for themselves.
This, however, does not drive him to despair. For what is almost impossible for an
individual is not so for a " public": "That the public should enlighten itself is more
likely; indeed, if it is only allowed freedom, enlightenment is almost inevitable" (
ibid.: 41-42). The freedom that Kant considers both a necessary and a sufficient
condition for a public to achieve enlightenment -  that is, the capacity for unguided
thinking -  is nothing more nor less than "the freedom to use reason publicly in all
matters" ( ibid.: 42). The free public use of reason will spread enlightenment from
the -  perhaps few -  mature individuals, who are likely to exist in every public, to
greater and greater numbers, releasing in each the (hitherto suppressed) potential
for using reason, which Kant firmly believes that every human being is endowed
with. Progress towards enlightenment is for Kant humanity's "essential destiny". As
a way of achieving such progress, the free public use of reason in all matters is -
Kant admits -  a slow, painstaking process, not a revolutionary one, for a revolution
"can never truly reform a manner of thinking" ( ibid.: 42). But it is a reliable
1
process; and the only one available.
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Kant’s immense confidence in reason was equally exhibited by such quintessential 
Enlightenment figures as Diderot, Voltaire, Montesquieu and generally all those 
collectively known as the French philosophes, including the more ambivalent 
Rousseau. But it can legitimately be attributed to David Hume too, despite his 
radical philosophical skepticism with regard to reason. For Hume’s following 
celebrated admonition is as expressive of the spirit of the Enlightenment as any:
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school 
metaphysics, for instance; let as ask, Does it contain any abstract 
reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any 
experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?
No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but 
sophistry and illusion (1975:165)
However, the Enlightenment as a movement should not be thought of as identical 
with “The Age of Enlightenment”, and this for two reasons. On the one hand, “The 
Age of Enlightenment”, as Kant knew, was not an entirely "enlightened age" (Kant, 
1983: 44); not only had the considerable efforts of the Enlightenment not 
succeeded during that period in fully defeating the heavy legacies of Europe's non­
enlightened past, but also the Age had witnessed the birth of new forms of 
counter-enlightenment (Berlin, 1979). On the other hand, central aspects of the 
Enlightenment -  such as confidence in reason -  had a strong presence in other 
periods too, both before and after “The Age of the Enlightenment”.
So far we have identified the core of the Enlightenment in minimalist and rather 
imprecise terms; we have done so mainly in terms of certain (positive and 
optimistic) views, attitudes and practices concerning reason, while leaving the 
notion of reason itself largely unclarified. This “thin” characterization -  which is 
more or less all that can be done about defining the Enlightenment in general -
13
provides us with an initial, approximate understanding of the relevance of the 
Enlightenment to present-day discussions of practical rationality. However, for a 
fuller appreciation of the philosophical issues the Enlightenment raises for these 
discussions it is necessary to move beyond the Enlightenment in general to a 
consideration of specific forms of it.
Of course, we are not here concerned with forms of the Enlightenment in the 
sense of different sets of substantive doctrines or practical projects that result from 
the application of reason. Rather, we are interested in different sets of views 
concerning the nature and power of reason itself. In particular we are concerned 
with different Enlightenment approaches to the action-guiding aspects of reason, 
that is, with different Enlightenment conceptions of practical rationality.
2.2 Three Enlightenment conceptions of practical rationality
Enlightenment theories of practical rationality can be classified in terms of their 
position on two questions: (1) Can rationality provide ultimate guidance for human 
action and, if yes, on what grounds? (2) What form does rationality’s guidance 
take? On this basis, we can identify three distinct conceptions:
1) The objective-substantive conception of practical rationality
This conception is typically embodied in Natural Law theories. According to it 
rationality does have the capacity to provide ultimate guidance for human action. It 
can do so by virtue of its ability to know objective reality, including human nature, 
which is the fundamental source of such guidance. Rationality’s guidance comes 
in the form of substantive ends and values.
The derivation of substantive values from properties of objective reality, which has 
been severely criticized by David Hume and was later charged with committing the
14
“naturalistic fallacy”, was not of course an invention of the Enlightenment. It is a 
type of inference encountered already in important works such as Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, and employed long before by Thomas Aguinas who had himself 
derived it from Aristotle. Natural Law theories, however, with their reliance on such 
a form of argument, gained particular prominence in the Enlightenment. They did 
so mainly through the influence of John Locke, who in his Second Treatise of 
Government (in Locke, 1988) derives the natural rights of life, health, liberty and 
property -  and from them a particular normative theory of government -  on the 
basis of a view of the state of nature according to which all human beings are 
created by God equal, independent and rational.
2) The subjective-instrumental conception of practical rationality
This conception was famously articulated in the 18th century by David Hume, but 
has since had widespread appeal, having been espoused by positivism and 
presently underlying the Rational Choice paradigm of Decision and Game Theory. 
Its central tenet is that ultimate values and norms derive directly from the 
subjective realm of human affective states, without any mediation by the rational 
faculties. Rationality can know those states but does not have the power to judge 
or influence them; it is not, therefore, able to provide ultimate guidance for action. 
What rationality can do, with respect to action, is to show us how to attain the 
affectively determined ultimate values and norms, being thus an instrument of 
human affections. (Hume’s account of the subjective-instrumental view of practical 
rationality is briefly presented in Appendix I of this study).
3) The transcendental-procedural conception of practical rationality
This third major Enlightenment conception of practical rationality is put forward in 
Kant’s theory of morality and Practical Reason. In Kant’s view, ultimate guidance
15
for action derives neither from objective nor from subjective reality but from a 
transcendental realm accessible to our rational faculties. In this way rationality can 
guide action in an ultimate sense. Such guidance comes not in the form of 
substantive ends and values but primarily in the form of procedural principles on 
the basis of which substantive maxims of action can then be determined. (For a 
more detailed account of Kant’s theory, see Appendix II). This Kantian conception 
of practical rationality has, in its broad structure, important contemporary 
adherents, including John Rawls and -  in his later, communicative paradigm -  
Habermas himself.
2.3 Critical responses to Enlightenment views on practical rationality
Enlightenment ideas on practical rationality have been strongly challenged both 
with regard to reason’s ability to establish ultimate values or norms, and with 
regard to its role as a neutral instrument in the service of non-rationally chosen 
human ends. Three main strands of criticism can be distinguished, two of them 
concerning the former issue, and a third focusing on the latter.
1) Contextualist critiques of rationality
Beginning with Hegel’s critique of Kant, it has been argued that rational 
deliberation on values and norms is inconceivable independently of the 
evaluative/normative context in which it is carried out. No “Archimedian point” can 
be found from which reason can autonomously determine values or norms. 
Against Kant’s alleged empty moral formalism -  also in opposition to Natural Law 
objectivism, but very much in line with Aristotle’s virtue ethics -  Hegel puts forward 
the idea of Sittlichkeit, or “ethical life”, which comprises all of society’s customs, 
traditions, habits, values, laws, institutions, etc. The ethical life constitutes for 
Hegel the (insurmountable) context within and on the basis of which rational
16
human beings must unavoidably derive guidance for their decisions and actions. In 
a similar, contextualist vein are also several more recent lines of thought such as 
Gadamerian hermeneutics, Wittgensteinian language-game theory, and 
communitarian/neo-Aristotelian ethics.
2) Radical critiques of rationality
According to a line of argument originating in Nietzsche and in certain respects 
resembling that of the contextualists, what normally pass for purely rational 
processes are thoroughly permeated by non-rational, and often sinister, elements 
such as unconscious motives, interests and power. These elements -  usually 
without being detected -  leave their stamp on the outcomes of “rational” 
deliberations. This position must be clearly distinguished from that of Marx. For 
while Marx also considers the political and other values of bourgeois society as 
nothing but ideological constructs ultimately determined by the interests of the 
ruling, capitalist class, he looks forward to an emancipated, classless society in 
which evaluations and decisions would be made through rational deliberations free 
from ideological distortions. Nietzscheans, by contrast, view the influences of 
interests, power, etc. on deliberative processes not as distortions of a potentially 
“pure” rationality but as intrinsic aspects of rationality as such. This Nietzschean 
approach to rationality characterizes much of poststructuralist/postmodernist 
thought, most prominently that of Foucault and Lyotard.
3) The “Dialectic of Enlightenment” thesis
The third major line of critical response to the Enlightenment centres on the idea 
that the spread of rationality in modern society, far from bringing about human
17
emancipation and happiness as the Enlightenment had postulated is, on the 
contrary, leading to unfreedom and meaninglessness.
This idea appeared in its first important version in the work of Max Weber, and -  
after being construed in Marxist terms -  formed the basis of Georg Lukacs’s 
theory of reification. Then, under the strong influence of both Weber and Lukacs, 
the leading thinkers of the early Frankfurt School, above all Horkheimer, Adorno 
and Marcuse, developed their own highly original and radical formulations of the 
idea, which, after them, came to be known as the “Dialectic of Enlightenment” 
thesis.
Max Weber
For Weber the predominant feature of modernity is the spread of instrumental, or 
“purposive” rationality in all areas of social life, from the economy and 
administration to science and culture. Modern societies, surely, make so much use 
of instrumental rationality because they see in it -  in Humean fashion -  a most 
powerful tool in the service of their own purposes. But its generalized employment, 
according to Weber, is having seriously adverse effects on its own human users. 
The (instrumental) rationalization of society leads to the “disenchantment of the 
world” by bringing about the loss of the world’s old religious-metaphysical meaning 
without replacing it with any new meaning. Moreover, it results in the most 
effective domination of nature and society and forces human beings into a 
dehumanizing, bureaucratic “iron cage”.
This melancholy condition of modern humanity is for Weber virtually irreversible, 
precisely because instrumental rationality is, indeed, “technically superior” to any 
other way of pursuing the realization of human ends. Moreover, his pessimism 
regarding the action-guiding role of rationality is compounded by his -  also
18
Humean -  conviction that ultimate values or norms cannot be determined through 
rational deliberation (see Appendix III for a more extended account of Weber’s 
views on modern rationalization).
Georg Lukacs
In his seminal Hegelian-Marxist work History and Class Consciousness (1971), 
Luk£cs introduces the crucial concept of reification, which is based on Marx’s 
analysis of commodity fetishism, in Capital. It refers to the transformation of 
human beings and their experiences and social relations into objectified, 
manipulable “things”. Lukacs uses the concept of reification in order to shed new 
light on Weber’s analysis of rationalization. To begin with, he interprets what 
Weber identified as the adverse consequences of the spread of instrumental 
rationality as cases of reification. Unlike Weber, however, he does not see those 
reifying consequences of rationalization as inevitable effects of rationality as such. 
Rather, he attributes reification to the partial and distorted nature of capitalist 
rationalization; and for that he puts the blame squarely on the “commodity form” 
that lies at the heart of capitalism and permeates every aspect of capitalist 
society.This opens for Lukacs the prospect of an overcoming of reification. For that 
purpose the commodity form must be abolished and the distorted rationalization of 
parts of society must be replaced with the rationalization of the social totality.
Lukacs, just like Marx, reserves the task of such a transformation of society for the 
class of the proletariat. However, the proletariat will not play this historical role by 
historical necessity. Given the existing conditions of pervasive reification, it will 
develop the class consciousness necessary for doing so only by being 
appropriately enlightened by an avant-garde who can grasp in thought what it itself 
has to realize in history: the idea of a non-reified rational society.
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The early Frankfurt School
The first generation of Frankfurt School Critical Theorists, especially in the post­
al 930’s period, largely endorse and build on Weber’s and Lukacs’s theses 
concerning the inextricable relationship between modern rationalization on the one
hand and meaninglessness, domination and reification on the other. In works such
2 3 4as Dialectic of Enlightenment, Eclipse of Reason, One-Dimensional Man and
5
Negative Dialectics, Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse paint a picture of a totally 
administered, integrated, reified society; a society without any oppositional social 
forces or forms of thought; one in which social ideals -  with the possible exception 
of those embodied in modern art -  do not transcend social reality, and thus do not 
provide any potential or hope for emancipation. Blame for this bleak situation is 
clearly placed on instrumental reason, which is thought to dominate all thinking 
and practice.
Thus, the Enlightenment project is taken to have failed totally, turning into its exact 
opposite. In addition to rejecting instrumental rationalization, these theorists were 
also darkly pessimistic about the prospects of an alternative. Indeed, although they 
often alluded and at times explicitly refered to the idea of a non-instrumental form 
of rationality, they never specified its character in adequate conceptual terms, nor 
did they explain how it could take root in social reality. In fact, apart from not 
sharing Lukacs’s faith in the emergence of a revolutionary working class 
movement -  or any other radical movement for that matter -  which would 
transform the structure of capitalist society, their analyses seem to rule out the 
historical and even the anthropological possibility of a non-reifying reason that 
would characterize an alternative society. Furthermore, these theorists -  Adorno in 
particular -  often seem to rule out also the very conceptual possibility of a non­
reifying, non-instrumental form of reason; for they tend to either charge
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encountered instances of rationality that are claimed to be non-instrumental with 
openly having instrumental purposes, or suspect them for being covertly 
instrumental. To that extent, Frankfurt School Critical Theory comes very close to 
Nietzschean/poststructuralist critiques of reason.
3. HABERMAS AND THE DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT
For Habermas, the Enlightenment, and modernity more generally, are not so much 
failed projects, as projects that are one-sidedly and distortedly implemented and 
thus unfinished. Although himself a major second generation Critical Theorist, he 
disagreed with the total-reification thesis of his Frankfurt mentors, while at the 
same time firmly denying that there are in the post-liberal phase of modern 
society, oppositional forces -  working class or other -  that guarantee the eventual 
victory of reason in history. His own view was that, despite the considerable 
degree of integration, there was still potential for emancipatory change; but 
whether and to what extent that potential would be realized was a historically 
contingent matter.
Habermas has always differed from the early Frankfurt philosophers also with 
regard to the central question concerning the nature of rationality itself. On the one 
hand he does not consider all the uses of instrumental reason as objectionable or 
indeed avoidable. In the context of our relationship to the natural world the 
employment of instrumental reason is for Habermas both necessary and 
acceptable. What is objectionable is its employment in human/social contexts, as 
is the case, for example, with the instrumentalization of politics or other areas of 
the “lifeworld”. And even here, the culprit, in the last analysis, is not instrumental 
reason as such but its application in the wrong fields, as a result of “technocratic
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consciousness”, which typically mistakes evaluative and normative questions for 
technical ones.
Moreover, Habermas has been from the beginning confident that a form of 
rationality capable of determining values and norms -  one that would complement 
an instrumental rationality kept to its proper field of application -  is both 
conceptually possible and socially feasible. Such a form of rationality, however, 
would have to avoid the weaknesses of older versions of it, such as Natural Law 
theory and Kantian practical reason. In defending the possibility of an 
evaluative/normative rationality, Habermas has been at odds not only with the 
early Frankfurt School thinkers but also with Humean and Weberian “decisionism”, 
contextualist relativism and Nietzschean/poststructuralist radical critiques of 
reason.
Throughout his career, Habermas has aspired to contribute to the project of 
modernity mainly through renewing and invigorating Critical Theory, which in his 
view had been driven into a cul-de-sac by the older Frankfurt School generation. 
To that end, he has endeavoured to develop an adequate concept of value- and 
norm-oriented rationality, suitable for issues concerning intersubjective human 
interaction, or “praxis”. I shall frequently be referring to this type of rationality as 
“praxial”. It is a type of rationality that, although not entirely absent from modern 
social practice as the Frankfurt theorists argue, has nonetheless been seriously 
neglected by modernity, both in theory and in practice. For Habermas, praxial 
rationality would be the cornerstone of a substantive social theory that could once 
more engage not just in the description but also in the rational assessment and 
criticism of existing social realitry. Complementary to praxial rationality, in a binary 
classification of rationality types, would be instrumental rationality, suitable for 
dealing with technical issues.
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4. THE PRESENT STUDY
This study critically examines Habermas’s views on practical rationality, praxial as 
well as instrumental, in both the pre-communicative and communicative phases of 
his work. In both phases Habermas constructs a sharp and exhaustive dichotomy 
between instrumental and praxial types of rationality. The former type is largely 
conceived along Humean lines. It concerns the pursuit of ends by means of 
causally manipulating objective or objectified processes. The basic structure of this 
form of rationality remains essentially unchanged in the two phases of Habermas’s 
work. Praxial rationality, on the other hand, concerns the determination of values 
and norms through intersubjective interaction. Here, there is a significant 
conceptual shift between the two phases. In Habermas’s pre-communicative 
theory, praxial rationality combines (conventional) hermeneutics with a depth- 
hermeneutical form of self-reflection based on a “therapeutic” relationship between 
enlightener and enlightened-to-be. In his communicative paradigm, however, to 
which Habermas turns mainly because of his dissatisfaction with precisely this 
form of self-reflection, praxial rationality is conceived as a combination of ethical 
and moral discourse. The former component is concerned with the dialogical or 
“communicative” clarification of values and identities, the latter with the 
determination of universal moral norms through the communicative application of a 
universalization principle. The difference between this concept of praxial rationality 
and the pre-communicative one lies mainly with the second component. For 
whereas ethical discourse can largely be construed as a form of hermeneutics, 
just as the first component of the early concept, with the latter component there is 
a drastic shift from depth-hermeneutical self-reflection to a communicatively 
rendered, Kantian-type normative morality.
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Despite this difference, however, both the early and the later versions of the 
dichotomy between instrumental and praxial rationality seem to suffer from the 
same serious defect -  one that is encountered also at the deeper level of the 
dichotomy’s philosophical underpinnings: It looks as if the dichotomy -  by grouping 
together on one side means-ends relations with causal manipulation and on the 
other side communicative relations with an orientation to values and norms -  
makes it categorially impossible for human beings to pursue their goals by means 
of each other (i.e. to use the services of each other) in dialogical, communicative 
ways. They must -  by conceptual necessity -  do so through causal manipulation. 
The repercussions of such a conceptual arrangement on the prospect of a non­
reified, rational society, are obviously momentous.
This study mainly focuses on this important problem. Its central axis constitutes an 
effort to confirm the existence of the problem, to clarify its nature and to offer 
solutions to it. The study is divided into three main Parts. Parts One and Two 
explore, respectively, Habermas’s pre-communicative and communicative views 
on practical rationality. In the course of these explorations the above-mentioned 
problem is identified and discussed in a preliminary manner. Part Three attempts a 
more in-depth analysis of the problem and proposes remedies for it in terms of a 
revised and suitably underpinned model of practical rationality, albeit one that 
broadly remains within Habermas’s later, communicative paradigm. The central 
component of this revised model is the concept of communicative negotiation. It is 
a concept that makes an entirely non-reified, rational society conceivable, by 
specifying how human beings can pursue their goals by means of each other in 
purely communicative ways. Finally, the study tentatively considers ways in which 
the proposed conception of practical rationality can be made practically applicable 
in society, under conditions of modernity.
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PART ONE
HABERMAS’S EARLY WORK ON ACTION AND 
PRACTICAL RATIONALITY
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The Frankfurt tradition of Critical Theory to which Habermas belongs has always 
understood both itself and the type of Marxism from which it originates as being 
concerned, primarily, with the critique of ideology; that is, with the identification 
and critical exposure of the central misconceptions which hold sway over human 
thought and action in capitalist societies, concealing on the one hand the 
exploitative and oppressive aspects of those societies and on the other the 
potentiality for emancipation and happiness inherent in them. However, the 
ideology singled out for critique, within this tradition, varies from one generation of 
theorists to the next. More specifically, there are significant shifts regarding the 
target of critique, between Marx, the first generation Frankfurt School and the 
second generation, including Habermas.
Thus Marx is mainly concerned with a critique of the ideology of “equal exchange 
of commodities”; an ideology that conceals the unequal and unjust capitalist 
relations of production, as well as the socialist-revolutionary potential of the 
proletariat.
Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, on the other hand, looking at modernity from 
the vantage point of post-liberal, organized capitalism, rather than the liberal 
capitalism of Marx’s time, and having studied Weber’s and Lukacs’s analyses of 
modern, capitalist rationalization, focus their critique on Instrumental Reason
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instead. According to their diagnosis, the fundamental ideological misconception of 
modem society lies in the belief in Instrumental Reason’s value-neutrality, or more 
precisely, in the concealment of the inherent link between Instrumental Reason 
(above all, in the form of science and technology) and domination over nature and 
human beings alike. This misconception, combined with the recognition of 
Instrumental Reason’s immense power as a tool in the service of diverse human 
purposes, results in modern humanity’s worship of Instrumental Reason as the 
method whose systematic employment guarantees unending historical progress. 
One of the important consequences of this ideology is that it conceals the 
necessity of any search for alternative -  non-instrumental, non-dominatory -  ways 
of thinking and acting.
With Habermas, now, we have yet another important shift in this tradition of 
ideology critique; a shift -  vis a vis the early Frankfurt thinkers -  which is not 
attributed by Habermas to the emergence, since their time, of any radically new 
phase of social development, comparable to that which separates them from Marx 
but rather to a different theoretical understanding of largely the same state of 
affairs as they had experienced: post-liberal, organized capitalism, or “late 
modernity”.
Habermas, particularly in the early phase of his work, contends that the dominant 
ideological misconception of the age is no longer that of equal exchange, as was 
the case in Marx’s liberal-capitalist times. But at the same time he rejects the view 
that the ideology in question is the worship of Instrumental Reason as such; he 
does so, however, not because he denies that such a worship is strongly present 
in late modernity, but because he does not think that it is ideological in the 
sweeping, undifferentiated manner claimed by his Frankfurt progenitors. The 
central ideology of late modernity, according to Habermas, is technocratic
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ideology, or, as he often refers to it, technocratic consciousness. This
consciousness is said to consist in failing to distinguish adequately between two
qualitatively different action-related questions, the “practical” and the “technical”,
and treating all as if they were of the latter type. (For now suffice it to say that by
“practical” Habermas here means, roughly, moral, political, and evaluative,
1
referring to what he calls praxis, whereas by “technical” he means whatever 
involves the devising and using of techniques for the realization of goals). Thus, 
instrumental or purposive rationality, which according to Habermas is proper to 
technical issues -  and to them only -  in late modernity tends to be wrongly applied 
to all issues in an undifferentiated way.
Ironically, the early Frankfurt thinkers in their wholesale rejection of Instrumental 
Reason are, for Habermas, as guilty of confusing the “technical” and the “practical” 
-  a misconception that constitutes the core of the technocratic ideology -  as those 
who give Instrumental Reason wholesale endorsement.
With his critique of technocratic ideology, Habermas wants to restore and clarify 
the distinction between the “technical” and the “practical” so as to be able, firstly, 
to define the proper space of instrumental rationality (that is, the space of 
“technical” issues), and secondly -  and more importantly for him -  to show that 
“practical” issues are also amenable to rational treatment, albeit by means of a 
rationality fundamentally different from the instrumental or purposive kind.
The two main sections of Part One -  section 1.2 and 1.3 -  provide, respectively, 
an exposition and a critical analysis of Habermas’s early views on action and 
practical rationality.
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1.2 AN EXPOSITION OF HABERMAS’S EARLY VIEWS ON ACTION AND 
PRACTICAL RATIONALITY
1.2.1 Techne vs Praxis
In Theory and Practice, Habermas confesses that he became aware of “the 
fundamental significance of the Aristotelian distinction between techne and praxis” 
through studying Hannah Arendt’s Vita Activa and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth 
and Method (Habermas, 1974: 286, n.4).
Aristotle, crystallizing notions already present in ancient Greek language and 
thought, sharply differentiates two types of human action: poiesis or making, on 
the one hand, and praxis or doing, on the other. The fundamental difference 
between the two is specified by Aristotle in the following way:
[D]oing and making are different in kind, since the maker 
of a thing has a different end in view than just making it, 
whereas in doing something the end can only be the doing 
of it well (Aristotle, 1955:177).
Corresponding to these two types of action, are two very different types of ability
•  2or skill; two different “rational faculties. The faculty exercised in making is techne, 
practical art, covering also what we today classify as fine art. The faculty 
associated with praxis is phronesis, prudence, practical wisdom. Thus the domain 
of poiesis and techne is that of the arts and crafts. Here, the object, the end of 
techne, the result of “technical action”, is a particular product which is external to 
the action itself: a statue, a table, a tool. Moreover, not only is it the purpose of 
techne to produce something which is external to the productive activity, but it is 
essential to the nature of techne to bring about its products causally, in the sense 
of Aristotle’s efficient causality:
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The business of every art is to bring something into 
existence, and the practice of an art involves the study of 
how to bring into existence something which is capable of 
having such an existence and has its efficient cause in 
the maker and not in itself ( ibid.: 175).
By his last remark, above (“something which.... has its efficient cause... not in itself 
[my emphasis] ), Aristotle refers to the distinction between things produced 
through human action and things in nature that come about through an inner 
causal necessity, thereby stressing the specifically human character of techne.
In contrast to productive action, the domain of praxis is that of ethics, family life 
and above all, politics. And phronesis, prudence, or practical wisdom, is “a rational 
faculty exercised for the attainment of truth in things that are humanly good or bad” 
( ibid.: 177). Good praxis is conduct which is conducive to a good human life. But 
since the end of praxis is not a product external to action but an end that lies in the 
action itself, good praxis is conduct that is constitutive of the good life. Accordingly,
practical wisdom is the ability -  for Aristotle one that involves deliberation -  to
make judgements about what conduct is conducive to -  in the sense of being 
constitutive of -  the good life. Thus, in private life, a practically wise man
is supposed to be characterized by his ability to reach 
sound conclusions in his deliberations about what is good 
for himself.... not in one department of life... but what 
conduces to the good life as a whole ( ibid.: 176).
In the same way, in public life, Pericles and others like him have the reputation of 
being “men of practical genius” because they “have the power of seeing what is 
good for themselves and for humanity” ( ibid.: 177). Similarly, Aristotle adds, we
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consider practically wise those who “display an aptitude for governing a household 
or a state” ( ibid.: 177).
Finally, Aristotelian practical wisdom has this important characteristic: It is not 
simply about knowing which general norms of action are conducive to the good 
life. It is also -  one might even say, ultimately -  about identifying which particular 
action in a given particular situation is conducive to the good life:
Prudence is something more than a knowledge of general 
principles. It must acquire familiarity with particulars also, 
for conduct deals with particular circumstances, and 
prudence is a matter of conduct ( ibid.: 180).
Practical deliberation about particulars, Aristotle insists, is not merely an 
intellectual enterprise, but involves a kind of “perception” which can only be 
developed through many years of practical experience ( ibid.: 182).
Concern with the particular, and learning through practical experience rather than 
through a purely intellectual endeavour, are among the features which practical 
wisdom shares with techne. Indeed, whereas from one point of view Aristotle 
distinguishes between techne and praxis, from another he groups the two together 
and contrasts both with another type of activity, episteme, science, or more 
precisely, episteme theoretike, theoretical or contemplative science. Techne and 
praxis are both concerned with bringing about new states of affairs by changing 
particular concrete things which are contingent and changeable through human 
action. Science, by contrast, is about knowing things that are universal, necessary 
and not changeable through human action:
Science is the coming to conclusions about universals 
and necessary things ( ibid.: 178).
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Clearly, Aristotelian science is not oriented to intervening in the world in order to 
change it in a technical, practical or any other way. Both Hannah Arendt and 
Hans-Georg Gadamer adopt the Aristotelian distinction between making and 
doing, and, having impressed their own interpretative stamp on Aristotle’s terms, 
make extensive use of them in their own work. Some of their interpretations are 
reflected in -  and might therefore illuminate -  Habermas’s own corresponding 
conceptual duality between techne and praxis.
Hannah Arendt divides vita activa -  human “active” life, as opposed to vita 
contemplativa, contemplative life -  into three types of activity: (1), labour, (2) work 
or fabrication, and (3) action. The latter two correspond, by and large, to Aristotle’s 
poiesis and praxis. Of these, it is Arendt’s concept of action which warrants our 
special attention. This is how she conceives of action, in contrast to work or 
fabrication:
Action, the only activity that goes on directly between 
men without the intermediary of things or matter, 
corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the 
fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the 
world (Arendt, 1958: 7).
and,
Action, as distinguished from fabrication, is never 
possible in isolation; to be isolated is to be deprived of 
the capacity to act. Action and speech need the 
surrounding presence of others no less than fabrication 
needs the surrounding presence of nature for its material 
and for a world in which to place the finished product.
Fabrication is surrounded by and in constant contact with
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the world: action and speech are surrounded by and in
constant contact with the web of the acts and words of
other men ( ibid.: 188).
Thus, whereas work concerns above all a relationship between human beings and 
the material world, action in Arendt’s understanding is essentially interactive and 
closely related to language. One cannot engage in action, just as one cannot use
language, outside a network of human relations. Action, praxis -  just as much as
language -  cannot be a solitary, asocial activity.
Gadamer’s interpretation of Aristotle’s dichotomy between poiesis/techne, on the 
one hand, and praxis/phronesis on the other emphasizes another point of 
difference: one concerning the significance, in each type of activity, of the concrete 
act; or, more precisely, the relationship, in each, between the concrete act and the 
general idea held prior to, and guiding, the concrete act. It has already been 
pointed out that making and doing, techne and praxis, -  in contrast to science -  
are both primarily concerned with concrete acts, carried out in concrete situations. 
In this very respect however, according to Gadamer, the two are also 
fundamentally different.
In poiesis, the idea of the object to be made is present in the mind of the maker in 
a complete, determinate form, prior to the concrete act of making. Thus, techne is 
about the application, through some kind of technique, of an idea fully determined 
outside the “technical” action itself. In the case of praxis, on the other hand, there 
are only incomplete, indeterminate prior ideas, giving only general guidance to 
concrete action. The precise determination of the content of any concrete 
“practical” action, therefore, takes place in the concrete situation where the action 
is called for, and constitutes at the same time the assignment of a precise
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meaning, applicable to that particular situation, to the prior, not fully determinate, 
idea guiding the action.
Consequently, phronesis, or practical wisdom (rendered by Gadamer as "practical” 
or “moral” reasonableness), being concerned with the deliberate determination, by 
the acting agent, of what to do in specific situations, always involves over and 
above possessing a “sketchy” [Gadamer’s term] notion of the good life, also a 
further irreducible evaluative, or normative element: an element of concrete 
choice, or decision (proairesis) about what is good -  an aspect of the good life -  in 
a particular situation.
The following passages express eloquently Gadamer’s understanding of this 
difference between techne and praxis.
(1) The image that the person has of what he ought to 
do, thus, for example, his concepts of right and wrong, of 
decency, courage, honor, solidarity and so on... are guiding 
images in a certain sense, to be sure. But still a 
fundamental difference is recognizable from the guiding 
image that the blueprint of an object to be produced 
represents for the artisan; what is right, for example, is not 
fully determinable independently of the situation that 
demands the right from me, whereas the eidos of that 
which an artisan wants to produce is certainly fully 
determined, namely by the use for which it is intended.
(Gadamer, 1975: 283).3
(2) To speak with Aristotle, the conclusion of the practical
syllogism and of practical deliberation is the resolve. This
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resolve, however, together with the whole path of 
reflection, from the willing of the objective to the thing to be 
done, is simultaneously a concretization of the willed 
objective itself... With [practical reason] the point, which is 
delimited against any technical rationality, is that the aim 
itself, the “universal” derives its determinacy by means of 
the singular (Gadamer, 1981: 81).
(3) The knowledge that gives direction to action is 
essentially called for by concrete situations in which we are 
to choose the thing to be done; and no learned and 
mastered technique can spare us the task of deliberation 
and decision ( ibid.: 92).
In the language of means and ends, this difference between making and doing can 
be put as follows: In making, the concrete action producing an object is merely the 
means to the production of something that was conceived prior to the action -  in a 
fully determinate form -  as the action’s end or purpose; in doing, by contrast, the 
concrete action is itself a fully determinate end chosen through practical 
deliberation as a situationally appropriate form of a value or norm adopted prior to 
the action as a general, not fully determinate, end.
The importance of the distinction between techne and praxis for Habermas cannot 
be exaggerated. The analysis of the demise of that ancient distinction in modern 
thinking and social practice -  in the form of the “technocratic pathology” -  together 
with his sustained efforts to redefine and reestablish the distinction for modernity, 
rehabilitating praxis, constitute a central axis of Habermas’s philosophical and 
social-theoretic endeavours.
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Looking, first, into Habermas’s work prior to the communicative turn, we come 
across various formulations of the distinction, each emphasizing different aspects 
of it, albeit all in keeping with the spirit of Aristotle, Arendt and Gadamer. To begin 
with, he differentiates between “technical” questions, i.e. questions pertaining to 
techne, and “practical” questions, i.e. questions pertaining to praxis, in the 
following way;
Technical questions are posed with a view to the rationally 
goal-directed organization of means and the rational 
selection of instrumental alternatives, once the goals 
(values and maxims) are given. Practical questions, on the 
other hand, are posed with a view to the acceptance or 
rejection of norms, especially norms for action, the claims 
to validity of which we can support or oppose with reasons 
(1974: 3).
Here, the distinction is made in terms of the different ways in which the two kinds 
of activity relate to means and ends. Techne is about finding, and employing, 
appropriate means to given ends. It is this -  the means-ends -  sense of technical 
action that Habermas conveys by the frequently used terms “goal-directed”, 
“purposive”,, “purposive-rational” and “instrumental” action. Praxis on the other 
hand concerns the taking of reasoned decisions about the ends themselves. 
Accordingly, praxis, frequently referred to as the “praxis of life”, is associated by 
Habermas with ethics and politics as well as with moral and political philosophy. It 
is worth noting that in this formulation of the distinction, ends, or goals -  whether 
given, as in the case of techne, or chosen, as in the case of praxis -  are rather 
general and abstract ends (values, maxims, norms) than concretely situated, 
specific ones.
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Another important aspect of techne and technical action is brought out by 
expressions such as “technical” control over (objective and) objectified processes”, 
which occur frequently in Habermas’s texts (e.g. 1971: 57; 1974: 275, 269). This 
emphasis on control and mastery is in line with Habermas’s understanding of 
Greek techne as “the skillful production of artifacts and the expert mastery of 
objectified tasks” (1974: 42) and accords with Aristotle’s conception of poiesis as 
bringing about changes in reality through the harnessing of efficient causes. It is in 
connection with this property that Habermas often associates technical action with 
“work”, or “labour”, understood as the type of activity through which human beings 
exercise control over natural processes for the production of goods. However, it 
would be a gross misinterpretation to think that Habermas restricts technical action 
to humanity’s relationship with nature. Far from it, it is of paramount importance for 
his Critical Theory that technical action is applicable -  and indeed applied, often 
objectionably so -  to society as well. It concerns “the technical control over the 
objects or... objectified processes of nature and society” (1974: 264).
Coming now to the side of praxis, we also encounter a second aspect, over and 
above its being concerned with examining and settling evaluative, normative, goal- 
setting questions; namely the interactive nature of practical action. Echoing 
Hannah Arendt, (without, though, distinguishing between labour and work as she
4
does) but also drawing on the early Hegel, Habermas contrasts labour, work, 
technical action -  which involves a relationship of a subject to an object -  with 
interaction, which he conceives as the reciprocal relationship between mutually 
recognizing subjects ( ibid., p.160). Intersubjective interaction is mediated through 
linguistic communication. Indeed Habermasojsed the terms “interactive” and 
“communicative” interchangeably long before he worked out the thoroughly 
communicative philosophy that found expression in The Theory of Communicative 
Action (Habermas, 1984, 1987).
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These and certain other elements that for Habermas comprise the technical and 
the practical types of activity are brought together in the respective definitions of 
“work” and “interaction” given in the important essay Technology and Science as 
“Ideology” ’ (1971: Chapter 6).
By “work” or purposive-rational action I understand either 
instrumental action or rational choice or their conjunction.
Instrumental action is governed by technical rules based 
on empirical knowledge. In every event they imply 
conditional predictions about observable events, physical 
or social... The conduct of rational choice is governed by 
strategies based on analytic knowledge. They imply 
deductions from preference rules (value systems) and 
decision procedures;... Purposive-rational action realizes 
defined goals under given conditions. But while 
instrumental action organizes means that are appropriate 
or inappropriate according to criteria of an effective control 
of reality, strategic action depends only on the correct 
evaluation of possible alternative choices, which results 
from calculation supplemented by values and maxims 
(1971:91-2).
Some noteworthy points emerge in relation to this definition. Purposive-rational 
action is, according to Habermas, of two kinds: (a) “instrumental action” and (b) 
“rational choice”, often also referred to as “strategic action”, in a sense of this term 
very different from the one given to it in Habermas’s later work. Both kinds have to 
do with means-ends relations. In instrumental action ends are realized causally, 
through the effective control of physical or social reality, a control that is achieved
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on the basis of predictive empirical knowledge. In strategic action, on the other 
hand, the relationship between means and ends is an analytic one. The “choices” 
between alternative means are not “evaluative” ones; they are not choices 
involving decisions about the good life, as in Aristotelian praxis. They are, rather, 
choices fully determined by deductive calculations made on the basis of non- 
evaluative decisions. This strategic type of purposive-rational action seems to 
reflect an acknowledgement, on Habermas’s part, of the internal, conceptual and 
logical complexity of the realm of “ends” (values, interests, norms, etc).
In contradistinction to “work” or “purposive-rational action”, Habermas defines 
“interaction” in this way:
By “interaction”... I understand communicative action, 
symbolic interaction. It is governed by binding consensual 
norms which define reciprocal expectations about 
behaviour and which must be understood and recognized 
by at least two acting subjects... while the validity of 
technical rules and strategies depends on that of 
empirically true or analytically correct propositions, the 
validity of social norms is grounded only on the 
intersubjectivity of the mutual understanding of intentions 
and secured by the general recognition of obligations 
( ibid.: 92).
Thus, at the opposite pole to purposive-rational action Habermas installs 
intersubjectivity: Interaction is communicative action, symbolic exchange, between 
subjects. This form of intersubjective activity relates to norms in two different ways, 
(though, in the above passage, the two are not differentiated with sufficient clarity). 
On the one hand, communicative action is bound by norms that are mutually
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acceptable to the interacting subjects; on the other hand, communicative action is 
the way in which norms come to be accepted as valid, and thus as binding. 
Though these two aspects of communicative action -  that is (a) being governed by 
norms and (b) determining the validity of norms -  go hand in hand in Habermas’s 
work (with relative emphasis varying according to context) it is only the latter that 
has a genuinely evaluative character, which is the hallmark of praxis, as distinct 
from techne.
1.2.2 The modern triumph of techne and demise of praxis.
A great deal of Habermas’s early work was devoted to tracing, and working out the 
philosophical basis for reversing, what he saw as the unfortunate demise of praxis 
and practical reason in modern times. For the ancient distinction between techne 
and praxis has been gradually reduced, both in social thought and social practice, 
to a near one-dimensional state of affairs. Techne and instrumental reason, 
empowered through an alliance to a new, technically-oriented form of theory, not 
only has achieved triumphant success in its own traditional field of activity, but has 
also deeply encroached on realms properly belonging to praxis and practical 
reason. This encroachment has indeed been so extensive that praxis and the 
practical are virtually squeezed out of existence.
In tracing this line of development, Habermas concentrates in particular on the 
changing understanding and practice of politics. For Aristotle, the polis is not an 
association formed by members of society in order to secure means for promoting 
their private interests of survival and security; that instrumental pursuit is the 
business of private social life, in the case of the Greek city the business of the 
oikos, the household. (Habermas, 1974: 47) The polis is, rather, a community 
concerned with promoting the virtue and good life of its members. The 
constitutional and legal arrangements of the state are studied and judged as good
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or bad from the point of view of this ethical criterion. Politics -  the activity of the 
polis -  is continuous with ethics; a form of praxis as opposed to techne.
This Aristotelian conception of politics was dominant in the Greek and Roman 
world and survived, albeit in a significantly modified form, in the European Middle 
Ages up until the Renaissance, and was, according to Habermas, finally defeated 
by the modern technicised conception only in the 19th century. It did, however, 
undergo a significant transformation already in theocratic medieval Europe, as is 
shown in Aquinas’s work. Thomas Aquinas, writing in the 13th century, like 
Aristotle conceived of the state with respect to its purpose not as an institution 
concerned, in an ethically neutral manner, merely with the private interests of 
individuals and groups; but as a moral order, in continuity with ethics, concerned 
with the virtue of its members. With respect to the manner in which it operates, 
however, the political order as conceived by Aquinas is not, as in Aristotle, 
“anchored in the praxis and lexis of free citizens, in public political life” ( ibid.: 49). 
Instead, the Thomist state is an autocratic social-moral order largely true to the 
reality of Feudal Europe, and assumed to be in accordance with both Natural Law 
and biblical revelation. But the technicized conception of politics first appeared 
during the Renaissance, in the work of Machiavelli and Thomas More, and was 
presented in a more complete form in early modernity, in the works of Hobbes.
Machiavelli and More
In the Renaissance we have the first signs of a transformed, instrumentalist 
understanding of politics, which Habermas -  in an interpretation which, as he 
admits, is “not without a degree of stylization” -  finds in Machiavelli’s works, 
especially The Prince (1513) and in More’s Utopia (1516). In contrast to both 
Aristotle and Aquinas, Machiavelli and More divorce politics from ethics; in 
Habermas’s words, “they extricate the structure of domination from its ethical
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context” (Habermas, 1974: 52). They both view politics as being concerned not 
with establishing conditions that would enable individuals to lead a virtuous life, but 
first and foremost with securing the fundamental need of survival. They treat it as 
an activity that is morally neutral, at best related to ethics only as its precondition.
The two political thinkers, however, differ greatly in their views about what 
constitutes the main threat to life and, consequently, how best to confront that 
threat. For Machiavelli the prime threat is “violent death at the hand of one’s 
neighbour” ( ibid.: 51) -  a neighbour turned enemy, either from within one’s own 
society or from outside it. This danger is, for Machiavelli, a permanent feature of 
the human condition, stemming from the inevitability of human aggressive 
behaviour. To counter this ever present threat, Machiavelli recommends to the 
Prince political techniques whose purpose is “the assertion of princely power 
externally as well as the unity and obedience of its citizens internally” ( ibid.: 55). 
The employment of such techniques is the main object of politics, and success in 
this employment the epitome of political -  as distinct from ethical -  virtue.
Thomas More, by contrast, singles out death by starvation as the greatest evil, 
avoidance of which must be the primary purpose of politics. The danger of dying 
from hunger, however, is not for More an immutable condition of humankind; it is, 
rather, a condition brought about by “compulsion toward exploitation which is 
established together with private property” ( ibid.: 53). Consequently, More’s 
Utopia proposes a form of social organization which, if established, More believes 
would not produce the human compulsion toward exploitation which is responsible 
for the threat of death by starvation; it would be an effective means toward the 
preservation of life.
Thus both Machiavelli and More “deal not with practical questions, but with 
technical ones” ( ibid.: 54); they transform politics from praxis to techne. This is so
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not only in the sense that they are concerned with instrumental, means-ends 
relationships but also in that their political techne aims at affecting human conduct 
itself; as Habermas puts it, “it has -  and this was inconceivable for the Ancients -  
human behaviour rather than nature as the material on which it operates” ( ibid.: 
59).
Finally, Machiavelli’s and More’s technicized politics share one more feature, for 
Habermas a shortcoming, which a century and a half later, Hobbes’s social 
philosophy would try to overcome. Both Machiavelli’s and More’s political thinking 
is untheoretical just as both praxis and techne were for the ancients who 
conceived theory as a purely contemplative activity unrelated with change-oriented 
action. The technical-political recommendations of Machiavelli and More 
“completely lack the scientific precision of calculated technique” ( ibid.: 60). They 
are empirical, “pragmatically attained” rules, rather than conclusions drawn from a 
systematic body of scientific theory. Habermas refers in this connection to 
“Machiavelli’s book of recipes for the technically correct calculus of power”.
Thomas Hobbes
It was Hobbes, above all in his Leviathan (1651), who would first attempt to ground 
political recommendations (of a technical/instrumental character as in Machiavelli 
and More) on systematic theory, thus becoming “the founder of social philosophy 
as a science” (Habermas, 1974: 56). Hobbes is separated from his two 
Renaissance predecessors by a momentous intellectual development: the 
foundation by Galileo of modern natural science, a body of theory that would reach 
maturity -  after the publication of Leviathan -  in Newtonian mechanics. Galileo’s 
achievement was made possible through the application of a new scientific 
method that constituted an ingenious synthesis of systematic experimentation and 
observation on the one hand and mathematical methods on the other, two
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elements each of which was, at around the same time, one-sidedly proposed as 
the sole pillar of scientific method, in Francis Bacon’s empiricist-inductivist and 
Descartes’ rationalist-deductivist philosophies of science, respectively.
What is radically new in this modern, Galilean method of studying nature 
compared to that of the ancients is, according to Habermas, that it seeks the kind 
of knowledge that can be used technically to bring about desired changes in 
nature: “The modern, scientific investigation of nature set about to pursue theory 
with the attitude of the technician” ( ibid.: 61). But this interest in technically 
exploitable knowledge is not merely a “psychological” interest -  one that happened 
to exist in the minds of modern scientists and philosophers, although such 
pioneers of modern science as Bacon and Descartes made no secret of their 
ambition to establish a science that would give human beings power over nature. 
Rather, it is a “transcendental” interest (see ibid.: 287, note 35), an interest 
logically presupposed by and imprinted on the structure of modern scientific theory 
itself: “From the days of Galileo on, theory is measured by its capacity for 
artificially reproducing natural processes. In contrast to episteme, it is designed for 
‘application’ in its very structure” ( ibid.: 61). Ironically, however, the first real 
conjunction of scientific theory and technique was to take place, in Habermas’s 
view, in the field of social philosophy, to be precise in the work of Hobbes -  
whereas any significant technical application of natural science itself had to wait 
for another three centuries until the second Industrial Revolution of the latter part 
of the 19th century.
Taking seriously Galilean science’s aim of providing knowledge that is technically 
usable with respect to nature, and insisting on the use of “a clear and exact 
method”, Hobbes sought to establish a social theory which could empower a
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political technique, one whose object would be not the realm of natural 
phenomena but human conduct itself.
Hobbes begins establishing a “modern physics of human nature” in the form of a 
“science of the state of nature” ( ibid.: 64). He depicts the state of nature -  that is 
the human condition in the absence of any political institutions -  as one of the war 
of all against all, a condition where beings lead lives that are “solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish and short” (Hobbes, 1962: 43) and are dominated by constant fear of 
violent death. This fear brings about -  “by a certain impulsion of nature no less 
than that whereby a stone moves downward” (Habermas, 1974: 64) -  a universal 
desire to escape from the fearful situation of permanent threat of death. This state 
of affairs, Hobbes continues, necessitates the creation, through a social contract 
among human beings, of an order of Law with punitive power -  a Leviathan -  that 
would bring an end to the fearful state of nature by coercing people through the 
use of sanctions to restrain their aggressive natural impulses and conduct 
themselves according to the prescriptions of the Law instead.
Comparing the relationship of theory to practice in Hobbes -  as interpreted by 
Habermas -  and in modern science, we can identify one major similarity and one 
major difference. The similarity concerns the way in which theory is used in order 
to bring about desired changes in the object which the theory is about. In both 
cases, the realization of certain ends is pursued through the technical control of 
the object on the basis of theoretical knowledge about it. This knowledge concerns 
regularities in the behaviour of the object and enables its possessor on the one 
hand to predict how the object will behave given a certain intervention in a given 
initial state, and on the other hand to bring about desired states of the object 
through appropriate intervention into the object’s given state. Thus, by analogy to 
the modern technologist’s science-based interventions in nature, a Hobbesian
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political agency can exercise control on human conduct through interventions in 
the form of the use or the threatened use of legal sanctions that are determined on 
the basis of knowledge about human nature; more specifically, on the basis of 
knowledge about regularities concerning human desires, fears and beliefs and 
how these relate to human actions.
The dissimilarity between Hobbes and natural science-based technology lies in the 
origin of the ends that are pursued in the two cases (albeit they are both pursued 
by means of technical control). The ends of technology -  the construction of a 
bridge or a new weapon, the design of a new computer programme, the 
development of a new, genetically engineered, type of grain -  are in no way 
necessitated by or derivable from the scientific knowledge employed in the 
technical efforts to realize them, though, to be sure, their choice is made on the 
assumption that the scientific knowledge necessary for their realization either 
exists or is feasible. In Hobbes’s theory, by contrast, the ends served by the legal 
order of the Leviathan which is established through the social contract, are thought 
to be necessitated by the laws of human nature itself, the very same laws that 
underlie the sanctions and other means that the Leviathan employs to control 
human conduct and thereby realize its ends.
Habermas objects to Hobbes’s understanding of both (1) the relationship between 
the state of nature and the social contract and (2) the manner in which human 
conduct is influenced by the political and legal order. On both counts he criticizes 
him for being blind to the specific nature of praxis and its essential difference from 
causality and techne.
With regard to the first issue, Habermas argues, Hobbes begins with an “analysis 
of the natural state of the human species prior to all sociation [which] is not ethical 
at all [but] is purely physicalistic” (Habermas, 1974: 65), an analysis in terms of the
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“apparatus” of sensation and “instinctive...casually determined modes of reaction” 
( ibid.: 65). He then moves to “commandments of natural reason” requiring the 
establishment of “rules of social life” that would facilitate the “satisfaction of needs” 
( ibid.: 66). The problem, Habermas maintains, is that Hobbes conceives this 
transition from the state of nature to commandments of reason about social rules 
as causally necessitated, whereas it can be properly understood only as a 
transition dictated by practical necessity. The mistake is covered by Hobbes’s ( 
ibid.: 67) equivocal use of the term “law of Nature” in both a causal and normative 
sense: He calls “law of Nature” both “the causal connections of man’s asocial 
instinctual nature prior to the contractual constitution of society and the state; and 
the normative regulation of their social cohabitation after this constitution” 
( ibid.: 66).
Once the normative character of social rules is grasped, it becomes clear that they 
cannot be caused by human desires but must be adopted through deliberate 
decisions made by human beings as subjects (the very same human beings who 
in the science of human nature which informs their decisions are treated as natural 
objects). It is this moment of decision, of praxis, that is, according to Habermas, 
missing from Hobbes’s theory. Ironically, as Habermas points out, in the absence 
of praxis, Hobbes’s own theory would be “impotent -  just like any other theory that 
failed to understand the nature of praxis', its own recommendations could not be 
implemented in a causal manner unless “generally published and accepted by the 
mass of the citizens” ( ibid.: 73).
Habermas’s objection to Hobbes’s treatment of the relationship between the 
political-legal order and the behaviour of citizens is that he construes that 
relationship in technological terms, failing to see that “control over the processes 
of nature is essentially different from control over social processes” ( ibid.: 75).
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Technological control of nature is a manipulative process in which nature itself 
plays an entirely passive role. This model of control, Habermas argues, is 
inappropriate for redirecting human conduct, for in this case, the objects of the 
desired change are human beings themselves who -  unlike nature -  cannot be 
passive objects of manipulation but are actively involved in the process. Influences 
on human conduct are not possible without “a prior mediation through the 
consciousness of the citizens who discuss and act...” ( ibid.: 75). Once more, 
praxis disappears from view. Thus, according to Habermas’s interpretation, at 
Hobbes’s hands far more systematically than at the hands of either Machiavelli or 
More, politics as practical activity is dealt a massive blow: its role as a process of 
discussing and deciding on norms and values is replaced by natural causality, 
whereas its capacity as a process of change is transformed from a form of human 
interaction into a theoretically informed technique.
However, at the same time as he laments the demise of praxis, Habermas 
acknowledges an important gain in Hobbes, an altogether modern achievement: 
the introduction of scientific rigour in social and political theory. Thus for Habermas 
the way forward after Hobbes is to restore to politics “the dimension of praxis to 
which the classical doctrine offered direct access” ( ibid.: 74), but do so without 
sacrificing the genuine gains in theoretical rigour, without reverting to the ancient 
form of praxis that relied merely on non-theoretically- rigorous phronesis
Enlightenment: Natural Law and the Public Sphere
The age of Enlightenment is hailed by Habermas as marking a significant advance 
in this respect, with the emergence of the “bourgeois public sphere”, a new 
historical phenomenon which Habermas analyzed, and in certain respects 
idealized and celebrated, in his first major work, The Structural Transformation of 
the Public Sphere (1989).
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Conceived as “the sphere of private people come together as a public” 
(Habermas, 1989: 27), the bourgeois public sphere presupposes a civil society -  
the “realm of commodity exchange and social labour” ( ibid.: 30) -  separate from 
and independent of the state, and, similarly, private and autonomous individuals 
who do not depend for their own and their family’s livelihood on political authority. 
Clearly, we are referring to a phenomenon that grew on the soil of a well 
developed capitalist market economy.
The bourgeois public sphere developed in two main areas, the world of letters 
(mainly literature and literary criticism) and -  most importantly -  the world of 
politics, and was characterized by the “rational-critical public debate” of important 
issues of general interest. The ideal of this form of public rationality that 
constituted the mode of operation of the public sphere concerned the formation of 
“public opinion” through human interactions based on the public use of reason, 
with a view to influencing developments in society, not least political decisions. It 
was undoubtedly a realm of praxis.
Furthermore, the bourgeois public sphere goes beyond the ancient form of praxis 
in that it is informed by systematic theory, specifically by the Natural Law theories 
dominant at the time. Here, however, according to Habermas, also lie some of the 
main shortcomings of the bourgeois public sphere. To be sure, Habermas has a 
high regard for the formal, procedural aspects of the bourgeois public sphere, the 
process of critical, rational public debate which Kant philosophically 
conceptualized for the Enlightenment and he himself has struggled to articulate 
and defend in much of his work, not least in its later, communicative phase. In its 
substantive aspects, though, the bourgeois public sphere is thought to be vitiated 
by its relationship with Natural Law theory.
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Habermas discusses two examples of theory in its relation to public sphere 
practice: those of the French Physiocrats and the British (Scottish) moral and 
economic philosophers. Both the Physiocrats and the Scottish philosophers 
viewed civil society as a coherent whole, without major internal fault lines, in 
harmony with Natural Law. For the Physiocrats the public sphere remained outside 
their theory and was treated as its “practical complement”. Its role was to draw, 
with the help of philosophers and through the public use of reason, the political 
implications of their Natural Law theory of civil society and try to transmit those 
implications to political authorities who could implement them: “[scholars] 
determined the public opinion, [governors] converted into practice whatever 
conclusions were drawn from the critical reflection of the public guided by experts” 
(Habermas, 1989: 95). In the case of pre-revolutionary France, a public sphere 
informed by a theory such as that of the Physiocrats would push the state to 
transform itself so as to be in greater harmony with civil society. In the case of the 
Scottish thinkers, the public sphere was seen as part and parcel of bourgeois 
society -  the object of their theory -  and was thus incorporated into the theory 
itself. The bourgeois political public sphere followed the evolution of bourgeois 
society, “[unfolding] to the same degree as the natural laws of the market assert 
themselves” (Habermas, 1974: 78).
A public sphere informed by such a theory would also strive to bring the political 
system into line with bourgeois civil society; or, as in the post-revolutionary British 
situation where civil society and state were largely in harmony, it would strive to 
preserve and fine-tune that harmony through influencing day to day political 
decisions. Thus, in these and other analogous cases, social theory, failing to 
detect fundamental internal contradictions of its object -  capitalist society -  takes 
that society for granted, idealizing it, moreover, as a natural order; and, to the 
extent that it informs and affects the praxis of the public sphere, it does so in an
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one-directional way: in the direction of the public sphere accepting and conforming 
to the theory’s object. Responsible for this, Habermas maintains, is the fact that 
Natural Law social theories were constructed on the technically oriented model of 
natural science and could not properly conceive of political action as praxis and of 
their own relationship to it in accordance with such a conception. For social and 
political action to be informed by rigorous theory and at the same time possess the 
character of genuine praxis, we need, according to Habermas, a social and 
political theory different in structure from that of modern natural science.
Heael and Marx
Habermas recognizes precisely such a theory in the dialectical aspects of the work 
of Hegel and Marx. Hegelian and Marxian dialectical social theory does not 
objectivistically describe its object from the outside, from the point of view of a 
subject external to it. It self-reflectively understands itself as being actively 
involved in its own object; as part of social praxis and at the same time as 
depending on social praxis for its validation. It is a theory that recognizes deep 
internal contradictions in its object, reveals these contradictions to the object itself 
and becomes engaged in the social praxis through which the object tries to 
overcome them by transforming itself. This kind of theory is thus “critical” of its own 
object. Above all it is critical of the ideology that conceals from the object -  society 
-  its own true being. The theory’s intention -  and criterion of validity -  is not 
faithfully to describe its object but to relate to praxis so as to facilitate its object’s 
self-development. The role of social praxis, conversely, is not to apply or conform 
to theory, as in the case of the relationship of practice to scientific and Natural Law
5
theory, but to render the theory valid by realizing its critical intentions. It is 
precisely along these lines that the early Habermas, following the footsteps of the
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first-generation Frankfurt School, develops his own conception of praxis and 
praxis-related critical reason.
Hegel’s and Marx’s theories themselves, however, in Habermas’s estimation, went 
astray. The old Hegel “relinquished the dialectical relation between [theory and 
praxis]” (Habermas, 1974: 130). Just like the owl of Minerva that flies only when 
the day is over, philosophical theory now comes always after the event, capable of 
making sense of it, but not being entangled with it and influencing its nature in any 
way: “Philosophy...arrives too late to instruct, because it comprehends its time in 
thought only after reality has completed itself -  a theory such as that is exempted 
entirely from praxis by the old Hegel” ( ibid.: 130). Thus -  philosophy having 
returned to the role of theoria in the Greek sense -  social and political practice is 
left without theoretical guidance.
The young Marx of the Paris Manuscripts, inspired by Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Mind, conceives of human history as a process of self-generation of the human 
species through social labour, the process by means of which socialized humanity 
relates to nature ( ibid.: 168). From this starting point Marx’s theory develops in 
two directions which coexist in an uneasy relationship throughout his work.
On the one hand, we have a critical theory of a contradiction-ridden capitalist 
economy, a theory with the practical intention of relating dialectically to a social 
and political praxis that would overcome capitalism’s contradictions. The most 
fundamental contradiction that the theory claimed to have revealed is one between 
the origin of the products of labour in human social activity and the fetishistic 
appearance of these products to their creators as external and alien objects. This 
approach can be found just as much in Marx’s mature analysis of “commodity 
fetishism” in Capital as in his early analysis of alienated labour in the Paris 
Manuscripts.
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On the other hand, Marx develops a materialist theory of history, where historical 
change is seen as driven by developments in the process of social production. The 
young Marx conceived of the development of the process of social production as 
resulting from the interrelations between the instrumental power over nature that 
human beings employed in the process of production (the “forces of production”, 
or “labour”) and the social relations holding between human beings engaged in the 
process of production (the “relations of production” or “interaction”). However, 
Habermas explains, this “brilliant insight into the dialectical relationship between
g
the forces of production and the relations of production” ( ibid.: 169) was 
interpreted one-sidedly, in favour of the former: “a precise analysis of the first part 
of the German Ideology reveals that Marx does not actually explicate the 
interrelationship of interaction and labour, but instead, under the unspecific title of 
social praxis, reduces the one to the other, namely: communicative action to 
instrumental action” ( ibid.: 168). As a result, Marx’s theory of history could easily 
be interpreted as a technological determinist one. Indeed, such an interpretation 
came to overshadow the critical-dialectical aspect of Marx’s work and, in the 
hands of Marx’s epigones, led to the technocratic political practice that dominated 
the Marxist socialist movement down to our own times.
From the Bourgeois Public Sphere to Modern Technicized Politics
At the same time, a parallel development is traced by the early Habermas in 
mainstream bourgeois practice and theory, namely, the degeneration of the highly 
promising Enlightenment public sphere into a 20th century political and social life 
dominated by the technocratic ideology.
The demise of the 18th century bourgeois public sphere and, with it, of rational- 
critical public debate was, according to Habermas, the result of a growing 
intertwinement of state and society, a process that culminated in the Welfare State
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of the second half of the 20th century. As we have seen, Habermas considers the 
strict separation of state and civil society, more precisely of state and the market 
economy, as the foundation of the bourgeois public sphere. A separate market 
economy at the level of which the innumerable conflicts of interest between small 
and relatively autonomous private economic agents were resolved, could still be 
seen -  ideologically- as a realm of equal, or just, exchange. Such a situation 
allowed the existence of a public sphere that left behind sectional interests and 
focused on the rational debate of issues of genuinely general interest.
Those conditions were gradually eroded. Capitalist crisis tendencies and the post- 
industrial-revolution concentration of economic power into the hands of fewer and 
fewer individuals and organizations, including workers’ trades unions (to a large 
measure initiated by the industrial revolution), made it increasingly difficult to 
resolve conflicts of economic interests at the level of the market economy, and 
called for bigger, stronger, interventionist state institutions. Thus, the separation of 
state and civil society gave way to a situation where the state intervened more and 
more deeply into the economy and civil society while powerful economic and 
social agents got increasingly involved in the affairs of the state. Habermas speaks 
characteristically of a
dialectic of a progressive “societalization” of the state 
simultaneously with an increasing “state-ification” of 
society [that] gradually destroyed the basis of the 
bourgeois public sphere -  the separation of state and 
society (1989:142).
The key to the degeneration of the bourgeois public sphere and of rational-critical 
debate -  its form of praxial rationality -  was, for Habermas, the significant loss of 
credibility by the ideology of just exchange, which inevitably resulted from the 
intertwinement of state and society.
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The more pronounced the economic and social influence of powerful state and 
private agents became, the harder it was to view the functioning of the economy 
and society through the lenses of that ideology. The contradictions, injustices and 
inequalities inherent in society became increasingly visible. Developments such as 
Hegel’s and Marx’s theoretical accomplishments, the rise of socialist and other 
radical movements, and the revolutions of 1848, can indeed be interpreted as 
early evidence of such an enhanced visibility. Thus, conflicts of interests between 
holders of concentrated economic and social power -  which were now not 
resolvable at the level of the market -  could not be allowed to become objects of 
rational-critical public debate, despite their unquestionable public relevance. They 
were, instead, dealt with away from the public arena.
The process of the politically relevant exercise and 
equilibration of power now takes place directly between 
the private bureaucracies, special-interest associations, 
parties, and public administration (1989:176).
But this form of decision making, together with the whole institutional framework of 
society, required a new kind of legitimation, in replacement of that formerly 
provided by the ideology of just exchange. And that need became all the more 
important as the masses came to acquire a formal political role through the 
extension, and eventually the universalization, of the right to vote.
The required legitimation can be provided, according to Habermas, by what he 
refers to as the technocratic ideology, or technocratic consciousness. This is a 
way of thinking which essentially consists in treating questions of praxis, involving 
normative and evaluative choices, as technical questions to be decided upon by 
experts, including decision theorists and social system analysts:
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The ideological nucleus of this consciousness is the 
elimination of the distinction between the practical and the 
technical (Habermas, 1971:113).
Accordingly, politically important decisions are claimed to be adaptive measures 
technically dictated by “objective exigencies”, the whole organization of society 
itself being ultimately justified in terms of its alleged superior ability to secure 
material well being, in particular through continuous science-based technological 
progress.
On the basis of that ideology even democracy becomes a technical issue:
[Tjhe process of democratic decision making about 
practical problems loses its function and “must” be 
replaced by plebiscitary decisions about alternative sets of 
leaders of administrative personnel (Habermas, 1971:
105).
Major strands of social theory itself -  systems theory, above all -  have already 
developed along such technocratic lines, viewing societies as systems of 
adaptation to externally imposed imperatives. Thus, referring to Niklas Luhmann’s 
systems theory, Habermas maintains:
[Tjhis theory represents the advanced form of a 
technocratic consciousness, which today permits practical 
questions to be defined from the outset as technical ones, 
and thereby withholds them from public and unconstrained 
discussion (Adorno, 1976: xxxii, quoted from Theorie der 
Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie?, by Habermas and 
Luhmann).
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By concealing the politically important normative and evaluative choices made 
away from public sight -  a concealment that applies, by and large, to the decision 
makers themselves -  technocratic consciousness depolitizes and at the same 
time technicizes politics. By the same token it depoliticizes the mass of citizens.
To be sure, Habermas is not claiming that technocracy, as an actual mode of 
decision making or as a form of ideological consciousness, is today anything other 
than a partly realized potentiality. Citizens in the formally democratic and relatively 
affluent contemporary societies still have an ample range of opportunities to make 
politically significant decisions, both as voters and as consumers of material and 
cultural goods; and they are often still able to see these decisions not as 
technically dictated but as involving genuine normative and evaluative choices. To 
that extent, however, Habermas observes in modern societies further tendencies 
-  mainly complementary to the technocratic ones -  in the direction of the 
technicization of politics: tendencies toward the technical manipulation of people’s 
voting and consumer behaviour and of public opinion more generally.
In the new situation, members of the public are less and less participants in 
rational-critical debate aiming at shared political views and decisions, and 
increasingly isolated, private individuals who form their opinions and make their 
choices in their capacity as separate voters and consumers. These opinions and 
choices are systematically influenced by sophisticated techniques of manipulation 
such as advertizing, marketing and public relations; techniques that are employed 
in the realm of politics as much as in the realms of culture. Aided by technically 
usable scientific disciplines such as psychology, such manipulation techniques 
normally work through individuals’ unconscious. And despite the influence they 
exert, they are used by agencies which are in no way publically accountable for 
their activities. Speaking specifically of the manipulation of public opinion in order
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to secure a certain behaviour by voters, Habermas points out what he considers to 
be true of manipulation techniques in general:
Especially manipulative are social-psychologically 
calculated offers that appeal to unconscious inclinations 
and call forth predictable reactions without on the other 
hand placing any obligation whatever on the very persons 
who in this fashion secure plebiscitary agreement 
(1989: 217).
As the main agents of public opinion manipulation (beyond the immediate culprits, 
i.e. the experts in advertizing, marketing and public relations) Habermas identified 
special interest groups, state administration, the political parties, and the press; 
the latter being accused of having changed “from being a merchant of news to 
being a dealer in public opinion” ( ibid.: 182).
This transformation of politically significant decision making from an object of 
rational-critical public debate to an object of technical manipulation is associated 
by Habermas with the theoretical position he refers to as “decisionism”: the view -  
prominently advocated by Hume and Weber -  that normative and evaluative 
choices are not amenable to rationality, but must be made on the basis of non- 
rational decisions.
But even with this, decisionistic-manipulative, aspect of the technicization of 
politics added onto the technocratic one, the early Habermas still considers the 
future of politics and the public sphere in modern society as open-ended. In 
contrast to the first generation Frankfurt School thinkers, he sees modern 
societies as far from being completely engulfed in technical rationalization, 
discerning possibilities for the repoliticization of the masses and the regeneration 
of a praxis-oriented political public sphere; one that would now be guided by a
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new, more adequate form of praxial rationality, which he confidently considered 
philosophically possible and persistently tried to articulate.
1.2.3 Habermas’s early conception of praxial rationality
As we have seen in the previous section, Habermas, from the very beginning, 
expressed his strong belief in the philosophical and social possibility of praxial 
rationality. His first notion of such a rationality is that of “rational-critical debate”, 
the kind of rationality that in his view characterized what he identifies as the first 
major modern form of social praxis: the eighteenth-century “bourgeois public 
sphere”. Habermas thought highly of the formal-procedural aspects of rational- 
critical debate, broadly understood in terms of Kant’s analysis of the “public use of 
reason”. With regard to its substantive aspects, however, he was critical of its 
close association with Natural Law theories. His main objection was that the 
objectivist structure of those theories -  leaving aside their bourgeois ideological 
content -  tended to deprive participants in rational debate of any genuine role in 
determining their own identities and values, which for for Habermas is an essential 
characteristic of true praxis.
Thus, in order to develop his own conception of praxial rationality, the early 
Habermas turns to a different kind of social theory, initiated -  but in his view not 
employed consistently -  by Hegel and Marx: a non-objectivist theory, whose aim is 
not simply to describe its objects (human beings or society) accurately, from an 
observer’s point of view, but to remove obstacles to their self-understanding and 
thereby enable them to transform themselves in self-determined ways. What he 
had in mind was in fact close to what the Frankfurt School of the 1930’s, most 
notably Max Horkheimer, called Critical Theory (Horkheimer, 1972).
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Habermas broadly articulates his understanding of such a form of praxial 
rationality -  mainly under the terms “dialectics” and “critique” -  in essays such as 
“The Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics” (in Adorno, 1976) and “Between 
Philosophy and Science: Marxism as Critique” (in Habermas, 1974). But that 
concept is fully developed only in Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas’s 
major, systematic exposition of his early paradigm of thought.
The starting point of Knowledge and Human Interests is the rejection of 
“objectivism”; that is, of the “interpretation of knowledge as a copy of reality” (1972: 
89), which Habermas identifies as the view of scientific knowledge that not only 
prevails in society at large but dominates the self-understanding of the sciences 
themselves as well as much philosophical thinking on the subject. Habermas, by 
contrast, in a Kantian manner, considers scientific systems of knowledge as 
“result[s] of interaction between the knowing subject and reality” ( ibid.: 90); albeit, 
he views that subject not (like Kant) as an individual consciousness but (like Marx) 
as the whole of humanity conceived as a species that reproduces itself in history 
through its own action.
Thus, scientific knowledge is not knowledge of reality as it is itself, but of reality as 
it reveals itself when looked at from particular points of view. These points of 
viewreflect human species interests which are a priori encoded in the very 
structure of the sciences. To identify those a priori elements of the sciences, 
Habermas undertakes a Kantian-type, “self-reflective” ( ibid.: 212) “critique of 
knowledge” which, due to the connection between knowledge and human action, 
is at the same time a “critique of rational action” ( ibid.: 17). Thus, he reflects on 
“the transcendental framework[s] of processes of inquiry” pertaining to different 
kinds of science, which establish “[t]he conditions of the objectivity of possible 
experience” within those sciences ( ibid.: 195). Through this reflection, Habermas
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differentiates between three categories of science, each governed by a different 
“knowledge-constitutive” or “cognitive” interest: 1) The “empirical-analytic” 
sciences are governed by the technical cognitive interest and disclose their object- 
domains from the perspective of possible technical control. 2) The “historical- 
hermeneutic”, or “cultural” sciences are governed by the practical cognitive interest 
and are oriented to communicative understanding. 3) The “critical” sciences are 
governed by the emancipatory cognitive interest and are oriented to critical self­
reflection (1972: 308-311).
Knowledge-constitutive interests are “transcendental”, in the sense that they are a 
priori conditions of possibility of scientific knowledge. Habermas wants them to be 
clearly distinguished from contingent, empirical interests of scientists or social 
groups, which also exist and undoubtedly influence the specific directions taken by 
scientific research. But knowledge-constitutive interests, together with the a priori 
structures of scientific inquiry that reflect them, are transcendental in a sense 
different from Kanf s: They “have a transcendental function, but they determine the 
architectonic of processes of inquiry and not that of transcendental consciousness 
as such” ( ibid.: 194). Furthermore, they are not just transcendental. They are at 
the same time embedded in the form of activity of the human species, which 
Habermas -  following Marx -  conceives materialistically as a product of nature. 
The cognitive interests and the corresponding structures of inquiry are “rooted in 
specific fundamental conditions of the possible reproduction and self-constitution 
of the human species” ( ibid.: 196). More specifically, the technical interest is 
rooted in the structures of work, or instrumental action, the practical interest in the 
structures of language-based interaction, and the emancipatory interest in social 
relations of power.
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Thus, the knowledge-constitutive interests are both transcendental and products of 
nature. To express this dual conception, which, as we shall see, he later came to 
consider unsatisfactory, Habermas frequently uses the term “quasi- 
transcendental”.
By being inherently linked to forms of human action, the three types of inquiry 
differentiated by Habermas -  the empirical-analytic, the hermeneutic and the 
critical -  ipso facto constitute for him forms of practical rationality, technical and 
praxial.
1) Empirical-analytic inquiry and technical rationality
According to the mainstream hypothetico-deductive model of science, which is 
adopted also by Habermas (1972: 113-139), empirical-analytic inquiry develops 
general hypotheses regarding lawlike, cause-effect connections between 
observable phenomena. These hypotheses are normally expressible in the form 
“Under initial conditions C, event A always causes event B”. Hypotheses are 
accepted (as laws) into the body of theory of a (nomological) science once they 
withstand empirical testing on the basis of predictions of the form “If A occurs 
under conditions C, then B will occur”, which are deductively derived from them. 
By employing a law, or theory, established in this way, we can explain the 
occurrence of event B in terms of the occurrence of event A under conditions C.
The rationality of technical action is strictly analogous to the above logic of 
scientific prediction and explanation: Since A under conditions C always causes B, 
B can be brought about if A is brought about under conditions C. Thus, if B is our 
goal, we can attain it by means of an action that produces A under condition C. 
Evidently, the (inherent) technical exploitability of the empirical-analytic, 
nomological sciences lies in that, by (inescapably) providing us with knowledge of
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lawlike, cause-effect relationships pertaining to particular objectified processes, 
they enable us to causally control and manipulate those processes so as to attain 
our ends.
2) Hermeneutics and critical self-reflection: Forms of praxial rationality
As we have seen, for Habermas the rationality of praxis concerns not the causal 
manipulation of objectified processes for attaining pre-decided ends but the 
determination by human beings of the very ends, values and norms to which their 
actions should be oriented. The hermeneutic form of inquiry that in his view 
constitutes the methodological structure of the cultural sciences is said to be 
governed by the practical cognitive interest, that is by the interest in the mutual 
understanding between communicating subjects. As such, hermeneutics is a 
methodical dialogic process, based on the use of ordinary language, whereby 
evaluative and normative meanings, among others, can be clarified and agreed 
upon (1972: 161-186). It is thus for Habermas unquestionably a form of praxial 
rationality. When it comes to his more detailed understanding of this hermeneutic 
form of praxial rationality, Habermas is in essential agreement with Gadamer, 
particularly his analyses in Part II of Truth and Method (Habermas, ibid.: 348, n9).
Hermeneutics, however, whether of a Gadamerian or other equivalent variety, 
though undoubtedly an important form of praxial rationality, is for Habermas 
inadequate. As we shall see at greater length in the discussion of the 
Habermas-Gadamer debate in section 1.3.2.2, the fundamental weakness of 
hermeneutics according to Habermas is that it ultimately addresses only “meaning 
structures in the dimension of what is consciously intended” ( ibid.: 217). It is 
directed at interpreting meanings which are either immediately present to the 
subject’s consciousness or can be brought to consciousness by ordinary linguistic
62
means. Hermeneutics, in other words, assumes that misunderstandings, including, 
importantly, self-misunderstandings, are always due to “accidental” or “external” 
obstacles to communication, which can be identified and removed in the medium 
of ordinary language.
Habermas does not of course deny that difficulties in understanding and 
communication are often of this kind and can, therefore, be adequately dealt with 
by means of hermeneutic methods. He insists, however, that failures in 
understanding, particularly self-understanding, are frequently “systematic”, 
originating in deep-seated causes which are internal to the subject and yet 
inaccessible to it. They are cases of “systematically distorted communication” (see 
also Habermas, 1970), which are not amenable to hermeneutic analysis. Such 
cases, Habermas argues, require an entirely different method, one that “joins 
hermeneutics with operations that genuinely seemed to be reserved to the natural 
sciences” (Habermas, 1972: 214), or “unites linguistic analysis with the... 
investigation of causal connections” ( ibid.: 217). This composite method, which 
constitutes a stronger form of praxial rationality -  complementary to the purely 
hermeneutic one -  is elaborated by Habermas primarily through a study of what 
he considers to be its best exemplification: Freud’s psychoanalysis (see 
Habermas, 1972: chapters 10 and 11)7 It is said to be a “depth-hermeneutic” 
method, termed “self-reflection” or “critical self-reflection”. I shall also be referring 
to it as “critical-emancipatory self-reflection”.
The core logical structure of the method of critical self-reflection (with reference to 
an individual subject but mutatis mutandis applicable also to a social class or other 
collective subject, including society as a whole) is as follows:
(i) There are systematic distortions in the patterns of understanding/ 
communication/behaviour of a person (probably in the form a neurosis) whose
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origins cannot be fathomed -  not least by the person in question (henceforth 
“subject”) -  through hermeneutic efforts that employ ordinary linguistic means and 
are directed at the subject’s conscious mind.
(ii) Someone else (assuming the role of “therapist”, possibly at the request of the 
subject, now in the role of “patient”) undertakes to generate causal hypotheses, in 
the empirical-analytic fashion, that would explain the distortions in question. The 
causes looked for and eventually included in the hypotheses are internal to the 
subject but inaccessible to its consciousness. In psychoanalytic cases they are 
typically unconscious motives.
(iii) The aims of an exclusively empirical-analytic inquiry would be to yield 
knowledge of cause-effect connections on the basis of which the behaviour of the 
object of knowledge (of the “subject”, in our case) could be causally explained, 
predicted and manipulated. Thus, such an inquiry has an inherent interest in the 
continued existence of the relevant causal connections. As an aspect of the 
method of critical-emancipatory self-reflection, however, empirical-analytic inquiry 
is interested in identifying causal connections not in order to take advantage of 
their existence, but on the contrary in order to dissolve them and thereby liberate 
the subject from the unwanted distortions in communication and understanding
g
which result from them.
(iv) To that end, the inquiry into the unconscious causes of systematic distortions 
must be joined with ordinary hermeneutic communication. Thus, the 
inquirer/therapist proceeds to communicate to the subject/patient the hypothesized 
unconscious cause of the problematical symptoms. If the subject, through self­
reflection and possibly not without strong inner resistance, comes to recognize the 
proposed cause as truly a product of its own self-deceiving mind, the hitherto 
unconscious cause is thereby brought to consciousness. With such self-reflection
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“[djepth-hermeneutic understanding takes over the function of explanation” (1972: 
272).
(v) The subject’s self-acknowledged “enlightenment” concerning the self imposed 
genesis of its own problems is -  in the context of the method of critical self­
reflection -  the only acceptable verification of the therapist-inquirer’s causal 
hypothesis: “The experience of reflection is the only criterion for the corroboration 
or failure of hypotheses” (1972: 266).
(vi) Enlightenment in the above sense is closely linked to emancipation from the 
self-imposed problematical situation. In psychoanalytic contexts unconscious 
motives are supposed to lose their causal efficacy merely by virtue of being 
brought to consciousness. In contexts of social critique, however, the transition 
from enlightenment to emancipation requires organized political action. As we 
shall see in the critical discussion of Habermas’s concept of praxial rationality, in 
section 1.3.2.2, the relationship between enlightenment and emancipation, 
together with that between “therapist” and “patient”,is among the most 
questionable aspects of the method of critical-emancipatory self-reflection.
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1.3 CRITIQUE OF HABERMAS'S EARLY VIEWS ON ACTION AND 
PRACTICAL RATIONALITY
This section will be devoted to critical -  including self-critical -  perspectives on 
Habermas's early (pre-linguistic-turn) ideas concerning action and the rationality of 
action. The most central of these ideas, as presented in the preceding section,are, 
in a nutshell, the following
1) There are two, mutually irreducible, types of action. On the one hand, there is 
the type of action concerned with the pursuit of pregiven ends through the control 
of objectified processes, which is referred to by the terms techne, work, 
instrumental action or purposive-rational action. On the other hand there is praxis, 
interaction or communicative action, concerned with human relations based on, or 
aimed at determining, mutually accepted norms. This dualistic view is, according 
to Habermas’s own interpretation, in line with the Aristotelian tradition of thought 
on the subject of action, taken up in the 20th century by Hannah Arendt and Hans- 
Georg Gadamer and before them expressed (and then abandoned) by the young 
Hegel of the Jena period and manifested in Marx's concrete analyses of 
capitalism, though not in his theoretical self-understanding.
2) Each of these two types of action is governed by its own specific type of 
rationality. Techne is governed by "technical” rationality, a rationality of 
hypothetical imperatives, to use Kant's term, informed by scientific and 
technological knowledge. The latter is largely conceived by Habermas on the lines 
of the hypothetico-deductive model of mainstream philosophy of science, 
emphasizing the logical relation between explanation and prediction, which makes 
possible the use of science for the technological control and manipulation of
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objects on the basis of their own patterns/laws of behaviour.
Unlike modern positivism, however, Habermas does not hold the "scientistic" belief 
that scientific knowledge of this kind is identical with knowledge as such. In 
particular, he rejects the idea that there can be no rationality with regard to the 
determination of norms and values in the context of praxis, and that such 
determination is simply a matter of non-rational decision. In this respect Habermas 
is also at odds with Hume and Weber, as well as with various non-positivist yet 
relativist schools of thought, such as communitarianism, hermeneutics and post­
structuralism.
Habermas's belief in the possibility of a rationality pertaining to praxis, here 
referred to as "praxial rationality" -  a belief which he considers the cornerstone of 
any critical theory of society -  is first expressed in his earliest major work The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989) in terms of the notion of 
"rational-critical debate". His early ideas on praxial rationality were elaborated in 
his defence of Adorno against Popper in the context of the "Positivist Dispute" of 
the 1960's (see Adorno et al, 1976), and were given their fullest expression in 
Knowledge and Human Interests (Habermas, 1972).
In the latter work Habermas maintains that in contrast to technical rationality, 
which is based on empirical-analytic knowledge, governed by the "quasi- 
transcendental” knowledge-constitutive interest in technical control, praxial 
rationality is based on a combination of hermeneutics, govered by the knowledge- 
constitutive interest in mutual understanding, and critical self-reflection. Critical 
self-reflection itself is a dynamic synthesis of empirical-analytic and hermeneutic 
elements that provides cirtical-emancipatory self-knowledge.
This form of praxial rationality differs from both its objectivist and Kantian
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Enlightenment variants. Self-reflection -  its most important aspect -  is an idea of 
Hegelian origin that Habermas models on Marx's critique of ideology and, above 
all, on Freudian psychoanalysis. It aims to reveal and eliminate self-deception and 
all self-imposed, hypostatized powers, thus bringing about genuine self- 
understanding and freedom and creating the conditions for authentic mutual 
understanding.
3) In modernity, according to Habermas, there has been an increasing 
displacement of forms of praxis and praxial rationality by forms of techne and 
technical rationality, culminating, in the late 20th century, in technocracy -  the 
reduction of ethical and other evaluative questions to technical ones.
Habermas rejects the idea which he claims Marcuse was toying with, namely that 
technical action and rationality could be historically overcome as a mode of 
relating to nature. However, he also disagrees on the one hand with the Weberian 
andpost-1930's Frankfurt School view that the development of technical rationality 
necessarily leads to social domination and the destruction of praxial rationality, 
and, on the other hand, with the opposite view, namely that the development of 
technical rationality and the concomitant "liberation from hunger" inevitably leads 
to praxial rationality and the "liberation from servitude". He is convinced that whilst 
each form of practical rationality is possible and desirable in its own proper field of 
application, there is no inevitable link between them of either a positive or a 
negative kind.
The main criticisms advanced against these early Habermasian views can be 
grouped in two clusters, the first addressing issues relating to the dichotomy of 
techne and technical rationality vs praxis and praxial rationality, the latter 
concerned with the philosophical foundations of praxial -  and to a lesser extent of 
technical -  rationality, as these foundations have been developed in Knowledge
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and Human Interests. I shall discuss these two clusters of criticism in turn.
1.3.1 Critical perspectives concerning the dichotomy between techne and 
praxis.
1.3.1.1 McCarthy’s critique
In his major book on Habermas, covering the latter's writings until the mid­
seventies, Thomas McCarthy discusses a number of ambiguities and confusions
regarding Habermas's use of the distinction between labour and interaction and
g
various other terminological versions of it (McCarthy, 1978: 16-40). Here I shall 
take up only some of the issues raised by McCarthy.
One of Habermas’s main intentions behind the labour/interaction distinction has 
been to differentiate conceptually between two fundamental kinds of 
anthropological relationships and the very different and irreducible forms of 
rationalization to which each is amenable. These are the relationship between 
human beings and nature on the one hand and the relationship of human beings 
to each other in society on the other. The former relations concern the satisfaction 
of material needs and are in modernity facilitated above all by science and 
technology, as the most important elements in productive activity; the latter 
concern the establishment of forms of understanding, coexistence and cooperation 
between human beings that make social life possible. Labour, or purposive- 
rational action, in McCarthy's words "is governed by technical rules that imply 
conditional predictions, as well as preference rules and decision maxims that imply 
conditional imperatives; it is directed to the attainment of goals through the 
evaluation of alternative choices and the organization of appropriate means; it is 
sanctioned by success or failure in reality " (McCarthy, 1978: 26). Social 
interaction, on the other hand, "is governed by consensual norms that define
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reciprocal expectations; it is grounded in the intersubjectivity of mutual 
understanding and secured by the general recognition of obligations; it is 
sanctioned conventionally" ( ibid.).
McCarthy points out, justifiably, that this contrast implies, contrary to what 
Habermas is at pains to reject elsewhere, that the use of science and technology 
as well as all other activities involved in material production -  "the activities of 
scientists and technicians, producers and planners" ( ibid.) -  are by definition not 
social, not in any way governed by social norms or interpersonal relations. 
Similarly, the distinction has the equally unacceptable implication that social 
interactions cannot be about activities of material production, for if a social activity 
were directly concerned with material production it could not be classified as 
purely interactive, or, for that matter, as purely purposive-rational, as demanded by 
the distinction.
Evidently, concrete spheres of action, or even single concrete actions, more often 
than not inextricably combine purposive-rational and social-interactive elements, 
and therefore the proposed dichotomy is incapable of sorting them out and 
clarifying their relationship in a coherent manner. McCarthy, following certain 
clarificatory cues from Habermas, suggests that there are two other ways in which 
the dichotomy can be interpreted and that these are in fact the ways Habermas 
understands and uses the dichotomy, though confusingly not specifying which of 
the two he is employing each time.
Firstly, the two concepts are applied to different aspects of actions rather than to 
whole concrete actions. Thus, the terms purposive-rational, technical, etc. "focus 
on task elements of actions or action systems... [thematizing] the means-ends 
orientation of the action, the technical knowledge and decision procedures on 
which it is based, its degree of success 'in reality', in short the economy and
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efficiency with which means are employed to realize specified ends" ( ibid.); 
whereas the terms social-interactive, communicative, praxial, etc, "focus on the 
intersubjective structure of action... [thematizing] the consensual norms, reciprocal 
expectations, mutual understanding..." ( ibid.) In other words, the former set of 
terms refers to those elements of actions that concern the technical control and 
manipulation of an object by a subject who uses the object as a means to his or 
her own ends, whereas the latter set refers to those elements of actions that 
involve the norm-oriented, mutually respectful relations between subjects.
Secondly, the terms are applied by Habermas not to aspects of actions but to 
whole, concrete actions or systems of actions according to the aspect -  the 
technical or the praxial -  which is dominant in them.
This conceptual arrangement, however, raises certain questions of its own. To 
begin with, if the point of the dichotomy is to differentiate between actions that are 
predominantly technical (i.e., involving the control and manipulation of an object by 
a subject using the object as a means to its own ends) and actions that are 
predominantly praxial (i.e., involving mutually respectful intersubjective relations) 
the initial intention to use the dichotomy in order to differentiate between the 
sphere of humanity's transactions with nature in the form of activities of material 
production, on the one hand, and the sphere of interaction among human beings 
in social areas outside material production, on the other, cannot be sustained.
For it cannot be a priori assumed and conceptually guaranteed that social 
interactions in such spheres as politics, family, culture, ideology, etc, are and will 
always be predominantly of a praxial kind in the above sense. Indeed, as 
McCarthy points out, Habermas explicitly considers the concept of purposive- 
rational action to be applicable to social relations. In this regard, he repeatedly 
refers to purposive-rational action as action involving the technical control not only
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of natural but also social processes. For example, when talking about the technical 
rules that govern instrumental action he makes it clear that "they imply conditional 
predictions about observable events, physical and social" (Habermas, 1971: 92). 
Furthermore, it is a central thesis of Habermas as well as of all Critical Theory that 
social relations in capitalist modernity involve exploitation, oppression and 
reification, and are far from exhibiting intersubjective respectfulness.
Thus, the concept of technical or purposive-rational action cannot be employed, 
and is not employed by Habermas, to capture only activities concerned with the 
utilization of nature in processes of material production; it is also applied to 
objectifying relations between human beings. In this respect, Habermas's concept 
of strategic action is important. As McCarthy shows, Habermas, after some initial 
ambivalence as to his usage of the term, characterizes as strategic that sub-set of 
technical/instrumental actions for which the object of control is human beings and 
their behaviour. In this kind of action, in McCarthy's words,
an agent acts instrumentally towards others, [that is] he 
comprehends their behaviour in terms of observable 
regularities and therefore as effectively controllable. He is 
involved in a subject - "object" relationship in which the 
"object's" capacity for a moral relationship, "its" potential 
for communicative relations with the agent, recedes into 
the background (McCarthy, 1978: 29).
But if Habermas recognizes, as he clearly does, that much of social interaction is 
strategic in this sense, why does he conceptually associate interaction -  having 
dichotomously distinguished it from work -  with communicative, intersubjective 
action? Perhaps the answer is that, with the "interaction" - side of the dichotomy 
Habermas is interested not so much in descriptively capturing what, as a matter of
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fact, is communicative, as in normatively expressing what he believes ought to be 
communicative, and which in his view lies exclusively within the sphere of social 
interaction.
Moreover, the simple dichotomy between (a) technical actions, involving 
manipulative, subject-object relations in the process of dealing with nature for the 
purpose of material production, and (b) praxial actions, involving communicative 
relations among human beings engaged in social interaction, is problematical not 
only because there can be, and are, subject-object relations between human 
beings in any social sphere but also with regard to the association of processes of 
material production -  processes of work -  exclusively with technical, manipulative, 
subject-object relations.
To examine this association we must analytically differentiate between two distinct, 
though closely interwoven, aspects of the process of material production: on the 
one hand there is the strictly physical relationship that a working person/agent of 
production, in performing a productive task, has with the material objects involved 
in production; and on the other hand there are the relationships into which working 
persons enter among themselves in performing their productive tasks. The latter 
kind of relationships include those involved in the structure and operation of work 
organizations such as relations concerning the division and sharing of work, 
cooperation, the distribution of functional organizational authority, as well as the 
determination of what knowledge, skills and equipment need to be used for 
various tasks and made available to the relevant working people.
Regarding the former aspect -  that of productive activity that concerns the strictly 
physical relationship to nature -  Habermas, in sharp contrast to an important line 
of early Frankfurt School thinking, rejects outright as of mystical provenance any 
idea that it can be anything other than technical, i.e., one of control and
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manipulation of an object by a subject. In this aspect of humanity's relation to 
nature Habermas includes the very structure of modern natural science and 
technology, which he considers as inherently oriented to possible technical control, 
ruling out the possibility of an alternative science and technology, which would not 
be oriented to the technical control of nature while at the same time being of 
service to humanity in its efforts to satisfy its material needs.
Of course even if one agreed with the idea that nature can never be a partner in a 
communicative relationship in the way another human being can (though this 
could be questioned with regard to higher animals), one could criticize Habermas 
for not making an effort to differentiate beween qualitatively different kinds of 
subject-object relationship between human beings and nature. For it is one thing to 
relate to nature in a mechanistic way, as to something little more than abstract 
matter open to control and manipulation on the basis of laws of physics obeyed in 
the same way by all matter in the universe; and quite another thing to relate to it -  
still in a broadly subject-object mode -  with ecological sensitivity, as to a unique, 
concrete biosphere, an integral ensemble of interrelated ecosystems, with its own 
means of self-regulation and self-reproduction, which we humans must leave so 
far as possible undisturbed, and when necessary protect, when making use of 
nature's resources for meeting our material needs. But this lack of internal 
differentiation within Habermas's concept of the subject-object relation to nature is 
an omission which -  though in need of remedy -  does not seriously damage the 
broader framework of his ideas.
Habermas, however, does not restrict technical, manipulative, controlling action to 
the strictly physical relationship between human beings and nature; he goes 
further, "surrendering" to such action also the social-interactive aspects of 
processes of production. To be sure, Habermas accepts Marx's distinction
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between forces and relations of production and emphasizes the historical- 
evolutionary importance of the "dialectical" relationship between the two, regretting 
that Marx, in certain influential formulations of historical materialism, gave primacy 
to the former. And Habermas would place relations of production on the side of 
praxis, these relations including such "class" relationships as the ownership of 
premises, equipment, materials and final products of work, as well as payment 
agreements between employers and employees. Moreover, as we have seen, the 
early Habermas identifies as the core ideological distortion of post-liberal 
capitalism the technocratic tendency to treat genuinely "practical" (in the sense of 
praxial) issues such as these -  which are amenable to rationalization through 
"public unrestricted discussion, free from domination" (Habermas, 1971: 118) -  as 
technical ones, to be dealt with by means of some kind of manipulative "human 
engineering" ( ibid.).
Nonetheless, Habermas tends to include, though often implicitly, under the term 
“forces of production”, and thus to place on the side of the genuinely technical, i.e., 
instrumental and strategic, other social-interactive aspects of the process of 
production such as the (so called "technical" as opposed to "social/class") division 
of labour and the relationships of authority involved in the structure and operation 
of work organizations. This is evident, for instance, when he differentiates between 
areas where instrumental and strategic action serves (acceptable) rationalization, 
and when it serves (unacceptable) “manipulation”:
Whether it is a matter of rationalizing the production of 
goods, management and administration, construction of 
machine tools, roads, or airplanes, or the manipulation of 
electoral, consumer, or leisure-time behaviour, the 
professional practice in question will always have to
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assume the form of technical control of objectified 
processes" ( ibid.: 55).
Sometimes he goes further -  following Weber and anticipating the explicit and 
systematic position he takes later in The Theory of Communicative Action -  by 
referring much more broadly to "the economic system" and "the state apparatus" 
as primarily "subsystems of purposive-rational action" (Habermas, 1971: 93-4).
Thus, just as with the concept of interaction (in the sense of communicative action) 
Habermas aims to capture not all existing social interaction but rather, normatively, 
all the areas of interaction he thinks ought to be communicative, so with the 
complementary concept of work (in the sense of technical-instrumental, 
manipulative, control-oriented action) he seems to want to capture not only the 
purely physical relations of human beings to nature but also those social 
interactions which, again normatively, he accepts as properly technical and locates 
exclusively in the sphere of work processes.
Here of course the question arises: on what grounds does Habermas distinguish 
between those social-interactive aspects of production processes that should 
rightly be governed by technical/purposive-rational/strategic action and those that 
ought to be governed by praxial/communicative action? Or, putting the question 
somewhat differently, according to what criterion does he draw the line between 
the social-interactive aspects of production that are to be considered as forces of 
production and those that are to be considered as relations of production?
One possible, and eminently Habermasian answer (see Habermas, 1972: 280-1) 
would be that certain kinds of social interactions can be allowed to be purposive- 
rational because the agents involved do, or would, as a result of adequate 
processes of critical self-reflection, come to consider such purposive-rational
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interactions as acceptable because they are inextricable aspects of work 
processes that are productive enough to satisfy their material needs and therefore 
unavoidable if that level of satisfaction of material needs is to be secured; whereas 
other kinds of social interactions are, or would be, considered acceptable to 
agents as purposive-rational only in the absence of self-reflection, that is, as a 
result of reification.
In that case Habermas would then have to provide empirical evidence or 
counterfactual arguments to establish that his placing of social-interactive areas of 
production processes, such as management, administration, the technical division 
of labour and the structure of work organizations, on the side of purposive-rational 
action satisfies the above criterion of adequate critical self-reflection; which, 
however, he does not. In fact, the question whether, on the basis of the above 
criterion, this or that area of social activity should rightly be a domain purposive- 
rational, rather than praxial/communicative, action, could not be answered 
adequately before systematic processes of critical self-reflection, on the part of the 
agents concerned, took place; and even then, the verdict would be fallible, subject 
to revision by further processes of critical self-reflection. In the absence of 
adequate self-reflection of this kind, it is best for Critical Theorists to leave these 
questions open.
But there is another possible explanation, of a conceptual kind, as to why 
Habermas divides social interactions into techne and praxis the way he does, and 
why he does so in a seemingly a priori manner, without apparently feeling the 
need to provide evidence in support of his decisions in this regard.
In the Habermasian conceptual framework, "work", or techne, or purposive rational 
action (including both instrumental and strategic action) is goal-oriented action, 
that is, action involving the employment of means to achieve ends, and, by
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definition, also action involving the control and manipulation by a subject of 
something treated as an object. In the case of strategic action, human beings, or 
human behaviour, are at once the means to the subject's ends and the object of 
control and manipulation. On the other hand, "interaction", or praxis, or 
communicative action is, again by definition, action involving a relationship 
between mutually respecting subjects, and, at the same time, action oriented to 
norms, not to goals.
According to this conceptual architecture, therefore, actions which are 
predominantly involved in a direct way with the pursuit of goals -  as in the case of 
pursuing the satisfaction of material needs through activities of production -  
cannot, by definition, be other than technical, in the sense of controlling and 
manipulating. Conversely, actions, by definition, can be praxial only if they are not 
primarily oriented to goals, or perhaps so oriented only indirectly.
To be sure, even on the basis of this strategy, decisions to put a certain activity on 
one side of the divide or the other would need a lot of explanation, much of it 
turning on the meaning of terms such as "predominantly", "directly" and 
"indirectly". More importantly, however, the very dichotomous nature of the 
work/interaction conceptual framework is seriously flawed, for, apparently, it rules 
out the possibility of human relationships that are at once both goal-oriented and 
communicative. This conceptual flaw reappears in Habermas’s later, 
communicative paradigm, as will be seen in Part Two, and has very important 
implications for his social theory. In fact, Part Three of this study is largely devoted 
to clarifying this flaw and its implications, and to working out adequate remedies.
In the light of the preceding discussion I would like to refer briefly to certain 
criticisms of the Habermasian conceptual distinction between labour and 
interaction advanced by Axel Honneth and Anthony Giddens.
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1.3.1.2 Honneth's critique
Axel Honneth (1982) focuses his critique on the concepts of work and instrumental 
action. He begins with Marx who, according to Honneth, developed a complex 
concept of work in which alienated and non-alienated aspects remained in tension 
with each other. This concept was based on the experience of early 
industrialization when both "meaningful, handicraft-oriented" and "atomized 
industrial" (Honneth, 1982: 23) forms of work coexisted. Marx's concept covered 
on the one hand meaningless, "abstract" acts of labour whose object is out of the 
control of the worker and on the other a "meaningful and self-regulating form of 
activity intimately related to its object", or "acts of artisanry which are complete in 
themselves" ( ibid.: 25). Emphasizing the latter aspects, Marx -  in the footsteps of 
Hegel -  conceives of work as the core developmental process of the human 
species, a process that combines within itself technical-productive as well as moral 
and political elements; so much so that "world history is defined [by Marx] as the 
self-recreation, self-preservation and self-emanicipation of society through work" ( 
ibid.: 22).
This rich and critical 19th century concept of work has been impoverished in 20th
century social theory, Honneth maintains, in the wake of the extreme
impoverishment of real work in industrial capitalism. Hannah Arendt (1958),
among others, redefined work as an activity that shared a great deal with partial,
repetitive, mindless, mechanized labour processes that came to prevail in the
large-scale industrial plants of late 19th and early 20th centuries, and were then
10radicalized and systematized in Taylorism. As a complement to this "lowly" 
concept of work Arendt reintroduced the Aristotelian concept of praxis, to cater for 
political, cultural and other activities that are "free from all contact with things" and 
constitute "true action" (Honneth, 1982: 27).
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For Honneth, 20th century Marxist theory too adopted this theoretical approach of 
"categorically removing any sort of potential emancipatory significance from the 
act of work" ( ibid.: 28). Thus, theorists such as Lukacs, the early Marcuse and 
Sartre assign emancipatory potentiality not to the concrete work experience of the 
worker but to the ”praxis of a transcendental or collective working subject" ( ibid.), 
whereas Horkheimer and Adorno, in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, sever even 
this tenuous link between work and emancipation, arguing instead for the 
existence of an intrinsic association between work and domination, and resting 
their hopes for human emancipation on "the aesthetic idea of a mimetic mode 
dealing with nature" ( ibid.: 30).
Precisely this trend of 20th century social theory, Honneth points out, is followed 
by Habermas himself. Thus, Habermas adopts "too thin" a concept of work, one 
that is limited to "instrumental action which can be applied without distinction to 
any manipulative relation to an object" ( ibid.: 36). Honneth charges Habermas 
with constructing a flat, uncritical concept of work that prevents him from 
differentiating between work processes that handle objects in significantly different 
ways:
A critical concept of work must grasp categorically the 
difference between an instrumental act, in which the 
working subject structures and regulates his own activity on 
his own initiative, according to his own knowledge, in a self- 
contained process, and an instrumental act, in which 
neither the accompanying controls nor the object-related 
structuring of the activity is left to the intitiative of the 
working subject ( ibid.).
While both the above kinds of work are forms of instrumental activity, Honneth
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argues, the former possesses potential for resistance, conflict and emancipation, 
whereas the latter does not -  a fact that Habermas, unlike Marx, does not, and 
conceptually cannot, recognize.
Thus, unnecessarily condemning work to the status of morally neutral, 
manipulative, instrumental action, Habermas, (Honneth concludes), in a manner 
similar to Arendt, explores potentialities for moral development and emancipatory 
action in terms of the concept of communicative interaction among human 
subjects, which he applies to areas of social activity that lie beyond the sphere of 
work.
I have already pointed out that Habermas's concept of technical action, or work, is 
too thin to differentiate between mechanistic and ecological ways of relating to 
nature. Now, Honneth argues that the concept is too thin to make a different 
internal distinction, that between Tayloristic and craft-like work processes, while 
the complementary concept of praxis cannot help in this respect because it is too 
far removed from the world of work, and -  having been modelled on Arendt's 
concept -  may in fact have "nothing to do with things" whatsoever.
It is true that Habermas does not differentiate between Tayloristic and craft-like 
work processes (i.e. forms of technical division and organization of work). At the 
same time, under the concept of work he tends to assimilate the strictly physical 
relationship to the object of work with the other aspects of the work process. But 
this problem could not be remedied by means of an internal differentiation within a 
concept of work understood as referring to an instrumental, manipulative relation 
to nature, as if different kinds of technical division and organization of work 
constituted merely different ways of relating to the physical objects of production. 
As argued above, such aspects of the production process are predominantly 
social-interactive. They should therefore be subsumed under some concept
81
different from work in the above physical sense, a concept of interaction which, in 
addition to recognizing their social nature and differentiating them from the strictly 
physical aspects of the work process, would preferably have the critical edge to 
internally differentiate between those social interactions that can be accepted as 
strategic and those that ought to be communicative, in Habermas's sense of these 
terms. That way, Honneth's critical concerns about the distinction between 
Tayloristic and craft-like work could be addressed in a more coherent and rigorous 
manner.
Nor would it be satisfactory to tackle Honneth's objection by assimilating the 
physical and the social-interactive aspects of work processes under an expanded 
concept of "work" o r"praxis" in a manner akin to that of the young Marx, and then 
differentiating among work processes according to how Tayloristic or how craft-like 
they are, thus conceding that whatever kind a work process is involved, it is an 
inextricable bundle of physical and social elements. Such a conceptual strategy 
would, I think, be a step backwards from Habermas's distinction between 
communicative and purposive-rational action, the latter further differentiated into 
instrumental and strategic variants.
To be sure, such a move would help us regain some of the critical acumen lost by 
Habermas -  a loss evident in the relative ease with which he accepts the existing 
forms of work organization, management and administration, while knowing that 
they are pervaded by controlling, manipulative, strategic action. And, even though 
this gain would have been achieved at the expense of analytical rigour, the trade­
off could be acceptable if we could not have both the analytical rigour and the 
critical perceptiveness. However, as I will argue in Part Three, we can have both if 
we take forward steps to develop the Habermasian concepts further; in particular, 
if we move in the direction of uncoupling the ends-means orientation from the
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manipulative aspect of "purposive-rational action", and the norm orientation from 
the intersubjective communication aspect of "communicative action", and making it 
conceptually possible to have social action which is at once goal (ends/means)- 
oriented and communicative.
1.3.1.3 Giddens's critique
In his contribution to the volume Habermas: Critical debates (1982: 149-61),
Anthony Giddens, while noting the enduring importance of the labour/interaction
distinction in Habermas's writings, as well as some positive effects the distinction
has had within the framework of Habermas's work, such as the "identification of
positivistic strains in Marx and the connecting of these to an analysis of the
limitation of technical reason" ( ibid.: 155), nonetheless focuses on certain features
of the distinction which, in his view, render it ultimately inadequate. I shall
concentrate on Giddens's objections concerning the notion of interaction, the
objections that I think would be the most damaging if well founded, but which, on
11examination, proved not to be.
Giddens summarizes Habermas's distinction between labour and interaction as 
one between purposive-rational action, which is "governed by technical rules, and 
sanctioned by the likelihood of failure to reach objectives" ( ibid.: 156) and 
communicative action, which is "governed by social norms, and sanctioned by 
convention or law" ( ibid.). A serious problem with this conceptual scheme, 
according to Giddens, is the identification of social interaction with communicative 
action and of both with action oriented to norms, making norms the central 
component of social interactions, just as in Parsons’ "normative functionalism". But 
"there is more to interaction than the norms to which it is oriented", maintains 
Giddens ( ibid.: 158), arguing that "power is as integral a component of all social
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interaction as norms are" ( ibid.: 159). Giddens charges Habermas with conceptual 
blindness to crucially important power-related social phenomena such as 
disparities with regard to access to scarce resources and struggles over sectional 
group interests, a blindness that for Giddens amounts to an "absent core" in 
Habermas's conceptual scheme, one that makes it unfit "for grasping the 
production and reproduction of society" ( ibid.).
This communicative and normative understanding of social interaction, Giddens 
claims, has serious consequences for the scope of Habermas's critique of modern 
society, not allowing it to extend beyond the moral, cognitive and ideological 
orders, to the material basis of social domination. For Habermas, according to 
Giddens, "the critique of domination comes to turn upon freedom of 
communication or dialogue, rather than upon material transformations of power 
relations" ( ibid.).
It would be fair to say that before The Theory of Communicative Action Habermas 
had not -  and did not claim to have -  worked out a comprehensive set of social- 
theoretical concepts capable of accounting for "the production and reproduction of 
society"; Giddens is right when he says that "Habermas has little to say about, and 
proffers little in the way of concepts for analyzing, the social relations that are 
constitutive of social systems" ( ibid.: 158). Moreover, even The Theory of 
Communicative Action does not, of course, amount to a substantive sociology of 
modern societies.
But irrespective of the comprehensiveness or otherwise of his social theory and 
the extent of his substantive sociological analyses, the claim that the conceptual 
scheme of labour and interaction makes it impossible for Habermas to grasp 
phenomena of social power and struggle and to criticize social domination other 
than in the form of communicative and ideological distortions is, I believe, the
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result of a gross misunderstanding.
For as we have seen above, the very phenomena of power stressed by Giddens 
can be adequately captured in terms of Habermas's concept of purposive-rational 
action, which is clearly intended to be applicable to social as well as to physical 
reality. More specifically, such phenomena come under the variant of purposive- 
rational action Habermas calls strategic, as distinct from the instrumental variant, 
which refers to non-social purposive-rational actions.
As might be expected, Habermas, in his "A reply to my Critics" (Thomson and 
Held, 1982: 219-83), responds to Giddens by directing attention precisely to the 
concept of strategic action.
The concept of force already has a central place in the 
action theory sketched above: to the degree that 
interactions cannot be coordinated through achieving 
understanding, the only alternative that remains is force 
exercised by one against others (in a more or less refined, 
more or less latent manner). The typological distinction 
between communicative and strategic action says nothing 
else than this ( ibid.: 269).
But although the blindspot Giddens claims to have identified in Habermas's work 
seems not to be there, there is, I will argue, another gap in Habermas's work which 
does have its origin in a conceptual problem; the same problem which I pointed 
out above, in the course of my discussion of McCarthy's and Honneth's critiques. 
With reference to the above quotation of Habermas, this problem can now be 
approached from the slightly different angle of action coordination.
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Habermas's conceptual scheme seems to allow for two kinds of action 
coordination between social agents: The first kind is coordination by means of 
"exercising force", or more precisely, and generally, by means of strategic, i.e. 
controlling, manipulative, goal-directed action by some human beings towards 
others whom they want to use as means to their own ends. The second kind of 
social coordination is through "achieving understanding", which Habermas 
understands as communicative, norm-directed action between mutually respecting 
subjects. This dichotomy categorially rules out the possibility of action coordination 
between goal-directed social agents who want to use other social agents as 
means to achieving their goals, but are intent on doing so not in a strategic, 
controlling, manipulative manner but communicatively, through reaching 
understanding. At first sight, this concept of a third way of coordinating social 
action seems to have considerable descriptive applicability as well as enormous 
prescriptive attractiveness. If this is so, its absence from Habermas's conceptual 
apparatus constitutes a theoretical lacuna that creates a major blindspot for his 
Critical Theory. As already mentioned, this point will be central to my line of 
argument in Part Three.
1.3.2 Critical perspectives on Habermas's ideas on the rationality of 
techne and praxis
The question concerning the nature, and indeed the very possibility, of praxial 
rationality is central for Habermas, as it is for all Critical Social Theory, that is, for 
all social inquiry that, in addition to comprehending social reality, wants to pass 
reasoned evaluative judgement on it, while seeing itself reflexively as part of that 
very same societal process.
86
The question of the possibility and structure of technical rationality, however, as 
opposed to that of technical rationality's scope of applicability and ideological 
social role, receives in Habermas's work much less attention. This is largely 
because on the issue of the structure of technical reason Habermas is in 
considerable agreement with the thinking of mainstream philosophy of science, 
while the possibility of technical reason is not, and can hardly be, questioned in the 
age of modern science-based technology.
Nonetheless, Habermas's ideas on the fundamental conditions of possibility of 
technical rationality are sufficiently distinct to justify some critical discussion. I shall 
begin with such a discussion, and then turn to a critical consideration of 
Habermas's views on the rationality of praxis.
1.3.2.1 Critical perspectives on technical rationality
Technical rationality, for Habermas, is concerned with the development and 
employment, through the use of reason, of technical means to given ends. The 
term "technical means" here refers to means that involve controlling and 
manipulating objects or objectified processes.
The technical capacity of reason is measured according to the effectiveness -  in 
terms of reaching desired goals -  of the technical means devised and employed 
through its use. Of course, often technical means can serve goals other than those 
for the sake of which the means were devised, even goals that are chosen later 
and in the light of the fact that the means to their satisfaction have come into 
existence. Telephone networks, for example, were not initially developed in order 
to be used as the basis for the internet.
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The degree of "rationalization" of techne, or technical action, at any given time, 
can be defined as the extent to which technical means are developed and 
employed through the use of rationality. Traditional techne, largely in the form of 
craft, relied more on intuitive knowledge embodied in skills which were passed 
from craftsman to craftsman across generations, than on systematic knowledge 
arrived at through deliberate rational processes. The degree of rationalization of 
traditional techne was thus low, and at the same time its progress, in terms of 
increasing effectiveness of technical means, was limited. In modernity, however, 
the effectiveness of technical means has increased to an unprecedented degree, 
and continues to increase with an accelerating pace. This development has been 
achieved through growing rationalization, effected by means of the fusion of 
techne with modern scientific knowledge, in the form of science-based technology.
Thus, at the heart of the impressive advancement -  through rationalization -  of 
technical action in modem times, especially since the "second industrial 
revolution" in the late 19th century, lies the technical exploitability of modern 
science, that is the capacity of modern scientific knowledge to be utilized for 
technical purposes. Nomological science makes possible precise predictions 
about the effects of specified interventions into specified objectified processes. 
Thus, it enables us to technically bring about the predicted effects through making 
the specified intervention into the specified objectified process.
This much, concerning the technical exploitability of modern science, is by and 
large shared by mainstream philosophy of science. The early Habermas, however, 
is not content with taking the technical exploitability of science for granted, as an 
unproblematic incidental property of it; an attitude that might be understandable 
from the point of view of a realist interpretation of science: since science grasps 
the true nature of the reality it studies, it is bound to give clues as to how that
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reality is to be controlled and manipulated. Nor is Habermas content with 
considering technical exploitability as a property of all forms of knowledge, as, in 
his view, positivism does, treating natural science as the paradigm of all science, 
and scientific knowledge as the paradigm of all knowledge.
Unlike positivism, Habermas inquires, in a Kantian-critical manner, into the 
epistemological conditions of possibility of scientific knowledge, and provides an 
answer in terms of the theory of cognitive interests. In contrast to the hermeneutic 
and critical sciences that are governed by the "practical" and "emancipatory" 
cognitive interests, respectively, the nomological, empirical-analytic sciences are 
said to be governed by the "technical" cognitive interest, the interest in developing 
knowledge that can be utilized for technical purposes. Thus, in a way reminiscent 
of Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology” (in Krell, 1993), Habermas 
considers technical exploitability not as an incidental property, but as a kind of 
prior “intention” of scientific activity.
This attempt by Habermas to provide epistemological underpinnings for empirical- 
analytic science, and thus for modern technical rationality, can be criticized on two 
main counts.
1. The first criticism concerns the nature of the cognitive interests. Specifically with 
regard to the technical interest Habermas has been criticized for making two 
claims which are incompatible with each other.
On the one hand, Habermas holds that the technical cognitive interest is the 
"transcendental" condition of the possibility of scientific knowledge of natural or 
other objective or objectified processes, and it has also played this role, though in 
a much less systematic way, with regard to prescientific technical/craft knowledge. 
But the technical cognitive interest is not "transcendental" in the strictly Kantian
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sense of structuring the individual consciousness of the knowing subject. It rather 
structures the methods of inquiry of the human species -  or, in the age of modern 
science, it structures, more precisely, the methods of inquiry followed by the 
community of scientists. In this way the structure of scientific inquiry is linked to the 
structure of technical action itself: The hypothetico-deductive logic of empirically 
testing scientific hypotheses is analogous to the logic of technical action guided by 
scientific theories, that is, by hypotheses that have withstood empirical testing (see 
section 1.2.3, above).
Thus, according to this view, the technical exploitability of science is a property 
inherent in the very structure of scientific method and scientific theory and not their 
contingent after-effect, whilst nature, as well as other objectified processes, is 
constituted by the technically acting and knowing subject as an object of possible 
technical control.
But on the other hand, Habermas insists that the human species and its technical 
cognitive interest are themselves products of nature, albeit making it clear that he 
does not want this latter position to be interpreted in a pre-critical, metaphysical- 
materialist or naturalistic manner.
The problem with this combination of views is succinctly described by Thomas 
McCarthy.
Habermas appears to be caught in a dilemma: either nature 
has the transcendental status of a constituted objectivity and 
cannot, therefore, be the ground of the constituting subject; or 
nature is the ground of subjectivity and cannot, therefore, be 
simply a constituted objectivity. Habermas wants, 
paradoxically, to hold on to both horns (1978:111).
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In a similar vein, Henning Ottmann maintains that "Habermas's conception of the 
technical interest finally sways between naturalism and idealism" (Thomson and 
Held, 1982: 92).
McCarthy (1978: 111-125) surveys Habermas's efforts to resolve the dilemma via 
a "reconstruction of Marx's implicit epistemology" ( ibid.: 114), but concludes that 
these efforts are, in the end, unsatisfactory.
No matter what form it takes, nature-in-itself remains, within a 
transcendental framework, "an abstraction required by our 
thought". That such an abstraction should simultaneously be 
the ground of thought is incomprehensible ( ibid.: 125).
Habermas described the cognitive interests as quasi-transcendental, in an effort to 
avoid over-privileging, terminoiogically, one of the two aspects of his intended 
concept. He was, however, himself fully aware of the serious tension between 
these two aspects, and in the end knew that he had failed to resolve it. In a review 
of his early work, referring to objections concerning "the inadequately clarified 
status of the interests that direct knowledge", he admits:
the formula "quasi-transcendental" is a product of an 
embarrassment which points to more problems than it solves 
(Habermas, 1971:14).
2. Habermas's theory of cognitive interests can also be questioned with regard to 
the possible implications of its transcendentalist aspect concerning such issues as 
the nature of scientific knowledge and the ways in which human beings can relate 
to the natural world.
In particular, an objection to the idea that scientific knowledge is governed by a 
technical interest is one that -  as McCarthy points out -  could have come from the
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first generation Frankfurt theorists themselves, mainly from Horkheimer, Adorno 
and Marcuse. The objection is that
it appears that this conception limits our knowledge of nature 
to information that is technically utilizable and our intercourse 
with nature to instrumental mastery of objectified processes 
(McCarthy, 1978: 66).
It is certainly true, as we have seen in an earlier section, that Habermas rejects the 
possibility of a qualitatively different, non-manipulative form of productive, physical 
need-satisfying relation to nature; and of a "mode of cognizing nature" ( ibid.: 67) 
other than that offered by the technically governed empirical-analytic sciences. 
However, he does -  as McCarthy suggests -  allow for other, non-technical 
attitudes towards nature, such as the "mimetic, poetic, playful, mystical, fraternal" ( 
ibid.) attitudes. Such attitudes, though, must by implication be understood as 
modes of consciousness that are empty of any cognitive content; and such a 
thesis is highly problematic.
Thus the theory of knowledge-constitutive cognitive interests proves 
unsatisfactory, and Habermas recognizes this fact. In the 1970s he abandons the 
theory, together with the whole paradigm of his early work, in favour of an 
alternative, communicative paradigm, which will be discussed in Part Two of this 
study.
However, it should not be concluded that because the theory of cognitive interests 
-  which was intended to provide an explanation for the technical utilizability of 
science -  is inadequate, therefore Habermas's views concerning the possibility 
and structure of technical rationality are invalid. For these views are premised only 
on the fact of the technical utilizability (including the technical effectiveness) of 
science; and that fact cannot be denied just because of a failure to explain it.
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Indeed, Habermas's early conception of technical reason and technical 
rationalization, in terms of the idea of the technical utilizability of science, seems to 
have survived intact his communicative paradigm shift.
A potentially more damaging criticism of Habermas's conception of technical 
rationality, both pre-communicative and communicative, is closely related to the 
one raised at the end of our discussion of McCarthy's, Honneth's and Giddens's 
critiques of the work/interaction dichotomy. It concerns the identification of 
technical rationality, in the sense of rationality involving the control and 
manipulation of objectified processes, with means-ends rationality; an identification 
that conceptually rules out the possibility of means-ends rationality that is not 
technical in the above sense. This issue, as already mentioned, will be taken up 
and extensively discussed in Part Three.
1.3.2.2 Critical perspectives on praxial rationality
Critical, including self-critical, discussion on Habermas's ideas concerning the 
rationality of praxis centres, by and large, on a certain concept of self-reflection.
Replacing -  perhaps also to some extent explicating -  the early motion of 
"rational-critical debate" which represented Habermas's understanding of praxial 
rationality in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989), this 
concept of self-reflection was first introduced in the context of the "positivist 
dispute" (see Adorno et al, 1976) and in essays contained in Theory and Practice 
(Habermas, 1974). In these works the terms mainly used for the self-reflective 
approach were "dialectics" and "critique". The concept was later fully worked out in 
Knowledge and Human Interests (Habermas, 1972), with the predominance of 
terms such as "reflection", "self-reflection" and "critical self-reflection". I am also 
referring to it as critical-emancipatory self-reflection.
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The concept of self-reflection, which, as we have seen, is of Hegelian provenance 
and is modelled on Freudian psychoanalysis and to a lesser extent on Marx's 
critique of ideology, is proposed by the early Habermas as the most developed, 
most adequate form of praxial rationality.
It is a rational process in which the subject is supposed to gain self-understanding 
and insight into self-deceptions, and through it emancipation from self-imposed, 
hypostatized powers. Self-reflection of this type is proposed by Habermas as a 
form of praxial rationality associated with the emancipatory cognitive interest, just 
as analytic-nomological knowledge is associated with the technical cognitive 
interest and hermeneutic knowledge, itself a weaker form of praxial rationality, is 
associated with the practical cognitive interest.
In what follows, I shall discuss the main criticisms advanced against this 
Habermasian concept of self-reflection and Habermas's response to them. More 
precisely, I shall discuss, firstly, some criticisms coming from the side of 
hermeneutics; secondly, certain difficulties regarding the psychoanalytic analogue 
of self-reflection (the "therapist-patient" relationship, and the relationship between 
enlightenment and emancipation); thirdly, the status of self-reflection as praxial 
rationality; and fourthly, confusions concerning two different senses of critical 
reflection.
As we shall see, some of these criticisms have given Habermas an opportunity to 
further clarify and defend his ideas. Some others, however, have led him to a more 
radical questioning of his earlier views, and eventually to the paradigm shift to his 
later, communicative theory.
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1) Critique coming from the side of Gadamerian hermeneutics
In his analysis of Gadamer's Truth and Method (1975), Habermas praises 
Gadamerian hermeneutics for marking a significant advance on both the 19th 
century "romantic" hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Dilthey and 
Wittgensteinian language-games theory, themselves an advance, according to 
Habermas, on the positivist conception of social science.
To begin with he is in agreement with Gadamer's rejection of the "objectivistic" 
conception of interpretation, that is, of the idea that interpretation is unaffected by 
the interpreter’s perspective. For 19th century hermeneutics, this conception is 
represented above all by the idea that successful interpretation requires, on the 
part of interpreter, an "empathy" with the author, i.e. psychologically putting 
oneself in the author's position; this alone would enable the interpreter to achieve 
understanding of the author's true meaning. For Wittgensteinianism, the idea of 
empathy is rendered in linguistic rather than psychological terms: to achieve 
understanding the interpreter must learn, and step into the author's language 
game.
Gadamer, by contrast, stresses the subjective and historical dimension of 
understanding: the ineradicable role, in every instance of understanding, of the 
interpreter's own language, tradition, "prejudices", historical point of view or 
"horizon". Gadamer's hermeneutics "insists that we learn to understand a 
language game from within the horizon of the language that is already familiar to 
us" (Habermas, 1988: 152-3). With regard to historical interpretation, the 
hermeneutic idea, which Habermas approves, is that "what [the historian] can 
know historically cannot be grasped independently of the framework of his own 
life-praxis” ( ibid.: 160).
But if understanding is not an objective representation of the author's authentic 
meaning, it is not an arbitrary, subjective construction either. For Gadamer it is 
rather a kind of unity of subject and object, one resulting from the "fusion" of the 
author's linguistic-historical horizon with that of the interpreter. This fusion is the 
outcome of a dialogical process and involves the mutual adjustment of the two 
horizons. From the point of view of the interpreter -  ordinary communicating social 
agent, historian or social scientist -  understanding meaning involves self­
reflection, self-understanding and self-change. In particular it has an effect on the 
interpreter's future actions. In this respect Gadamerian hermeneutics generalize, 
according to Habermas, from "the immanent connection between understanding 
and application [that] can be seen in the cases of theology and jurisprudence" ( 
ibid.: 162), where one seeks to gain understanding of sacred texts or laws, 
respectively, with a view to applying it in his or her own situation. Indeed, Gadamer 
compares hermeneutic understanding with Aristotelian practical knowledge 
( ibid.: 153-4).
Habermas wholeheartedly endorses the re-establishment by Gadamer of the 
intrinsic linkage between understanding and praxis, fact and value, science and 
the ethico-political realm, which had been severed both by positivism and by other 
forms of hermeneutics:
I see Gadamer's real accomplishment as his 
demonstration that hermeneutic understanding is 
necessarily related, on the transcendental level, to the 
articulation of an action-orienting self-understanding.
(Habermas, 1988:162)
At the same time, however, Habermas strongly objects to what he sees as 
Gadamer's profound conservatism. He rejects the view, which Gadamer seemingly
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maintains, that the prejudices, or prejudgements, inherent in tradition, thus in 
language, are largely uncriticizable and ineradicable aspects of all understanding. 
For Habermas, the action-orienting aspect of Gadamerian hermeneutics is 
nowhere near as decisive as he would wish. It is limited to the application of 
traditional meanings in new conditions, ruling out their radical questioning and 
criticism. Indeed, with every situation of hermeneutic understanding, with its 
inseparable applicative moment, traditional prejudices, and the authority of 
tradition as such, are largely reaffirmed.
A major problem with Gadamer, Habermas argues, is that he is content with 
remaining within the bounds of tradition and language, assuming that all possible 
meaning lies within these bounds and that all genuine understanding takes place 
within them. He fails to see that language and tradition can be -  and are -  carriers 
of systematic, not just occasional, distortions of meaning, akin to the unconscious 
and repressed motives dealt with by psychoanalysis: "Language is also a medium 
of domination and social power" ( ibid.: 172). And if this is so, understanding 
cannot be simply assumed to be veridical. Gadamer, in Habermas's view, also 
fails to see that there are significant aspects of social and historical reality that lie 
beyond tradition and language and cause systematic distortions in tradition and 
language, which should also be addressed in any effort at social and historical 
understanding.
Furthermore, Gadamer is too preoccupied with the “ontological” issue of showing -  
in opposition to objectivism -  that in all understanding the interpreter's perspective, 
on the one hand, and tradition and language (the alleged repository of all meaning, 
i.e. of all possible objects of interpretation) on the other, are bound up with each 
other; and he is too unconcerned with questions of method. As a result he does
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not search for methodological means of creating a distance between the 
interpreter and the social reality that is to be interpreted.
All in all, Gadamerian hermeneutics, according to Habermas, leaves us with no 
reference point from which traditional prejudices and authority could be critically 
questioned.
Habermas's own position is that, in addition to tradition and language, social reality 
is also constituted by two kinds of "real" constraints: (a) those of external nature, 
reflected on the social plane in labour processes involving the technological 
exploitation of nature, and (b) those of inner human nature, socially reflected in 
repressive power relationships: "The objective context in terms of which alone 
social actions can be understood is constituted conjointly by language, labour, and 
domination" ( ibid.: 174).
These two types of constraint act "behind the back of language" ( ibid.: 174) to 
influence language itself and thus the very processes of hermeneutic 
understanding. Thus, true understanding of social reality, one that also makes 
possible the critical questioning of the prejudgements contained in tradition and 
language, can be obtained only if we also look beyond tradition and language, into 
the "real" world of our (exploitative) relations to nature and (oppressive) relations 
to each other.
Methodologically, Habermas proposes that genuine comprehension of this 
complex of language, labour and domination can be achieved through a type of 
self-reflection akin to that of Freudian psychoanalysis and Marx's critique of 
ideology, one that is achieved not by hermeneutic methods alone but by "joining 
empirical-analytic methods and hermeneutic ones" ( ibid.: 167). Such a 
combination of causal and interpretative methods makes possible a critical and
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emancipatory form of self-reflection, one that "understands the genesis of the 
tradition from which it proceeds and to which it returns [and thereby shakes] the 
dogmatism of life-praxis”. ( ibid.: 168)
In his response to Habermas, Gadamer rejects the latter's charge of conservatism. 
He denies that hermeneutics considers all authority and tradition as good and 
acceptable, and that it is incapable of subjecting it to any kind of criticism: "It is an 
inadmissible imputation to hold that I somehow meant there is no decline of 
authority or no emancipating criticism of authority" (Gadamer, 1967: 34). However, 
one cannot a priori reject all authority either: "Authority is not always wrong" ( ibid.: 
33). Hermeneutics brings aspects of authority and tradition to awareness and 
renders them open to conscious acceptance or rejection. Authority accepted on 
the basis of hermeneutic understanding, far from being dogmatic and arbitrary, is 
true, legitimate authority: "Authority can rule only because it is freely recognized 
and accepted. The obedience that belongs to true authority is neither blind nor 
slavish" ( ibid.: 34).
To be sure, the interpreter, at any given time, can become aware of, and 
consciously assess, only a small fraction of his or her tradition and the prejudices 
inherent in it. The rest operates "behind his or her back":
Reflection on a given preunderstanding brings before me 
something that otherwise happens behind my back.
Something -  but not everything, for what I have called the 
[consciousness of effective history] is inescapably more 
being than consciousness, and being is never fully manifest 
( ibid.: 38).
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But if hermeneutics does not conservatively lead to the blind acceptance of all 
authority, Habermasian reflection -  Gadamer retorts -  has the dogmatic tendency 
to reject all authority and traditional prejudgements, a tendency allegedly of 
anarchistic provenance:
The basically emancipatory consciousness must have in 
mind the dissolution of all authority, all obedience. This 
means that unconsciously the ultimate guiding image of 
emancipatory reflection in the social sciences must be an 
anarchistic utopia ( ibid.: 42).
This excessively critical stand towards authority and tradition Gadamer associates 
with Enlightenment's "abstract antithesis" between reason and authority, a view 
that allegedly ignores the "true dependencies" between the two:
[T]he thing that hermeneutics teaches us is to see through 
the dogmatism of asserting an opposition and separation 
between the ongoing, natural "tradition" and the reflective 
appropriation of it ( ibid.: 28).
Reason, for Gadamer, is an aspect of tradition, not something outside and 
opposed to it.
Linked to this argument is Gadamer's criticism of Habermas's thesis that labour 
and political power are "real" factors that lie beyond and operate "behind the back" 
of language and tradition, thus being outside the scope of hermeneutics but 
nonetheless accessible to reason. For Gadamer "it is absolutely absurd to regard 
the concrete factors of work and politics as outside the scope of hermeneutics" ( 
ibid.: 31). Hermeneutics is concerned with "everything that can be understood" 
and "being that can be understood is language" ( ibid.). But work, politics and all
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other aspects of society must take a linguistic form -  thus place themselves within 
the hermeneutically accessible realm of language and tradition -  before they can 
present themselves to us as parts of social reality and become objects of 
reflection:
there is no societal reality, with all its concrete forces, that 
does not bring itself to representation in a consciousness 
that is linguistically articulated. Reality does not happen 
"behind the back" of language; ... reality happens precisely 
within language ( ibid.: 35).
Of course, Gadamer explains, this is not the same as the idealistic thesis that 
"linguistically articulated" consciousness determines material reality.
Habermas should not have a problem with the view that all social reality, including 
social labour and power relations, cannot but present itself to us in a linguistic 
form. On the contrary, he virtually states as much himself:
There is good reason to conceive language as a kind of
metainstitution on which all social institutions depend. For
social action is constituted only in ordinary-language
communication (Habermas, 1988:172).
For both philosophers social reality is a potential object of interpretative
understanding. Also for both, traditional authority and prejudgements, once 
understood, can be consciously accepted or rejected, though in this respect there 
is a considerable difference in emphasis between the two thinkers. For surely, 
Habermas -  contrary to Gadamer’s unjustified claim quoted above -  does not 
advocate or imply an "anarchistic" rejection of all tradition, despite emphasizing
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the critique and overthrowing of traditional authority and prejudgements, unlike 
Gadamer who stresses their confirmation.
The fundamental difference between them lies in the methodologies which they 
propose for the successful understanding of social reality. For Gadamer, 
hermeneutic reflection, in the form of dialogical, communicative exchanges in the 
medium of ordinary language, is proper and sufficient for genuine understanding. 
Dialogical hermeneutic reflection is considered capable of seeing through the 
"dogmatic power [that] authority exercises ... in innumerable forms of domination" 
(Gadamer, 1976: 33) and enabling us to judge between acceptable and 
unacceptable authority, justified and unjustified prejudgements. Even unconscious 
motives, in the psychoanalytic sense, are claimed by Gadamer to "[fall] within the 
larger perimeter of hermeneutics" ( ibid.: 41).
Habermas denies precisely the capacity of hermeneutic reflection to create the 
methodological "distancing" necessary for seeing through distorted 
communication, above all the kind of systematic distortions in communication -  the 
"internal foreign territory" (Habermas, 1972: 218) -  produced by social forces akin 
to psychoanalytic unconscious and repressed motives.
To overcome this weakness, Habermas proposes a combination of hermeneutic 
reflection with empirical-analytic, nomological methods that would make possible 
an emancipatory, critical reflection, one that would give access to meanings that 
would remain inaccessible to hermeneutic dialogue. Empirical-analytic methods 
would yield hypothetical causal explanations of alleged systematic distortions, and 
ultimately might lead to their dissolution. The capacity of self-reflection to dissolve 
a causal connection is of course due to the fact that we are dealing here with a 
"causality of fate, not of nature" (Habermas, 1972: 256), that is a causality 
determined not by external “natural” factors, but by factors internal to the mind.
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To be sure, this emancipating effect occurs only if those allegedly under the spell 
of the presumed distortion ultimately come to accept -  through self-reflection 
taking place in the medium of ordinary language discourse -  the validity of the 
relevant causal hypotheses: "Only the patient's recollection decides the accuracy 
of the construction" ( ibid.: 230). Thus, Habermas, in agreement with Gadamer and 
in opposition to positivism, in the final analysis returns to the medium of 
hermeneutic dialogue as the ultimate locus of judgement concerning genuine 
understanding. But only in the final analysis; not before the detour of causal, 
empirical-analytic methods. For this reason Habermas characterizes his approach 
as a hermeneutic one, though as a special form of "depth hermeneutics" ( ibid.: 
272), in contrast to what can be termed as Gadamer's "surface" hermeneutics, 
which is considered capable of revealing and removing only shallow impediments 
to true understanding.
Both hermeneutic and critical-emancipatory reflection rely in the end on agents'
own self-understanding. The question that separates them is by what method, if
any, can we probe deep enough for authentic self-understanding. And in this
respect Habermas offers a systematic method, whereas Gadamer concentrates
12rather on the ontology of understanding.
2) The psychoanalytic analogy
Confronted by various “prima facie disanalogies" between the psychoanalytic 
therapeutic method and Habermasian critical social theory based on the idea of 
emancipatory self-reflection, Thomas McCarthy concludes that perhaps we should 
not take the comparison to be anything more than a "broad metaphor":
Perhaps we have taken the model too literally, and there is 
no need to find a correlate for every feature of the
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psychoanalytic situation. In any case it is evident that the 
model of psychoanalytic therapy is a rather broad 
metaphor when applied to the organization of political 
enlightenment (McCarthy, 1978: 212-3).
Nonetheless, two particular areas of criticism of the analogy would repay 
examination in terms of sharpening the Habermasian concept. These concern, 
firstly the "therapist-patient" relationship, and secondly the relationship between 
enlightenment and emancipation.
(a) The therapist-patient relation
In the psychoanalytic situation the relationship between therapist and patient is an 
asymmetrical one, the therapist being in a privileged, "superior" position vis a vis 
the patient, in the sense of being one who can "see through" the other -  the 
patient -  and enlighten him/her about things the patient cannot see about 
him/herself.
But at the same time the psychoanalytic therapist-patient relationship is socially 
institutionalized, defining role-limits that safeguard the autonomy of the patient, not 
least his/her right to voluntary entry into and exit from that relationship. The 
psychoanalytic patient is one who freely submits to the analyst's treatment, having 
experienced a problem from which he/she wishes to be released.
Critics point out that no analogous relationship exists between social and political 
theorists with enlightening aspirations on the one hand and (to-be-enlightened, 
ideologically self-deluded) members or sections of society on the other. Such a 
situation cannot be assumed to be generally prevalent in society, nor is it 
institutionalized for any circumscribed area of social life. And if any would-be 
enlightener-emancipators attempted to assume such an asymmetrical role towards
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society, they would, at best, be rejected, and thus unsuccessful. Gadamer makes 
this point quite eloquently:
But what happens when [the psychoanalyst] uses the 
same kind of reflection in a situation in which he is not the 
doctor but a partner in a game? Then he will fall out of his 
social role! A game partner who is always "seeing 
through" his game partner, who does not take seriously 
what they are standing for, is a spoil-sport whom one 
shuns (Gadamer, 1967: 41).
At worst, the aspiring enlightener-emancipators would slide in the direction of an 
authoritarian, oppressive attitude towards those who resist their enlightening- 
emancipatory efforts. In Habermas's own words, there is a danger of "exploitation 
and deception", or even of "uncontrolled exercise of force on the part of self- 
appointed elites". (Habermas, 1974: 33,16)
Habermas makes it clear that the "therapeutic" relationship he envisages is not 
primarily -  as Gadamer, agreeing with Giegel, seems to assume -  one between 
the oppressed and their oppressors, between the exploited and the exploiting 
class, where the former tries to enlighten the latter in order to bring an end to the 
oppressive or exploitative relationship. It is, rather, first and foremost, a 
relationship between theorists concerned with enlightening and emancipating the 
oppressed and exploited classes, and those classes themselves. In terms of the 
Marxist paradigm, which Giegel himself refers to,
[t]his model can only be used for normatively structuring the 
relationship between the Communist Party and the masses 
who let themselves be enlightened by the Party concerning 
their own situation ( ibid.: 30).
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Habermas, however, does not rule out processes of enlightenment aimed toward 
broader sections of society, including even the (equally self-deluded) ruling 
classes. But, whether, in any given situation, any social group would "let 
themselves" enter into a "patient-therapist" relationship with an aspiring 
enlightener-emancipator, is a contingent, empirical matter. There is no guarantee 
that this would happen. It depends largely on whether any social group has a 
sufficiently strong feeling of suffering to motivate them to seek help, and at the 
same time sufficient confidence in a potential "therapist".
To be sure the development of the explanatory, causal hypotheses intended for 
enlightenment is, for Habermas, a process that can be carried out by critical social 
theorists without the participation or the cooperation of those for the sake of whose 
enlightenment the hypotheses are developed. It is a scientific process that takes 
place prior to, and is distinct from, the process of enlightenment, in which the 
active role of the ones to be enlightened is absolutely decisive (see, ibid.: 31).
Concerning the asymmetrical nature of the relationship between the social 
enlightener and those to be enlightened, Habermas stresses that this is initially 
inevitable, due to the systematically distorted communicative situation, rooted in 
self-deception on the part of the latter; but the aim of the enlightening reflection 
process is precisely to remove the self-deception and the consequent distortions, 
and thus to establish a purely symmetrical communicative relationship. After all, 
the truth of the causal hypotheses proposed by the enlightener can be confirmed 
only by the one to be enlightened:
the vindicating superiority of those who do the enlightening 
over those who are to be enlightened is theoretically 
unavoidable, but at the same time it is fictive and requires
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self-correction: in a process of enlightenment there can 
only be participants ( ibid.: 40).
Of course, Habermas is not naive as to the dangers arising out of the element of 
asymmetry which is involved in the psychoanalytic model of social and political 
emancipation; and he has no illusions about the fact that, in the absence of 
institutionalized safeguards, much reliance must be placed on the "commitment" of 
the "self-appointed" enlighteners not to abuse their position:
processes of enlightenment (if they are to avoid 
exploitation and deception) can only be organized under 
the precondition that those who carry out the active work 
of enlightenment commit themselves wholly to the proper 
precautions and assure scope for communications on the 
model of therapeutic "discourses" (1974: 33-4).
It is worth exploring the idea of applying the model of the psychoanalytic therapist- 
patient relationship in a reciprocal manner: in such a way that each of the two 
sides in the relationship would have the opportunity to take on both the role of 
therapist and the role of patient vis a vis the other, in what we might call a situation 
of mutual asymmetry (to be transformed into one of dialogical symmetry).
Such a concept would mitigate somewhat the dangers of one-sided asymmetry, 
but, more importantly, it would expand the scope of application of emancipatory 
self-reflection. It would cover situations of social interaction where no one 
individual or group would be exclusively characterized as "being an enlightener" or 
as "being in need of enlightenment", while it could still be recognized that the 
interactions are far from meeting the conditions of undistorted communication. 
Such situations are, arguably, more prevalent in late modernity than in Marx's 
time, or even in the time of the young Habermas.
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(b) The relationship between enlightenment and emancipation
In the case of psychoanalysis, enlightenment and emancipation are fused into 
one. A successful psycho-analytic process, in which the patient comes to confirm 
the validity of an explanatory hypothesis offered by the therapist, concerning the 
causal power of certain unconscious intentions, issupposed to release the patient 
from the causal power in question. Once reflectively brought to consciousness, the 
so far unconscious connection is dissolved.
In the case of critical social reflection, as proposed by Habernas, this, evidently, 
cannot be so. A process of social enlightenment might be successful in changing 
the minds of those it addresses, but would not, by itself, remove the social- 
institutional aspects of the unintended social causes revealed through it. A marxist 
critique of the ideology of equal exchange, for example, no matter how successful 
in convincing its addressees, would not automatically lead to the abolition of the 
legal and institutional bases of capitalist commodity exchange. To that end, 
political action would be necessary, over and above the process of enlightenment.
Responding to critics on this point -  including his close associate Karl-Otto Apel, 
who criticizes him for "simple identification of reflection and practical engagement" 
(McCarthy, 1978:96) -  Habermas admits that he neglected organizational-political 
issues and offers clarifications that dispel any suspicions of idealism or political 
passivity.
Habermas (1974: 32) distinguishes the psycho-analytically modelled process of 
critical self-reflection by social groups from two other phases of the enlightenment- 
emancipation continuum: On the one hand he distinguishes it, as we have already 
seen, from the development of explanatory hypotheses, or "critical theorems", 
which precede self-reflection. But he also distinguishes it from the political
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activities that must follow the self-reflection and aim to bring about emancipatory 
social change, according to the insights gained in the preceding self-reflective 
process. This third phase, that of political organization and activity, is absolutely 
essential. Without it any enlightening insights that might have been gained in the 
self-reflective phase would remain politically sterile. At the same time Habermas 
emphasizes (and criticizes Lukacs, Lenin and much of the working class 
movement for not being clear on this point) that these three phases consist of 
three different kinds of activity, based on different methodological principles, and 
different kinds of relationship between the aspiring enlightener-emancipators and 
the ones to be enlightened-emancipated.
In the first phase, the former group develop and discuss, according to the 
standards of scientific method, explanatory hypotheses about the latter group, 
without the latter group's participation. In the second phase the two groups engage 
in an asymmetrical, psychoanalytic-type relationship, where the former -  in the 
role of "therapist" -  communicates to the latter the potentially enlightening 
explanatory hypotheses developed in the previous phase, and the latter -  in the 
role of "patient" -  by self-reflecting on the hypotheses may or may not gain the 
desired self-enlightenment, subject to their own judgement. In the cases where 
such enlightenment is attained, the asymmetrical "therapist-patient" relationship 
between the two sides ceases to be necessary, and the two become potentially 
equal partners inordinary, symmetrical -  dialogue.
In the third phase, the enlighteners and the newly enlightened, now as one group 
sharing the same emancipatory interests, must take common decisions, by means 
of ordinary dialogue, about emancipatory political action vis a vis their political 
opponents. In this action, those opposing the changes necessary for social 
emancipation can be treated in an instrumental-strategic manner, in which case
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the action will include "the selection of appropriate strategies, the solution of 
tactical questions and the conduct of political struggle" ( ibid.: 32). But Habermas, 
making approving references to Marx, does not rule out the possibility that the 
opponent can also be treated, depending on contingent circumstances, as another 
partner in dialogue, as in situations where
the weapon of critique will have greater effect than the 
critique of weapons. These are situations in which the 
initiatives of radical reformism, which seek to persuade not 
only within the group, but also externally, are more 
promising than the revolutionary struggle ( ibid.: 31).
To be sure, other things being equal, the latter, communicative approach is in 
principle preferable. Any treatment of others in an instrumental-strategic way 
would require strong justification, and such justification cannot be given until after 
the event, in terms of the self-acknowledged emancipation of those so treated. 
And of course, any such ex post facto consensual justification of the emancipating 
methods -  just as the justification of enlightenment through a consensus between 
the oppressed and their vanguard -  is always fallible, subject to illusion (see 
Wellmer, 1971: 49).
Furthermore, the very possibility of bringing about the emancipatory changes 
attempted is also in question, being theoretically impossible to decide until 
confirmed in historical practice. For a nomological connection claimed to be a case 
of "causality of fate" -  one depending entirely on ideological self-delusions on the 
part of social agents -  and therefore in principle dissolvable through social action, 
can eventually prove to be in fact a case of "causality of nature", socially 
impossible to dissolve.
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Attempts at emancipation ... are... tests; they test the limits within which 
human nature can be changed and above all, the limits of the historically 
variable structure of motivation, limits about which we possess no 
theoretical knowledge, and in my view, cannot in principle possess any 
(Habermas, 1974: 37).
3) Critical self-reflection as praxial rationaiity
We can identify three distinct ways in which rationality can move us to action: 
Firstly, it can do so by changing our factual/theoretical beliefs about the nature of 
reality in such a way as to reveal a hitherto unrecognized divergence between 
reality and those already held values that determine our view about how reality 
should be. In this case, it is theoretical rationality that makes the difference that 
leads to action, though, strictly speaking, the motivating power is provided by the 
values. Secondly, rationality can make us undertake a specific action by 
demonstrating that the action in question would be an effective way of attaining a 
certain -  already desired -  end. This, of course, is the work of technical rationality, 
which, though classified by Habermas as a form of practical rationality -  the other 
form being praxial rationality -  is ultimately reducible to a form of theoretical 
rationality. And thirdly, rationality may bring about a change in our values 
themselves, thereby creating a new imbalance between our ideas about what is 
and our beliefs about what should be, thus moving us to action which aims to 
correct the imbalance.
It is only in this, third capacity that rationality is praxial in the Habermasian sense. 
It is evident that with regard to the theory of rationality Habermas's efforts in both 
his early and later work concentrated on developing a satisfactory concept of such 
a praxial rationality: a rationality that is practical, in the sense that -  unlike 
theoretical rationality -  it gives us directions about how to act, and at the same
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time it is not of the technical/instrumental/strategic kind, which is merely concerned 
with the effective realization of pre-given ends by means of technically 
manipulating objects. He is concerned with establishing a form of rationality which 
is capable of giving direction to action through its having implications for values 
and norms themselves.
Of course, Habermas rules out a praxial rationality akin to Natural Law theory or 
other forms of value naturalism, while not (yet), on the other hand, considering a 
Kantian form of practical reason. To be sure, Gadamerian hermeneutics might be 
considered as praxial rationality of the kind sought by Habermas for it contributes 
not only to the clarification but also to the modification of identities and evaluative- 
normative attitudes; and Habermas himself does recognize this action-orienting 
quality of hermeneutics. However, as we have seen, he believes that Gadamerian 
hermeneutics keeps too close to existing reality to be able to establish evaluative- 
normative standards capable of judging reality critically, which is the cornerstone 
of his kind of Critical Theory. For this reason, he would consider Gadamerian 
hermeneutics at best a weak form of praxial rationality, one that would need to be 
supplemented by a stronger form, capable of establishing values and norms in a 
more radical way, on the basis of a sufficient critical distance from existing social 
reality.
The depth-hermeneutical method of critical self-reflection is proposed by the early 
Habermas as precisely such a strong form of praxial rationality, to supplement the 
weaker form of "ordinary" hermeneutics. In this, Habermas differs from previous 
forms of Critical Theory, beginning with Marx. Marx's critique mainly turns upon 
(and against) certain factual beliefs about the nature of capitalist economic 
exchange, in particular the belief that the capitalist market is operating according 
to the principle of free and equal exchange, in a manner ordained by nature. Marx
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did not intend to challenge the dominant bourgeois ideology of his time, which 
emphasized the values of freedom and equality; rather, his intention was to ride 
the wave of the prevailing ideology, showing firstly the gap -  the "contradiction” -  
that existed between the values proclaimed by that ideology, and the capitalist 
reality of unfree and unequal exchange, and secondly the fetishistic/reified 
character of that reality. Awareness by social agents, above all by the proletariat, 
of the "contradictions" between ideals and reality, as well as of their own role in 
fetishistically sustaining that reality, would lead to action that would change social 
reality so as to bring it into harmony with the predominant values of freedom and 
equality. Thus, the rationality of Marx's critique is, strictly speaking, theoretical 
rather than praxial in the Habermasian sense.
Similarly, the Lukacs of History and Class Consciousness -  still believing in the 
working class as a potential oppositional social force espousing ideals, such as 
freedom and equality, that contradicted and transcended the capitalist reality of the 
time -  concentrated mainly on the theoretical tasks of interpreting social reality 
and showing its reified character. The very different post-1930's Frankfurt School 
thinking paradigmatically articulated in Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of 
Enlightenment is not a form of praxial rationality either -  at least in Habernas's 
strong sense. For the post-1930's Horkheimer and Adorno as well as the Marcuse 
of One-Dimensional Man, while believing that there is no longer a gap between the 
values actually held by a -  totally integrated -  working class and the reality of 
advanced capitalism dominated by the ideology of instrumental reason, are at the 
same time deeply pessimistic about reason's ability to help by establishing critical 
standards transcending currently prevalent societal norms, or engage in value- 
changing discourse. They are indeed profoundly sceptical about reason's ability to 
do anything but play an instrumental role.
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The early Habermas dissents to some extent from the sociological interpretation of 
advanced capitalism put forward by the post-1930's Frankfurt School. He reworks 
the theme of the ideology of instrumental reason into the closely related theme of 
technocratic ideology, and more importantly replaces the claim that advanced 
capitalist society is seamlessly and inescapably engulfed in (instrumentalist) 
ideology with the more moderate view that (technocratic) ideology is ominously 
spreading but has not yet succeeded in pervading the whole society -  a view that 
leaves a (sociological) window of opportunity for social emancipation. But where 
Habermas most sharply differentiates himself from his Frankfurt mentors is in 
rejecting their profound (philosophical) pessimism concerning reason's ability to be 
anything but instrumental. He emphatically maintains that reason can be praxial in 
the strong sense explained above, through changing values by means of critical 
emancipatory self-reflection, in addition to being action-orienting/will-determining in 
a theoretical way through changing entrenched factual beliefs.
In light of the above, what is philosophically crucial (and most controversial) in the 
three-phase process of enlightenment and emancipation proposed by Habermas 
is neither the formation of explanatory hypotheses by the "therap|st''-theorist, nor 
the undertaking of emancipatory action following the enlightenment that ensues 
from a successful self-reflective hypothesis testing. The crucial transition is, rather, 
the formation of the "patient's" will to emancipatory action via a change in values 
effected in a process of enlightening self-reflection. Here lies the key to 
Habermas's claim that the method of critical-emancipatory self-reflection is an 
adequate form of (strong) praxial rationality.
The question is, in what precise way and to what precise extent can critical self­
reflection affect the values of those subject to self-reflective enlightenment? In
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what precise way does it constitute praxial rationality, and is it as strong a form of 
praxial rationality as Habermas would have wished?
[S]elf-reflection ... traces back the formative course of an 
ego's identity through all involutions of systematically 
distorted communications and brings this analytically to this 
ego's awareness ... (Habermas, 1974:16)
Self-reflection brings to consciousness those determinants 
of a self-formative process of cultivation and spiritual 
formation which ideologically determine a contemporary 
praxis of action and the conception of the world ( ibid.: 22).
Thus, in Habermas's view, self-reflection makes the subject conscious of the 
process through which its own identity was formed. Self-reflective hypothesis 
testing brings to light compulsions, repressions and other distortions in that 
process, and reveals how these have unconsciously marked the subject's identity.
Furthermore, the self-awareness generated by self-reflection releases the subject 
from the spell of the powers that have unconsciously and falsely determined 
significant aspects of its identity such as behaviours, perceptions and 
assumptions.
[Psychoanalytic] self-reflection means the disclosure and 
analytical negation of unconsciously motivated compulsive 
behaviour and of limits to perceptions tending to function 
like false a priori assumptions (Habermas, 1972: 359).
This self-reflective process, by "negating" unconscious falsehood concerning one's 
identity, clears the way for the development of an authentic self:
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successful self-reflection results in insight which satisfies 
not only the conditions of the discursive realization of a 
claim to truth (or correctness) but in addition satisfies the 
condition of the realization of a claim to authenticity... In the 
patient's acceptance of the "worked out" interpretations 
which the doctor suggests to him and his confirming that 
these are applicable, he at the same time sees through a 
self-deception. The true interpretation at the same time 
makes possible the authentic intention of the subject ...
(1974: 23-4).
No doubt this move to authenticity, via the removal of self-deception, applies to 
such important aspects of self-identity as interests, values and normative 
principles. Critical-emancipatory self-reflection is, thus, a form of praxial rationality 
in the sense that it leads -  through a process of rational discourse -  to a change in 
the subject's values and norms.
But is this, for Habermas, a strong enough praxial rationality? The values 
authentically adopted by one subject are certainly not "objective", in the sense of 
being ipso facto applicable to all subjects. Each subject can, in principle, 
authentically espouse a different set of values. But what if a whole social class, or 
better still the entire society, or even humanity as a whole, could be treated as a 
single, collective, self-reflecting subject, authentically adopting certain values? 
Such values would be "subjective", in a sense, yet general, or even universal. 
Such an achievement of self-reflection might satisfy Habermas's criteria for praxial 
rationality. However, in his (self) critical writings following the initial publication of 
Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas warns against considering 
collectivities of individuals as "large-scale subjects". He charges Marx explicitly,
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and himself implicitly, with such a mistake, explaining that attributes of collectivities 
of multiple subjects must be derived in an intersubjective way, that is, not through 
the subject-centred method of critical self-reflection.
Thus to the objective structures within which socialized 
individuals encounter each other and act communicatively, 
large-scale subjects are assigned. The projective 
generation of higher-order subjects has a long tradition.
Marx too did not always make clear that the attributes 
ascribed to social classes (such as class consciousness, 
class interest, class action) did not represent a simple 
transference from the level of individual consciousness to 
that of a collective. These are rather designations for 
something that can only be arrived at intersubjectively, in 
the consultation or the cooperation of individuals living 
together (1974:13).
In "A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests" Habermas maintains that to 
have "a rational human will", that is, praxial rationality in his strong sense of the 
term, it must be possible to rationally determine "generalizable interests and 
norms"; and he claims that this can be done through the intersubjective processes 
he now refers to as "practical discourses":
practical discourses are capable of testing which norms 
manifest generalizable interests and which are merely 
based on particular interests (1972: 372).
He is not, however, able at this stage to spell out the nature of these practical 
discourses. He would do that, in the form of his discourse theory of morality, only
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after he had altogether given up the subjectivist, consciousness-based paradigm 
of his early work and developed the intersubjectivist, communicative paradigm.
In the latter paradigm Habermas entirely abandons the idea of critical- 
emancipatory self-reflection. As I shall suggest in Part Three, he did not have to do 
that. Such a form of self-reflection, when developed in a communicative/dialogical 
direction and purged of the weaknesses acknowledged in Habermas’s own self- 
criticism, could prove valuable in the new paradigm too, being linked to the notion 
of authenticity, which remains an integral and important part of the new complex 
concept of practical rationality.
4) Critical-emancipatory self-reflection vs rational reconstruction
Thus, critical-emancipatory self-reflection can, at best, enable a subject to adopt 
(substantive) values and norms which are authentically its own, but cannot 
establish objective/universal values and norms. These can be determined only by 
means of "practical discourses", a procedure that lies beyond the paradigm of 
Knowledge and Human Interests and remains, at this transitional stage in 
Habermas's thought, still largely unclarified.
There is, however, a certain range of universal values and norms which cannot be 
determined even through practical discourses, but nonetheless are claimed to be 
established in Knowledge and Human Interests through a method other than 
critical self-reflection. These are the universal interests in technical control, 
communicative understanding and emancipation, which are constitutive of the 
knowledge provided by the empirical-analytic, practical and critical-emancipatory 
sciences, respectively. What is the method by which these fundamental "cognitive" 
interests are determined?
118
[K]nowledge-constitutive interests... are not susceptible to 
justification in practical discourses. They cannot be 
recognized as generalizable through the mechanism of 
discursive decision-making, but can only be found to exist 
as general interests through a process of rationally 
reconstructing the conditions of how experience can be 
objective. The universality of cognitive interests implies that 
the constitution of object domains is determined by 
conditions governing the reproduction of the species, i.e. by 
the socio-cultural form of life as such. To speak in this 
context of a basis of interests is justified precisely because 
the cognitive strategies serving the creation of technical, 
practical and emancipatory (true) knowledge are related to 
general classes of problems pertaining to the reproduction 
of human life... (Habermas, 1972: 372).
The universal cognitive interests are, therefore, established by means of the 
method of rational reconstruction, in this case the rational reconstruction of the 
universal conditions governing the reproduction of the human species, which 
determine the constitution of different object-domains for human knowledge and 
make possible different kinds of science.
Rational reconstruction is a Kantian, transcendental form of self-reflection, 
different from critical self-reflection, yet also present in Knowledge and Human 
Interests. Moreover, it is more fundamental than -  indeed it is a precondition for -  
the critical-emancipatory form of self-reflection. For it is only through rational 
reconstruction that the architectonic of the theory of cognitive interests, including 
the idea of emancipation through critical self-reflection, is developed. Critical self­
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reflection on distorted modes of identity-formation (self-deceptions, distorted 
communication, etc.) must presuppose the idea of a "normal", undistorted self­
formation process, and such an idea, according to Habermas, can only be 
provided by reconstructive reflection.
These two types of self-reflection differ in some important respects. .Above all, 
whereas critical self-reflection aims to reveal to the subject, and as a consequence 
dissolve, the "pseudo-objectivity" of certain objects of the subject's experience, 
rational reconstruction, by contrast, aims to "explicate" "objective data" -  
unquestionable givens - " without involving practical consequences" ( ibid.: 378).
Despite the differences, however, Habermas failed to distinguish clearly between 
these two types of self-reflection, and reproaches himself for this failure:
The studies I published in Knowledge and Human 
Interests suffer from the lack of a precise distinction ... 
between reconstruction and "self-reflection" in a critical 
sense... [T]he traditional use of the term "reflection", which 
goes back to German Idealism, covers (and confuses) two 
things: on the one hand, it denotes the reflection upon the 
conditions of potential abilities of a knowing, speaking and 
acting subject as such; on the other hand, it denotes the 
reflection upon unconsciously produced constraints to 
which a determinate subject... succumbs in its process of 
self-formation ( ibid.: 377).
Following his realization of the distinctiveness and unique power of reconstructive 
reflection -  it was, after all, fundamental to the paradigm expounded in Knowledge 
and Human Interests, albeit without him being fully aware of the fact -  and given 
the problems he came to recognize with regard to the critical-emancipatory form of
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self-reflection, Habermas resolved to make the method of rational reconstruction, 
in a more self-conscious, explicit and systematic way, the cornerstone of his new 
theoretical departure. But instead of using it, within the framework of what he 
thought to be a flawed and limiting subjectivist philosophy of consciousness, to 
inquire into the conditions of knowledge, he would now employ it within an 
intersubjectivist, communicative paradigm of thought to reveal the "universal 
pragmatics" of linguistic interaction. A prominent place in this new paradigm would 
be occupied by the discourse theory of morality, itself a part of a more 
differentiated and complex conception of practical rationality.
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PART TWO
PRACTICAL RATIONALITY IN HABERMAS’S 
COMMUNICATIVE PARADIGM
2.1 INTRODUCTION
2.1.1 Taking Stock
In working out his early paradigm, which was presented in its most developed form 
in Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas was attempting to take Critical 
Theory out of the cul-de-sac into which he believed it had been driven by the first 
generation of Frankfurt School theorists, Adorno above all. To that end, he sets 
out to develop an adequate conceptual framework that would include both forms of 
rationality, instrumental and praxial, in a proper relationship to each other. Such a 
framework would be the basis for a renewed Critical Theory of society.
This aspiration was realized in terms of a theory of knowledge in which three 
"quasi-transcendental" and anthropologically fundamental cognitive interests 
underpin three forms of knowledge and, in the last analysis, three kinds of 
sciences: the technical interest is linked in this way to the empirical-analytic 
sciences, the practical interest to the historical-hermeneutic sciences, and, most 
importantly, the emancipatory interest to the critical social sciences, modelled on 
Freud's psychoanalysis and Marx's critique of ideology. Critical social sciences are 
based on the method of critical self-reflection, which for the early Habermas 
represents the highest form of praxial rationality.
As explained in the previous Part, this early Habermasian paradigm for Critical 
Theory, put forward in the late 1960's, soon came to be seen -  not least by 
Habermas himself -  as having important defects. The main shortcomings of the 
paradigm are the following: 1) There is a serious ambiguity concerning the
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status of cognitive interests: are they universal anthropological constants, that is, 
are they part of nature, or are they transcendental preconditions of types of 
knowledge? The term "quasi-transcendental”, used by Habermas, obfuscates 
rather than illuminates the situation (see Habermas, 1971:14).
2) There is no clear distinction between two very different senses of critical 
reflection, namely (a) (emancipatory) critical self-reflection on the psychoanalytic 
model and (b) rational reconstruction, with emphasis placed on the former. The 
lack of clarity about the nature of rational reconstruction -  the logically more 
fundamental of the two -  is not unrelated to the ambiguity identified in (1) above.
3) Questions about the truth or validity of statements are not clearly distinguished 
from questions concerning the constitution of possible objects of experience, about 
which statements are made. More attention to the question of assessing truth 
claims would have pointed in the direction of intersubjective, discursive processes.
4) Societies, even humanity as a whole, as well as more limited social 
collectivities such as social classes, tend to be misconstrued as single, 
undifferentiated macro-subjects capable of reflecting on themselves, rather than 
being treated as the complex, predominantly intersubjective realities that they are. 
And this despite Habermas's explicit emphasis on intersubjective interaction and 
rational debate in several essays of roughly the same period as well as in the 
slightly earlier Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.
5) The power asymmetry, in the process of emancipatory-critical self-reflection, 
between enlightener and enlightened-to-be, has been criticized for opening 
possibilities of abuse by the former, more powerful party. And although Habermas 
might have dealt with this problem by developing the concept of self-reflection in a
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dialogical/communicative direction, in later work he largely ignored its considerable 
rationalizing potential.
6) In the concept of critical-emancipatory self-reflection two different kinds of 
issues which ought to be distinguished and dealt with separately are collapsed 
together: the question of (Critical) theory and the question of political organisation 
and action.
7) As a process of praxial rationality, emancipatory self-reflection goes only as far 
as bringing up the authentic values of the subject of reflection, failing to establish 
universally valid substantive values or norms. The paradigm did of course claim to 
have established, on the evaluative-normative side, the three cognitive interests. 
But there again the endeavour has been problematic, as pointed out in (1) above.
8) The dualistic typology of action and rationality in terms of techne and praxis, 
work and interaction, seems to exclude categorically actions and instances of 
rationality which are at once interactive and oriented to the solution of 
instrumental, means-ends problems of the interacting agents.
2.1.2 New Departure
Under the weight of criticism, especially self-criticism, Habermas, rather than 
seeking to mend his early paradigm, abandoned it altogether (some believe 
wrongly so) and embarked -  from the early 1970's onwards -  on developing an 
entirely new one. At this juncture his aims as well as his prima facie assessment of 
the socio-historical situation and its challenges for a critical thinker remained much 
the same as before. He was still both acutely aware of multiple post-liberal forms 
of domination and reification in society, and a firm believer in the possibility -  
though not the inevitability -  of emancipatory social transformations. This latter
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belief was in part based on what he saw as evidence of new emancipatory 
movements on the one hand, and of significant elements of genuine social 
progress on the other. He saw modernity and its Enlightenment foundations as a 
project still unfinished, not as one that had simply failed to live up to its promise.
Despite the difficulties he experienced with his earlier attempt, as well as the new 
radical questioning of rationality, most notably by poststructuralism, Habermas 
remained at bottom convinced of the philosophical possibility and social efficacy of 
a critical, yet normatively constructive theory of society; one based on a model of 
rationality that encompasses a strong praxial dimension while still avoiding the 
dogmatic side of Enlightenment rationalism.
Given his critical assessment of his earlier attempt, Habermas felt that the new 
paradigm had to meet the following requirements:
1) It had to be based on the self-conscious and consistent employment of a 
rational-reconstructive methodology.
2) Questions of validity and truth, as distinct from questions of object constitution, 
should figure prominently in it.
3) It had to be thoroughly intersubjectivist. The Cartesian philosophy of the
subject and of consciousness came to be considered by Habermas as responsible
for the exclusively instrumentalist conception of reason which, together with its
1
reifying and dominating social repercussions, has prevailed in modern times.
4) Intersubjectivity should be consistently extended beyond the philosophical 
aspects of the paradigm, to the substantive theory of society, where any lingering 
temptation to treat society as a macro-subject should be strongly resisted.
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5) It should establish sufficiently strong forms of praxial rationality, capable of 
providing non-relativistic (normative/evaluative) standards of critique and guidance 
for action.
6) It had to respect the distance between social theory and political action.
To these requirements I should add a further one: that the new paradigm should 
successfully address the problems identified with regard to the dualistic nature of 
the typology of action and rationality.
As it was presented in the 1980's and 1990's -  first comprehensively stated in the 
two-volume Theory of Communicative Action and then further developed and 
elaborated in works such as Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 
Justification and Application and Between Facts and Norms -  the new, "mature" 
paradigm consists of four main dimensions:
(1) A theory of Universal, or Formal, Pragmatics, derived from the application of 
the rational-reconstructive method to the intersubjective realm of linguistic 
communication.
(2) Typologies (a) of social action, and rationality, and (b) of forms of societal 
integration.
(3) A model of practical rationality that includes a discourse theory of morality and 
in its later developments, discourse theories of law and democracy.
(4) A substantive Critical Theory of modern society constructed around the 
concepts of lifeworld and system and the thesis of the colonization of the lifeworld 
by media-steered sub-systems of strategic action.
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The rest of thisPart constitutes a presentation and critical discussion of these four 
dimensions of the paradigm, with inevitable emphasis on practical rationality, 
particularly the themes that will bemy focus of attention inPart Three.
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2.2 FUNDAMENTALS OF HABERMAS’S UNIVERSAL PRAGMATICS OF 
LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION
2.2.1 A synoptic presentation
I would never have tackled a formal-pragmatic 
reconstruction of the rational potential of speech if I had not 
harboured the hope that by means of this approach I would 
be able to generate a concept of communicative rationality 
from the normative contents of the universal and ineluctable 
presuppositions of a non-circumventable practice of 
everyday process , of reaching understanding (Habermas,
1991:243)
The starting point of Habermas’s communicative paradigm is the application of the
method of rational reconstruction to what is at once a universal and an
intersubjective feature of human existence: linguistic communication. The idea is
to develop a theory of Universal, or Formal, Pragmatics (Habermas, 1979: 1-68)
which would “[reconstruct] universal and necessary conditions of communicative
action” (Habermas, 1984: 139). Such a theory would provide certain normative
standards for social action -  “standards for normal, that is, undisturbed
2
communication” ( ibid.) -  and, hence, yardsticks for a critical theory of society.
The method of rational reconstruction employed by Habermas is akin to Kant’s 
Transcendental Deduction, albeit not applied to the consciousness of a subject, 
and without aprioristic, transcendental claims (Habermas, 1982: 233-4). Just as 
Kant tried to reconstruct, or “deduce”, from the inescapable facts of ordinary 
human experience, those features of the consciousness of the individual human 
being without which that experience would be inconceivable, so Habermas sets
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out to reconstruct those features of language -  more precisely of the 
intersubjective realm of linguistic communication -  which are universal and 
necessary, i.e. unavoidable, and without which that communication would be 
impossible. In particular, he tries to unearth speaking agents’ “communicative 
competence”, i.e. those intuitive, pretheoretical presuppositions, or that know how 
(here Habermas refers to Ryle’s distinction between know how and know that -  
see Habermas, 1979: 12) without which agents, even if they are not fully aware of 
it, could not communicate in the way they in fact do: the competence which one 
cannot deny having -  the presuppositions one cannot deny making -  while 
performing an act of communication; for in that case he or she would be involved 
in a “performative contradiction” (Habermas, 1990: 80).
Habermas considers his Universal Pragmatics as an example of a “reconstructive 
science”, on a par with other such sciences as Chomsky’s structural linguistics and 
Piaget’s developmental psychology. In his view, reconstructive sciences are 
disciplines that combine formal-conceptual and empirical elements, and produce 
falsifiable knowledge -  knowledge open to revision in the light of further reflection 
or empirical evidence. It is in this way that he understands his own Universal 
Pragmatics (Habermas, 1979: 21-5), in contrast to his close collaborator 
Karl-Otto Apel, who insists on the foundational, justificatory character of rational 
reconstruction and retains the predicate “Transcendental” for his own Pragmatics 
of language (see Apel’s critical discussion of Popper’s and Albert’s fallibilism, in 
Apel, 1987).
Both Apel and Habermas see the method of rational reconstruction as a way out of 
the “Munchhausen Trilemma”, which has led Popper and his followers (most 
prominently Hans Albert) to their version of fallibilism: the idea that it is impossible 
to (deductively) provide foundations for any statement. For according to the
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Trilemma, any attempt to provide foundations would involve one either in (1) 
arbitrarily breaking off the chain of reasons, or (2) an infinite regress, or (3) a 
circular argument. However, whereas Apel maintains that the method of rational 
reconstruction provides ultimate justification, Habermas -  defending a softer 
version of fallibilism than Popper’s and Albert’s -  rejects justificationism 
(Habermas, 1991: 215). To begin with, any pretheoretical knowledge of agents 
that is reconstructively revealed cannot be said to be justified for the agent; it is 
simply presupposed, as a “fact of reason”. But more importantly, Habermas 
argues, the philosophical reconstruction of this pretheoretical knowledge cannot, 
itself, be considered ultimately justified and indubitable; reconstructions are 
“hypotheses” (Habermas, 1982: 234): “[W]e have to put our reconstructions up for 
discussion in the same way in which the logician or the linguist for example, 
presents his theoretical descriptions” (Habermas, 1990: 97).
In reconstructing linguistic communication, Habermas’s starting point is a theory of 
meaning -  one that unifies three pre-existing theories, each of which, in his view, 
captures only one aspect of a complex picture (1992: 57-64). These are (a) the 
intentionalist theory, which emphasizes what speakers intend to express, (b) the 
formal-semantic theory which focuses on speakers’ reference to the external 
world, and (c) the use-theory of meaning, that brings out the social aspect of 
language. Building also on Austin’s and Searle’s speech act theories (which 
highlight the performative/illocutionary functions of language over and above its 
propositional content), as well as on Biihler’s classification of linguistic expressions 
on the basis of their “relations to the speaker, the world and the hearer” ( ibid.: 57), 
Habermas formulates his own pragmatic theory, not of sentences, or propositions, 
but of utterances, or speech acts.
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The core guiding idea concerning the meaning of an utterance is that of a “speaker 
coming to an understanding with another person about something” ( ibid.: 73). 
Accordingly, for Habermas, every utterance is a complex (speech) act which 
involves (a) making a statement about the (external) objective world, (b) 
expressing some aspect of the (internal) subjective world of the speaker 
(subjective experiences such as intentions, beliefs, preferences, feelings, desires, 
etc) and (c) making an appeal to the (legitimate) social world shared between the 
speaker and the hearer (Habermas, 1984:100).
Implicit in every speech act are what Habermas calls validity claims. There are, 
more specifically, three types of validity claim, namely, (a) that the assertion made 
in the utterance about the objective world is factually true, (b) that the speaker’s 
expression of (some of) his/her subjective states (to which he/she has priviledged 
access, ibid.: 307) is sincere or truthful, and (c) that the utterance is right with 
respect to the (legitimate) social world that speaker and hearer share ( ibid.: 99). In 
some formulations of his Universal Pragmatics, Habermas -  in addition to the 
above validity claims to truth, truthfulness and rightness -  refers also to a fourth 
validity claim, that to the utterance’s comprehensibility, corresponding to a (fourth) 
world, that of language itself. This fourth dimension of speech acts, however, is 
normally left out of his further analyses (Habermas, 1979: 68).
In each speech act -  whether that takes the form of an assertion, a command, a 
question, an exclamation, or any other -  all three world relations and 
corresponding validity claims are present, though each utterance may explicitly 
thematize only one of them, by taking the form of a constative, expressive, or 
regulative speech act, respectively (Habermas, 1984: 309). Thus, when X says to 
Y that the lawn is turning yellow, in addition to explicitly making a factual statement 
about the colour of the lawn, she is also implying that she means what she says
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and that, given the social norms that X and Y share or ought to share, she has the 
right to make that comment in the given context.
Also, when X says to Y “You ought to have declared all your income to the Tax 
Office”, she explicitly makes a claim to rightness and at the same time implies that 
she is expressing her sincere opinion on the matter, and also that it is factually 
true that there is such an institution as a Tax Office and that Y did not declare all 
his income to it. Similarly, when one directly expresses an intention, in addition to 
making an explicit claim to truthfulness, he is, simultaneously, also making some 
implicit claims to truth and rightness.
Furthermore, Habermas argues that implicit in every speech act is the speaker’s 
commitment, or “promise”, to offer, if challenged, justification, or “redemption”, of 
any of the (in principle criticizable) validity claims made, and to do so by means of 
a discursive, dialogical process of argumentation aimed at universal, rationally 
motivated agreement, or consensus (Habermas, 1984: 26). Habermas insists on 
an internal, conceptual link between the validity and the very meaning of speech 
acts: “To understand what a speaker wants to say with such an act, the hearer has 
to know the conditions under which it can be accepted” ( ibid.: 307; see also, ibid.: 
115). Thus, to understand, the hearer has to know how the validity claims made in 
the speech act can be redeemed. He has to understand and judge the reasons 
given, though, of course, he does not have to agree with them (Habermas, 1991: 
230). This point is crucial for Habermas’s derivation of normativity from the 
description of the process of reaching understanding. It is also a strongly disputed
3
point, albeit one vehemently defended by Habermas.
The argumentational process through which validity claims must be redeemed is 
what Habermas calls communicative rationality. Communicative rationality itself 
presupposes, for its existence, certain “general symmetry conditions”,
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encapsulated by Habermas Initially in the term “ideal speech situation”, and later 
(following Apel) also in terms of the Peircean “unrestricted communication 
community” (Habermas, 1990: 88) and “ideal community of communication” ( ibid.: 
202). The most fundamental, general requirements of communicative rationality 
are summed up by Habermas -  in the context of his discussion of a theory of 
argumentation -  as follows:
Participants in argumentation have to presuppose in general 
that the structure of their communication... excludes all force 
-  whether it arises from within the process of reaching 
understanding itself or influences it from the outside -  except 
the force of the better argument (and thus that it also 
excludes, on their part, all motives except for the truth).
(Habermas, 1984: 25)
In such a process of argumentation participants intersubjectively acknowledge 
each other’s validity claims and respond to any problematic ones with reasons 
only.4
Thus, communicative rationality/discourse/argumentation aimed at consensus is 
presupposed in every utterance, as the proper way of settling disputes concerning 
validity claims explicitly raised or implied in speech acts. It is, in Habermas’s 
words, “a reflective continuation with different means, of action oriented to 
reaching understanding” (Habermas, 1984: 25).
Communicative rationality, with all the normative force associated with it -  the 
normative force embodied in the rules of argumentation and, above all, in the 
notion of the ideal speech situation -  is in this way reconstructively established as 
a universal and necessary implication of everyday language use. Anyone
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engaging in linguistic communication -  i.e. anyone participating in social life, thus 
any human being whatsoever -  who denies this normative concept of 
communicative rationality is committing a performative contradiction.
Being applicable to all the different types of validity claims -  and thus extending 
over both the theoretical and practical domains -  this concept of rationality 
secures the unity of reason, albeit in its purely procedural dimensions. To be sure, 
as soon as communicative rationality addresses validity claims of different types, 
differentiations begin to emerge. Although speech acts call for universal 
consensus in all three aspects -  the truth of the factual/existential claims, the 
truthfulness of the expressive claims and the rightness of the regulative claims 
made in them -  what are admissible as reasons in argumentation (empirical 
evidence, norms, interests, etc) vary from one type of validity claim to another. 
Differences between various types of discourse will be considered in later 
sections, in the context of discussing forms of practical rationality.
2.2.2 Some important objections and clarifications
Habermas is well aware that language is very often used in non-communicative 
ways, i.e. in ways not primarily oriented to reaching understanding in the above 
sense, but oriented mainly to producing what Austin called “perlocutionary” effects. 
It is used, most importantly, in a strategic way, i.e. with an intention to satisfy aims 
other than reaching understanding about something, and do so by influencing the 
other causally, albeit through the use of language; in Habermas’s words, “by 
[inducing] him to behave in a desired way by manipulatively employing linguistic 
means and thereby [instrumentalizing] him for his [that is, the speaker’s] own 
success” (Habermas, 1984: 288). Yet, he insists on considering what, strictly 
speaking, is a reconstructive analysis of language in its communicative mode, to
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be a “Universal” Pragmatics of language as such, not only of language insofar as it 
is used communicatively. The apparent contradiction is dealt with by Habermas in 
terms of an argument to the effect that the strategic use of language is “parasitic” 
on what is the logically prior, “original mode” of language use ( ibid., and 
Habermas, 1998a: 122). The success of a strategic use of language is dependent 
on the communicative success of the utterances employed:
If the hearer failed to understand what the speaker was 
saying, a strategically acting speaker would not be able to 
bring the hearer, by means of communicative acts, to 
behave in the desired way (Habermas, 1984: 293).
This logical priority of the communicative over the strategic mode of interacting 
can be extended from linguistically mediated interaction to all social actions (non- 
linguistic symbolic gestures, non-symbolic actions such as acts of physical 
violence) insofar as these can exist only in a linguistically structured social context.
Some essential additional clarifications of the above most fundamental and 
general aspects of Universal Pragmatics can be made through a brief 
consideration of important Habermasian responses to major lines of criticism.
1) The concept of communicative rationality, including the notion of the ideal 
speech situation which is inseparable from it, has been criticized for excessive 
intellectualism. Too much emphasis is claimed to be placed on the cognitive side 
of human beings, at the expense of their a-rational, affective, instinctual, 
sensuous, aspects. There is, in Agnes Heller’s words, neglect of “the human being 
as a whole, as a needing, wanting, feeling being” (Heller, 1982: 31). The ideals of 
autonomy and self-control inherent in Habermasian rationality are similarly
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criticized -  for instance by feminists -  for treating women and men- as 
disembodied beings (Cooke, 1999:179).
Habermas, in response, explains that the concept of communicative rationality 
should not be (mis)understood as specifying a concrete form of individual or 
collective life in its fullness; that we must not be misled into “inferring an idea of the 
good life from the formal concept of reason” (Habermas, 1982: 262). 
Communicative rationality is just one dimension -  albeit an important one -  of a 
very rich reality. And even as one such dimension, it is simply a skeletal 
procedure, or form, that, in its different manifestations (constative, expressive, 
regulative), is given substance precisely by the experiences, needs, affections, 
intuitions, and habits, of real, total human beings; and that allows -  indeed enables 
-  them to choose and lead diverse ways of life, both private and public.
2) The idea of consensus as the aim of discourse also comes under attack, 
notably from Jean-Francois Lyotard, for promoting uniformity and suppressing 
diversity and difference. In Lyotard’s words, “consensus does violence to the 
heterogeneity of language games” (Lyotard, 1984: xxv, 66).
That consensus implies uniformity is a fair assessment (though not obviously valid 
as a stricture) with regard to questions of truth and rightness (moral rightness as 
we shall see later). It is not so, however, with regard to the third dimension of 
communicative rationality, the one concerning the expression of subjective states, 
understood by Habermas, as we shall see, to extend to questions of clarifying 
individual and collective identities and adopting preferred forms of life. Here, 
communicative rationality in fact protects difference against pressures for 
communal conformity and uniformity.
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3) The concept of communicative rationality also attracts criticism for being 
inherently biased in favour of modern Western culture. For it is in the modern 
European philosophical tradition, and in the institutions of modern western 
societies, that we come across a clear distinction between the objective world, the 
subjective world and the social world, as well as the institutional separation of 
issues regarding truth, truthfulness and rightness, and it is only here that these 
different types of issues are treated reflectively in terms of argumentative, 
discursive practices (McCarthy, 1982: 64-5).
Furthermore, the concept of communicative rationality is criticized for being 
gender-biased, in a male-oriented way. This claim is closely associated with the 
intellectualist one considered above. The emphasis on thinking, according to this 
argument, devalues the allegedly more feminine qualities of affection and intuition; 
on the plane of ethical life the (typically male) perspective of abstract justice, 
based on universal principles, is given priority over the (typically female) 
perspective of concrete, situational care (Gilligan, 1982; Benhabib, 1987).
In the spirit of his fallibilistic, non-transcendental approach, Habermas aims for 
coherence with other sciences (Habermas, 1991: 231). He thus searches for 
interdisciplinary corroboration for his universalist claims regarding communicative 
rationality. In particular, he turns to the developmental psychology of Piaget and 
Kohlberg, pointing out the close affinity of his own as well as other similar 
concepts of rationality with what in these developmental models is considered the 
highest, most mature stage of cognitive and moral development, in Kohlberg’s 
terminology the postconventional stage (Habermas, 1979: 69-94). In addition, 
Habermas worked on an analogous developmental model of social evolution ( 
ibid.: 95-129, 130-177).
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Nonetheless, the same critics also challenged the idea of a superior post- 
conventional stage of development in precisely the same way as they did the 
Habermasian concept of communicative rationality: with respect to its universality 
and cultural and gender neutrality (Gilligan, 1982).
4) Communitarians -  in the tradition of Aristotle’s ethics, Hegel’s Sittlichkeit and 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics -  have, like Gadamer himself before them, reproached 
Habermas, along with liberalism, for assuming Cartesian, “unencumbered”, “non­
situated” agents engaging in purely rational discourses; and for ignoring the 
necessary embeddedness of all communication and discourse in background 
knowledge (see, for example, Taylor, 1991: 23-35; and Benhabib, 1992: 39-59).
In his response to Charles Taylor, just as in his earlier exchange with Gadamer, 
Habermas fully acknowledges the historical-cultural situatedness of human beings, 
and the “massive preunderstanding” on the basis of which participants in 
communication carry out their everyday interactions and discourses (Habermas, 
1991: 244). Accordingly, he recognises the world-disclosing function of language. 
But at the same time, he argues that language has also a problem-solving 
function, making it possible for communicative rationality to “[trigger] off learning 
processes that may have a retroactive effect on the previous understanding of the 
world”, and criticizes Taylor for a tendency “to totalize [the] world-disclosing 
function of language” and for “[allowing the] problem-solving capacity of language 
to disappear behind its capacity for world disclosure” ( ibid.: 221, 222).
5) Sympathetic critics have pointed out that actual discourses more often than 
not result in “false consensus”; and they are referring not to agreements secured 
through overtly strategic methods such as deliberate deception or the forcible 
exclusion from a discourse of eligible participants, but to agreements resulting 
from discursive processes that are entered into by all participants with a genuine
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communicative attitude, and believed by them to b6 (communicatively) rational. 
Such unwittingly false consensus can come about due to contingent, random 
distortions in communication arising from insufficient linguistic or other 
communicative or discursive skills on the part of at least some participants; or due 
to practically insurmountable obstacles such as insufficient time, or unavailability 
of some important information. Critics, however, tend to concentrate on what, 
following Habermas, they refer to as “systematically distorted communication”, as 
the major cause of false consensus (Young, 2003, 102-120;Bohman, 2000). Over 
and above the quality of agreements reached in discourses, this type of 
communication distortion affects also the very process of development of 
communicative competences themselves, i.e. the contingent historical dynamics 
through which, what Habermas considers as cognitive, moral and social-historical 
developmental logics actualize themselves.
Iris Young, for example, identifies two major sources of systematically distorted 
communication in modern societies. The first is “structural inequalities”:
In a society structured by deep social and economic 
inequalities... formally inclusive deliberative processes 
nevertheless enact structural biases in which more 
powerful and socially advantaged actors have greater 
access to the deliberative process, and therefore are 
able to dominate the proceedings with their interests and 
perspectives (Young, 2002:110).
The systematic biases referred to here are contingent upon the existence of social 
and economic inequalities among those participating (formally as equals) in 
discourse. They are evidently different from, and additional to, the eurocentric and 
gender biases which, as we have seen, are claimed to be inherent in the very
139
concept of communicative rationality, and thus reflected in agreements produced 
even by the most perfectly rational discourses.
The second main source of systematically distorted communication, for Young, is 
discursive “hegemony” (the latter term used in Gramci’s sense). The argument is 
that there are in society entrenched ideological ways of thinking which, unbeknown 
to them, prevent society’s members -  and, now, they prevent all members equally 
-  from conducting fully rational discourses:
The conceptual and normative framework of the members 
of a society is deeply influenced by premises and terms of 
discourse that make it difficult to think critically about 
aspects of their social relations or alternative possibilities 
of institutionalization and action ( ibid.: 116).
This point has similarities with the communitarian, contextualist argument 
presented above, concerning the embeddedness of communicative action and 
discourse in linguistically encoded background knowledge and preunderstandings. 
However, whereas communitarians consider such an embeddedness to be an 
inevitable and acceptable fact of social life, the critics considered here refer to 
unnecessary ideological distortions which stand in the way of rationally instituted, 
just social relations, and, therefore, ought to be removed. Furthermore, these 
critics reproach Habermas for abandoning in his later works (above all in Between 
Facts and Norms) the idea of systematically distorted communication ( ibid.: 120, 
n11), while Bohman, responding to the reality of systematic distortion, undertakes 
his own analysis of it and suggests ways of overcoming it (Bohman, 1996: 
107-149).
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For his part, Habermas, like Apel and Peirce, has never denied that there is, and 
will always be, a distance -  at best an “asymptotic” relationship -  between ideal 
and actual consensus. For “the consensus required of all concerned transcends 
the limits of any actual community” (Habermas, 1990: 202). Thus, actual 
agreements will always have to be open to revision. Habermas makes clear that 
the conditions of discourse under which ideal consensus can be achieved -  i.e. 
the ideal speech situation -  are not part of an actual state of affairs but a 
counterfactual presupposition that is nonetheless operative in every actual 
instance of linguistic communication, and without which communication is 
impossible:
It is part of the structure of possible speech that in 
performing speech acts (and actions) we act 
counterfactually as though the ideal speech situation 
(or the model of pure communicative action) were not 
merely fictitious but real -  precisely this is what we call 
a presupposition (Habermas, 2001: 102; see also 
Habermas, 1996: 322-3).
We make this presupposition on entering a communicative interaction, and sustain 
it during it; but the moment we drop it -  which we may do if it becomes obvious 
that the actual conditions of the interaction diverge significantly from the 
presupposed conditions -  then, the communicative relationship breaks down.
But, by the same token, the ideal speech situation is a normative standard which 
actual conditions must always strive to approximate and according to which they 
must always be assessed. As such, it is “the point of departure for a critical theory 
of society” (Habermas, 2001:103).
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Consequently, for Habermas it is Critical Theory’s task to identify and develop 
ways of removing distortions in communication and the conditions that produce 
them; for these are the factors determining the degree of falsehood that actual 
agreements made in society have with regard to questions of truth, truthfulness 
and rightness. A great deal of communicative distortion, to be sure, is such that 
can be effectively removed through the skillful use of “ordinary” hermeneutics. 
Much actual distortion, however, might be more intractable, because it is 
“systematic”, as the critics maintain.
It is true that having developed, in the early 1970’s, the important and promising 
idea of systematically distorted communication -  understood as a condition of 
mutual unconscious deception (and self-deception) -  Habermas makes less and 
less use of it in his later work (though, as we shall see, in The Theory of 
Communicative Action he still includes it in his typology of social actions, as a form 
of concealed strategic action, (see Habermas, 1984: 333). Arguably this neglect is 
a result of Habermas’s dissatisfaction, after Knowledge and Human Interests (as 
we have seen in the previous Part) with what could be an effective antidote -  
perhaps the only effective one -  to systematically distorted communication: the 
depth-hermeneutical method of critical-emancipatory self-reflection, inspired 
mainly by psychoanalysis. This method, with its combination of causal and 
dialogical elements and the asymmetrical therapist-patient relationship it involves, 
seemed to Habermas too strongly dependent on the (rejected) philosophy of 
consciousness, and thus ill-suited to the new intersubjectivist paradigm.
6) A final major concern about Habermas’s Universal Pragmatics -  over and 
above those relating to the status and nature of communicative action and 
rationality and the associated notions of consensus and ideal speech situation -  
takes the following form: Assuming that the normative commitments that are part
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and parcel of the concept of communicative rationality are convincingly shown, 
through the rational reconstruction of linguistic communication, to be logically 
binding, to what extent can we realistically expect them to become also 
psychologically binding and thus efficacious in real social practice? What 
motivational force can the presuppositions presumed to be inherent in every 
speech act be expected to exert on agents so that the latter do actually relate to 
each other in communicative ways when their self-interest inclines them to do so 
with a strategic attitude instead? This question of social efficacy is an important 
one for an intellectual undertaking centrally concerned with relating theory to 
practice and acutely aware of the dangers of “utopianism”, in the sense used by 
Marx with reference to the socialists and other radical reformers of his day.
In this respect, Habermas points out that the normative aspects of his Universal 
Pragmatics, far from being unrealistic, are in fact met by social reality “halfway”. 
On the one hand, he once more appeals -  albeit controversially, as indicated 
above -  to developmental theories. He does so in order to demonstrate that the 
universal, inherent logics of development of individual personalities and societies -  
despite the dependence of the actualization of these logics on contingent historical 
circumstances -  are much in the direction of his own (and other similar, e.g. Kant’s 
and Rawls’s) concepts. On the other hand, he directs attention to empirical 
evidence in modern societies of actual rationalization of the communicative -  as 
opposed to the Weberian, purposive -  type. He finds such evidence, for example, 
in new social movements, including feminism, environmentalism and the peace 
movement (Habermas, 1987: 393-4), as well as in modern democratic institutions, 
particularly as interpreted in Between Facts and Norms (1996), and more 
generally in what he refers to as the rationalization of the modern lifeworld (see 
section 2.5.1, below).
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But in Habermas’s work, the challenge concerning the realistic character of 
Universal Pragmatics, at a societal level, is met also in another way: by relieving 
communicative action and rationality from some of the burden of social 
actualization placed upon it. This is done by way of shifting two huge domains of 
social life -  namely the economy and state administration -  from the field of 
applicability of communicative interaction and discourse to that of systems of 
strategic action (Habermas, 1984 and 1987; see also section 2.5, below).
In more recent work (Habermas, 1996) Habermas pays more attention, in this 
respect, to questions concerning discursive processes of public opinion and will- 
formation, and the connection of the “communicative power” attached to these 
processes with the “administrative power” of the state, based on strategic action 
(questions which will also be further discussed in section 2.5).
No doubt the above review hardly does justice to the important and difficult issues 
regarding the fundamental and general aspects of Habermas’s Universal 
Pragmatics. Some of these issues will be taken up again and discussed further in 
subsequent sections. These include questions concerning (a) the types of validity 
claims (b) the relation of communicative rationality to difference and diversity, (c) 
the possibility of using emancipatory reflection in the context of an intersubjective, 
communicative paradigm, (d) the motivation (and more generally, the practical 
requirements) for acting communicatively, and, above all, (e) the dichotomy 
between communicative and strategic action and its significance for social theory. 
Some other issues, however, will not be reopened. These include (a) the alleged 
intrinsic intellectualism and eurocentric and male biases of communicative 
rationality, (b) the linguistic and cultural embeddedness of discourses and, in 
connection with it, the world-disclosing and problem-solving functions of language, 
and, not least, (c) the parasitic relationship of strategic to communicative action,
144
and (d) the derivation of normative content from the reconstruction of linguistic 
communication, upon both of which (b and c), arguably, the whole edifice of the 
Habermasian communicative paradigm rests.
Nonetheless, we shall assume that the fundamentals of Habermas’s 
Communicative Paradigm constitute a sufficiently sound and fruitful framework of 
thought, that can form the basis on which to explore further the issues that are of 
central importance to this work: those of practical rationality and its social- 
theoretical implications.
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2.3 TYPOLOGY OF ACTION IN THE NEW PARADIGM
2.3.1 Presentation of main ideas
In the work prior to his communicative paradigm, as we have seen, Habermas 
works with a dualistic typology of action: Techne vs Praxis. Techne (or work, or 
instrumental action, or purposive-rational action) is associated with instrumental or 
technical rationality -  the cognitive and reflective side of techne -  culminating in 
modern science-based technology. Praxis (or interaction, or communicative 
action) is associated with what we have termed praxial rationality -  the reflective 
form of praxis -  combining hermeneutics and critical self-reflection. Techne and 
technical rationality are concerned with effectively realizing already decided goals 
and values, by means of causally manipulating objects and objective or objectified 
processes. Praxis and praxial rationality, on the other hand, are concerned with 
the interactive, or communicative (i.e., non-causal-manipulative) clarification and 
determination of goals, values and norms.
Habermas’s early work met with serious difficulties with regard to developing an 
adequate concept of praxial rationality, due mainly to problems concerning the 
idea of critical self reflection. Judging these problems to be insurmountable within 
the philosophy of consciousness, Habermas, as we know, shifted to an 
intersubjectivist, communicative paradigm, within which he worked out an 
alternative conceptualization of action and rationality. But in addition to the 
difficulties with praxial rationality, it was pointed out that the early 
conceptualization suffered from another important drawback: It seemed to 
categorially exclude the possibility of action, and of a related rationality of action, 
concerned with the effective realization of ends and values by way of 
communicative interaction with other subjects, rather than by causally influencing 
objects or objectified human beings and social situations. It might be argued that
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the existence of that categorial gap, and Habermas’s relative indifference to it, are 
in a relationship of reciprocal influence with his apparent belief that human 
relations in organizations involved in, or being close to, the highly goal-directed 
area of material production -  i.e., roughly, in work organizations -  will, for practical 
reasons, alwayshave to be largely causal-manipulative, rather than based on 
communicative interactions; a belief that in the context of his later paradigm takes 
a much clearer, firmer, and more explicit shape, in his view that, in conditions of 
modernity, the fields of the economy and state administration in their entirety are 
best allowed to operate as networks, or systems, of causal-manipulative social 
relations.
In the new paradigm, Habermas also begins with a distinction between 
communicative and purposive-rational action, much along the lines of the early 
distinction between techne and praxis, work and interaction. Thus, in purposive 
rational action
the actor is primarily oriented to attaining an end... he 
selects means that seem to him appropriate in the 
given situation, and... he calculates other foreseeable 
consequences of action as secondary conditions of 
success. Success is defined as the appearance in the 
world of a desired state, which can, in a given 
situation, be causally produced through goal-oriented 
action or omission (Habermas, 1984: 285).
By contrast, in communicative action, which is at the same time communicative 
action coordination,
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the actions of the agents involved are coordinated not 
through egocentric calculations of success but through 
acts of reaching understanding... Reaching 
understanding [Verstandigung] is considered to be a 
process of reaching agreement [Einigung] among 
speaking and acting subjects ( ibid.: 285-7).
Thus, the dichotomy between communicative and purposive-rational action hinges 
upon the distinction between, on the one hand, an orientation to reaching 
understanding, in the sense of agreement, and on the other hand, an orientation to 
success, in the sense of employing appropriate means to attain desired ends 
through causally influencing a given state of affairs.
Action oriented to reaching understanding, as we have seen, is reconstructively 
analysed into three different aspects -  the constative, the expressive and the 
regulative -  each associated with a corresponding “world relation”, to the objective 
world, to the subjective world of the speaking actor and to the legitimate social 
world shared by speaker and hearer -  and a respective mutually recognized 
validity claim -  to truth, truthfulness and rightness. Each type of validity claim, in 
turn, requires universal consensual “redemption” in terms of communicative 
rationality -  a process of argumentation between equal, mutually respecting 
agents, and under “ideal” speech conditions.
Purposive-rational action is also subdivided. Habermas firstly distinguishes 
between instrumental and strategic forms of purposive-rational action. 
Instrumental actions are purposive, causal interventions into the physical world or, 
in general, into any “complex of circumstances and events” (which is not itself 
capable of acting purposefully). Strategic actions, on the other hand, are actions in 
which the agents aim to realize their own goals through causally influencing the
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decisions of “rational opponents”, i.e. other agents, who are also capable of 
purposeful action (see Habermas, 1984: 285). Strategic actions are, by definition, 
social actions in themselves, whereas instrumental actions can be linked to social 
actions -  strategic or communicative -  by being their “task elements” (e.g. pruning 
the trees can be the instrumental task element of the -  strategic or communicative 
-  social action of engaging a gardener).
About instrumental action, particularly instrumental relations to nature, Habermas
5
has little to say in the new paradigm. It can be safely assumed that he has 
retained his early views on the internal relation between the structure of our 
technological-instrumental interventions into nature and the predictive character of 
our nomological knowledge of nature, as well as his belief in the practical 
indispensability and irreplaceability of such technologically structured practical 
relations to the natural world. Strategic action, by contrast, being itself social 
action, remains always at the centre of attention, in the context of a paradigm of 
thought created primarily as a framework for developing a social and political 
theory.
On the level of typology, Habermas identifies different sub-categories of strategic 
action. To begin with, he distinguishes between open and concealed strategic 
action. Open strategic action is overtly oriented to success through causally 
influencing (the decisions of) other human beings. In concealed strategic action, 
on the other hand, the orientation to success through causally influencing others is 
covert. Here, a further distinction is made: between concealed strategic action that 
involves conscious deception and similar action involving unconscious deception. 
In the case of interactions involving conscious deception, which Habermas calls 
cases of manipulation -  either one of the interacting agents deliberately deceives 
the other -  i.e. acts with a strategic orientation -  pretending to act
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communicatively while the other acts communicatively believing that the other one 
does so as well, that is, that the interaction is communicative; or, both parties 
knowingly deceive each other, while pretending that they act communicatively and 
believing that the other one actually does so: i.e. each is at once a deceiver and a 
victim of deception.
In situations of unconscious deception it is also possible for one or both parties in 
an interaction to act deceptively towards the other without knowing it. If only one 
does so, the other one, while being deceived, acts either in a communicative way 
or in a consciously strategic/deceptive one. What is important in the case of 
unconscious deception is that whoever unconsciously deceives, that is, deceives 
while believing that he or she does not do so, is ipso facto also involved in self- 
deception. Habermas characterizes interactions involving one-sided or mutual 
unconscious deceptions/self-deceptions as cases of systematically distorted 
communication. They are cases in which “false consensus” is typically produced 
(the discussion of “false consensus” in section 2, above, is relevant in this 
respect). Figure 1 shows Habermas’s schematic presentation of his typology of 
social actions (Habermas, 1984: 333).
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2.3.2 Some objections and clarifications
1) It has been argued that the distinction between action oriented to success and 
action oriented to reaching understanding cannot be sustained because 
communicative action is as success-oriented -  as oriented to employing means to 
attain ends -  as purposive-rational action is (“One can reach a linguistic 
understanding successfully” in Berger’s words -  see Berger, 1991: 172). Every 
communicative act aims to succeed in reaching understanding about something 
and is a means to such an aim. Habermas agrees that both types of action are 
teleological in a certain sense, but explains that in the case of communicative 
actions the “end” of reaching understanding is conceptually inseparable from the 
linguistic “means” used, whereas in purposive-rational action the means and the 
ends are external to each other.
The illocutionary “ends” of reaching understanding cannot 
be defined without referring to the linguistic means of
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reaching understanding. The medium of language and the 
telos of reaching understanding intrinsic to it reciprocally 
constitute one another. The relation between these is not 
one of means and ends ( ibid.: 241; see also Habermas,
1984: 287).
It is on this fundamental difference between an internal and an external 
relationship of means to ends, that Habermas’s differentiation between 
communicative and purposive-rational action rests.
2) Hans Joas objects that the distinction between communicative and purposive- 
rational action misses non-teleological forms of dealing with objects in non-social 
situations such as the “playful and artistic commerce with objects” or the “[pjlayful 
self-development and creative solution of problems” (Joas, 1991: 100, 102). 
Without disputing the point, Habermas explains that, in developing his typology, he 
is “concerned with an explanation of social action, not with constructing an 
anthropology of action as a whole” (Habermas, 1991: 249). However, it might be 
counter-argued that dealing with objects, though not in itself “socially” interactive -  
thus not constituting social action in that sense -  nonetheless takes place within a 
social setting, and is for that reason by no means irrelevant to social theory. And it 
is true that Habermas’s discussions of action leave one with the strong impression 
-  perhaps misleadingly -  that the only way of dealing with objects -  the only form 
of “non-social action” in his terms -  is purposive-rational (instrumental) action 
oriented to the successful attainment of pre-selected ends through causal 
influence. Yet, over and above play and art, there are many important ways of 
dealing with objects which, even though ends-means-oriented, cannot be 
conceptualized as involving influence of the usual causal variety, nor of course as 
involving a communicative relationship. Such are, for example, ways of relating to
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numbers and other mathematical objects, computer software, scientific concepts, 
and texts -  perhaps to all objects belonging to Popper’s “Third World”.
3) As we shall see in section 5 below, several commentators have criticized 
Habermas for dividing society sharply into areas governed by communicative 
action and areas governed by strategic action -  namely into lifeworld and system 
areas -  not recognizing that all realms of social life do in fact include a variety of 
types of action; a criticism which Habermas claims to be based to a great extent 
on misunderstandings, for which, though, he accepts a large share of 
responsibility.
A more basic objection, however -  linked to that concerning the division of society 
into two starkly different realms -  concerns the even sharper dichotomy at the 
level of action types: an action has to be either (a) oriented to success and 
causally influential, or (b) oriented to norms and values and communicative, i.e. 
oriented to reaching understanding. An action that is oriented at once to success 
and to reaching understanding is inconceivable. Habermas’s new typology -  
despite its increased sophistication over the early one -  is equally dualistic, also 
categorially excluding the possibility of pursuing success (in attaining agent- 
relative, or “egocentric” goals) in a communicative manner, i.e. by means of 
rationally motivated agreement with another agent. This exclusion can be traced to 
Habermas’s identification of “success” with “causal influence”. Characteristically, in 
describing the distinction between communicative and purposive-rational action, 
he uses, on the same page, “success” and “causal influence” interchangeably:
(a) Social actions can be distinguished according to whether 
the participants adopt either a success-oriented attitude 
or one oriented to reaching understanding (Habermas,
1984: 286).
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(b) distinguish situations in which [competent speakers] are 
causally exerting an influence upon others from those in 
which they are coming to an understanding with them ( 
ibid.).
If this identification between success and causal influence does indeed underly 
Habermas’s model of action, the only way of pursuing egocentric goals which is 
coherently available to that model is through strategic action. Hence, fields of 
social life primarily involving the pursuit of (individual or collective) agent-relative 
goals -  arguably, areas such as the economy and politics -  cannot in principle be 
conceived by Habermas as areas governed by communicative action.
This question of a possible conceptual gap with serious social-theoretic 
implications for Habermas, will be the focus of the final Part of this study.
2.4 HABERMAS’S MATURE MODEL OF PRACTICAL RATIONALITY
Habermas’s post-communicative-turn views on the different forms of practical 
rationality are directly based on the universal-pragmatically reconstructed concept 
of communicative rationality and its threefold internal differentiation that 
corresponds to the three types of validity claim. These views are initially presented 
briefly in The Theory of Communicative Action (see, for example, 1984: 333-4), 
and in certain respects even earlier, mainly in Legitimation Crisis (1976: 102-110); 
but they become the focus of attention and are given full-scale treatment in later 
works, above all in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990) and 
Justification and Application (1993), and in certain respects in such works as in 
Between Facts and Norms (1996) and The Inclusion of the Other (1998b).
In these later, more definitive formulations, Habermas distinguishes three forms of 
Practical Rationality, or three “Employments of Practical Reason”: the “pragmatic”, 
the “ethical” and the “moral (Habermas, 1993: 1). Each of these forms -  presented
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below -  approaches the question “what should I (or we) do” in a different way, and 
involves a different relationship between reason and volition.
In addition, in some of these later works, above all in Between Facts and Norms, 
Habermas develops the concept of legal rationality, based on a combination of the 
above three forms of practical rationality with what Habermas calls “fair 
bargaining”, a form of interaction which he considers to be strategic rather than 
communicative. Legal rationality, and in particular the notion of “fair bargaining”, 
will be discussed in later sections.
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2.4.1 The Pragmatic Employment of Practical Rationality
As used in this context, the term “pragmatic” must not be confused with its usage 
in connection with philosophical pragmatism or with the (universal) pragmatics of 
language. It is rather used in the sense of everyday pragmatism, referring to 
expedience and effectiveness. More precisely, it is used in the sense of 
Habermas’s terms “purposive” (or “purposive-rational”), “instrumental” and 
“strategic”, as well of his earlier term “technical” (as opposed to “praxial”). It refers 
to relations between means and ends, which for Habermas necessarily involve 
causal, subject-object relations.
Thus, the pragmatic form of practical rationality deals with the question “What 
should I/we do?” with a purposive orientation.
Practical reflection here proceeds within the horizon of 
purposive rationality, its goal being to discover appropriate 
techniques, strategies or programmes (Habermas, 1993: 3).
These techniques, strategies or programmes are rationally chosen as means to 
“fixed purposes” which are themselves capable of being assessed in a 
pragmatically-rational way in terms of existing value preferences. The end-results 
of processes of pragmatic practical rationality, in other words, are 
recommendations expressible as what Kant referred to as “hypothetical 
imperatives” (see Appendix II, below); i.e. as “task[s] that we must accomplish if 
we want to achieve a certain goal” (Habermas, 1993: 2). Hypothetical 
recommendations are concerned with “how we must [causally] intervene in the 
objective world in order to bring about a desired state of affairs” ( ibid.: 8). They 
are based on empirical knowledge about the objective world in which the 
intervention is made, and their validity depends on -  and is judged according to -  
the truth of that knowledge. Therefore, the pragmatic employment of practical
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rationality relies on theoretical rationality, i.e. on discourses concerning factual 
truth, and is thus universal-pragmatically grounded by Habermas in terms of the 
constative aspect of linguistic communication and the validity claim to factual truth 
implicit in it.
The discussion of Habermas’s views on (factual) truth is beyond the scope of this 
study; certain clarifications on this issue, however, would seem to be in order. 
From the early 1970’s up until recently Habermas (under the influence of Peirce 
and in essential agreement with Apel and Hilary Putnam) conceived of truth as 
“ideal ascertainability” or “rational acceptability”, a view known initially as the 
“consensus theory of truth” (see Habermas, 1996: 13-15, and 2003: 36). This is a 
discursive concept of truth, according to which a proposition is true if it is justifiable 
in a discourse held under ideal speech conditions. In the last decade, however, 
Habermas has come to revise this view, due to the realization that truth is “a 
property of propositions that they ‘cannot lose’ ” (2003b: 38) (i.e., if a proposition is 
true it will always be true); whereas a proposition accepted as true even on the 
basis of the best of reasons and as a result of the most exhaustive argumentation 
process that has taken place under conditions as close to ideal ones as possible, 
could always turn out to be false in the light of new evidence. In other words, the 
discursive concept of truth does not do justice either to the communication- 
transcendent reference to an objective, external world, implicitly made by every 
speech act, or to the absolute certainty with which we deal with what, in our 
everyday activities, we undoubtedly take to be a common objective world, on the 
basis of non-thematized factual beliefs non-reflectively accepted as true:
We don’t walk onto a bridge whose stability we doubt. To 
the realism of everyday practice, there corresponds a 
concept of unconditional truth, truth that is not 
epistemically indexed ( ibid.: 39).
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But unlike in everyday non-reflective practice, where we take the acceptability of a 
factual belief to be identical with the beliefs truth with respect to objective reality, 
once we adopt a reflective, discursive mode of thinking and communicating, we 
know that no discursive justifiability can ever be identical to truth in the sense of a 
discourse-transcendent relation to the objective world: “the gap between rational 
acceptability and truth cannot be bridged” ( ibid.: 40).
Nonetheless, agents reflectively seeking to test claims to truth still have to rely on 
rational discourse; for there is no direct access to the objects truth claims refer to, 
whereby the gap between accepted beliefs and truth would disappear, and no way 
exists that can reduce the (inevitable) gap as much as rational discourse.
Argumentation remains the only available medium of 
ascertaining truth since truth claims that have been 
problematized cannot be tested in any other way. There is 
no unmediated, discursively unfiltered access to the truth 
conditions of empirical beliefs ( ibid.: 38).
Thus, the revision in Habermas’s theory of truth concerned only what truth means, 
not how it is ascertained. The way to redeem truth claims pertaining either to pure 
theory or to questions of pragmatic practical rationality remains the respective 
discursive process established in the context of the Universal Pragmatics of 
linguistic communication.
The final point on the pragmatic dimension of practical rationality concerns the 
relationship between reason and volition that corresponds to that dimension.
It is clear that the (technical or strategic) recommendations of pragmatic 
discourses are not binding on the will, for they are conditional upon the will’s 
commitment to the ends for whose sake the recommendations are made. And the
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making of this volitional commitment -  the choice of ends -  is, in this conception, 
external to pragmatic discourses. Thus, for Habermas, pragmatic discourses have 
no determining role with regard to volition. In fact their function is to serve a 
volition that is entirely independent of them. They are the “slaves of passion”, in 
the words of Hume, to whose instrumentalist conception of practical rationality 
(see Appendix I below) Habermas’s understanding of practical reason’s pragmatic 
dimension corresponds.
In the next Part we shall question the thesis of the independence of volition from 
pragmatic practical rationality, arguing that the choice of ends and values is 
conditioned by pragmatic considerations, that is, considerations concerning the 
available means to their realization.
2.4.2 The Ethical Employment of Practical Rationality
When the goals of action, rather than the means to their realization, cease to be 
taken for granted and are called into question, pragmatic rationality is obviously 
not appropriate for dealing with the problem. For now the issue is not how to 
devise effective means to given ends, but how to select the ends themselves. The 
question “what should I/we do”, now means what ends/values I/we should choose 
for myself/ourselves, thus, what is good for me/us. Practical rationality applied to 
this question is for Habermas ethical rationality.
The exercise of practical reason directed... to the good and 
not merely to the possible and expedient belongs, following 
classical usage, to the sphere of ethics (Habermas, 1993: 4).
The ethical employment of practical rationality, or “ethical discourse”, is not about 
the arbitrary choice of specific goals. It is concerned with placing specific goals in
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the context of a subject’s broader choices and interests, such as one’s preferred 
career, and those in turn, in the context of the subject’s conception of the good life 
-  itself seen in the light of the subject’s culturally bound life history. In their more 
radical forms, ethical discourses deal with questions concerning one’s self-identity 
and ego-ideals: “who am I, and who would I like to be?” ( ibid.). For this reason, 
Habermas refers to ethical discourses also as ethical-existential discourses.
Thus, ethical discourses are hermeneutic processes involving a reflective 
appropriation of an -  individual or collective -  subject’s cultural traditions and 
historical development and leading to the subject’s self-understanding and self­
clarification.
Such processes become critical and self-critical insofar as they dissolve a subject’s 
illusions and self-deceptions and improve a subject’s chances of leading an 
authentic and happy life. Habermas often speaks in this respect of a clinical or 
therapeutic use of rationality.
Evidently, in an ethical discourse, the subject’s perspective is not that of an 
observer, who value-neutrally serves one’s interests and self-identity. It is rather 
that of a subject (evaluatively) adopting interests and a conception of the self as 
one’s own preferred ones: "... existential self-understanding is evaluative in its 
core” ( ibid.). Thus, unlike pragmatic rationality, in ethical discourse the relationship 
between volition and rationality is an internal one: the rational process of ethical 
self-understanding cannot be conceptually divorced from evaluation, and thus from 
volition, anymore than ethical evaluation/volition -  though dependent on cultural 
context -  can be conceptually divorced from the rational process of ethical self- 
understanding: “In ethical-existential discourses, reason and the will condition one 
another reciprocally, though the latter remains embedded in the life-historical 
context thematized” ( ibid.: 12).
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Habermas’s ethical dimension of practical rationality can be said to correspond in 
orientation and scope, though not in structure, with the Aristotelian conception of 
practical reason as phronesis -  a faculty of judgement equally context-bound and 
oriented to self-realization and the good life.
Ethical discourses (and sometimes also aesthetic critique -  see Habermas, 1984: 
334) are taken by Habermas to be philosophically rooted in the Universal 
Pragmatics of the expressive dimension of linguistic communication -  of linguistic 
communication expressing the subjective world of the speaker -  thus in the 
inescapable communicative fact of issuing, and promising to argumentatively 
redeem, validity claims to truthfulness. This Universal Pragmatic grounding of 
ethical rationality raises a number of questions:
1) When Habermas speaks of “truthfulness” in the context of developing his 
Universal Pragmatics, he seems to refer to a correspondence between what 
speakers know their subjective states to be (having privileged access to them) and 
what they claim them to be through their utterances. He seems, in other words, to 
be referring to sincerity, or honesty, to whether the speaker tells the truth to the 
hearer(s). Ethical discourse, by contrast, emphasizes subjects’ coming to a 
genuine understanding/determination of their subjective states -  values, interests, 
conceptions of the good, ego-ideals, etc. Thus, the truthfulness with which ethical 
discourses are concerned is authenticity rather than sincerity vis a vis others; 
absence of self-deception rather than of deception of others. If this is so, there 
seems to be a problem with regard to grounding the ethical employment of 
practical rationality. How can a discursive practice concerned with authenticity be 
justified in terms of the rationally reconstructible validity claim to sincerity?
This difficulty could be resolved if the universal validity claim to truthfulness were 
interpreted as referring not simply to sincerity but to correspondence between what
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speakers, through their utterances, express as their subjective states, and what 
their genuine subjective states are, even if these are not immediately accessible to 
the speaker’s consciousness but need to be identified through self-reflection. In 
fact, on closer inspection, this is how Habermas does understand “truthfulness”, 
his frequent, misleading emphasis on mere sincerity notwithstanding: as the 
sincere expression of one’s authentic subjective states, as opposed to the sincere 
expression of the subjective states one is conscious of at any given moment, even 
if as a result of self-deception or insufficient self-knowledge. This understanding is 
apparent, for example, in the following statement: “Dramaturgical actions embody 
a knowledge of the agent’s own subjectivity. These expressions can be criticized 
as untruthful, that is, rejected as deceptions or self-deceptions” (Habermas, 1984: 
334). Thus, expressions of one’s subjectivity (in some formulations, Habermas 
refers to them as “dramaturgical actions”) are truthful if they are neither deceptive 
nor self-deceptive, that is if they are both sincere and authentic.
2) Like all types of validity claims, validity claims to truthfulness (in the sense of 
both sincerity and authenticity) ought to be, for Habermas, redeemable by 
argumentative means. That is, they ought to be settled through universal rational 
agreement. For,
the fundamental intuition connected with argumentation can 
best be characterized from the process perspective by the 
intention of convincing a universal audience and gaining 
general assent for an utterance; from the procedural 
perspective, by the intention of ending a dispute about 
hypothetical validity claims with a rationally motivated 
agreement (Habermas, 1984: 26).
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Yet, Habermas maintains that subjects have privileged access to their inner, 
subjective states (see, for example, ibid.: 86), and considers ethical discourses as 
processes, of se/f-description, se/f-understanding and se/f-clarification (see 
Habermas, 1993: 4-5 and 11, emphasis added).
Surely, on the face of it, there seems to be an internal tension in the idea of one’s 
subjective experiences, and idea of the self, requiring validation in terms of 
universal consensus. In fact in some important parts of his work Habermas 
differentiates between validity claims to truthfulness on the one hand, and validity 
claims to truth, rightness (and comprehensibility) on the other, arguing that only the 
latter three are “universal validity claims that can be tested in discourse” 
(Habermas, 1984: 42). However, on closer look, his own arguments do not permit 
such a sharp differentiation. Claims to sincerity and authenticity, though certainly 
different from claims to truth and normative rightness in some important respects, 
do also call for, and are amenable to, validation through the use of reasons.
To begin with, we must distinguish between claims to the truthfulness of utterances 
expressing one’s subjective states, such as ethical choices, and claims to the 
validity of the content of one’s subjective states, e.g. claims to the correctness of 
one’s ethical choices themselves. The latter types of claim are often made in 
utterances, but are so made contingently; they are not among the. rationally 
reconstructive, ineluctable validity claims which are universally present in all 
speech acts. And it is argumentation concerning such claims -  claims “to justify 
important value decisions and to gain assurance concerning his [the subject’s] 
identity” (Habermas, 1993: 11). -  that Habermas has in mind when he confines 
“ethical-existential discourses” to contextual forms of argumentation -  rather than 
universal ones as in the case of truth and rightness discourses -  in which only 
“[t]hose who belong to a shared lifeworld are potential participants who can
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assume the catalyzing role of impartial critics in processes of self-clarification” ( 
ibid.). In such contextual forms of argumentation participants aim at justifying 
particular (ethical) value judgements in terms of value standards acceptable within 
their own cultural context: “[Vjalues can be made plausible only in the context of a 
particular form of life” (Habermas, 1984: 42). The value judgements justified in this 
way are binding not only for the subjects who make them initially but also for those 
who share the subject’s “form of life” and are (potential) participants in the 
discourses for the contextual justification of those judgements.
However, it can be argued -  although it isn’t by Habermas -  that universal 
discourses, with the (potential) participation of all human beings, also have a role 
in the contextual justification of value judgements. On the assumption that 
contextual value judgements and contextual reasons and arguments relevant for 
their justification are comprehensible to (though not necessarily acceptable by) all 
subjects who do not share the particular cultural context in question -  which is a 
reasonable assumption to make -  all human beings can have (in principle) a role 
(indeed they must have a role) in deciding whether a contextual value judgement is 
justified within its own context. Such a judgement would thus be justified in terms 
of universal consensus but binding only for those who share the form of life in 
which it is made.
Moreover, it can be said -  and this is a point Habermas does make -  that, 
although rational discussions on value judgements cannot lead to rationally binding 
conclusions for those who do not share the context of those judgements, can 
nonetheless have an illuminative effect on them, as in the case of aesthetic 
critique:
The situation with discussions of value standards, for which
aesthetic criticism provides a model, is somewhat different.
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Even in disputes about questions of taste, we rely upon the 
rationally motivating force of the better argument, although a 
dispute of this kind diverges in a characteristic way from 
controversies concerning questions of truth and justice...
[T]he peculiar role of arguments in this case is to open the 
eyes of participants, that is, to lead them to an 
authenticating aesthetic experience (Habermas, 1984: 42).
When their eyes are opened in this way, that person may adopt the other’s 
evaluation as his or her own. This outcome -  that is, their coming to be committed 
to an evaluation held and proposed by another and been the object of arguments -  
is the result of the relevant arguments, but not their rational conclusion.
But let us now come to (universal) validity claims to truthfulness proper -  that is 
claims not to the justifiability of value judgements but to the sincerity and 
authenticity of expressions of evaluations and other subjective states. Questions 
concerning the truthfulness of such expressions -  unlike those concerning the 
justifiability of value judgements -  are amenable to discursive processes carried 
out with (potential) universal participation and aiming at universal consensus. In 
particular, reasons and arguments are considered by Habermas to be pertinent to 
claims to truthfulness in two ways:
Firstly, the sincerity, or honesty, of an expression of a subject’s inner world can be 
rationally tested -  in potentially universal discourse -  in terms of its consistency 
with the subject’s behaviour: “[Ijnsincerity can be revealed by the lack of 
consistency between an utterance and the past or future actions internally 
connected with it” ( ibid.: 41). Habermas tends to differentiate considerations 
regarding the consistency between expressions of subjective states and actions as 
rational grounds, from the reasons that are appealed to for the justification of
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factual propositions or normative statements: “In the case of claims to truth or 
rightness, the speaker can redeem his guarantee discursively, that is, by adducing 
reasons; in the case of claims to truthfulness he does so through consistent 
behaviour” (Habermas, 1990: 59). However, the facts regarding the consistency 
between expressions and actions are just as universally applicable reasons in 
argumentation as facts regarding the objective world. The difference between the 
subject of expressive utterances and third parties with regard to their role in the 
discursive testing of the sincerity of those utterances is this: whereas third parties 
have an equal say as the subject of the expressive utterance in arguing about the 
sincerity or insincerity of that utterance -  that is about the utterance’s consistency 
with the subject’s actions -  only subjects themselves can put forward for discursive 
testing expressive utterances representing their own subjective states. In other 
words, expressive utterances can in principle be accepted as valid or rejected as 
invalid in universal discourses, but if such an utterance is thus rejected, others 
cannot without the consent of the subject propose -  let alone consensually decide 
on -  an alternative subjective state as valid for the subject. This seems to be the 
core meaning of the intuitively plausible idea that subjects have a privileged role in 
the discursive testing of utterances that claim to express their own subjective 
states.
Secondly, the validity of a claim to the authenticity of a subjective state depends 
on whether the subject is free from illusion, including self-deception. In particular, 
authenticity is tested through securing full awareness on the part of subjects of 
their context-bound life histories -  the histories of their cultural development in the 
case of collective subjects -  within which their present subjective states (desires, 
feelings, beliefs, evaluative choices) have emerged. Once a subjective state is -  
through such awareness -  freed from all illusion and has survived, it is ipso facto 
recognized as authentic.
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Now, provided that all potential participants, including the subject, are capable of 
being motivated only by the force of the better argument, claims to authenticity can 
in principle be examined in universal discourses, in terms of (public) reasons and 
arguments concerning facts in the subject’s life history. And this, despite the fact 
that such a discursive process is essentially a process of self-clarification and self- 
understanding for the subject; a process at the end of which -  when all the 
discursive efforts at eliminating the subject’s possible illusions are exhausted -  it 
is, again the subject’s privilege to determine the authentic contents of his/her/their 
subjective world.
However, it cannot be assumed that the subject, even when intent on following the 
better argument just like all the other participants in the discourse, is always 
capable of doing so. As Habermas makes clear, the subject can be motivated by 
unconscious forces, in which case, instead of a rational hermeneutic process, we 
have a process of “systematically distorted communication”. This situation, 
according to Habermas, calls for self-reflective therapeutic dialogue, or “critique”, 
on the depth-hermeneutic, psychoanalytic model (Habermas, 1984: 41-2). This 
form of dialogue aims to restore the subject’s capacity for non-systematically- 
distorted discourse, through helping the subject recognize the influence of hitherto
g
unconscious causes on his/her present subjective states and thus behaviours. 
Yet, Habermas admits that, even in such a non-fully-discursive dialogue, 
argumentation plays a role: “[l]n the psychoanalytic view, the healing power of 
analytic dialogue owes something to the convincing force of the arguments 
employed in it” (1984: 41-2).
Nonetheless, he largely abandons depth-hermeneutic self-reflection, together with 
the related concept of ideology critique, as an integral part of his post-linguistic- 
turn paradigm, emphasizing instead ordinary “hermeneutic self-clarification”
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(Habermas, 1993: 5)7 He does so mainly due to the danger of authoritarianism 
which is inherent in the asymmetry between the psychoanalytic patient and 
therapist roles (see Part One, above), and more generally because the depth- 
hermeneutical model does not fulfill the necessary presuppositions of discourse.
3) The validity claim to truthfulness, on which ethical discourses are based, not 
only is not a claim to the universal validity of any ethical judgements or beliefs 
expressed, but it is not a claim that such judgements or beliefs deserve universal 
respect, or recognition either. It is simply a claim that it should be universally 
agreed that the utterance in question sincerely expresses certain aspects of the 
speaker’s inner world and, furthermore, that those aspects are authentically -  i.e. 
without illusion -  the speaker’s “own” states. Yet, Habermas clearly advocates the 
equal respect of all individual and collective ethical choices:
the universalism of equal respect for all is first put to the 
test by radical freedom in the choice of individual life 
histories and particular forms of life (Habermas, 1993:15).
The Universal-Pragmatic grounding of the equal respect of ethical perspectives, 
therefore, (since it cannot be effected via the validity claim to truthfulness, nor, of 
course, via the validity claim to factual truth) must be established by Habermas in 
terms of the validity claim to rightness. We shall look into this question below, in 
the context of the discussion of the moral aspect of practical rationality.
4) Habermas speaks of individuals as well as groups as being possible ethical 
subjects, i.e. as subjects of values, identities, conceptions of the good. At the same 
time he is concerned that social collectivities are not treated as mere macro­
subjects, insisting that we must “do justice to the intersubjective nature of collective 
will formation, which cannot be correctly construed as individual will formation writ
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large” (Habermas, 1993: 16). This concern, in fact, has been one of the reasons 
why he abandoned his early paradigm -  which he considered as being based on 
the subjectivist philosophy of consciousness -  for the intersubjectivist, language- 
based paradigm.
Consequently, Habermas needs to explain how collective ethical discourses derive 
collective ethical choices from the goals, values, identities and conceptions of the 
good of individuals. There is, of course, no difficulty in that with regard to individual 
ethical choices which coincide with each other, or can be brought into line with 
each other through hermeneutic dialogue -  which is largely the case, for groups 
whose members share the same cultural tradition, in which their individual ethical 
choices are rooted. It is, however, highly challenging when the sets of values, 
identities and conceptions of the good of the individuals comprising a collectivity 
differ, and much more so when they conflict with each other. And it must be said 
that this is a challenge which Habermas does not meet. For in order to 
communicatively synthesize, or aggregate the diverse sets of ethical choices of 
several individual subjects into a single, composite set of ethical choices adopted 
by the whole group collectively, there must be, firstly recognition by each individual 
subject of the (authentic) ethical choices of all other individuals involved, and 
secondly, a communicative method for synthesizing the mutually respected 
choices, both recognition and method being justified in terms of Universal 
Pragmatics. We have already pointed out that mutual recognition cannot be 
grounded in terms of the validity claim to truthfulness, which forms the basis of 
ethical discourse, and that the question of its grounding needs to be examined in 
connection with the only remaining relevant aspect of practical rationality, the 
moral aspect. On the other hand, Habermas neither provides nor Universal- 
Pragmatically justifies in the context of ethical discourse, any communicative 
procedure for aggregating diverse values, identities and conceptions of the good.
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Compromise as a result of bargaining, which is increasingly relied upon by 
Habermas (especially in Between Facts and Norms) as a way of dealing with 
conflicting goals, is seen by him as a strategic, not a communicative, approach, as 
we shall see in the following Part (section 3.3.1).
2.4.3 The Moral Employment of Practical Rationality
Here we are dealing with the question “what should I/we do?” in the deontological, 
moral sense of what I/we ought to do, or what is my/our duty to do, unconditionally 
(Habermas, 1993: 8). Whereas the pragmatic and ethical employments of practical 
rationality are oriented to the purposive and the good, respectively, the moral 
employment of practical rationality is oriented to what is universally right, or just, or 
equally in the interest of everyone. The shift from the perspective of “what is good 
for me” to the moral attitude of “what is good for all” occurs, according to 
Habermas, “as soon as my actions affect the interests of others and lead to 
conflicts that should be regulated in an impartial manner” ( ibid.: 5). The impartial 
resolution of conflicts of interests is contrasted to their settlement through a 
strategic approach, where “the participants assume that each decides 
egocentrically in accordance with his interests” ( ibid.: 6).
The moral employment of practical rationality primarily takes the form of 
discourses oriented to the justification of moral norms, or maxims. Moral norms are 
understood, in line with the Kantian, deontological tradition, as commands or 
“ought” statements, applicable universally, i.e. in all (relevant) situations, 
regardless of social, historical or other context, and for all potential addressees, 
that is, all human beings, or -  even more broadly -  for all beings capable of 
speech and action.8
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Moral norms prescribe duties, or obligations, either of a positive kind (Do X) or of a 
negative kind, that is prohibitions (Do not do Y). Often one and the same norm can 
take both a positive and a negative form (e.g. “You must always keep your 
promises”, or “Never break your promises”). Furthermore, one’s moral duty implies 
a corresponding moral right of others. My duty not to lie corresponds to others’ 
right not to be lied to by me. Unlike Kant, however, Habermas does not consider 
the criterion “whether I can will that a maxim should be followed by everyone as a 
general law” as the test for valid moral norms ( ibid.: 7). For such a test -  such a 
formulation of the principle of universalization -  “remains bound to the personal 
perspective of a particular individual” ( ibid.), and could, counter-intuitively, justify 
as moral, for example, “a casual attitude towards deception”, if only one personally 
happened not to mind others having a similar attitude in comparable situations ( 
ibid.).
Habermas’s Universalization Principle is formulated as follows:
Every valid norm has to fulfill the following condition: All 
affected can accept the consequences and the side 
effects its general observance can be anticipated to have 
for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and these 
consequences are preferred to those of known alternative 
possibilities for regulation) (Habermas, 1990: 65).
Habermas stresses that this universalization principle must not be interpreted as a 
test that can be applied to norms monologically. It is not up to individuals to judge, 
by putting themselves into the position of others affected, whether everyone else 
would approve the norm in question. Rather, the decision must be taken, in a 
cooperative manner, by all concerned, a point encapsulated in what Habermas 
calls the Discourse Principle:
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Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could
meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as
participants in a practical discourse ( ibid.: 66).
Thus, contrary to those whom he considers “monological” moral theorists,
Habermas denies that moral philosophers can go beyond clarifying moral concepts
and the nature of moral discourse, to passing (philosophically authoritative)
judgements on substantive moral norms. Such norms can be determined only at
the level of universal moral discourses, in which of course philosophers must take
part as ordinary participants, and, perhaps, also play the role of process experts
g
(see Habermas, 1990: 94). His version of the universalization principle,
Habermas maintains, captures more adequately than rival ideas (such as those of 
R. M. Hare, Kurt Baier, Bernard Gent, Marcus Singer and Rawls) important 
common intuitions regarding the nature of morality, as distinct from ethics, above 
all those of “impartiality” and “equality of treatment” ( ibid.: 64-66; Habermas, 
1990: 43). As already implied in the preceding discussion, moral discourses in 
which U is applied are argumentative deliberations aiming not to produce universal 
moral norms but to test moral norms whose validity has been questioned.
Following this initial presentation of some central tenets of Habermas’s conception 
of moral rationality, a number of additional issues need to be discussed.
1) The process of testing moral norms, through the application of the Principle of 
Universalization takes place in abstraction (i.e., it is detached) from any particular 
concrete situation or context; and this is what, for Habermas, secures their 
universal status: “Valid norms owe their abstract universality to the fact that they 
withstand the universalization test only in a decontextualized form” (Habermas, 
1993:13). Participants in such moral discourses apply the Principle -  i.e. examine 
whether they would accept the consequences of the general observance of the
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norm under consideration -  by envisaging as wide a variety of possible 
applications of the norms being tested as they can. However, the perspective of 
such participants cannot but be historically situated and finite, making it impossible 
to take into consideration the relevant features of all the possible concrete 
situations that might present themselves to moral agents, especially future ones. 
Thus, any set of valid moral norms -  i.e. norms that have passed the test of 
universalization in the above sense -  might not provide sufficient guidance to a 
moral agent confronted with a new concrete situation. An agent, for example, 
being asked by the ill-intentioned pursuers of an innocent person to give 
information (that the agent possesses) about the whereabouts of the person being 
pursued, might not be able to derive sufficient guidance as to the morally right 
thing to do, from the two arguably relevant moral norms, (1) “Do not harm innocent 
persons” and (2) “Do not tell lies”. For it is unlikely that the processes of discursive 
validation of the two norms could have endowed these norms with sufficient 
qualifications regarding their conditions of application so that they might fully cover 
the very specific conditions in which the agent in question is called upon to apply 
the norms. In such a situation, how could the agent decide what to do? Which of 
the two norms is more appropriate in the given situation? Is it morally right for the 
agent to lie to the pursuers, making sure that no harm would be done to an 
innocent person, or to tell the truth, and as a result cause such harm?
In addition to cognitive, decision-making deficiencies, decontextualized,
10universalist moral discourses are also responsible for a motivational deficit (and 
this, despite the fact that, unlike Kant’s universalization principle that totally 
divorces duty from inclination, Habermas’s principle incorporates interests into 
moral norms). For such discourses involvb “the uncoupling of moral judgement 
from the concrete motives that inform action” ( ibid.: 14), thereby depriving, so to
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speak, the moral will of the (strong) motivating force of interests and leaving it only 
with the (weaker) force of reason:
under a strict deontological point of view, moral questions 
are taken out of their contexts in such a way that moral 
solutions retain only the rationally motivating force of 
insights (Habermas, 1990:178).
Thus, even if one knows what, according to universalist morality, the right thing to 
do is, one may not “summon the resolve” to act accordingly. It is Habermas’s view 
that unlike the imperative “should” in its pragmatic and ethical senses, which have, 
respectively, an external (hypothetical) or reciprocal relation to the will, the moral 
“should” -  the unconditional, categorical ought -  has an obligatory function: “the 
rightness of moral commands... is intended to bind the will rationally from within” ( 
ibid.: 15).
Sometimes the will obeys the imperatives of moral rationality, and in these cases 
Habermas, following Kant, characterizes it as “autonomous” will. But often volition 
does not adhere to rational moral imperatives. This happens when the “rationally 
motivating force of insights”, or the “motivational force of goods reasons” is 
outweighed by other, interest-oriented motives, concretely operating in specific 
situations ( ibid.: 10). In such cases we speak of “weakness of will”.
Habermas rejects neo-Aristotelian responses to the above cognitive and 
motivational difficulties of universalist, deontological morality (See Habermas, 
1993: 113-132). Neo-Aristotelians such as Alastair MacIntyre, Bernard Williams, 
Charles Taylor and others, typically reject the sharp separation between norm- 
based morality and evaluative ethics and propose tackling concrete ethical/moral 
decision-making challenges in terms of some form of context-dependent practical
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deliberation -  akin to Aristotle’s phronesis -  restricted within the bounds of a 
particular form of life. Such deliberation, being carried out by agents socialized in, 
and belonging to the form of life in question, is claimed to possess both the 
situational cognitive sensitivity and the motivational force necessary for good 
practical judgement and corresponding action.
Habermas’s central objections to this approach run as follows: Aristotle’s phronesis 
is metaphysically underpinned by a teleological theory of human nature which 
privileges life in a Greek polis. Modern philosophers, by contrast, no longer have at 
their disposal the metaphysical tools with which to establish a hierarchy among the 
vast plurality of contemporary forms of life, and thus to provide support for any 
particular context-based set of practical judgements. Consequently, they are left 
with two options. The first one is to reduce practical reason to the clarification of 
the parochial ethical/moral common sense of one’s own culture. This relativistic 
interpretation, with its unmistakable conservative overtones, would be 
objectionable to most neo-Aristotelians, who would like to reserve for practical 
reason a socially critical role. The second option is to open up the boundaries of 
particular cultural life-forms from within and extend the application of practical 
reason to what is common to all life-forms. But this would not be far from the 
Kantian-type narrowly moral point of view, including Habermas’s own.
The horizon of every form of life is fluid, its boundaries 
permeable... If each individual community can achieve 
“knowledge”... concerning what is good for it, it is far from 
obvious why this practical knowledge should not be 
extended in an intercultural direction and become so 
thoroughly emancipated from provincial limitations that it 
orients itself to what is equally good for all. Without
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metaphysical backing, what Aristotle called phronesis must 
either dissolve into mere common sense or be developed 
into a concept of practical reason that satisfies the criteria of 
procedural rationality (Habermas, 1993: 124-5).
Hence, Habermas insists that the above mentioned cognitive and motivational 
problems facing universal norm-based morality should not lead us to give up either 
the specifically modern distinction between such a conception of morality and 
evaluative ethics, or the effort to develop an adequate form of non-contextual 
rationality for the former. His suggestion for overcoming the cognitive problem of 
situational moral decision making is to supplement Discourses of Justification -  
that is the discursive processes concerned with the validation of universal moral 
norms -  with Discourses of Application. The latter would be concerned not with the 
testing of norms but with the application, in specific situations, of already validated 
norms. Though situation-sensitive and requiring some form of “hermeneutic 
prudence”, such discourses would not be contextual in a relativist sense. They 
would “rely on reasons that are in principle valid for everyone” (Habermas, 1993: 
172).
In his initial major statement of his discourse theory of morality, in Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action, Habermas refers to “the mature 
capacity for moral judgement” as a faculty necessary for both justifying and 
applying norms. This faculty is said to be characterized by a combination of 
“cognition, empathy and agape” (Habermas, 1990: 182). In his important 
subsequent elaborations of the theory, however, in Justification and Application a 
few years later, he adopts for the discourses of application the more precise model 
developed by Klaus Gunther in The Sense of Appropriateness (1993). Whereas 
discourses of justification are based on the principle of universalization, discourses
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of application, according to this model, rely on the principle of appropriateness. 
Together, the two principles provide the foundations for a fully rational process of 
moral decision making:
In discourses of application, the principle of appropriateness 
takes on the role played by the principle of universalization in 
justificatory discourses. Only the two principles taken together 
exhaust the idea of impartiality (Habermas, 1993: 37).
The principle of appropriateness is said to specify a method for impartially deciding
which of the prima facie valid but conflicting moral norms which are found to be
applicable in a given situation (e.g. “Do not tell lies” or “Do not harm innocent
persons”, in our earlier example) is the appropriate one to apply in that particular
situation. This method is based on what Gunther calls “the criterion of coherence”
(Gunther, 1993: 243). Here we shall not discuss this criterion of appropriateness,
11or more generally expand any further on the issue of discourses of application.
The resolution of the cognitive problem of moral norm application leaves, of 
course, intact the motivational deficit of universalist morality. In this respect, 
Habermas- in line with Hegel as well as the neo-Aristotelians -  recognizes the 
dependence of moral action on ethical life. Rational moral insight does carry a 
certain motivational force, evidence of which are “the pangs of conscience that 
plague us when we act against our better judgement” (Habermas, 1993: 14). This 
force, however is weak. It needs to be supplemented with social (cultural as well 
as institutional) motivational force. It is thus no accident, for Habermas, that 
universalist morality historically arose in conditions of modernity; For it is only 
under such conditions -  with their cultivation and institutional support of 
postconventional forms of consciousness -  that it can be effective in practice.
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Any universalistic morality is dependent upon a form of 
life that meets it halfway. There has to be a modicum of 
congruence between morality and the practices of 
socialization and education... Morality thrives only in an 
environment in which postconventional ideas about law 
and morality have already been institutionalized to a 
certain extent (Habermas, 1990: 207-8; see also ibid.:
108-109).
2) Application issues notwithstanding, the Universalization Principle remains, for 
Habermasian norm-based discourse theory of morality, the central rule of moral 
argumentation. As such, of course, it itself stands in need of justification. 
Habermas’s strategy, in this regard is to ground the principle in the structure of 
communicative rationality, thus, in the last analysis, in the universal pragmatics of 
speech oriented to reaching understanding.
[T]he principle of universalization, which acts as a rule of 
argumentation, is implied by the presuppositions of 
argumentation in general... Every person who accepts the 
universal and necessary communicative presuppositions of 
argumentative speech and who knows what it means to 
justify a norm of action implicitly presupposes as valid the 
principle of universalization, whether in the form I gave it 
above or in an equivalent form (Habermas, 1990: 86).
Among the necessary presuppositions of argumentation referred to by Habermas, 
particularly relevant to morality are those concerning (a) the exclusion of “all 
external or internal coercion other than the force of the better argument”, (b) 
“relations of mutual recognition” and (c) participants’ equal opportunity to
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contribute to the argumentation and to put forth their own arguments”, especially 
“to express [their] attitudes, desires and needs” ( ibid.: 88, 89).12 Thus, the 
universal-pragmatically established presuppositions of argumentation include the 
recognition and equal treatment of every participant’s interests. On this basis 
Habermas argues that the universalization principle is derivable from the structure 
of communicative rationality and action. In an alternative formulation of this point to 
the one quoted above he traces the universalization principle specifically to 
normative argumentation (as distinct from argumentation concerning truth or 
truthfulness):
[E]veryone who seriously tries to discursively redeem 
normative claims to validity intuitively accepts procedural 
conditions that amount to implicitly acknowledging [the 
universalization principle] ( ibid.: 92-3).
The testing of a moral norm by means of the universalization principle is certainly 
in line with the presuppositions of argumentation, including that of the (recognition 
and) equal treatment of the interests of those concerned, thus with communicative 
action as such. However, this does not amount to the derivation from 
communicative action of the necessity to apply the principle. What can reasonably 
be argued is that if a universal moral norm needs to be argumentatively tested, 
such a testing -  in order to respect presuppositions such as that of the equal 
treatment of the interests of those concerned, but also in order to deal with the 
universality of the norms being considered -  must be done in terms of the 
universalization principle. Consequently, the necessary application of the principle 
would be derivable from, or presupposed by, the structure of communicative action 
itself, only if the latter necessitated the (discursive) justification of universal, moral 
norms. Equally, to say that the structure of communicative action does not
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presuppose the necessary employment of the universalization principle, would 
mean that it (the structure of communicative action) does not presuppose the need 
to (discursively) justify moral norms. The two presuppositions -  that of moral 
norms and that of the universalization principle -  stand or fall together.
Evidently, Habermas defends both these presuppositions in terms of the idea of 
the validity claim to rightness. According to that idea, in every speech act there is 
an implicit claim that the act in question is right with regard to legitimately shared 
social norms, which, directly or indirectly, include valid moral norms. Thus, 
communicative action is thereby said to imply the need to discursively justify 
universal moral norms and, by the same token, the need to apply the principle of 
universalization. In addition, the validity claim to rightness seems to imply that 
communicative action entails the existence of valid moral norms, i.e., that some of 
the applications of the universalization principle will yield positive results, that is 
approve the candidate moral norm being tested.
However, all these three aspects of Habermas’s validity claim to rightness are 
highly questionable. We shall return to this issue in the nextPart (section 3.5), 
where I shall propose an alternative to the validity claim to rightness and look 
further into the role of the universalization principle.
3) In the section on the Ethical Employment of Practical Rationality above, we 
referred the issue of ethical choices made by collective agents to Habermas’s 
treatment of moral rationality. It was pointed out that in order to give a 
communicative (as opposed to a strategic) account of the aggregation of diverse 
individual ethical choices into composite ones, Habermas had to provide (a) a 
universal-pragmatic justification of the recognition and equal treatment of the 
interests of the individuals concerned and (b) a communicatively rational method of 
aggregation.
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In the light of the preceding discussion of his views on moral rationality, we can 
maintain that Habermas largely succeeds with regard to requirement (a), but not 
with regard to (b). Concerning the latter, even if the universalization principle were 
(plausibly) construed as a method for synthesizing diverse interests, it could not 
serve the purpose, for that principle can deal only with norms of action of the 
universal collective of all thinking and acting beings, not with substantive ethical 
choices (goals, values, etc.) of multifarious, particular, contingently formed groups.
In the following Part (section 3.6.2) we shall return to the pragmatic, ethical and 
moral/normative forms of practical discourse in order to explore relations of mutual 
dependence between them.
2.4.4 A conceptual lacuna
In Part One it has been argued that Habermas’s early paradigm categorially 
excludes the possibility of human beings using other human beings as means to 
their ends in “praxial”, or communicative, rather than instrumental-manipulative, 
ways. An analogous conceptual gap seems to reappear in the later paradigm, as 
already indicated at the end of the previous section. There, it was pointed out that 
the dichotomy between success-oriented and communicative action categorially 
rules out the pursuit of success, in the sense of seeking to attain egocentric goals, 
in other than strategic ways, that is, communicatively.
The same lacuna is evident, now with regard to the rationality of action, in the 
universal-pragmatically grounded tri-partite model of practical rationality just 
considered. In this model, communicative rationality can only deal on the one hand 
with the adoption and sincere expression of a subject’s goals, values, ethical 
choices in general, and on the other with the testing of moral norms. No place is 
reserved for determining how to attain the realization of particular goals, values, 
etc., by using certain other subjects as means, through a communicative discourse
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in which those other subjects participate. The model allows only for the 
“pragmatic”, thus strategic, pursuit of ends by means of others. In such a pursuit 
other human beings are treated as objects to be causally influenced. On the level 
of speech act theory, the heart of the problem seems to be the inability to give a 
universal-pragmatic account of requests -  that is of utterances through which 
speakers typically ask addressees to be means to their ends -  as speech acts that 
can conceivably be communicative, i.e. oriented to understanding/agreement, 
rather than being necessarily strategic.
Thus, utterances such as “Please give me a glass of water” and “Can I have a 
discount on that laptop?” -  insofar as they are addressed to the hearer not as 
commands but as mere requests, which are not in any way impermissible to make, 
but whose satisfaction by the hearer is understood to be optional -  cannot be 
validated in terms of any of the forms of discourse that correspond to the three 
validity claims grounded by Habermas in communicative action. This lack of a 
communicative interpretation of requests makes it impossible for Habermas to 
conceive of bargaining as a form of interaction that can possibly be 
communicative. Consequently, it also rules out the development of a 
communicative method of aggregating diverse ethical choices into composite 
ones; for such an aggregation could only be achieved on the basis of some form of 
compromise-seeking bargaining process.
As we shall see in Part Three (section 3.3), in some later texts Habermas develops 
an interpretation of requests, or, in his terms, of “naked imperatives”, as utterances 
which can take the form of somehow inferior, “weak” communicative acts. However 
as will be shown, this interpretation cannot account for all requests. Habermas also 
distinguishes between ordinary bargaining and “fair” bargaining, the latter seen as 
a form of interaction linked to morality. Nonetheless, he considers even that type of 
bargaining as in the last analysis power-based, strategic action.
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2.5. HABERMAS’S SUBSTANTIVE THEORY OF MODERN SOCIETY: 
LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM
2.5.1 Main Theses
Habermas distinguishes two forms of societal integration, that is, two ways in 
which the multiplicity of social actions are coordinated with each other, so that 
societies hold together and reproduce themselves: social integration and system 
integration.
We have drawn a distinction between mechanisms of 
social integration, which attach to action orientations, and 
mechanisms of system integration, which reach right 
through action orientations. In one case the agents’ actions 
are coordinated through a harmonizing of action 
orientations that is present to them; in the other, through a 
functional intermeshing of action consequences that 
remain latent, that is, that can go beyond the participants’ 
horizon of orientation (Habermas, 1987: 202).
Social integration, that is, societal integration in terms of “action orientations” is 
understood by Habermas as integration effected by means of communicative 
interactions: It is achieved through “normatively secured or communicatively 
achieved consensus” ( ibid.: 117); or, by means of “consensus-forming 
mechanisms (which bring about agreement on values, norms and linguistic 
communication)” (Habermas, 1991: 252). System integration of society, on the 
other hand, takes place not in terms of the coordination of action orientations but 
“behind the backs” of social actors, as a result of “a non-normative regulation of 
individual decisions that extends beyond the actors’ consciousness” (1987:117).
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On the basis of the distinction between social and system integration, Habermas 
draws a corresponding distinction between two possible perspectives on social 
phenomena, those of lifeworld and system: To the extent that a society is seen 
as socially integrated -  an internal, participant perspective -  it is conceived as 
■the lifeworld of a social group” (1987: 117). To the extent that it is seen as 
holding together through system integration -  an external, observer perspective 
-  society is considered as a self-regulating system; as “a system of actions such 
that each action has a functional significance according to its contribution to the 
maintenance of the system” ( ibid.). Social actors themselves neither intend (or 
anticipate) the systemic effects of their actions, nor do they -  in their capacity as 
actors as opposed to their possible capacity as observers, e.g. social scientists -  
have an overall view, or even awareness of the system which their own actions, 
through their consequences, are creating.
The lifeworld is the inter-subjectively shared field of interactions between the 
members of society. It consists of common traditions and cooperative processes 
of situation interpretation and action coordination. As such, the lifeworld is 
internally linked to action oriented to reaching understanding (Habermas, 1987: 
119; 1991: 252). The reproduction of the lifeworld takes place through two 
complementary types of consensus, corresponding, respectively, to preservation 
and continuity on the one hand and learning and change on the other: The first is 
taken-for-granted consensus, based on the “massive preunderstanding of 
participants” (Habermas, 1991: 244) who share the same traditions; the second 
is communicatively achieved consensus, based on an orientation to 
argumentatively testing criticizable validity claims (see Habermas, 1996: 322-4).
In this connection, Habermas speaks of a polarity between taken-for-granted and 
achieved consensus, and provides an analysis of the historical movement from
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the predominance of the former to the predominance of the latter. This 
movement is described as a “linguistification of the sacred”, a process in which 
language ceases to be used merely in an instrumental way, as the medium for 
the ritual application of traditional social-religious (“sacred”) norms, and plays the 
primary role of questioning and justifying the validity and forms of application of 
norms (Habermas, 1987: 77ff). Thus, “linguistification”, in this sense, results in 
the “communicative thawing of traditionally solid institutions” ( ibid.: 91). Acting 
social agents always have knowledge of the lifeworld as the order of society 
created by their own communicatively oriented actions. This knowledge has the 
form of explicit awareness insofar as that order is the product of their deliberately 
pursued and achieved consensus, and is intuitive insofar as the lifeworld order is 
a result of unreflective, taken-for-granted consensus.
A lifeworld is said to be rationalized to the extent that it is reproduced by means 
of communicatively achieved -  rather than taken-for-granted -  consensus. For to 
that extent, the potential for rationality which is inherent in the communicative 
action that lies at the heart of the lifeworld is actualized (Habermas, 1987: 
145-6; 1991: 223-4). The rationalization of the lifeworld, therefore, is for 
Habermas intrinsically linked to the “linguistification of the sacred”. For the latter 
is precisely conceived as a process of “release of the rationality potential in 
communicative action” ( ibid.: 77).
To be sure -  and this is a lesson Habermas has learnt from Mead as well as 
from the phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition, above all Husserl, Schutz and 
Gadamer -  at any given time we can “thematize”, or “linguistify” and argue about 
only a small segment of the lifeworld; a segment that is thrown into relief as a 
problematical situation which calls for our communicative attention aiming at an 
agreed interpretation -  a “shared definition” -  and coordinated action. A
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situation, thematized in this manner, has a horizon beyond which lies the rest of 
the lifeworld, taken for granted from the perspective of the situation in question. 
A thematized segment of the lifeworld can expand to include more of what had 
hitherto been taken for granted, but beyond its new horizon there will always be 
the remaining taken-for-granted lifeworld “as the horizon within which 
communicative actions are ‘always already’ moving” (Habermas, 1987: 119). It is 
thus not possible to thematize (and consequently make transparent) the entire 
lifeworld -  the whole of tradition -  at once (Habermas, 1987: 122-135). What 
can be done in the way of lifeworld rationalization -  and can be said to 
characterize modernity to a considerable degree -  is thematized and subject to 
argumentative deliberation tradition piece by piece, each time (unavoidably) 
taking the rest for granted:
It is distinctive of the modern understanding of the world 
that the cultural tradition can be exposed to testing... 
across its entire spectrum and in a methodical manner ( 
ibid.: 133).
In modern societies the rationalization of the lifeworld can be observed in all
three of what Habermas, following Parsons, takes to be its constitutive spheres,
whose differentiation itself, in his view, has come about in the wake of lifeworld
rationalization. These differentiated and yet complementary and mutually
supportive spheres, or “structural components”, of the lifeworld are (a) culture
(meaning essentially society’s stock of knowledge), (b) “society” (the term now
being used in a narrower sense meaning society’s institutional order) and (c)
15personality (referring basically to subjects’ speaking and acting competences).
The sphere of culture is increasingly characterized by a reflexivity of traditions, 
value-generalization (or “abstraction”) and a professionalization of cultural
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transmission, especially in the fields of science, morality and law (jurisprudence), 
and art and art criticism. In the sphere of “society”, there has been a progressive 
institutionalization of formal, and at the same time democratic, procedures for 
establishing legal and other principles and norms. Rationalization in the sphere 
of personality has, most importantly, moved in the directions of creating formal 
systems of child rearing and education, and developing individuated, 
autonomous self-identities and personalities equipped with abstract moral and 
cognitive competences, in contrast to earlier concrete thinking ( ibid.: 145-8).
Habermas maintains that societies -  with the significant exception of modern 
ones, as we shall see -  can be conceived simultaneously as both socially 
integrated lifeworlds and self-regulating systems functionally integrated through 
the consequences of members’ actions (Habermas, 1987: 118,120).
In non-modern societies (more so in the simpler tribal societies organized around 
kinship relations than in the more differentiated traditional societies that have a 
state organization), system integration, although by and large beyond the 
consciousness of members, is nonetheless largely effected through precisely 
those members’ communicative action orientations, which are at the same time 
(intentionally) socially integrative. For this reason social scientists (for example, 
functionalist social anthropologists) who study those societies from the observer 
perspective are able to trace observed systemic features to specific aspects of 
the lifeworld. Thus, the two orders are, in a sense, “coextensive”. But of course, 
the reverse process -  that of tracing socially integrative lifeworld features to 
systemic functions -  is not possible. In such cases, for Habermas, this gives the 
lifeworld and the internalist, hermeneutic perspective primacy over the still 
“parasitic” ( ibid.: 181) system and systems theory.
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In modern societies, however, lifeworld and system cease to be coextensive 
(and hierarchically related) in the above manner. In the course of social evolution 
certain domains of social life, namely the market economy and state 
administration, have developed, which are integrated systemically through the 
functional interconnections of the consequences not of actions that are at the 
same time communicatively oriented and intended for social integration, and 
thus constitutive of the lifeworld, but of strategic actions that are merely “steered” 
by non-symbolic, or “delinguistified”, media of communication, namely money 
and power, respectively. Thus, in modern societies, the market economy and 
state administration have not just formed themselves into epistemologically 
distinct domains of social life amenable to scientific study from the observer 
perspective of systems theory (in which case they wouid remain the obverse, 
coextensive side of a lifeworld simultaneously comprehensible intuitively from 
the internal perspective of participants). Rather, they have, ontologically, so to 
speak, virtually disconnected themselves -  they have been “uncoupled”, in 
Habermas’s terminology -  from the lifeworld; they are now self-regulated 
subsystems amenable to analysis exclusively from the counter-intuitive, 
externalist perspective of systems theory.
The transfer of action coordination from language over to
steering media means an uncoupling of interaction from
lifeworld contexts. Media such as money and power...
encode a purposive-rational attitude toward calculable
amounts of value and make it possible to exert
generalized, strategic influence on the decisions of other
participants while bypassing processes of consensus-
oriented communication... the lifeworld is no longer
12
needed for the coordination of action ( ibid.: 183).
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From the point of view of everyday lifeworld activity, these subsystems appear 
increasingly as “something in the objective world”, as “second nature”, towards 
which social agents can relate only in an instrumental, subject-object manner ( 
ibid.: 154,173).
Habermas accounts for the uncoupling of the two subsystems from the lifeworld in 
terms of the process of lifeworld rationalization. It will not be necessary, for our 
present purposes, to go into the intricacies of his social-evolutionary and historical 
arguments to that effect (see, especially, Habermas, 1987: 153-197). The 
essential points are as follows:
In modernity, lifeworld rationalization, with the concomitant internal differentiation 
and complexity of the lifeworld, went so far that it overburdened the lifeworld’s 
coordination capacity; in other words, it overburdened society’s capacity to 
reproduce itself as a lifeworld, that is, purely communicatively. Thus, societal 
coordination and integration at modern levels of lifeworld rationality required relief 
mechanisms that would reduce the need for explicit communication, simplifying 
social coordination processes.
Historically, this requirement for relief mechanisms came to be fulfilled with the 
evolution and uncoupling from the lifeworld of the market economy and state 
administration as two self-regulated subsystems of strategic action. The core of 
this development was the legal institutionalization of the non-symbolic or 
“delinguistified” steering media of money and power, which came to replace (rather 
than “condense”) communicative action, as the respective integrative mechanisms 
in these two social action domains. This institutionalization -  a process necessary 
for the uncoupling and at the same time one that kept the uncoupled subsystems 
“anchored” in the lifeworld, i.e. indirectly linked to communicative action -  would be 
impossible in the absence of important aspects of a moderately rationalized
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lifeworld, above all, modern universalist morality and law. Thus, the rationalization 
of the lifeworld both created the need and provided the necessary means for the 
modern uncoupling of the economic and administrative subsystems from the 
lifeworld.
The legal institutions responsible for the institutionalization, uncoupling and 
anchoring of the subsystems are the conduits through which any influences 
between the subsystems and the lifeworld are transmitted. In theory, such 
influences can flow in either direction:
[T]he institutions that anchor steering mechanisms such 
as power and money in the lifeworld could serve as a 
channel either for the influence of the lifeworld on 
formally organized domains of action or, conversely, for 
the influence of the system on communicatively 
structured contexts of action (Habermas, 1987:185).
In The Theory of Communicative Action Habermas emphasizes what he believes 
to be an excessive influence in the direction from the subsystems to the lifeworld, 
an influence he characterizes as a colonization of the lifeworld and tends to 
attribute mainly to the expansionist dynamics of capitalism. Colonization occurs 
when core areas of the lifeworld are “mediatized”, that is, when communicative 
action, in areas in which it is indispensable for the very reproduction of the 
lifeworld, is replaced by instrumental/strategic action steered by the non-linguistic 
media of money and bureaucratic administrative power:
[S]ystemic mechanisms suppress forms of social 
integration even in those areas where a consensus- 
dependent coordination of action cannot be replaced,
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that is, where the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld 
is at stake. In these areas, the mediatization of the 
lifeworld assumes the form of colonization ( ibid.: 196; 
see also pp. 356, 367).
Prominent examples of colonizing tendencies are the progressive monetarization 
and/or bureaucratization of such identity- and meaning-producing areas of the 
lifeworld as family life, education, culture and the political public sphere.
As “meaning can neither be bought nor coerced” (Habermas, 1991: 259), such an 
encroachment of the subsystems on the lifeworld -  one that, as we have seen, by 
definition undermines the production of meaning in society -  has dire social 
effects. According to Habermas, serious pathologies of modernity diagnosed by 
major social theorists and encapsulated in such notions as alienation (Marx), 
anomie (Durkheim) and loss of meaning and freedom (Weber), are the result of 
system colonization of the lifeworld, and not of lifeworld rationalization itself 
(expressed, for instance, in the decline of religion and traditional morals) as 
counter-enlightenment critics of modern culture claim (Habermas, 1987: 148).Of 
course, it is the rationalization of the lifeworld that initially makes possible the 
emergence of the subsystems which then turn back to colonize the lifeworld itself. 
However, though made possible by lifeworld rationalization, colonization is not 
made inevitable by it. It is rather due to the “independent imperatives” of the two 
specific subsystems themselves ( ibid.: 155, 186). Moreover, lifeworld 
rationalization, while giving rise to forces that lead to the erosion of the lifeworld, at 
the same time, paradoxically, created the “utopian perspective” from which to 
criticize that erosion and the capitalist modernization responsible for it 
( ibid.: 357).15
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As mentioned above, the colonizing influences of the subsystems upon the 
lifeworld are channelled through the legal apparatus that institutionalizes the 
subsystems. In particular, the vehicle of these influences is juridification, in the 
specific forms that it has assumed in modern times.
By the term “juridification” Habermas refers to “the tendency toward an increase in 
formal (or positive, written) law that can be observed in modern society” 
( ibid.: 357). Habermas’s thesis is that in some of its “waves”, modern juridification 
has been an ambivalent process (hence, he speaks of a “dialectic” of juridification) 
( ibid.: 356-373): while it guaranteed freedoms and rights, at the same time it had 
destructive effects on the lifeworld existence of social actors. Major examples are 
the early modern emancipation of wage labour from feudal bonds, which “had to 
be paid for with the proletarianization of the wage labourers’ mode of life” 
(Habermas, 1987: 361), and the ambivalent character of the democratic welfare 
state. In the case of social-welfare law, for example, the unquestionably historically 
progressive “legal entitlements to monetary income in case of illness, old age and 
the like” are bought at a high price, in the form of their “bureaucratic 
implementation” ( ibid.: 362). Similar ambivalences exist with regard to family and 
school law, where the undoubtedly desirable legal protection of the rights of the 
individuals involved (family members, school children, teachers, etc.) from each 
other’s potential interest-based violations as well as from oppressive traditional 
practices, at the same time makes those very individuals dependent on the state 
and tends to transform their now formally regulated relationships into 
depersonalized interactions, in which “[as] legal subjects they encounter one 
another in an objectivizing, success-oriented attitude” ( ibid.: 369).
Whereas in The Theory of Communicative Action Habermas one-sidedly 
emphasizes the (colonizing) influence of the subsystems upon the lifeworld, in
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later works, above all In Between Facts and Norms, he pays more attention to 
(actual and potential) influences in Xhe opposite direction. Key role in lifeworld’s 
ability to control the media-steered subsystems and protect itself from their 
colonizing incursions is, once more, assigned to law. In contrast to his earlier 
focusing on the negative aspects of juridification, as a vehicle of lifeworld 
colonization, now Habermas views law more positively. By virtue of two 
complementary aspects of it, law is understood to have a foothold both in the 
domain of the lifeworld and in the world of the media-steered subsystems. On the 
one hand, as lawmaking, that is as a process primarily of generating legitimate 
legal norms and secondarily deciding how general legal norms should be applied 
in specific situations, law belongs to the lifeworld, and as such is linked to 
processes of opinion formation in political life and, more broadly, the public 
sphere. (Here, a prominent role is today played by new social movements such as 
those of feminism, anti-racism, environmentalism and peace activism). On the 
other hand, as law-administration and law-enforcement, supported by the state’s 
legitimate instruments of coercion, law belongs to the realm of the subsystems. 
Due to this twin capacity, law is viewed “as the medium through which 
communicative power is translated into administrative power” (Habermas, 1996: 
150).
Legitimate lawmaking, that is the process of generating valid -  thus justified -  
legal norms, is conceptualized by Habermas in terms of the “Discourse Principle”, 
which states that,
Just those action norms are valid to which all 
possibly affected persons could agree as 
participants in rational discourses ( ibid.: 107).
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This formulation of the Discourse Principle differs significantly from the earlier one, 
put forward in the context of his discourse theory of morality (Habermas, 1990: 
66). Though both formulations “explicate] the meaning of impartiality in practical 
judgements” (1996: 107), with the previous one, as Habermas self-critically 
maintains, he had “not sufficiently distinguished between the discourse principle 
and the moral principle” ( ibid.: 108). The older version was concerned with the 
rational process of justifying exclusively moral norms, that is, norms based on 
universalizable interests. That process, therefore, (potentially) involved the 
universal participation of all human beings. The new version of the Discourse 
Principle, quoted above, is understood to be one concerned with the rational 
justification of action norms in general, including both moral and legal norms. As 
such, the Principle is Uneutral with respect to morality and law” ( ibid.: 107).
When employed for the validation of moral norms, the Discourse Principle 
becomes a universalization principle. However, when applied to legal norms -  i.e. 
action norms given an institutional, legal form -  thus specifying a rational process 
of legitimate lawmaking, the Principle of Discourse takes a more complex form, 
that of the “Democratic Principle”. For law, Habermas insists, is not identical with, 
or subordinate to morality. Lawmaking does of course take into account issues of 
(universal)/7?ora/ justice, but at the same time it also considers questions of 
another two types: ethical questions, regarding the substantive goals (themselves 
based on the identities and conceptions of the good) of those involved -  i.e. those 
who will be affected by the legislation being considered and thus (in principle) 
participating in the lawmaking process; and pragmatic, means-ends questions, i.e. 
questions concerning the instrumental effectiveness of the relevant legislation. For 
a law such as, for example, one specifying a graduated income tax system, must, 
according to this conception, be at once (a) morally just (in a universalist sense),
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(b) oriented to certain purposes (goals, values, interests) of the legal community 
concerned, and (c) effective in realizing those purposes.
The process of lawmaking in terms of the Democratic Principle, therefore, involves 
the employment of the three forms of practical discourse, which Habermas 
grounds in the theory of Universal Pragmatics: the moral (including both 
discourses of justification and discourses of application), the ethical, and the 
pragmatic (see the previous section of this study; also, Habermas, 1993: 1-17, 
and 1996: 159-162). In addition, however, it involves processes of bargaining, or 
negotiation, insofar as among the relevant purposes, or interests, pursued there 
are some that are not common to all the individuals or groups comprising the legal 
community, but differ from or conflict with each other and need to be reconciled on 
the basis of mutually acceptable compromises. These bargaining processes 
seeking to reach compromises among conflicting interests are not oriented to 
reaching understanding but are, for Habermas, necessarily based on participants’ 
“factual power positions and the corresponding threat potentials” (1996: 140), i.e. 
strategic. This is the case, in the last analysis, even when bargaining is fair”, that 
is, procedurally regulated in such a way that bargaining power is “disciplined by its 
equal distribution among the parties” ( ibid.: 166); though, as we shall see in the 
next Part, Habermas does go someway towards establishing certain bridges 
between fair bargaining and argumentation oriented to reaching understanding.
Thus, Habermas distinguishes between (moral, ethical and pragmatic) 
communicative discourse, on the one hand and (essentially power-based, thus 
strategic), fair bargaining or negotiation, over interests, on the other, 
conceptualizing rational democratic lawmaking as a combination of the two.
The lifeworld, for Habermas, can exert effective influence on the subsystems 
precisely through rational lawmaking in the above sense, though not without “a
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radical and broadly effective democratization” (Habermas, 1991: 261). In this way, 
the lifeworld acquires the potentiality to promote such forms of juridification as 
would transform the capitalist logic of the economic and administrative 
subsystems, reverse their colonizing influence and keep them under lifeworld 
control ( ibid..).
However, despite his belief in the possibility -  and indeed the desirability -  of 
containing the media-steered subsystems and checking their colonizing effects on 
the lifeworld, Habermas insists that under conditions of modern complexity, the 
two media-steered subsystems remain indispensable for the reproduction of 
society, in particular for society’s material reproduction. The costs, in terms of time 
and energy, of the communicative coordination of social action (Habermas, 1996: 
325) make it impossible for modern society in its totality to be socially integrated, 
as a lifeworld. The uncoupling from the lifeworld of the domains of the economy 
and state administration as subsystems steered by the non-symbolic media of 
money and power, respectively, posses an “intrinsic evolutionary value” 
(Habermas, 1991: 261); and, unlike the colonizing encroachment of those 
subsystems on the lifeworld, any attempt to reverse it would be not only 
unrealistic, but historically a rather regressive move. Responding to criticism of this 
view, Habermas states:
I believe for empirical reasons that there is no longer 
much prospect of the democratic reshaping from within 
of a differentiated economic system... by switching its 
steering from money and organizational power 
completely over to participation ( ibid..).
Moreover, Habermas tends to consider the two media-steered subsystems by and 
large unproblematic, so long as they are properly “anchored” in the lifeworld and
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prevented from exerting colonizing influences upon it. For, as we have seen, for 
Habermas it is colonization and not uncoupling itself that is responsible for the 
major pathologies of modern society.
2.5.2 Some Important Critical Perspectives
The main objections to Habermas’s two-tier theory of modern society centre 
around two major aspects of it: Firstly, the distinction between a lifeworld socially 
integrated via communicative action orientations and systemically integrated 
domains of media-steered strategic action; and secondly, the normative 
acceptance of the economic and administrative subsystems as permanent 
features of modern society.
1) With regard to the distinction between Lifeworld and System, Habermas has 
been criticized for linking together too tightly types of action with forms of action 
coordination and societal integration and, ultimately, with domains of social life; 
namely, linking communicative action with social integration and the lifeworld, on 
the one hand, and strategic action with media-steered system integration and the 
societal domains of market economy and state administration, on the other:
Habermas identifies in a misleading fashion a typology 
of action with the distinction among types of 
coordination of action...[H]e connects too closely 
different types of action and different societal spheres of 
action, in so far as he speaks of subsystems of 
purposively rational or of communicative action... [A] 
linear relationship of correspondence among types of 
action, types of coordination of action, and societal 
domains is... established (Joas, 1991:104).
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Critics point out that in all societal domains we encounter various types of social 
action. In particular, the domains that belong to the lifeworld, such as those of 
family life, education, and the political public sphere, are not devoid of relations of 
power and domination (and that, of course, applies also when these domains are 
free from colonization by the media-steered subsystems); on the other hand, 
communicatively oriented action is not entirely absent from, or unrelated to, the 
economic and administrative spheres of action.
In view of these objections, which threaten to undermine the foundations of his 
two-level theory of modern society, Habermas further specifies his position as 
follows:
(a) He had never intended to portray the lifeworld as a purely communicative, 
free from domination area of social life -  in his own words an area of social life 
corresponding to “an innocent image of power-free spheres of communication” 
(1991: 254). He acknowledges that, with the exception of (unlikely to occur) 
lifeworld conditions where non-repressive, non-deceptive and non-self-deceptive 
relations obtain, social integration takes place through overtly or latently strategic 
action, mainly in the form of adherence to “norms of domination which sublimate 
violence”, or in the form of distorted communication ( ibid..). Thus, it is not so 
much a certain action type -  namely, communicative action -  that is associated 
with social integration and the lifeworld, as action orientation itself (communicative 
or strategic), as opposed to the unintended intermeshing of action consequences, 
which is responsible for system integration.
A point not brought out by critics, however, is that, although Habermas aspires to 
a lifeworld largely free from (overt or latent) strategic action, which is now widely 
present in it, he cannot adequately conceptualize -  due to his dichotomous 
typology of communicative vs strategic action -  lifeworld activity which is at once
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success-oriented and communicative. The closest he comes to such a conception 
is with the idea of “fair bargaining”, which he introduces as a dimension of 
rational, democratic lawmaking and whose potential applicability could, perhaps, 
be broadened to cover all other areas of the lifeworld insofar as they include 
success-oriented interactions. Fair bargaining itself, however, remains at bottom a 
power-based, strategic form of interaction.
Yet, a great deal of activity in the complex, modern lifeworld is irreducibly 
success-oriented, requiring coordination through negotiated compromise between 
conflicting interests. Habermas himself recognizes this with regard to the political 
areas of the lifeworld:
Compromises make up the bulk of political decision­
making process... Under conditions of cultural and 
societal pluralism, politically relevant goals often embody 
interests and value orientations that are by no means 
constitutive for the identity of the community at large...
(1996: 282).
This, of course, is true of the lifeworld as a whole, and can be expected to be 
even more so under conditions of further rationalization of individual and group 
identities. But if this is so, and if (for him) compromises between conflicting 
interests can come about only through interactions that, even when they consist 
of fair bargaining, are in the last analysis strategic, Habermas cannot conceive of 
-  and cannot hope for -  an entirely, or even for the most part, communicatively 
integrated and rationalized lifeworld.
(b) Regarding the action domains of the market economy and state 
administration, Habermas keeps insisting that these are, indeed, “in the final 
instance” systemically integrated through the consequences of media-steered
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strategic actions. Nonetheless, he explains that these domains are not entirely 
divorced from normative contexts and communicative action, and that to 
characterize them as areas of “norm-free sociality”, as he did in The Theory of 
Communicative Action, is misleading. For in the first place, the steering media of 
money and administrative power are legally institutionalized, thus anchored in the 
lifeworld. And secondly, the media-steered actions within the domains of the
economy and administration are inseparable from socially integrative actions
oriented to reaching understanding, though it is not the latter that are, in the last 
analysis, responsible for the systemic integration of these domains (1991: 256-8).
These responses suggest that Habermas continues to underestimate the effect 
that action-orientations have on the two domains which he considers to be 
integrated in a purely systemic manner. Concerning the sphere of the economy, 
for example, it is by no means evident that interventions into the market by state 
institutions, or by big private companies, affect economic integration -  positively or 
negatively -  through the unintended functional interconnections of their
consequences, rather than by virtue of their orientations, that is, socially. And 
insofar as the latter is the case, Habermas’s systemic model fails to explain 
modern economic integration. Furthermore, to the extent that any such powerful 
interventions into the economy are functionally or normatively desirable,
Habermas is not justified to advocate the (continued) existence of a purely 
systemically integrated market economy.
Equally, the systemic understanding of state administration seems to be highly
questionable. Post-Weber organization theory -  analyzing modern organizations,
both public and private -  identifies two types of organizational activities: the formal 
16and the informal. Formal activities largely consist in adhering to organizational 
norms (rules, regulations, procedures, etc) and obeying orders from hierarchical
200
superiors, in accordance with Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy. Research, 
however, has revealed that much of the activity going on in allegedly purely 
bureaucratic organizations is not of this formal type.
In his penetrating critique of Habermas’s systemic conception of organizations, 
Thomas McCarthy refers to significant informal elements:
[l]t seems obvious that there are also situations in which 
organizational superiors can act authoritatively only “with 
reservation”, that is, in which they know they cannot 
achieve their goals without collegiality, cooperation, mutual 
understanding (1991:129).
To this we can add two points. Firstly, informal organizational activities are not 
limited to communicative ones, as the above passage implies. Strategically 
oriented informal action also takes place. Secondly, informal organizational 
activity, communicative and strategic, is not sporadic and inconsequential. It has a 
substantial presence, and plays a significant role with regard to the organization’s 
results as well as its functioning. In particular, organization theory regards many of 
the informal elements of organizations as an answer to disfunctionalities inherent 
in the purely formal-bureaucratic model. Though all modern organizations combine 
formal and informal elements, the relative weight of the two aspects varies from 
organization to organization and from one period in the life of an organization to 
another.
Habermas is aware of the gap between activity in actual organizations and that 
anticipated by the idealized model of bureaucracy. Nonetheless, he denies that 
non-formally-regulated behaviour plays any significant organizational role,
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considering it as largely “neutralized”. For Habermas, action in modern 
organizations is, in essence, formally regulated:
[T]he classical model of bureaucracy is right in one 
respect: action within organization falls under the premises 
of formally regulated domains of action (Habermas, 1987:
310).
On this account, it is clear that Habermas views the overall integration of 
organizations exclusively in terms of relations of formal authority. This is made 
explicit in the following passage:
The basic characteristic of the action orientations of 
members is... the fact that all their actions fall under the 
conditions of organizational membership, that is to say, 
under the premises of a legally regulated domain of 
action. When we understand business concerns as self­
regulating systems, it is the aspect of legal organization 
that comes to the fore ( ibid.., emphasis added).
Leaving aside Habermas’s virtual dismissal of the possibility that informal 
elements -  whose existence he acknowledges -  might have an impact on an 
organization’s functioning, his account of organizations as self-regulated systems 
in terms of members’ action orientations, as clearly stated above, comes as a 
surprise. For as McCarthy aptly points out (1991: 129-30), this account is at odds 
with Habermas’s conception of system integration as taking place not through 
action orientations but via the functional interconnections of action consequences.
Evidently, the conception that emerges from Habermas’s analysis of how modern 
organizations integrate is one of social integration, essentially through formally-
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regulated action orientations. This formal regulation of intra-organizational actions 
is, to -be sure, thought to be power-driven, making these actions strategic in 
nature.
Viewing modern private and state organizations as societal units integraded 
socially -  rather than systemically -  through a varying combination of formally- 
regulated and informal, strategic and communicative action, raises the question 
whether it is possible to conceive of, and design, organizations that are integrated 
exclusively -  or at least predominantly -  by means of communicative action 
orientations. This question will be revisited in Part Three.
2) With regard to Habermas’s favourable attitude towards the continued existence 
in modern society of media-steered subsystems of the economy and state 
administration -  albeit, when these are relieved of their colonizing dynamic -  
critics reproach him on two main counts: (a) for not paying sufficient attention to 
the problematic character of the two subsystems even if they were kept in check 
by the lifeworld and prevented from making colonizing inroads into it; and (b) for 
considering the economic and administrative subsystems indispensable for 
modern, complex society, and, by implication, maintaining that systems theory is 
of enduring value as a scientific approach to modern social phenomena.
(a) Both money-steered market economy and power-steered, rule-based 
administration are beset by serious “intra-systemic” problems and contradictions 
(Joas, 1991: 117). These problems threaten the very self-integrative and goal- 
attainment capacity that so much recommends the subsystems to Habermas, and 
call for additional efforts to secure the subsystems’ stability and efficiency.
With regard to the market economy, the obvious example (which, needless to say, 
is by no means unknown to Habermas) is the internal crisis tendencies initially 
identified and analyzed by Marx and later studied also by mainstream -  above all
203
Keynesian -  economics (Berger, 1991: 177). From a non-systemic, normative 
point of view, of course, the capitalist market economy -  even when kept to its 
proper domain, away from meaning- and identity-producing areas of the lifeworld -  
can still be criticized for exploitation and injustice, as well as for instrumentalizing 
and commodifying human beings.
The “dysfunctions” of the pure, Weberian model of hierarchical, rule-governed 
(bureaucratic) organizations, when that model is applied in complex and rapidly 
changing situations (in contrast to being applied to simple, routine, stable tasks) 
have also been illuminated by several studies in the fields of the sociology of 
organizations and management theory. There are two core causes of these 
dysfunctions. Firstly, in the complex, fast changing and unpredictable conditions of 
modernity, strictly formal organizations do not possess the flexibility needed to 
respond in a timely and effective way to emerging situations; for it is not possible 
to devise a system of formal rules and hierarchical decision making that, in those 
conditions, could anticipate and cater in advance for all the challenges that an 
organization may face, or to give formally-determined solutions to unanticipated 
challenges when they emerge. Secondly, the more complex and fluid the 
conditions in which they operate, the less able formal organizations are to impose 
control over the actions of their members, often having to do so in the face of 
strong resistance.
These factors tend to give rise to informal practices, either in an effort to promote 
organizational goals more effectively (and this despite the rigidifying effect which 
the formal system has on members’ personalities), or in order to serve 
particularistic interests, including members’ desire to enlarge their control over 
their work situation. When they arise, these informal practices in some cases 
establish themselves as useful and acceptable elements of the organization, and
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to that extent the resulting organizational integration ceases to be systemic in the 
rule-governed manner claimed by Habermas; whereas in other cases they are 
treated by the organizational authorities as unacceptable acts of disobedience, 
and responded to by further tightening of the formal system, which, in turn, only 
exacerbates the initial disfunctionalities, leading thus to what has been called the 
“vicious circle” of bureaucracy (see, for example, the classic studies, Gouldner, 
1954; Merton, 1957; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Blau, 1963; Crazier, 1964).
Furthermore, strictly bureaucratic organizations and their Tayloristic managerial 
complements have been stigmatized for their dehumanizing effects on their 
members. Indeed, one of the most profound critics of bureaucracy in this respect 
was none other than Max Weber himself, who, while praising it for what he 
considered to be its technical superiority, at the same time spoke movingly of 
bureaucracy as an iron cage that deprives those working in it of freedom and 
meaning (see Appendix III; also Braverman, 1974). Here it should be added that 
this dehumanizing side of bureaucratic-Tayloristic economic and state 
administrative organizations cannot but have a corrupting effect on those areas of 
social life which Habermas strictly reserves for the lifeworld, such as the family 
and the political public sphere. This corrupting effect is over and above any 
incidence of what Habermas describes as the colonizing bureaucratization of 
those lifeworld domains. Moreover, it is intrinsic to bureaucracy, and thus 
inextricable from it, unlike its tendencies to colonize the lifeworld by means of 
bureaucratization, which -  at least in Habermas’s view -  can be kept in check.
b) Habermas does not show convincingly how the domains of the economy and 
state administration can operate as well-functioning, media-steered systems which 
nonetheless make no colonizing inroads into the lifeworld. In Peter Dews’ words, 
‘The Theory of Communicative Action bequeathed us the problem of how the
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life-world can ‘steer’... systems, and limit their intrusions, without disrupting their 
functioning” (Dews, 1993).
But even on the assumption that this problem could be tackled successfully, 
critics, including generally sympathetic ones, reproach Habermas for over-readily 
surrendering the economy and state administration to media-steered subsystems 
of strategic action and for consequently “ced[ing] too much territory to systems 
theory” (McCarthy, 1991: 120). It is argued that in this way he ultimately gives up 
Critical Theory’s -  including his own earlier -  aspirations for an entirely non-reified, 
emancipated and cooperative social life, and seriously compromises his emphatic 
advocacy of participatory and deliberative forms of democracy, especially in his 
more recent work. In addition, his embracing of systems theory, even if partial, is 
at odds with his earlier polemical characterization of it as “the Hochform of 
technocratic consciousness that enters the lists against any tendencies toward 
democratization and promotes a depoliticization of the public sphere by defining 
practical questions from the start as technical questions” ( ibid.: 133-4). Thus, by 
being assigned to systems theory, the domains of the economy and state 
administration are said to be technocratically insulated form moral, ethical and 
political critique. In the same vein, several commentators deny that systems theory 
is best suited, let alone necessary, for the analysis of the market economy and 
state administration even in their present forms. Both Hans Joas (1991) and 
Thomas McCarthy, among others, argue that purely action-theoretic accounts of 
modern society are not impossible.
To be fair, in contrast to the exclusively systems-theoretic approach to society, 
Habermas’s hybrid theory does not reify what it takes to be media-steered 
subsystems. It does not treat them as given, inevitable parts of social reality -  as 
second nature. Habermas, rather, considers them as social arrangements which
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can be retained and kept under control (in a form relieved of any colonizing 
capacity) through deliberate lifeworld choices, particularly political-legislative ones. 
Thus, in the final analysis, he subordinates the media-steered subsystems to a 
rationalized lifeworld, and systems theory to the theory of communicative action. 
Habermas’s recommendation of retaining the media-steered economic and 
administrative subsystems constitutes, in a way, a self-limitation of communicative 
rationality for the sake of greater benefit -  a move analogous in certain respects 
with Odysseus asking his comrades to tie him on the mast in order to protect 
himself from the anticipated, destructive lure of the Sirens.
With some risk of oversimplification, it can be argued that Habermas’s favouring 
the continued operation of the economy and state administration as systems of 
media-steered strategic action is based on a comparison between two conceptions 
of modern society: the first is one of a society consisting of lifeworld and system 
domains and attaining high effectivity regarding its “material reproduction”, in the 
sense of both material well being and societal stability and integration; the second 
conception is one of a society coextensive with a lifeworld structured and 
reproduced by means of highly rationalized communicative action, but which, due 
to a heavy cognitive and motivational burden, would fail to achieve adequate 
levels of productive and integrative effectivity. The choice between the two would 
thus involve a trade-off between productive and integrative effectivity, on the one 
hand, and human emancipation from objectification and strategic 
instrumentalization, on the other; or, put differently, a trade-off between society’s 
overall purposive rationality (with respect to the goals of material well being and 
integration) and its communicative rationality. For a critical/communicative theorist 
such as Habermas to opt for the former type of society, he must consider the gains 
in effectivity/purposive rationality involved in that choice as far outweighing
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whatever losses in emancipation/communicative rationality are thought to be 
suffered because of it.
This judgement, however, is based on shaky ground. On the one hand, Habermas, 
as we have seen, underestimates the dysfunctionalities and other serious 
shortcomings of the two favoured subsystems, even when considered in their pure 
form; he thus overrates their contribution to society’s purposive rationality. On the 
other hand -  and more importantly -  he fails to put forward a sufficiently worked 
out concept of the rejected option of a thoroughly communicative, yet complex and 
modern society, on the basis of which to assess the likely level of that society’s 
purposive rationality. More particularly, he has not conceptually envisaged a 
communicative economy or a communicative state administration; nor has he 
constructed other, intermediate options, such as of societies that include more 
limited systemic “pockets” of economic and administrative action. All such 
concepts would have to incorporate possible mechanisms whose function would 
be to condense, without negating, communicative action and thus lessen, as far as 
possible, society’s communicative -  cognitive and motivational -  load and 
correspondingly enhance its productive and integrative effectivity.
In fact, as has already been pointed out, Habermas lacks a concept of action that 
is at once success-oriented and communicative, which would be necessary for 
meeting this challenge. For without a concept of success-oriented communicative 
action he would not be able to extend the application of the communicative 
approach over any part of the thoroughly success-pervaded economic and 
administrative fields of action, or indeed to any competitive areas of what he now 
identifies as the lifeworld.
A final, major point of concern regarding Habermas’s favourable stance towards 
retaining the subsystems -  a point that would evidently be valid also if he had
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chosen the other way -  is that his choice is based on his own personal evaluative 
assessment of the relevant gains and losses, over and above the estimates of 
these gains and losses themselves. There would be no misgivings, of course, if he 
intended the judgement under discussion as the contribution to a public dialogue 
on the issue, made by one of the participants. But to present this judgement as the 
authoritative, epistemologically privileged view of a social theorist, or philosopher, 
contradicts Habermas’s own proceduralist conception of practical rationality -  
indeed his postmetaphysical conception of reason as such. In accordance with 
that conception, the question of what societal arrangements should be made, 
including whether to institutionalize any media-steered subsystem of any particular 
kind or scope -  a question, to be sure, that becomes possible only once reifying 
attitudes towards social structure are seen through -  ought to be left to processes 
of practical discourse in which all members of society can participate. Such 
discourses should not reach conclusions a priori, on the basis of cognitively 
constructed possibilities, but should be linked to social experimentation aimed at 
testing the realizability of imaginative visions in practice.
In the following, final Part of the thesis I shall be concerned with the development 
and philosophical grounding -  still largely within the Habermasian communicative 
paradigm -  of the missing concepts of success-oriented communicative action and 
of the rationality of that action. On the basis of these concepts, it will be possible to 
work towards developing ideas of a society coordinated and integrated exclusively 
or predominantly in communicative and communicatively rational ways.
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PART THREE
TOWARDS A THOROUGHLY COMMUNICATIVE 
CONCEPTION OF SOCIAL ACTION AND ITS
RATIONALITY
3.1 A CONCEPTUAL GAP IN HABERMAS: BRINGING TOGETHER 
CRITICAL THEMES DEVELOPED IN PARTS ONE AND TWO.
The dichotomous classification of action and practical rationality which we find in 
both the early work of Habermas (culminating in Knowledge and Human Interests, 
1972) and in the later, post-linguistic-turn paradigm (mainly expounded in The 
Theory of Communicative Action, 1984, 1987) creates a serious conceptual 
lacuna.
In the early work Habermas distinguishes between techne and praxis (or, 
respectively, between work and interaction); in certain early texts he even uses, 
correspondingly, the terms purposive and communicative action which 
predominate in the later paradigm. In techne a subject seeks to realize a pre­
given/previously adopted goal by means of technically manipulating an object, 
including possibly an objectified human being, social entity or social process. 
Thus, in techne, and consequently in technical rationality -  the type of rationality 
involved in techne -  the employment of certain means to an end and the technical 
manipulation of an object by a subject are inextricably bound together.
In praxis, on the other hand, two mutually respectful subjects cooperatively try to 
agree on common values or norms, or on how to act in accordance with already 
agreed values or norms. Thus, praxis, and hence the corresponding form of 
rationality, which I have termed praxial rationality, also involve two inextricably
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bound elements: the concern with determining or following common values or 
norms, on the one hand, and a relationship between mutually respectful subjects, 
on the other.
An analogous situation exists in the later paradigm. Here, again, action is either 
oriented to success or oriented to reaching understanding. In the first case it is 
purposive, or purposive-rational (instrumental, if it involves a relationship between 
human and natural objects; strategic, if it involves a social interaction). In the 
second case it is communicative. Practical rationality is, accordingly, either 
purposive (instrumental or strategic) or communicative. Purposive action and 
rationality concern, just like techne and technical rationality, the employment of 
means for attaining given ends through technically manipulating or, what is a 
somewhat more precise, equivalent expression, causally Influencing, objects. 
Communicative action and (practical, for there is also theoretical) communicative 
rationality, on the other hand, like praxis and praxial rationality, concern the 
mutually respectful effort to determine, clarify or apply common values and norms.
A significant innovation in the later work is a clear internal differentiation within 
(practical) communicative rationality. This differentiation is between: (a) ethical 
rationality, dealing with what is "good for me or for us", more precisely with the 
clarification and expression of a particular individual or collective subject's 
authentic substantive values, intentions, identity; and (b) moral rationality, 
concerned with what is unconditionally right, or just, for all, in other words with 
specifying and applying universal moral norms by means of the Universalization 
and Appropriateness Principles, respectively. The differentiation within praxial 
rationality, in the earlier work, between (ordinary) hermeneutics and the depth 
hermeneutics of critical-emancipatory self-reflection is not equivalent to the new 
differentiation. For although self-reflection is considered to be a higher form of
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practical rationality than hermeneutics (as morality is taken to be vis a vis ethics), it 
nonetheless remains within the bounds of (Aristotelian/Hegelian) contextual 
immanence, not aspiring, as communicative morality does, to (Kantian) 
transcendent universality.
Both the early and the later forms of the dichotomous classification of action, and 
the rationality of action, seem to categorially exclude the possibility of success- 
oriented yet communicative action and corresponding rationality. They exclude, in 
other words, the possibility of such cases as that of one person seeking to pursue 
a goal by means of another person, and doing so through communicatively coming 
to an understanding with that person.
In the early work Habermas, on a philosophical plane, rejects all 
objectification/reification of human/social reality, not least that involved in a social 
science modelled on the natural sciences and the social engineering based on it. 
Yet, as we have seen, in some of his social-theoretical discussions of that period 
he seems to be resigned to the prospect that certain areas of social action that are 
close to the productive process, such as the management of work organizations, 
will always be of an instrumental/purposive, thus objectifying, nature.
In his later work, while still espousing the initial emancipatory philosophy of Critical 
Theory, Habermas, much more explicitly and systematically than before, argues 
that two major areas of social life, namely the market economy and state 
administration, cannot but be organized as media-steered subsystems of strategic 
action. The main thrust of the argument is that in conditions of modern complexity 
it would be extremely impracticable and socially costly to coordinate and integrate 
action in these areas in communicative ways. This line of argument implies that a 
communicative coordination and integration of such actions would not be 
impossible in principle. Yet the conceptual tools for such an — even in principle —
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possibility are not available to Habermas. For the (in theory) possibility of 
communicative coordination and integration of such thoroughly success-oriented 
areas of social life as the economy and state administration would require the 
missing category of success-oriented communicative action.
Habermas came under severe criticism, especially from fellow Critical Theorists 
who shared his anti-reification, emancipatory aspirations, for surrendering the 
economy and state administration to media-steered subsystems of strategic 
action, and thus handing these fields of social activity to the jurisdiction of Systems 
Theory rather than keeping them within the scope of Critical Theory. Under the 
weight of this criticism, and in the light of his own subsequent inquiries concerned 
with establishing a communicative basis for democratic politics and law -  areas of 
social life that inescapably contain a strong success-orientation component -  
Habermas has come more recently to add certain new elements to his analysis of 
action and practical rationality which acknowledge and in some ways address the 
problem of the categorial gap identified above. These new elements appear mainly 
in the works Between Facts and Norms (1996) and "Some Further Clarifications of 
the Concept of Communicative Rationality", in On the Pragmatics of 
Communication (1998a). Before examining them, however, we need to take a 
closer look at Habermas's dichotomous typology of action and practical rationality, 
presented in its most mature form in The Theory of Communicative Action (1984, 
1987), with a view to specifying with more precision the category claimed to be 
missing from it.
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3.2 A MORE PRECISE SPECIFICATION OF THE CONCEPTUAL GAP
In the concept of purposiveaction and rationality, as we have seen, Habermas 
binds inextricably together an orientation to success in employing means to attain 
goals with a causal-manipulative relationship between subject and object. 
Similarly, in the concept of communicative action and rationality he binds together 
an orientation to values and norms with a mutually respectful relationship between 
subjects. In binding these two pairs of aspects together, Habermas fuses two 
issues which, at first sight at least, seem to be distinct. First is the issue 
concerning the orientation of an action (and of the rationality of the action), which 
offers two options: orientation to means for the attainment of ends (which we can 
also refer to as orientation to success, using Habermas's term, though without 
associating it necessarily with a subject-object relationship as he does); and an 
orientation to values and norms. Second is the issue concerning the relationship 
between the acting agent and the other agents, or the objects, involved in the 
action (and in the corresponding rationality of action). This issue also gives two 
options: a technically manipulative/causal, subject-object relationship and a 
mutually respectful subject-subject relationship. I shall refer to the latter as 
dialogical, or communicative, relationship, (though using the term communicative 
strictly in the sense of mutually respectful, or dialogical, without associating it 
necessarily with an orientation to values and norms as Habermas does).
If indeed we are dealing with two different issues each offering two options, our 
classification of types of action and the rationality of action becomes fourfold, as 
shown in the grid below (Figure 2).
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Out of the four types of action and practical rationality corresponding to the four 
areas in the grid above, Habermas's dualistic classification covers at first glance 
only two: Habermas's techne, or purposive (instrumental or strategic) action and 
rationality, is covered by the category in Area 1 in the above grid. Habermas's 
praxis or communicative action and rationality is covered by the category in Area 
4. On a closer look, the category in Area 2 might be interpreted in a way that also 
brings it within the scope of the Habermasian dualistic typology, more specifically, 
under Habermasian tecfrne/purposive (instrumental or strategic) action and 
rationality: In a given interaction, agent A may set as an end of her action to get 
another agent, B, to adopt as his own, or to apply, a certain value or norm -  
though, perhaps, not necessarily a value or norm which A espouses herself. In 
other words, A’s action is oriented to using B as a means to her own end. Now, if 
A pursues her goal in a manipulative, causally effective way (either consciously or 
unwittingly/self-deceptively), while the interaction in question is overtly about the 
determination or application of the two parties’ values or norms, we have a typical
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instance of action/rationality which belongs to Area 2 but nonetheless comes 
under the Habermasian concept of the purposive. Thus, once we include the aim 
of making another adopt or apply certain values or norms among the possible 
ends of agents, all the instances of the category in Area 2 can be grasped in terms 
of Habermas's concept of techne, or the purposive, more precisely in terms of the 
strategic variety of the purposive.
The category in Area 3, however, concerning the communicative employment of 
means to ends, or, put differently, the pursuit of success in a communicative way, 
is far more problematic with regard to Habermas's dualism. To be sure, 
Habermas's concepts have no difficulty in capturing cases where two or more 
agents communicatively seek to come to an understanding about how to pursue a 
common goal by means of technically manipulating a third factor -  material or 
human/social. Such cases fall squarely under the concept of purposive 
action/rationality, the communication between the agents being about the truth of 
factual statements expressed perhaps in the form of hypothetical imperatives. But 
this is not what the category in Area 3 is about. According to the parameters on 
the basis of which the grid is constructed, the category in question concerns, 
rather, the dialogical/communicative/mutually respectful relationship between a 
success-oriented subject and the means to that subject's end(s).
What might count as an instance of this concept? Surely, we can readily rule out 
cases where human beings use objects of nature as means to their ends, for we 
can safely assume that, literally speaking, there can be no communicative 
relationship with such objects (with the possible exception of higher animals). The 
concept, however, need not therefore be an empty shell. For it might be possible 
to conceive of cases where success-oriented human beings seek communicatively
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-  rather than causally -  to induce other human beings (to act so as) to become 
means to the realization of the former's own goals.
However, some further clarifications are in order, concerning the meaning of 
"success-oriented" and "own goals". Habermas's typology does not rule out 
entirely the communicative use of another agent in pursuing one's goals. There 
are certain kinds of goals, certain forms of success, whose communicative pursuit 
by means of (the actions of) another agent falls under the category in Area 4, and 
can thus be captured by Habermas's concepts of communicative action and 
rationality. Consider, for example, the situation where agent A tries to get back 
from agent B a book which B borrowed from A and failed to return as promised. 
This is surely a case where one person is trying to attain a goal by means of 
another person. Agent A can pursue her goal strategically, by trying to influence B 
causally, for example through the use of force, threats, or deception. Alternatively, 
however, she can do so communicatively, according to Habermas's concepts, by 
appealing to the moral norm -  presumably acceptable to both A and B -  that 
promises should always be kept. In the same way, an attempt by A to realize, by 
means of B, a goal that violates a certain mutually accepted moral norm, can be 
rejected by B also in a communicative way, through an appeal to the norm in 
question.
Thus, goals that constitute applications or violations of moral norms -  let us refer 
to them as morally regulated goals (in a positive or negative sense) -  can, 
according to Habermas, be pursued (by A), through another agent (B) 
communicatively. Their realization is either prescribed or prohibited by the relevant 
norms. If prescribed, it is a moral right/entitlement of A and moral obligation/duty 
for B; if their realization is prohibited, it is a moral obligation/duty of A to refrain 
from pursuing it and a moral right/entitlement of B to refuse to become a means to
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it. Morally regulated goals, in the above sense, even if the initiative for their 
realization comes from one of the two sides -  who thus considers them as his or 
her “own goals” -  are in a way, ultimately shared goals, determined by the two 
sides’ common adherence to the relevant moral norms. Consequently, actions 
oriented to the realization, through others, of morally regulated goals can be 
communicative, according to Habermas’s typology, and as such included in the 
category in Area 4 of our grid.
At first sight, what is argued above about actions oriented to the realization of
morally regulated goals, might be thought to apply with regard to goals regulated
by shared non-moral norms (e.g. laws) as well. Here, however, an important
qualification needs to be made. In his analysis of law -  which can be extended to
non-moral norms in general -  Habermas argues that the determination of legal
norms depends on a combination of moral, ethical and pragmatic considerations;
and insofar as the ethical grounds (i.e. the values) involved are not originally
common to the members of the legal community but are shared as a result of
compromises, they are inevitably based on bargaining, which, even when “fair”, is
1
for him a strategic process (see section 2.5.1, above). Therefore, for Habermas, 
goals regulated by non-moral norms are pursuable in an entirely communicative 
way -  thus covered by the category in Area 4 -  only if the norms in question are 
shared without the intervention of any bargaining. And this can be known for sure 
only at the end of a process of rational reflection that reaches back to the moral 
norm that underlies the non-moral norm in question.
Another class of (prima facie not common) goals that can, in a similar manner, be 
recognized by Habermas’s Area 4 concept as capable of being communicatively 
pursued through another agent are those goals which are positively or negatively 
regulated by a shared substantive (ethical) value, provided, again, that it is shared
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without the involvement of any bargaining. These are, in other words, the goals 
whose realization can be shown to be desirable or undesirable, good or bad, in 
relation to such values, including interests, higher goals, conceptions of the good, 
etc. In a similar way as in the case of action involving non-bargairring-dependent 
normatively regulated goals, actions oriented to the realization, through others, of 
non-bargaining-dependent va/i/e-regulated goals can, according to Habermas’s 
typology, be pursued and responded to communicatively, through appeals to the 
relevant shared values; they can thus also be included in Area 4.
Shared substantive values (e.g. social harmony, clean air, education for Third 
World children, environmentally sustainable development) must not be confused 
with shared conceptions of self-regarding or, more generally, particularistic values, 
such as "personal health", "family prosperity", or "national security". In these cases 
interacting agents may have the same idea as to what the values personal health, 
family prosperity and national security are, but what they value in them may not be 
the same; it may be personal health for themselves (and perhaps for certain other 
individuals), prosperity for their own families (and perhaps for certain other 
families) and security for their own nation (and perhaps for certain other nations). 
Shared ideas of particularistic values, unlike shared, in the sense of coincident, 
values, entail different, perhaps conflicting goals for interacting agents.
Certainly, in any interaction situation there might be goals which can be (shown on 
reflection to be, genuinely, not just at first sight), (a) unregulated by shared norms 
or values, or (b) regulated by norms or values which are shared but whose sharing 
depends on bargaining. These goals are, in the last analysis, normatively and 
evaluatively permissible or “optional” for the agents concerned. When adopted and 
pursued by an agent in the context of an interaction, any such optional goal is that 
agent’s “own goal” in a sense stricter than that in which a genuinely shared goal is.
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Strictly “own goals”, in the above sense, can be called egocentric goals, using this 
not entirely accurate term in accordance with Habermas’s usage in analogous 
contexts, as, for example, when he speaks of “egocentric calculations of utility” 
(1984: 94), or “egocentric calculations of success” ( ibid.: 286). Egocentric goals, 
as defined here, are not necessarily selfish -  hence the terminological oddity. 
They may well be pursued for the sake of a third party. They are egocentric simply 
in the sense that they are not shared by interacting agents, or are shared only on 
the basis of bargaining.
It is precisely the communicative pursuit, by means of other agents, of egocentric 
goals in the above sense, that belongs exclusively to Area 3 of our grid, and 
cannot be captured by the dualistic typology which Habermas adopts both in his 
early work and in The Theory of Communicative Action and related post-linguistic- 
turn writings. For according to this typology such goals can be pursued through 
others only in an instrumental/strategic manner. As an example, consider the 
following situation:
John wants Mary to lend him one of her books -  he has a goal which he wants to 
realize by using another person as means. As in our previous example of A 
wanting to get her book back from B, John can pursue his goal strategically, by 
causally inducing Mary to lend him the book. Alternatively, John could explore the 
possibilities for a communicative pursuit of his goal, for example on the basis of a 
normative obligation Mary had already undertaken (e.g., a prior promise), or on the 
basis of a shared value or higher goal which generates certain shared 
commitments, such as a common project for which it is necessary for John to 
consult the book in question. But if no such normative or evaluative basis exists for 
a communicative pursuit of John's goal -  if John wants the book for his own 
purposes which are in no way shared by Mary, his goal thus being egocentric, in
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our sense -  Habermas's dualistic typology does not give John any alternative way 
of pursuing his goal other than the strategic one. No possibility is available in 
Habermas's typology for a communicative handling -  a communicative 
"negotiation" -  by John and Mary of John's egocentric request to borrow Mary's 
book.
The classification of goals proposed here is summed up below, in Figure 3.
(Prima facie not common) 
goals persuable 
through other agents
Goals ultimately shared by 
interacting agents (in the context 
of a given interaction): Goals 
regulated (thus either prescribed 
or ruled out) by norms, or values 
shared without bargaining.
(For Habermas, these are capable 
of being pursued through others 
communicatively, thus catered for 
by Area 4 of the grid in Figure 2).
(Genuinely) egocentric goals, (in the 
context of a given interaction): Goals 
not regulated by shared norms or 
values (that is, goals that are 
permissible -  thus not ruled out -  but 
not prescribed by shared norms or 
values, including goals adopted in the 
absence of any shared norms or 
values) or regulated by norms, or 
values shared only on the basis of 
bargaining.
(For Habermas, these are not 
capable of being pursued through 
others communicatively, thus 
catered for by Area 3 of the grid in 
Figure 2, which is not recognized 
by Habermas’s typology).
Figure 3
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In contrast to traditional societies where the closely knit networks of shared norms 
and values tends (in a largely unreflective manner) to regulate much of social 
activity, in modern societies, the far move abstract normative-evaluative 
framework leaves unregulated a great deal of social interaction, which, as a result, 
consists of the reciprocal pursuit of egocentric goals. Consequently, the absence 
from Habermas’s typology of the possibility of the communicative coordination of 
egocentric pursuits, necessarily concedes to strategic action not only realms such 
as the economy and state administration but also a great deal of social action in 
both the private and public areas of what Habermas calls the lifeworld (family life, 
education, the political public sphere etc.); and this, despite the fact that he 
considers the lifeworld as the domain of society where communicative action 
should -  and to a substantial degree does -  reign.
Having established that Habermas’s early as well as post-linguistic-turn typology 
of action and rationality does not allow for the communicative pursuit of egocentric 
goals by means of other agents -  let us speak, for short, of success-oriented 
communicative action and rationality -  the question remains whether, and if so 
how, such a form of action and rationality is conceptually possible; and in what 
way such a concept, if possible, would be grounded in the theory of Universal 
Pragmatics and be made to cohere with the rest of Habermas’s conceptual 
architectonic. Furthermore, we need to ask whether success-oriented 
communicative action and rationality, if conceptually possible, is practicable as a 
way of dealing with the whole range of the considerable coordination and 
integration challenges facing modern societies.
As we have seen in Part Two (section 2.5), in The Theory of Communicative 
Action Habermas explicitly expresses the view that, at least in the predominantly 
success-oriented areas of economic and state-administrative action, tackling the
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tasks of coordination and integration in a way other than through subsystems of 
strategic action would be highly unrealistic in conditions of modern complexity. In 
doing so he appears to be implying that a communicative coordination and 
integration of action even in those two societal domains would not be in principle 
impossible. Nonetheless, he does not explain how it would be in principle possible, 
thus leaving open also the question of the possibility of communicatively dealing 
with the coordination and integration of success-oriented action in areas of the 
lifeworld. In some more recent writings, as already indicated, Habermas discusses 
issues closely related to the conceptual possibility of success-oriented 
communicative action and rationality. In the following section we shall take a look 
at these discussions.
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3.3 FAIR BARGAINING AND WEAK COMMUNICATIVE RATIONALITY: 
SOME RECENT THINKING BY HABERMAS CONCERNING ACTION 
AND ITS RATIONALITY.
3.3.1 Fair Bargaining
In Between Facts and Norms, his major work of political and legal theory, 
Habermas deals with the obvious tension between the idealized claims to legal 
legitimacy made by modern democratic states and the far from ideal, actual social 
and political conditions of lawmaking. His aim is to overcome, in terms of his 
communicative paradigm, the serious problems which he identifies in all the major 
efforts to provide an adequate theory of modern politics and law. Habermas is not 
satisfied either with the positivist-realist approaches to law and its legitimation -  
which emphasize legal enactment and functionality, neglecting the rational 
justification of law -  or with the ways in which various normative theories (of 
rational natural law) deal with the question of justification.
To begin with, Habermas distinguishes clearly between the essentially political 
process of lawmaking and the essentially administrative process of law- 
enforcement, locating the former within the domain of the lifeworld and the latter 
within the realm of media-steered subsystems of strategic action (see also section 
2.5.1, above). Whereas in The Theory of Communicative Action he stresses the 
role of juristification (“the tendency towards an increase in formal law”, 1987: 357) 
as a vehicle of colonization of the lifeworld by media-steered subsystems, in 
Between Facts and Norms he focuses on the potential role of lawmaking (as 
distinct from law-enforcement) as a vehicle of delimitation and control of the 
subsystems, thus as an agency of opposition to, and reversal of the colonization of 
the lifeworld. Indeed he now self-critically explains that although in the former work 
he emphasized the direction of influence from systems to the lifeworld, the
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architectonic of his theory does not privilege that direction of influence over its 
opposite, i.e. the direction from the lifeworld to the subsystems (Habermas, 1993: 
170-1).
Habermas’s effort to provide a satisfactory theory of the rational justification, and 
thus the legitimation, of law focuses on the nature of the decision making (or “will- 
formation”) that is involved in the political process of lawmaking. In contrast on the 
one hand to the Kantian-liberal tradition which puts the emphasis on individual 
human rights and is seen as making the rational justification of law dependent on 
law’s conformity to moral norms alone, and on the other hand to the 
Rousseauean-republican tradition which emphasizes popular sovereignty (“the 
general will”) and sets conformity to society’s shared values (the general interest) 
as the criterion for law’s justification, Habermas proposes as such a criterion a 
more inclusive and complex, four-dimensional conception of rational political-legal 
will formation.
Law, though not reducible either to morality or to ethics (in the Habermasian sense 
of these terms) has nonetheless both moral and ethical aspects; a piece of 
legislation must respect moral norms and also take into consideration the values, 
interests, needs and preferences, of those to whom it is addressed. But at the 
same time, lawmaking decisions often need also to consider “pragmatic” questions 
concerning factual, means-ends relationships. With regard to these three aspects, 
a rational lawmaking process can be based on the three forms of rational 
discourse that Habermas had in previous work identified as the three dimensions 
of his tripartite conception of practical rationality: the moral (justification and 
application), the ethical and the pragmatic discourses, grounded in Universal 
Pragmatics and corresponding to the validity claims to rightness, truthfulness and 
truth, respectively ( ibid.: 1-17; see also section 2.4, above).
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However, over and above these three forms of discourse, Habermas recognizes a 
fourth dimension in the process of lawmaking and wider political decision-making, 
namely bargaining, or negotiation. Bargaining takes place when the parties in an 
interaction pursue (prima facie) opposing goals or interests, over which, 
nonetheless, they have to reach an agreement. In Habermas’s formulation, it is a 
process of “negotiation between success-oriented parties who are willing to 
cooperate” (1996: 165). The introduction of the notion of bargaining in this context 
reflects the recognition on the part of Habermas that politics, lawmaking in 
particular, very often involves, among other things, the reciprocal pursuit of what 
we have earlier called egocentric goals -  we can, in the same way, speak of 
egocentric interests -  by means of (the consent and usually the active effort of) 
others.
Now, from the point of view of our inquiry concerning the missing category of 
success-oriented communicative action and rationality, the pertinent question is 
whether bargaining in the above sense could reasonably be construed as a 
possibly communicative process. For if it could, the concept would (in principle) 
have applicability far beyond lawmaking, and political will-formation in general, 
becoming a model for the communicative pursuit of egocentric goals across the 
whole range of social action.
Although, as indicated in the previous section, Habermas ultimately rules out the 
possibility that any form of bargaining can be communicative in a strict sense, his 
full position on the subject is fruitfully differentiated. On the one hand, he regards 
bargaining over opposing interests as a form of strategic process based on the 
use of “factual power” (e.g., “threats and promises”), unlike discourses, where 
power is entirely neutralized and only the force of the better argument counts. 
Whereas discourses aim at reaching “rationally motivated consensus [that] rests
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on reasons that convince all the parties in the same way” (1996: 166), bargaining 
processes aim at interest-balancing compromise agreements “accepted by the 
different parties each for its own different reasons” ( ibid.). i.e. in pursuit of its own 
(egocentric) interests. Consequently, when he refers to the four constituent 
elements of the democratic lawmaking process, Habermas always differentiates 
between (moral, ethical and pragmatic) discourses and bargaining, speaking 
standardly of “discourses and negotiations”.
But on the other hand, Habermas discusses a special form of bargaining, namely 
“fair bargaining”, or “fair negotiation”, which he places on the strategic side of the 
strategic/communicative divide only with considerable qualifications. Compromises 
reached in the course of bargaining in general, are acceptable to participants 
because the latter consider that these compromises leave them better off than (or 
at the very least as well off as) they would be without them. Participants who feel 
that this condition is not fulfilled would stop cooperating and pull out of the 
bargaining. However, the overall gains produced in the process need not be fairly 
distributed among the participants. For this distribution depends on the possibly 
unequal power that the different participants can wield in support of their own 
interests. Fair bargaining, though, is bargaining that results in balanced, or fair, 
compromises, i.e. compromises in which the gains are fairly distributed among the 
participants. Such compromises -  still accepted by the participants on the basis of 
their own different reasons -  are the outcome of bargaining processes which are 
regulated through procedures which secure the equal distribution of power among 
participants -  not quite the neutralization of power as is the case in discourses. 
More precisely, procedures of fair bargaining
provide all the interested parties with an equal opportunity
for pressure, that is an equal opportunity to influence one
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another during the actual bargaining, so that all the 
affected interests can come into play and have equal 
chances of prevailing (1996:166-7)
The procedures that secure the equal distribution of bargaining power among 
participants and hence the equal opportunity of their interests to count in the 
ensuing compromises, can, according to Habermas, be justified by means of 
moral discourses ( ibid.: 167). In this way, fair bargaining processes are for 
Habermas linked to the Discourse Principle. It is for this reason that he considers 
lawmaking processes which include fair bargaining in the above sense (in addition 
to moral, ethical and pragmatic discourses) as on the whole “rational” processes 
which confer legitimacy on the laws that result from them.
Nonetheless, as explained in Between Facts and Norms, even fair bargaining, 
being only indirectly linked to the Discourse Principle, is ultimately a non- 
communicative, strategic, process. It is a process which, in the final analysis, relies 
on power, thus on causal influence, rather than on the “force” of argument; in other 
words, the bargaining elements, or “reasons”, on the basis of which the parties, 
each for itself, come to agree on a certain compromise (i.e. elements such as the 
interests, needs and preferences of each, as well as the threats and promises 
exchanged between them) do not really play the role of elements raising or aiming 
to redeem validity claims and thus being objects in a process of communicative 
argumentation; rather, they play, even if in an equitable way, the role of facts 
exerting causal influence upon those involved.
In this conception of fair bargaining we witness, again, the co-presence of the two 
aspects which, as we have seen, are merged inextricably together in Habermas’s 
concepts of the communicative and the strategic: on the one hand the aspect of 
action orientation (here we have an orientation to success) and on the other hand
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the aspect of the relationship involved in the interaction (here we have a causal- 
manipulative relationship). However, through the concept of fair bargaining 
Habermas at the same time goes some way towards breaking the bond between 
success-orientation and causal relationship, and thereby moving towards a 
concept of action and rationality which is at once success-oriented and 
communicative. He does that by linking, though indirectly, the success-oriented 
process of bargaining with the communicative Principle of Discourse and the 
Universal Pragmatics of language more generally.
In “Some further Clarifications of the Concept of Communicative Rationality” 
(Chapter 7 of On the Pragmatics of Communication, Habermas, 1998a) -  
henceforth Clarifications -  Habermas introduces certain ideas which make 
possible the communicative treatment of forms of bargaining, and purposive 
(inter)action and rationality more generally, which in Between Facts and Norms 
and all previous works he assigns to the unavoidable strategic interplay of causal- 
manipulative influences. To these ideas we shall now turn.
3.3.2 “Weak” communicative action and rationality
It is a basic tenet of Habermas’s communicative paradigm ever since its first, full 
articulation in The Theory of Communicative Action that language, when employed 
in its primary, communicative mode (rather than in the “parasitical”, strategic 
mode), i.e. when employed in order to perform communicative actions in the form 
of speech acts, has the (illocutionary) aim of a speaker reaching understanding 
with someone (an addressee) about something: more precisely, about something 
in the objective world, something in the speaker’s subjective world and something 
in the social world intersubjectively shared between speaker and addressee. This 
aim is pursued by means of explicitly or implicitly making, and if challenged
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discursively justifying, or “redeeming”, validity claims of three kinds; namely, 
claims concerning (a) the truth of assertions about the objective world, (b) the 
truthfulness of representations of the speaker’s subjective world, and (c) the 
normative rightness of actions or the rightness of general norms of action. A 
speech act is said to be communicatively rational insofar as the validity claims it 
raises can be redeemed (see section 2.2.1, above).
In Clarifications, Habermas for the first time distinguishes between a strong and a 
weak form of understanding, hence between a strong and a weak form of 
communicative action and rationality. The strong form of understanding is 
agreement on the basis of the same, shared, actor-independent reasons, a 
situation for which Habermas reserves the term consensus. Weak understanding, 
by contrast, is a non-consensual form of agreement, one based on actor- 
dependent, i.e. not shared, reasons (Habermas, 1998a: 320-1).
Thus, here Habermas interprets as a form of (weak) communicative interaction 
what in his discussion of bargaining, in Between Facts and Norms, he understands 
to be a necessarily strategic exchange, ultimately based on causally operative 
power, even when that power is procedurally controlled so as to be equalized. 
Cases in which strong understanding/consensual agreement is aimed at are either 
factual statements, raising primarily validity claims to truth, or norm-regulated 
imperatives -  that is imperatives that are either prescribed or prohibited by shared 
norms -  which raise primarily validity claims to normative rightness. An example of 
the latter is “By the end of the month you must give me ten thousand pounds, as 
required by the contract you and I have signed”. Weak understanding, on the other 
hand, is, according to Habermas, sought in cases of (1) declarations of intention 
and (2) “simple” or “naked” imperatives, i.e. imperatives not governed by norms in 
the above sense.
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In fact, if weak understanding attaches to speech acts appealing to actor-relative -  
i.e. not shared -  reasons, a naked imperative, in the sense of an imperative not 
regulated by norms, may still aim at strong understanding; for such an imperative 
may be regulated by normatively permissible, yet shared interests or values, and 
thus still pursued in terms of actor-independent reasons. In the following 
discussion, we shall use the term “naked imperatives” in the sense of what can be 
referred to as egocentric requests that is requests, or imperatives, that are not 
regulated either by shared norms or by shared values. An analogous situation 
exists in relation to the claims to rightness in the sense of permissibility, which, as 
we shall see, are implied also by declarations of intention. Here too, the claims 
must be understood as ones concerning permissibility with regard to both shared 
norms and shared values. In drawing the distinction between strong and weak 
communicative actions, Habermas puts an explicit emphasis on normative 
regulation (“authorization”, “embeddedness”, etc). Sometimes, however, he 
explicitly uses as criterion for the distinction, the more adequate one of regulation 
of either a normative or an evaluative kind:
In strong communicative action, the participants 
presume... that they pursue their action plans only within 
the boundaries of norms and values deemed to be valid ( 
ibid.: 328).
3.3.2.1 Declarations of intention
Consider the declaration of intention “I shall spend the whole of next year travelling 
around the world”. If this declaration is uttered with an illocutionary aim, what kind 
of understanding does the speaker aim to reach with the addressee? The validity 
claims raised by such a speech act are those of (a) truthfulness and (b) viability, 
i.e. (a) that the speaker is sincere in expressing the intention in question (the
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intention representing the speaker’s genuine preferences, themselves reflecting 
his needs, interests, values, etc); and (b) that it is factually true that the speaker 
can (has the necessary means to) do what he intends. According to Habermas, a 
validity claim to rightness on the basis of shared norms (or, we would add, shared 
values) is not supposed to be raised by the announcement of an intention. Thus, if 
the addressee comes to accept validity claims (a) and (b), she will have agreed 
that the speaker has good reasons to act according to his expressed intention, but 
she will not thereby have adopted those reasons as her own, i.e. she will not 
herself have good reasons for acting in the same way.
The speaker’s reasons for having the intention are his own actor-relative reasons, 
not ones shared with the addressee. The acceptance by the addressee of the 
validity claims raised in the announcement of an intention amounts, in other words, 
merely to “taking the announcement seriously” ( ibid.: 322). Agreement of this kind 
is described by Habermas as a form of weak communicative understanding.
Two points need to be made with regard to this analysis. The first concerns 
Habermas’s view that declarations of intention do not raise validity claims to 
normative (or evaluative) rightness, this being the essential reason for considering 
them as forms of weak communicative actions. It is certainly true that such 
declarations do not raise a claim to the effect that the intention in question is right 
in the sense of being somehow obligatory for speaker and addressee on the basis 
of shared norms (or values). It is, however, reasonable to argue that they do raise 
the claim that the intention is right in the sense of being normatively (and 
evaluatively) permissible to have and express. For if it were not so permissible, it 
could be communicatively rejected by the addressee, with the agreement of the 
speaker, on the basis of shared norms (or values). Thus, the communication could 
be settled exhaustively on the basis of the same, actor-independent reasons, and 
would, therefore, not be counted as weak. It is in fact in this very same sense, of
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rightness as permissibility, that factual statements are thought by Habermas to 
raise simultaneously validity claims not only to the effect that they are true and 
truthful, but also that they are rightfully made. Nonetheless, even if declarations of 
intention are understood to raise also validity claims to rightness in the sense of 
permissibility, their acceptance by the addressee still amounts only to taking the 
intention seriously, not adopting it as one’s own.
The second point concerns certain confusions regarding the meaning of terms 
such as “same reasons”, “actor-relative reasons” and “agreement”, used in 
Habermas’s analysis of declarations of intention (as well as of naked imperatives, 
as we shall see). An agreement to share the intention -  an agreement with the 
intention -  would indeed have to be arrived at by each party on the basis of his or 
her own different, actor-relative reasons. An agreement to take the speaker’s 
intention seriously, however, must be made by both parties for the same set of 
reasons, namely those of the speaker. Admittedly, these reasons have a different 
status than the ones appealed to by agents testing validity claims to truth or 
rightness: Although they must be commonly appealed to by the two sides in order 
to test the seriousness of the speaker’s intention, they are actor-relative, in the 
sense that, in the last instance, they are “posited” (and espoused, or “owned”) by 
one of them, namely the speaker. Thus, in that sense, they have an asymmetrical 
relationship vis a vis speaker and addressee; whereas reasons concerning truth 
and rightness relate to the two sides symmetrically, being “posited” for both by the 
external and intersubjective/social worlds shared by them. This difference applies, 
of course, not only with regard to declarations of intention but in relation to all 
utterances aiming to express the speaker’s subjective states and raising primarily 
validity claims to truthfulness (see section 2.4.2, above).
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Nonetheless, this asymmetry does not warrant the view that communicatively 
oriented declarations of intention -  and expressive utterances in general, for that 
matter -  aim at agreement on the basis of different reasons; for the main 
agreements aimed at through such an utterance -  the one concerning the 
seriousness, or truthfulness, of those utterances and those concerning issues of 
factual truth and normative/evaluative permissibility -  can be sought in terms of 
the same reasons, even though in the case of the former those reasons are actor- 
relative. Nor is the characterization of these utterances as (somehow inferior) 
“weak” forms of communicative actions justified; for they are speech acts oriented 
purely to reaching understanding with the addressees, and in no way to causally 
influencing them; moreover they are capable of being redeemed by entirely 
discursive means.
In fact, Habermas explicitly acknowledges this much, concerning both 
announcements of intention and imperatives, despite his classifying both these 
forms of utterance as weak communicative actions:
Announcements and imperatives... move within the horizon 
of a mutual understanding based on validity claims and thus 
still within the domain of communicative rationality 
(Habermas, 1998a: 323).
In a similar vein, he speaks of agents interacting in terms of these two forms of 
utterances as “acting communicatively... renouncing] all intentions to deceive...” ( 
ibid.: 327).
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3.3.2.2 Naked imperatives
Let us now consider communicatively intended imperatives such as “(Please) lend 
me ten thousand pounds”, “Can you please close the window” and “I would 
appreciate it if you helped me with this report”, on the assumption that they are not 
normatively or evaluatively governed -  i.e., not imperatives claimed to be either 
impermissible to issue, or based on a contractual or other obligation of the 
addressee -  but “simple” or “naked” imperatives, in Habermas’s terms. Naked 
imperatives, Habermas explains, are such that ‘[t]heir illocutionary meaning 
consists in the fact that the speaker wants to motivate an addressee -  that is, 
another person -  to bring about “p”’ ( ibid.: 322) -  “p” being the propositional 
content of the imperative. More simply, here the speaker aims to 
(communicatively) get the addressee to comply with the (naked) imperative.
In this case, therefore, unlike the case of declarations of intention, it is required 
that speaker and addressee both come to agree with the imperative. The 
addressee is required to adopt the imperative as his own, just as the one who 
issues the imperative does, and thus to agree with the latter in that sense. But 
speaker and addressee are expected to agree with the imperative for their own, 
different, actor-relative reasons. The speaker’s reasons for asking for a loan will be 
different to the addressee’s reasons for giving the loan. Normally, the one who 
issues the imperative “assumes the availability either of sanctions, should the 
desired action fail to be carried out, or of rewards, if it is carried out” ( ibid.: 323). 
These will count as reasons for the addressee’s compliance. Sanctions and 
rewards may also be explicitly threatened or promised, while rewards can also be 
assumed or explicitly demanded by the addressee, as a condition for complying 
with the imperative.
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Cases in which it is reasonable to assume that complying with the imperative 
would be intrinsically satisfying for the addressee or that not complying would be 
intrinsically unsatisfying to him (e.g. when one is requested to make a donation for 
a cause which the addressee considers worthy) can also be interpreted in this 
way. By making such a request the speaker implicitly promises the addressee the 
satisfaction she believes to be intrinsic to his compliance and threatens him with 
the dissatisfaction (e.g. feelings of guilt) which she believes would necessarily 
accompany his non-compliance.
As with declarations of intention, Habermas maintains that in issuing naked 
imperatives with a communicative intent, speakers raise, and promise if 
challenged to redeem discursively, (i) validity claims to truthfulness, concerning 
their own actor-relative reasons -  i.e. subjective states such as interests, values 
etc. -  for issuing the imperative (together with any accompanying promises or 
threats), and (ii) validity claims to truth, concerning the existential statements they 
make or imply regarding the feasibility of the actions which they asked the 
addressee to carry out, as well as those they promised or threatened to carry out 
themselves in return. It might be added -  for the same reasons as in the case of 
declarations of intention -  that with naked imperatives speakers also make claims 
to the normative (and evaluative) rightness, in the sense of permissibility, of their 
requests, promises and threats.
But over and above these claims, here -  as Habermas stresses -  the speaker 
implies also that she has a right to “expect the addressee to comply with her 
imperative” ( ibid.: 322); and she has this expectation on the basis of interests, 
values and other actor-relative reasons which she attributes to the addressee. 
Thus,
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[a]n imperative is rational only if... the actor has good 
reasons for supposing that the addressee has reasons not 
to oppose her imperative (Habermas, 1998a: 22-3).
The speaker’s attribution of reasons to the addressee will naturally be tested, in 
the last analysis, in terms of the addressee’s truthful expression of his or her own 
subjectives states. For this reason Habermas apparently assumes that the 
speakers’ expectations of addressees’ compliance to their imperatives are covered 
by the validity claim to truthfulness. However, this does not seem to be an 
adequate account of the Universal Pragmatics of the situation. If the rational 
reconstruction of speech acts is to be carried out in terms of validity claims 
exclusively made by the speakers themselves, a (critical) aspect of an imperative 
such as the speaker’s expectation of compliance by the addressee cannot be 
accounted for in terms of validity claims to truthfulness made not by the speaker 
but by the addressee.
In fact, the claim implicit in the speaker’s expectation of compliance by the 
addressee is one concerning the truth of the speaker’s beliefs about the subjective 
states of the addressee. If this is so -  and given that such claims cannot be 
assimilated to those concerning truth about the external world -  Habermas’s 
Universal Pragmatics fails to account for an important type of speech acts such as 
(communicatively oriented) naked imperatives. It therefore seems necessary to 
supplement it, at least with regard to this type of speech acts, with an additional 
form of validity claim, one pertaining to the truth about the other’s subjective states 
-  let us refer to it, for the sake of brevity, as the validity claim to cross-subjective 
truth. With regard to “world relations”, which are said to be implicit in speech acts 
by virtue of the validity claims made in them, this form of validity claim would 
seem, on the face of it, to add the subjective world of the addressee to
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Habermas’s Kantian trinity of (i) the external, objective world, (ii) the shared social 
world and (iii) the speaker’s subjective world.
These suggestions, however, will have to remain tentative, in view of further 
discussion of Universal Pragmatics in section 3.5 below, where they will be 
incorporated in a more comprehensive proposal for revising Habermas’s model.
Finally, just as in the case of declarations of intention, so in that of naked 
imperatives, the term weak communication seems to be inappropriate. For here 
too, the interaction is oriented purely to reaching understanding, or agreement, 
and is amenable to an exclusively communicative form of rational treatment: with 
regard to its validity claims to truth and rightness, it is amenable to communicative 
rationality in terms of the same, actor-independent reasons; and with regard to its 
validity claims to truthfulness and what we have called “cross-subjective truth”, it 
can be rationally treated in terms of actor-relative -  yet still the same for all 
participants -  sets of reasons.
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3.4 COMMUNICATIVE NEGOTIATION: FULLY OR RESTRICTEDLY
SUCCESS-ORIENTED COMMUNICATIVE INTERACTION
The preceding discussion has obvious implications for our central inquiry into the 
conceptual possibility of action (and hence of rationality of action) which is at once 
purposive, in the sense of success-oriented, and communicative, in the sense of 
oriented to understanding, as opposed to causal influence. In somewhat more 
precise terms, it has implications for the possibility of pursuing through others what 
we have earlier called egocentric goals -  i.e. goals not regulated either 
normatively or evaluatively -  by purely communicative means.
Certainly, the issuing and responding to what have earlier been referred to as 
naked imperatives involves the reciprocal pursuit of normatively non-regulated (i.e. 
normatively permissible but not obligatory) goals by means of the actions of other 
agents. And in so far as this pursuit is oriented to mutual understanding, the action 
concerned -  or, better, the interaction concerned, given the strong element of 
reciprocity which is inherent in these cases -  is at once success-oriented and 
communicative. Habermas himself is quite explicit about the necessary 
conjunction of what he conceives as “weak” communicative action with success- 
orientation and purposive rationality.
In the weak forms of the communicative use of language 
and communicative action, communicative rationality is 
entwined with the purposive rationality of actors in an 
attitude oriented toward success (Habermas, 1998a: 329; 
see also ibid.: 323, 326).
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Thus, through his analysis -  in Clarifications -  of naked imperatives as 
conceivably communicative interactions, albeit weakly so, Habermas has, in effect, 
established the conceptual possibility of fully communicative success-oriented 
action and rationality. By extension, he acknowledges the possibility of 
communicative bargaining, or negotiation, for bargaining/negotiation processes 
consist precisely in the reciprocal pursuit of egocentric goals through others. By 
the same token, this analysis negates the exhaustive division between 
purposive/strategic (i.e. success-oriented and causally effective) and 
communicative (i.e. norm and value-oriented and dialogical) action and rationality, 
or, alternatively, between techne and praxis, which, as we have seen, has been 
central to Habermasian theory from its early formulations in the 1960’s to the most 
definitive statements of the later, communicative paradigm. For the first time in the 
Habermasian framework, actions are conceived which cut across this divide, being 
at once communicative, in the (restricted) sense of dialogical, and purposive, in 
the (restricted) sense of success-oriented.
At this point one might be tempted to conclude that all interactions where 
egocentric goals are mutually pursued through others -  all cases of bargaining, or 
negotiation, all social exchanges where coordination of success-oriented actions is 
necessary -  could be dealt with, by the parties involved, in a communicative way, 
i.e. through raising validity claims and if challenged justifying them discursively. 
And this would mean that there is no need -  no conceptual necessity -  ever to 
resort to strategic action in order to meet any such action coordination challenges: 
no conceptual necessity for surrendering to (systems of) strategic action huge 
areas of social interaction such as the economy and state administration; or, for so 
treating those success-oriented elements of social, including lifeworld, activity 
which Habermas, in Between Facts and Norms, recognized as necessary aspects
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of lawmaking processes and for the sake of which he introduced the notion of 
bargaining -  fair bargaining in particular.
Such an inference, however, would be too hasty, for the following reason. What 
the argument so far has tried to demonstrate is that success-oriented 
communicative interaction is conceptually possible; not that all cases of success- 
oriented interaction can be subsumed under that concept -  i.e. that all the efforts 
of agents to pursue egocentric goals by means of each other can be coordinated 
successfully in a purely communicative manner -  or even that it is conceptually 
certain that there is one single case that belongs to that category (though on 
empirical grounds it can be readily testified that many such cases are likely to be 
encountered). To clarify this point, it is necessary to focus on an element of naked 
imperatives/egocentric requests (which is thus an element of negotiation situations 
in general) which, though present, remained unthematized in the preceding 
analysis.
In issuing a (communicatively oriented) naked imperative the speaker assumes (a) 
that she has her own actor-relative reasons for doing so, and (b) that the 
addressee has his own actor-relative reasons to comply. The crucial point here is 
that the two actor-relative sets of reasons are supposed to be reasons for wanting 
one and the same thing: the addressee to act in a particular way, namely, in 
accordance with the imperative. The speaker, therefore, in issuing the imperative 
is implicitly saying to the addressee, “I believe that you have reasons to do what I 
have reasons to want you to do”.
This is a significantly different kind of claim to (i) “I believe that you have reasons 
to do X, and I have reasons to want you to do Y”, and to (ii) “I believe that we both 
have shared reasons to do Z”. In cases (i) and (ii), even though any particular 
claims of these types may prove to be wrong, it is certain that for each type of
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claim there is an instance on which the agents involved could in principle come to 
agree and thus coordinate their respective actions successfully: Some possible 
beliefs of the speaker concerning his own actor-relative reasons, the addressee’s 
actor-relative reasons and reasons shared between him and the addressee, 
respectively, must be true, on the assumption that there exist some speaker- 
relative reasons, some addressee-relative reasons and some reasons shared by 
the two. This is not so, however, with regard to claims of the type “I have reasons 
to want you to do X and I believe you have reasons to want to do X”, which, as we 
have seen are raised in negotiation situations, including naked imperatives. 
Similarly, assuming that there exist a set of speaker-relative reasons and a set of 
addressee-relative reasons, there is no guarantee that any claim of this type is 
valid. It is in principle possible that any actor-relative reasons of two or more 
agents would not converge on (i.e. simultaneously justify) one and the same 
action. For it is conceivable that in any communicatively oriented negotiation no 
deal is found which simultaneously satisfies the different interests, values, etc. of 
the parties involved, and which it is, thus, purposively rational for each party 
separately to accept. Such could be the case when at least one side believes that 
the best deal for itself among the deals acceptable to the other side(s) is not 
purposively good enough for itself. In such a case there would be no point of 
coincidence between what the sides find (purposive-rationally) acceptable to 
themselves, thus no mutually agreeable deal.
If the above argument is correct -  if it is indeed the case that in any negotiation, 
i.e. in any situation of mutual pursuit of egocentric goals through others, it may be 
impossible to reach a communicative agreement, hence attain the required action 
coordination -  then, it may be necessary to supplement success-oriented 
communicative action with strategic action in order to meet the multifarious 
coordination needs of egocentric social action. This conclusion has been drawn on
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the assumption that the success-oriented action in question is carried out by the 
parties in what, from their point of view, is a fully purposively rational manner. It 
has been argued, in other words, that it may be impossible for agents to 
coordinate their actions communicatively -  and thus it may be necessary for them 
to resort to strategic action -  when they pursue their egocentric goals through 
each other with an orientation to gaining the maximum benefit possible for 
themselves. To be sure, as already mentioned, such maximization -  thus full 
purposive rationality -  is in fact attainable by communicative means in plenty of 
cases; and the scope of such a possibility can be considerably expanded with 
skilful negotiation, as will be seen below, in section 3.6.3. Nonetheless, the 
possibility of failure in this respect -  and therefore of the need to seek 
maximization of benefit (i.e. full purposive rationality) through strategic action -  
cannot be eliminated. In other words, the notion of success-oriented 
communicative action cannot be said to cover fully the whole of Area 3 in Figure 2, 
above.
In order to render possible the communicative coordination of all mutually 
success-oriented action -  thus generalize the communicative approach to all 
negotiation cases, and make it in principle unnecessary to employ strategically 
oriented action -  we need to revise the concept of fully purposively rational 
communicative action into one of purposive-rationally restrained communicative 
action. With the latter, we stop insisting on the absolute maximization of agents’ 
satisfaction, in favour of aiming only at the maximum satisfaction which it is 
possible for agents to agree on by purely communicative means.
Interactions of this kind which fail to communicatively yield the maximum possible 
benefit for all parties -  which thus fail to attain full purposive rationality -  would still 
be success-oriented communicative interactions, though imperfectly so, for they
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would still pursue egocentric goals, rather than goals regulated by shared norms
or values. By the term communicative negotiation I shall refer to prima facie
success-oriented communicative interactions insofar as they are restrained in the
above sense, regardless of whether they in fact achieve full or only imperfect
purposive rationality. The qualification “prime facie” refers to the possibility that
what initially appear as egocentric goals which need to be pursued by means of
the success-oriented method of negotiation, may, in the course of the negotiation
prove to be in part -  or even fully -  regulated by shared norms and/or values (see
2
section 3.6.3, below).
Respecting the restrictions imposed by the requirements of communicative action 
means that in no part of a communicative negotiation would any of the parties 
involved seek -  through employing strategic action -  satisfaction of its own 
egocentric goals beyond what is communicatively justifiable, i.e. beyond what is 
acceptable to the other side(s) on the basis of each raising, and if challenged 
discursively redeeming, validity claims. It means, therefore, that none of the 
parties, at any point in the negotiation, gives priority to the satisfaction of its own 
egocentric goals over those of the other(s). Thus, in order to generalize the (in 
principle) applicability of the notion of success-oriented communicative 
(inter)action over the whole of Area 3 in Figure 2, above, so as to rule out 
altogether the need for the strategic coordination of actions aiming to realize 
egocentric goals by means of other agents, it is necessary to introduce the 
principle of (recognition and) equal treatment of each other’s egocentric goals in 
every negotiation; a principle, in other words, of not according priority to the 
satisfaction of one’s own interests over the satisfaction of the interests of the other 
parties. Its role is to facilitate a communicative conclusion to a negotiation where 
an unrestrained, fully purposively rational orientation would lead at least one of the 
parties to abandon communicative interaction in favour of a strategic approach.
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Of course, the introduction of the principle of equal treatment in the above sense, if 
it is not to be an arbitrary, ad hoc move, needs to be itself philosophically 
grounded. In this respect, I shall follow Habermas who, drawing on Alexy, 
considers a principle arguably identical to the one discussed here -  one that also 
underlies his own (moral) universalization principle -  to be a fundamental 
presupposition of discursive argumentation (see Part Two, section 2.4.3 and note 
12, above). Indeed, a process such as communicative discourse, which repudiates 
all coercion and deception, relying solely on the “force” of the better argument, 
cannot but treat equally the reasons relevant/admissible to the form of discourse 
concerned. And, whereas in discourses concerning factual truth the perceptions of 
participants are among the reasons that can legitimately be put forward, in the 
case of communicative negotiations -  that is, discursive processes concerned with 
the rational acceptability of negotiation proposals -  among the admissible reasons 
are the interests, values and purposes, including the egocentric goals, of those 
involved.
The concept of communicative negotiation invites comparison with Habermas’s 
idea of fair bargaining, discussed earlier. For in both, values, interests, 
preferences etc, are accorded equal chance of being heard and taken into 
account. But at the same time the two differ in important respects: whereas in fair 
bargaining the “equal treatment” of these elements is effected through the 
equalization of the power of bargaining agents, which in no way alters the factual, 
causally effective nature of those elements themselves, in the case of 
communicative negotiation the parties treat each other’s interests as mutually 
respected, i.e. in a sense “shared”, reasons, which are to be appealed to in a 
communicative, discursive process. On these grounds, communicative negotiation 
can be seen as a communicative analogue of strategically conceived fair 
bargaining.
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According to the above account, even though it is possible that a communicatively 
attainable negotiation deal might not be fully purposively rational for a certain 
participant, it is also possible that in some negotiation cases it might be. As we 
shall see later (section 3.7) when the concept of communicative negotiation is 
further elaborated, this can be the case when a communicatively attainable 
negotiation deal either (maximally) satisfies all the relevant aims of the participant 
in question, or constitutes a greater or lesser compromise on that participant’s 
maximum relevant aims, being nonetheless as good as or better than any of the 
deals which that participant considers attainable by strategic means. In other 
words the possibility exists that for an agent it is preferable from an unrestrictedly 
purposive-rational point of view to approach a given negotiation communicatively 
rather than strategically.
Such cases, it should be pointed out, can be accounted for also in terms of 
Rational Choice Theory [see, for example, Raiffa et al (2002), drawn upon in 
section 3.7 below] and do not therefore require for their justification the complex 
edifice of Habermasian universal pragmatics. Within the broad Rational Choice 
paradigm, for example, work has been done that claims to show how “cooperation” 
-  i.e. non-coercive, non-manipulative interaction- can arise among fully 
purposively rational agents (see Axelrod, 1984). A Rational Choice account would, 
in addition, provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of motivation for non- 
coercive, non-deceptive social interactions, relying on the strong motive force of 
needs and interests rather than on what Habermas himself has admitted is 
reason’s “weak motivational force” (1996:164).
As will be seen in section 3.7 below, with skill the range of cases admitting of fully 
purposive-rational communicative solutions, and thus the scope for the application 
of Rational Choice Theory, can be considerably expanded. With regard to these
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cases Habermasian theory could at best be credited for elucidating the idea and 
methodologically enriching the practice of human interaction which is not 
deceptive, manipulative or coercive.
This being the case, however, a non-fully-purposively-rational justification of 
cooperation, thus of communicative negotiation -  and Habermasian-type universal 
pragmatics is as good a justificatory line as can had- is still necessary; for as we 
have seen it is always possible to encounter negotiation cases where the actor- 
relative interests of the parties cannot converge on one and the same solution, 
and which, therefore, can be communicatively dealt with only in a restrictedly 
purposive-rational manner.
Furthermore, a non-Rational-Choice justification of negotiating communicatively -  
such as the Habermasian universal pragmatic one, encompassing, as indicated 
above, a principle of equal treatment of egocentric interests -  is necessary to be 
operative as a presupposition in all communicative negotiation cases, not only in 
those which do not admit of fully purposive-rational solutions. The reason for this is 
that it is not possible for participants to know in advance -  often it is not possible to 
know until the very end of the negotiation -  whether a particular negotiation can be 
(communicatively) resolved in a fully purposive-rational way, in which case it would 
not require the presupposition of equal treatment.
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3.5 A RECONSIDERATION, IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONCEPT OF
COMMUNICATIVE NEGOTIATION, OF MORAL AND NON-MORAL
NORMS AND RIGHTNESS AND THEIR UNIVERSAL-PRAGMATIC
GROUNDING
3.5.1 Applications of the universalization principle as communicative
negotiations
In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990) Habermas, as we have 
seen in the previous Part (section 2.4.3), offers his version of the universalization 
principle as a rule of argumentation suitable for testing the validity of moral norms. 
The latter are understood, along Kantian, deontological lines, as universal and 
unconditional prescriptions of right and wrong or, alternatively, of what is obligatory 
and what is impermissible, what ought and what ought not to be done by everyone 
in all circumstances.
According to Habermas’s formulation of the universalization principle, a moral 
norm is valid only if “all affected can accept the consequences and the side effects 
its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of 
everyone’s interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known 
alternative possibilities for regulation)” (Habermas, 1990: 65). The application of 
the universalization principle for testing a candidate moral norm, therefore, 
involves (a) the recognition of each other’s interests, and (b) the raising, and if 
necessary the discursive support by each participant, of validity claims to the effect 
that the interests of those concerned constitute sufficient reasons for each to 
accept the moral norm under consideration. (These claims imply further claims to 
what we have earlier -  in section 3.4 -  referred to as cross-subjective truth, that is 
truth about others’ interests, and subjective states more generally).
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Evidently, the application of the universalization principle, which Habermas 
describes also as “a cooperative process of argumentation” ( ibid.: 67), has the 
same structure as what I have called “communicative negotiation”. In fact every 
such application can be construed as communicative negotiation on a grand scale: 
a multiple, multi-party communicative negotiation, analyzable into a great number 
of component, multi-party communicative negotiations. In an application of the 
universalization principle -  in order to test a candidate universal, moral norm, e.g. 
the norm “Everyone should always keep their promises” -  all those who would 
have to abide by such a norm if it is endorsed (that is all human beings, or even 
more generally, all thinking and acting beings) must (potentially) participate, and 
give their considered, discursively arrived at positive or negative verdict on the 
norm in question.
To decide on their verdict, participants have to imagine/hypothesize finding 
themselves, in turn, in a variety of situations (in an as complete as possible range 
of communicative interaction situations, Si, S2 ,...Sn) relevant to the norm being
i
tested. With regard to the above mentioned norm, a relevant situation, S<\, would 
be whether in the context of circumstances Ci, agent Ai would keep promise Pi 
which he had given to agent Bi; where circumstances Ci might include the 
conditions under which Ai had given the promise, Ai’s family responsibilities, Bi’s 
business and family circumstances, the importance for Ai of his reputation in the 
community, etc. Another relevant situation, S2 , might be whether agent A2 would 
keep her promise P2 to agent B2 , in the context of a different set of circumstances, 
C2 . For each such hypothetical situation, participants should, in a process of 
communicative argumentation, (a) calculate the likely consequences and side 
effects the general observance of the norm under consideration (i.e. its 
observance by all in all instances of the situation) would have on each of the 
agent-roles concerned (in our example Si, roles Ai, B1, Ai’s and Bi’s family
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members, business associates, etc.); (b) imagine everyone in turn in each of the 
different roles, and, on the basis of what are discursively established as the 
genuine interests of each, decide (i) whether they would all accept the observance 
by all, of the norm being tested, in all instances of the situation, regardless of the 
role they would occupy in them, and (ii) whether they would all prefer such 
observance to any other possible (also communicative) form of resolution of the 
interaction problems in question. If all participants decide affirmatively on the 
general observance of the norm being tested in (all instances of) all the relevant 
situations (Si, S2,...Sn) the norm in question is thereby established as a valid 
moral norm.
Discursive consideration by participants of each hypothetical situation relevant to 
the candidate moral norm, as described above, can be understood as a (multi­
party) communicative negotiation among all human beings, in which the proposed 
deal consists of the observance by everyone of a certain norm in all the instances 
of the specified situation. The overall application of the universalization principle 
can, similarly, be seen as the summation of all the particular, situational 
communicative negotiations. Such a summation is concerned with whether the 
outcome of all these component negotiations is the same affirmative one regarding 
the general observance of the norm being tested.
3.5.2 The contingency of norm-based morality
Habermas seeks to provide justification for the universalization principle in terms 
of his Universal-Pragmatic theory of communicative action, arguing, as explained 
in section 2.4.3, above, that it is presupposed by the very structure of linguistic 
communication, in particular by the validity claim to rightness which is said to be 
inherent in it. As suggested in that section, if a (universal) moral norm is to be 
tested, it can indeed be reasonably said that the most appropriate way of doing
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that is by letting all those who would be affected by the tested norm’s acceptance 
negotiate such an acceptance among themselves, on the assumption that the 
structure of their communication already commits them to treating each other’s 
interests equally; which is precisely the test being given to moral norms by means 
of the universalization principle. However, to demonstrate in this way the 
appropriateness of the universalization principle for testing universal, moral norms 
-  even if that appropriateness is shown to be exclusive -  does not amount to 
deriving from the structure of communicative action (a) that the universalization 
principle will ever need to be applied to test any norm, or (b) that any application of 
the principle that might take place will lead to the endorsement of a universal, 
moral norm; i.e., that any candidate moral norms will ever be validated.
In fact, propositions (a) and (b), above, cannot be derived from the structure of 
communicative action. For the latter does not a priori determine the content of the 
communication that will actually take place between human beings. From the point 
of view of the structure of communicative action, it is an entirely contingent matter 
whether any specific speech act will ever be undertaken, and thus whether any 
specific negotiation will ever actually be called for or carried out. This, of course, 
applies equally to the universal (hypothetical) communicative negotiations that 
constitute -  as explained -  applications of the principle of universalization. It 
cannot thus be a priori determined whether any particular norm of action will ever 
become object of such universal negotiations, thus a candidate moral norm.
Furthermore, even if such a negotiation over a candidate moral norm is 
undertaken, there can be no guarantee that all its component negotiations, 
regarding different situations relevant to the norm in question, will yield the same 
positive result, thus establishing the norm under consideration as a valid moral 
norm. Again, how each component negotiation will be resolved is entirely 
contingent. What can be a priori guaranteed, according to our earlier analysis of
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communicative negotiations, is that -  since in such negotiations the effort to 
communicatively resolve the negotiation would never be abandoned in favour of a 
strategic approach -  each component negotiation will, for sure, deliver a solution, 
though not necessarily an affirmative one.
Thus, the above argument shows that it is not implicit in the concept of action 
oriented to reaching understanding that the universalization principle would be 
invented, or that, if invented, it would, or should, be applied, or that if applied it 
would lead to universal agreement on any moral norm. It is not, in other words, 
guaranteed by the nature of communicative action that any moral norms -  in the 
sense of universal norms established by means of the universalization principle -  
are either necessary or possible. This, of course, does not exclude the possibility 
that such norms are, contingently, so established.
In the above argument about moral norms, the qualification “(norms) established 
by means of the universalization principle” is important. For norms of this kind 
must be distinguished from morally loaded norms which -  as Habermas and 
others rightly maintain -  are derivable from the structure of linguistic 
communication as rules of argumentation, binding in contexts of discourse. One 
such rationally reconstructible rule, which is stressed by Habermas, concerns the 
exclusion, in all discourse, of “all external or internal coercion other than the force 
of the better argument” (1990: 89).
Evidently, the possibility of a moral norm, in the sense of a norm that has received 
its validation by means of the universalization principle, depends on two factors: 
the ethical/evaluative choices of human beings, and pragmatic/means-ends 
relationships between these choices and possible human actions. More precisely, 
it depends on the existence of such human interests that their communicative/non- 
strategic realization for each person can best be secured by means of the
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universal observance of a single, relatively simple, rule of action. Such interests 
might be described as universalizable interests.
\
The existence of at least some such universalizable human interests must 
therefore be presupposed by any confident expectation that the application of the 
universalization principle will succeed in establishing some universal norms of 
action. Of course, the truth of such a presupposition cannot be known a priori 
through the Habermasian rational reconstructive method. It can only be 
established a posteriori, as for instance and primarily by applying the 
universalization principle itself, i.e. through carrying out universal, multiple 
negotiations in which interests are asserted and mutually recognized by 
participants themselves.
Nonetheless, an anthropological assumption that there are universalizable human 
interests is implicit in Habermas’s thinking on the universalization principle. In this 
respect, it would be interesting to compare this assumption with that of the 
uniformity of nature, which underlies the Principle of Induction. For Habermas 
considers the Principle of Induction to be a “bridging principle”, in the domain of 
empirical science, between “particular observations and general hypotheses”, 
analogous to the principle of universalization, which he takes to be the equivalent 
bridging principle between particular and general in the area of moral discourse 
(Habermas, 1990: 63). This analogy, however, raises issues which cannot be 
discussed here.
3.5.3 The social functionality of norm-based morality
A norm that has passed the universalization test has two distinct functions: (1) It 
defines a certain class of interactions between human beings (e.g. interactions 
involving promises) and prescribes a particular, standardized way of resolving 
every interaction belonging to that class, if the optimum long-term satisfaction of
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certain interests is to be achieved for all human beings (e.g. it prescribes that, if a 
promise is given, it must be kept). (2) It specifies the way in which such an 
optimum outcome should be pursued, namely by applying the norm in question.
Now, let it be pointed out that function (1) does not entail function (2). It is in 
principle possible that the type of (communicative) resolution specified by the norm 
as the one that maximizes long-term interest satisfaction for all, is achieved not by 
applying the norm itself but by direct communicative negotiation (in the absence of 
a norm) of each single relevant interaction, or perhaps by the communicative 
negotiation of particular clusters of such interactions; such a cluster might consist, 
for example, of all the promise-involving interactions between two particular agents 
over a specified length of time, including their entire life. But such a non-norm- 
based way of pursuing the optimum result specified by a moral norm is rejected in 
the course of the norm’s discursive endorsement through the application of the 
universalization test, in which the method of norm-application is adopted.
An advantage of the norm-based approach is immediately apparent: It is highly 
improbable that a potentially infinite number of communicative negotiations would 
result in the same type of deal -  and that, that deal would be the one specified by 
the relevant norm. Thus, it would be exceptionally unwise to rely on such a 
precarious method -  rather than on consistently applying a (potentially) available 
norm -  for securing the desired outcome. Moreover, further reflection reveals that 
not only is it improbable to achieve the optimum deal in every communicative 
negotiation relevant to a moral norm, but that it is virtually certain that such a deal 
would not be obtained in any negotiation of this kind. This is so for the following 
reason: In cases where an interaction is resolved in accordance with the 
requirements of a relevant moral -  or indeed non-moral -  norm (e.g. by keeping a 
promise, paying a debt, or making an honest declaration of income to the tax 
office) there are, typically, immediate “winners” and “losers”. The loser acts -  and
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those “adversely” affected, e.g. his or her family, business associates, etc. agree 
that she acts -  according to the relevant norm on one understanding: that the 
winner(s) in the particular interaction as well as all others in similar encounters 
with them (the present losers) are committed to observing the norm in question, 
including when they are themselves in the role of the (immediate) loser. But, in any 
direct communicative negotiation over the same particular interaction -  now in the 
absence of a universally binding relevant norm -  the equal treatment of the 
immediate interests of those involved would certainly not lead to a solution 
identical to the optimal one that would be prescribed by the appropriate moral 
norm; for that solution would leave (immediate) winners and losers. It would 
inevitably lead to some other, immediately equitable, solution.
Thus, tackling each (morally relevant) situation by means of a direct 
communicative negotiation would, typically, result, for each agent involved, in a 
level of overall, long-term satisfaction of interests incomparably lower than what 
would be attained by approaching the same situations by way of applying to them 
the appropriate moral norms. Lower overall interest satisfaction would also be 
achieved by means of limited, communicatively negotiated agreements of 
reciprocity between an agent and one or more other agents. It would indeed be 
achieved by means of such agreements of any scope, short of the universal one 
resulting from a universal negotiation process tantamount to an application of the 
universalization principle: an agreement committing everyone to universal 
observance of a (moral) norm.
In addition to being preferable in terms of overall interest satisfaction, moral norm- 
following is also a more socially efficient way of dealing with the relevant classes 
of interactions. For -  even taking into account the (potential) requirements of moral 
norm-validation, and, more importantly, the (real) everyday difficulties regarding 
the application of moral norms (see section 2.4.3, above) -  moral norm-following is
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a relatively time- and effort-economical method of meeting the coordination needs 
arising in the relevant classes of interactions, in comparison to (communicatively)
3
negotiating equitability in every specific case or for clusters of cases.
On the above understanding, morality concerns interacting human beings 
undertaking towards each other commitments to act in certain standardized ways 
in specified classes of interactive situations; and this, regardless of whether such 
actions would immediately be less beneficial than the outcome they would achieve 
through the equitable, communicative resolution of the same encounters, either 
singly or in clusters. These universal, standardized solutions to whole classes of 
interactions -  i.e. moral norms -  are adopted for the sake of communicatively 
optimum, long-term interest-satisfaction for each, and are available only 
contingently and only with regard to certain possible (universalizable) human 
interests. Insofar as such (normative, moral) solutions happen to be available, they 
also make a valuable contribution to society’s procedural efficiency.
3.5.4 Moral and non-moral normative frameworks
The (possible) set of valid moral norms -  i.e. of the norms that pass the 
Universalization test, as explained above -  can be said to form a framework that 
specifies the set of actions/goals and by implication the set of interests or values 
that are morally regulated, i.e. whose realization is morally either obligatory or 
prohibited, and separates these from the actions/goals/interests/values whose 
pursuit, including their pursuit through others, is morally permissible, or optional, 
and thus open to possible negotiation between agents. The qualification “morally” 
(with regard to the obligatory, the prohibited and the permissible) signifies the 
context in which the normative framework in question applies: that context in which 
agents interact with each other purely in their capacity as human (or more 
generally thinking and acting) beings, in abstraction from any other determinations.
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This is also the capacity in which human beings can participate in applications of 
the principle of universalization, that is, in discourses that determine moral norms. 
In Figure 4, the moral normative framework is graphically represented by a circle. 
The area inside the circle comprises what is morally regulated, i.e. obligatory or 
impermissible. The area outside the circle comprises what is optional, from a 
moral point of view, i.e. morally permissible but not obligatory.
The moral normative framework
morally optional (permissible 
but not obligatory)
morally regulated 
(obligatory or 
impermissible)
Figure 4
Within the area of what is morally permissible to pursue, there may be elements 
which, for specific, small or large groups of agents, constitute shared goals 
(including complex projects), or broader positive or negative shared interests or 
values, i.e. desirable or undesirable states of affairs, which themselves specify 
further shared goals, or rule out others, for the corresponding groups. Such goals, 
interests or values can be shared by a group of agents either spontaneously or 
following negotiation between its members.
257
Morally permissible goals are what we have earlier referred to as egocentric goals 
for any agent who adopts them, vis a vis those who do not share them with him or 
do not share with him values that entail or rule them out. A morally acting agent 
can pursue such goals by means of those who do not share them with him, in 
either of two ways: through communicative negotiation, or through causally- 
effective, strategic action, so long as such action is compatible with the moral 
normative framework.
For the sake of communicatively maximizing overall interest satisfaction for each, 
and doing so in a socially efficient way, agents interacting in capacities different to 
that of abstractly conceived human being can, similarly, determine respective 
normative frameworks. For example, in their capacity as citizens of a particular 
state, or as members of a particular political, administrative, economic, religious, 
sports or other organization, including a criminal gang, they can, respectively, 
construct a constitutional-legal framework for their state, or a normative framework 
for their organization. The same can be said of collective agents, such as states or 
other organizations, who interact with each other in those capacities, possibly as 
members of international conglomerations of states such as, for example, the 
European Union or the United Nations, or as members of associations of 
organizations, respectively. These non-moral normative frameworks also specify 
what is obligatory, impermissible and permissible in their context of application. 
They similarly allow for the differentiation, within the normatively permissible, 
between goals that are, for any set of interacting agents, shared either directly or 
by being regulated by shared values, and goals that are egocentric and thus only 
pursuable either through communicative negotiation, or through strategic action 
insofar as the latter is permissible within their context. To be sure, normative 
frameworks can interlock with each other in complex ways.
258
The communicative determination of non-moral normative frameworks should take 
place by processes analogous to applications of the universalization principle, that 
is multiple communicative negotiations among all those involved in, or otherwise 
affected by, a certain interactive context (e.g. all the inhabitants of a certain state, 
all the members and other stakeholders of a certain organization, etc.). The 
possibility and scope of such frameworks depends on the existence of interests 
(values, needs, desires, goals) which are, within the given context generalizable 
by analogy to the universalizable interests that make normativity possible in the 
abstractly human, moral context.
3.5.5 Inadequacy of the instrumental justification of moral and non-moral 
norms
The conception of morality and non-moral normativity that emerges from the 
above analysis, is, therefore, that of a concern with the maximum satisfaction, on 
the basis of equal treatment, of non-negotiable interests generally embraced within 
any particular context. In this conception, the aspect of equal treatment is 
rationally reconstructible from the nature of linguistic communication, and its denial 
constitutes a performative contradiction; whereas the existence of generally 
embraced non-negotiable interests in any given context, remains a 
communicatively contingent matter, depending -  according to context -  on ethical 
choices as well as pragmatic considerations.
As explained in section 3.4, in negotiations it is conceivable, and often achieved in 
practice, that the best deal attainable communicatively -  i.e. relying on the force of 
the better argument and respecting the principle of equal treatment of interests -  
is, from the point of view of purposive rationality, better than, or at least as good 
as, any deal attainable by purely strategic means. Insofar as any given
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communicative negotiation proves to be fully purposively rational, in the above 
sense, the communicative approach to that negotiation is justifiable instrumentally 
-  in line with Rational Choice Theory -  and a Habermasian, rational-reconstructive 
justification of it is in that case strictly speaking superfluous. However, the question 
whether any particular communicative negotiation can have a fully purposive- 
rational resolution cannot be answered ahead of the negotiation; for it depends on 
a complex combination of factors, such as the interests, relations of power and 
communicative and negotiation skills of participants, which can only unfold in the 
course of the negotiation, and fully reveal themselves at the end of it. For this 
reason, a non-instrumental justification of the communicative approach -  such as 
the Habermasian justification -  is still necessary for all negotiations.
This argument applies of course also to the negotiations that constitute 
applications of the principle of universalization/generalization for testing moral or 
other norms of action. Thus, although any particular, communicatively validated 
norm may contingently prove to be justifiable instrumentally in the sense that its 
general observance happens to satisfy the relevant interests better than any 
alternative form of regulation, including strategic ones, morality and non-moral 
normativity cannot be a priori so justified. Their communicative nature requires a 
non-instrumental justification, such as the Habermasian one, based on the rational 
reconstruction of linguistic communication.
3.5.6 From the validity claim to normative rightness to the validity claim to 
intersubjective acceptability
The concept of communicative negotiation and the interpretation of moral and non- 
moral norms as conclusions of complex, multi-party communicative negotiations,
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makes possible a certain critical perspective on Habermas’s idea of the validity 
claim to rightness and eventually leads to its extensive revision.
It has already been argued, earlier in this section, that the existence of moral or 
non-moral norms communicatively justifiable in terms of the application of the 
universalization or other generalization principles -  as distinct from morally loaded 
rules of rational argumentation -  cannot be a priori guaranteed, nor of course ruled 
out, by the structure of linguistic communication; for it cannot be determined a 
priori whether any particular norm-justifying communicative negotiation will take 
place, and if it does, whether it will lead to the endorsement of the norm in 
question. If this is so, a validity claim to rightness, in the sense of justifiability in 
terms of legitimate social norms, cannot be implicit in communicative action as 
Habermas maintains; it cannot be the case that every speech act implicitly raises 
and offers to discursively redeem such a claim. However, the intuition that led 
Habermas to postulate the validity claim to norm-based rightness, namely that one 
of the roles of every speech act is to coordinate action, or more generally to 
regulate social relationships, is fundamentally sound.
Thus, every speech act, in addition to raising validity claims (a) to the truth of the 
factual statement it explicitly or implicitly makes and (b) to the truthfulness of its 
explicit or implicit self-expressive content, must also raise, and offer to redeem 
discursively, some claim (c) about the “appropriateness” (in a sense of the term 
that needs to be explained) of the intersubjective relationship regulation it implicitly 
or explicitly proposes or assumes. Factual statements, such as (i) “(our tests show 
that) you have a gall-bladder stone”, and expressive statements, such as (ii) “I feel 
bored”, which thematize claims to truth and truthfulness, respectively, also raise, 
implicitly, claims to the (contextual) appropriateness of their being made. An 
analogous situation exists with regard to explicitly regulatory utterances, such as
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(iii) “What he is planning to do is both wrong and illegal”; (iv) “If you buy two of 
these, I ’II give you a discount of 20%”; (v) “I ’ve got a flat tyre. Can you please 
help me?” and (vi) “Let’s hurry up! We ’II be late for the concert”. These 
statements, over and above making implicit truth and truthfulness claims, 
thematize claims to the appropriateness of their regulatory content.
The regulatory “appropriateness” claims raised explicitly through the thematized 
content of these utterances may -  as in example (iii) -  appeal to moral, legal or 
other social norms which are presumed to be shared by, and legitimate for, a 
certain set of agents, thus determining practical commitments (obligations and 
prohibitions) for them; or -  as in examples (iv) and (v) -  they may constitute claims 
to the effect that the regulation proposed is acceptable to those affected -  in these 
two cases, to speaker and addressee -  on the basis not of any normative 
commitments of theirs but of the equal treatment their relevant egocentric 
interests, including, possibly, other-regarding motives; or, they may appeal to 
shared interests of the interlocutors, as in example (vi).
On the other hand, the regulatory claims raised by speech acts, mostly implicitly, 
about the “appropriateness” of their being performed in the given context, may 
constitute claims to normative commitments, as in example (i); or claims to 
intersubjective acceptability on the basis of egocentric goals, as in examples (ii) -  
(v), combined with claims to normative permissibility, insofar as these speech acts 
are performed within a normatively structured social context; or claims to common 
evaluative commitments on the basis of shared interests, perhaps also combined 
with claims to normative permissibility. Thus, the claims concerning the 
“appropriateness” of the proposed, or assumed, regulation of intersubjective 
relationships, which (claims) are inescapable presuppositions of every speech act, 
cannot be identified with Habermas’s validity claim to normative rightness. Claims
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to normative rightness, as we have seen, are contingent, with regard to the 
structure of speech acts, and would be contingent even if they proved to be 
present in every actual speech act, which may very well be the case, since speech 
acts tend to occur within normatively structured social contexts. Furthermore, 
claims to normative rightness, insofar as they are (contingently) present, are only 
one of three major types of regulatory claims raised in actual speech acts, alone or 
in conjunction with each other; the other two types being (a) claims to 
intersubjective acceptability on the basis of the communicatively necessary equal 
treatment of the relevant egocentric interests, and (b) claims to common 
evaluative commitments based on the coincidence of interests (either 
spontaneous or resulting from communicative negotiations).
What is universal-pragmatically inescapable, in other words, is that every speech 
act raises not a validity claim to normative rightness, but a claim to 
“appropriateness” in one or more of the three senses explained above; i.e., (a) a 
claim to normative rightness, (b) a claim to intersubjective communicative 
acceptability on the grounds of egocentric interests, and (c) a claim to common 
evaluative commitments based on shared interests. But valid norms, as argued 
earlier, are intersubjectively accepted, by those affected by their general 
observance, through processes that amount to large-scale communicative 
negotiations based on the equal treatment of interests; thus normative rightness is 
itself reducible to intersubjective, communicative, interest-based acceptability; 
while common evaluative commitments also signify interest-based intersubjective 
acceptability. It can therefore be concluded that speech acts inescapably raise, 
and offer to redeem by means of communicative discourse, validity claims to the 
intersubjective acceptability of their regulatory content. These claims imply the 
equal treatment of the interests involved, as these are (a major kind of) reasons 
relevant to the justification of the regulatory aspects of speech acts.
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Such validity claims to intersubjective (communicative and interest-based) 
acceptability -  a number of which might be simultaneously implicit in a single 
speech act -  can take a direct form, appealing without mediation to shared or 
egocentric interests, or they can take the form of claims to normative rightness, 
thus appealing to interests in an indirect way, via (intersubjectively acceptable) 
moral or other norms.
Validity claims to intersubjective acceptability include, as explained in the 
discussion of naked imperatives, in section 3.2.2.2, above, a fundamental 
constituent claim to what we have called cross-subjective truth, that is, truth of 
beliefs about others’ subjective states, particularly interests.
The term “rightness” can, perhaps, still be retained, and we can thus still speak of 
necessary validity claims to rightness, albeit on one condition: that it ceases to be 
used in the sense of normative rightness, and takes on the meaning of 
intersubjective (communicative, interest-based) acceptability, in the above sense. 
“Justice” may be yet another term that can be made to carry the meaning of 
intersubjective acceptability as defined here.
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3.6 TAKING STOCK: THE HABERMASIAN AND THE REVISED
CONCEPTUAL SCHEMES REGARDING PRACTICAL RATIONALITY
The preceding discussion has led to certain revisions of Habermas’s 
understanding of action and practical rationality. Throughout his career Habermas 
has been operating with a two-fold distinction between techne, or purposive 
(instrumental and strategic) action/rationality, on the one hand, and praxis, or 
communicative action/rationality, on the other. The former prong of the distinction 
is understood to fuse together a means-to-ends, or “purposive” (in this narrower 
sense) or success-orientation of the subject and a causal-manipulative relationship 
between the subject and a (natural or human/social) object. The latter prong is 
understood to fuse an orientation of interacting subjects to determining values and 
norms, more simply, an ends-orientation, and a dialogical, or “communicative” 
relationship between them, in the stricter sense of communicative, referring to a 
mutually respectful relationship between agents oriented to reaching 
understanding.
This dichotomy has been replaced, in our discussion, by a four-fold distinction, on 
the basis of disconnecting questions concerning orientation, from those 
concerning relationship. Thus, we have differentiated between four types of 
action/rationality, as follows: (1) Means or success-oriented or purposive (in our 
narrower, orientation sense) and causal-manipulative, (2) oriented to values and 
norms and at the same time causal-manipulative, (3) means or success-oriented 
and dialogical, or communicative (in our narrower, relationship sense) and (4) 
oriented to values and norms and dialogical/communicative.
In addition to the above mentioned dichotomy, Habermas in his later work, i.e. in 
the work following his shift to the communicative paradigm, also proposes more 
differentiated models of practical rationality. Initially (in Justification and
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Application) he develops a tripartite model of (a) moral, (including both moral 
justification and moral application), (b) ethical and (c) pragmatic forms of 
discourse. Later (in Between Facts and Norms) he puts forward a model of legal- 
political rationality that includes a fourth element, that of procedurally regulated, 
fair bargaining, in addition to the former three. Moral and ethical discourses are 
conceived by Habermas as processes of reflective communicative action, the 
former with an orientation to determining and applying moral norms, the latter with 
an orientation to clarifying values, and more generally conceptions of the good and 
personal and group identities. Pragmatic discourses, on the other hand, are 
conceived as purposive or success-oriented rationality processes involving causal- 
manipulative relationships, either between those participating in the discourse or 
between these and a third party, natural or human/social. These three basic forms 
of practical discourse are, according to Habermas, founded on the validity claims 
to moral rightness, truthfulness (in the sense of both sincerity and authenticity) and 
truth, respectively. These claims are associated with three respective world 
relations: those to an intersubjectively shared social world, to the inner, subjective 
world of the speaker and to an objective external world.
Fair bargaining is, in the last analysis, a strategic element of practical rationality, 
linked to the Discourse Principle and Universal Pragmatics only indirectly. 
Habermas represents this four-dimensional model, applicable in its entirety in 
political decision-making, in the diagram shown in Figure 5.
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Habermas’s model of “rational political will-formation” 
(from Habermas, 1996: 168)
Pragmatic
discourses
Procedurally
regulated
bargaining
Moral
discourses
i
Legal
discourses
Figure 5
In the previous sections of this Part this model of practical rationality has, in effect, 
been revised in three main ways: (i) The category of success-oriented, yet 
communicative actions and discourses has been introduced. These, 
conceptualized also as communicative negotiations, are understood as processes 
in which interacting agents communicatively aim to use one another as means to 
their own ends including through composing collectively shared 
ends/interests/values out of diverse ones, (ii) Moral discourses have been 
relegated to a secondary, derivative status. Moral justification discourses, in the 
form of applications of the universalization principle, are considered to be special 
types of communicative negotiations (i.e. of success-oriented communicative 
discourses), moral application discourses being thus rendered dependent on the
Ethical -  
political 
discourses
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latter, (iii) The Habermasian category of legal rationality, just as other non-moral 
normative forms of rationality, can, accordingly, be construed as a process that 
also relies on communicative negotiation: directly, by virtue of its significant 
elements of fair bargaining; and indirectly by virtue of its normative component. 
According to (ii) and (iii), therefore, moral and non-moral normative discourses are 
distinct forms of discourse only prima facie.
This revised model of practical rationality is founded on two of the Habermasian 
validity claims, namely those to truth and truthfulness, as well as on a new validity 
claim to “intersubjective acceptability”, an element of which is a claim to “cross- 
subjective truth”. The Habermasian validity claim to moral rightness, as well as any 
validity claims to non-moral rightness, are special forms of this, more inclusive, 
new validity claim. The validity claims to (objective) truth, truthfulness and 
intersubjective acceptability correspond, respectively, with world-relations to an 
objective, external world, to the subjective, inner world of the speaker, and to the 
intersubjective world of shared or communicatively reconcilable values, interests 
and concrete goals of the speaker and the addressees and others affected.
As will be shown below, there are important interdependencies between the 
different forms of discourse comprising this, revised model of practical rationality -  
and indeed this holds also insofar as these forms of practical rationality are 
components of the original Habermasian model. For a schematic representation of 
the revised model, see Figure 6.
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Revised model of practical rationality
Pragmatic discourses 
(concerning truth in 
connection with 
causal, means-ends/ 
success-oriented 
purposive 
relationships)
Ethical 
discourses 
(concerning 
truthfulness)
Communicative purposive discourses/  
communicative negotiations 
(concerning intersubjective 
acceptability, including moral, legal 
and other kinds of normative 
rightness)
Prima facie 
normative 
discourses 
(moral, legal 
and other)
Figure 6
In the following section, 3.7, we shall discuss in more detail certain aspects of this 
revised model. Firstly, section 3.7.1 will consider the concepts of ethical, purposive 
(in both the causal-manipulative and the communicative sense) and prima facie 
normative discourses, discerning interdependencies between them. Secondly, 
section 3.7.2 will elaborate the concept of communicative negotiation, i.e., the 
specifically communicative form of purposive discourse to which the concept of 
prima facie normative discourse is, ultimately, reducible. The analysis will also 
bring to light the role played in communicative negotiation by the other three forms 
of practical rationality.
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3.7 FURTHER ELABORATION OF THE REVISED MODEL OF PRACTICAL 
RATIONALITY: RECIPROCAL DEPENDENCES BETWEEN ETHICAL, 
PURPOSIVE AND NORMATIVE DISCOURSES, AND THE CONCEPT 
OF COMMUNICATIVE NEGOTIATION
3.7.1 Ethical, Purposive and prima facie Normative Discourses and 
relations of interdependence between them
This section is naturally closely related to section 2.4, which presents and critically 
examines Habermas’s tri-partite model of practical rationality. The following 
discussion is an extension -  and in some parts a summing up -  of that in 2.4, now 
focusing attention mainly on issues of mutual dependence between the three 
forms of discourse.
3.7.1.1 Ethical Discourses
Both in the original Habermasian and in the revised model of practical rationality, 
ethical discourses deal with the clarification and determination of what is “good” for 
an individual or collective subject. When speaking of “the sphere of ethics”, i.e. 
that which ethical discourses are about, Habermas, in addition to the generic 
designation “good”, uses a variety of terms such as “values”, “ideals”, “conceptions 
of the good life”, “ego-ideals”, “needs”, “interests”, “(strong) preferences”, 
“inclinations”, “self-identity”, “intentions”, “ends” and “goals”. And if we specify 
further what comes under these terms, we can conclude that “the good”, for any 
particular subject, is likely to be a very complex and uneven ensemble of things.
In both the original and the revised version, the determination of the good for a 
certain subject rests, ultimately, on that subject’s own authentic choices i.e. 
choices not involving any kind of self-deception or erroneous judgement. In other
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words, validity claims as to what is good for a subject are, in the last analysis, 
redeemable only in terms of such choices. There is no guarantee that an ethical 
choice, even though expressed with sincerity, is authentic in the above sense. 
Thus, ethical discourses are concerned not simply with eliciting a subject’s ethical 
choices, but with assisting the subject to make ethical choices that are free from 
error and self-deception. In that capacity ethical discourses deal also with 
additional validity claims for whose redemption third parties have a say equal to 
that of the ethical subjects themselves. Such validity claims, and the related ethical 
discourses, are concerned with three main criteria of authenticity:
a) The internal coherence of the subject’s conception of the good.
What is positively evaluated -  i.e. considered desirable -  by a subject is normally 
an ensemble of diverse elements (states of affairs, objects, actions, properties) 
which can stand in various forms of relationship with each other. The main forms 
of such relationships are:
(i) Relationships between general and specific or abstract and concrete: a valued 
element can be a specific aspect of a more general value (e.g. freedom of speech 
in relation to liberty in general), or a concrete manifestation of an abstract value 
(e.g. my freedom to publish, today, my views on a particular current issue, in 
relation to freedom of speech, and, beyond that, to liberty).
(ii) Pragmatic relationships: some things are valued merely as means to other 
(valued) things. Money, for example, can be valued as means to such values as 
security, or social prestige; university education, as a route to a certain career. 
Some things can be valued both as means to other ends and as ends in 
themselves. Good health, for example can be valued for itself, and also as a 
means to other goods, such as longevity, or a sporting life.
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(iii) Priority relationships: Some goods are valued more, or less, than others (i.e. 
preferred to others, or the opposite).
Validity claims explicitly or implicitly made with regard to such relationships can be 
tested in open discourses in which the subject and others have an equal say, with 
respect to such criteria as logical-conceptual consistency, evaluative consistency 
and factual truth. There has to be consistency between one’s evaluations of 
something general and of its specific aspects. One cannot, consistently, value 
liberty and not freedom of speech, or do so to a disproportionate degree. Similarly, 
transitivity between preferences needs to be respected. If A is preferred to B, and 
B is preferred to C, then A must be preferred to C. Factual claims regarding 
relationships between means-values and end-values must also be discursively 
checked for truth; and where such means-ends links are not seen by the ethical 
subject concerned, they can be pointed out by others.
b) Consistency between a subject’s conception of the good and his or her
behaviour.
A subject’s behaviour -  which is in principle visible to all -  can be tested for 
consistency with the subject’s professed conception of the good in “objective” 
inquiries and discourses in which the subject does not have a privileged position 
vis a vis observers. Once aware of inconsistencies between their behaviour and 
their ethical choices, subjects should either reconfirm the ethical choices and 
change the behaviour accordingly, or revise the ethical choices, so that they are in 
line with the behaviour.
c) Making ethical choices in full awareness of possible influences on them. 
Influences on a subject’s ethical choices can be of three main kinds.
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(i) Influences that occur as a result of a subject’s specific life-history and 
socialization and which the subject can become aware of and acknowledge 
through ordinary hermeneutic processes. Such processes, for example, can make 
one understand -  and possibly revise -  her present religious affiliations and 
evaluative choices by enabling her to reflect on how these are linked to the 
religious family practices and school teaching of her childhood years; or lead one 
to review his present consumer habits through reflecting on the power of modern 
advertising techniques, and on his own early exposure to them.
(ii) Influences on a subject that are alleged by a third person to have occurred but 
which the subject does not acknowledge in the course of ordinary hermeneutic 
discourse. In such cases the subject refuses to accept either that an alleged 
biographical fact (e.g. a traumatic experience during infancy) has occurred, or that 
an (acknowledged) fact has had the alleged influence on his or her present 
subjective choices. In these cases the third-person allegations are either indeed 
false, or are true but the subject can come to accept them only through a process 
more radical than ordinary hermeneutics; such as a depth-hermeneutical, 
“therapeutic” process on the psychoanalytic model, combining hypothetical causal 
explanation by the “therapist” and emancipatory self-reflection by the subject/ 
“patient”, as analysed by the early Habermas in Knowledge and Human Interests 
and discussed in Part One, above.
As we have seen, Habermas plays down this idea, together with the associated 
concept of ideology critique, due to its divergence from communicative discourse, 
and above all due to the authoritarian implications of the asymmetrical relation 
between therapist and patient. As a result, he deprives his communicative 
practical rationality model of valuable critical and self-critical potency (see section 
2.4.2, above).
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However, with the introduction of certain restrictions, depth-hermeneutic 
processes can, perhaps, be brought sufficiently close to fulfilling the conditions for 
communicative discourse as to be made admissible as possible aspects of ethical 
discourses, on a par with ordinary hermeneutics. Such restrictions are, (a) that 
only ethical subjects have the right to initiate depth-hermeneutic processes about 
their own choices (i.e. “therapeutic” processes in which they themselves are the 
“patients”); (b) that the “patient” has the right to terminate the “therapeutic” process 
at any time; (c) that ethical subjects have the last word concerning the alleged 
causal influences on their choices, and thus the privilege, in the last analysis, of 
determining their own authentic choices; and (d) that ethical discourse participants 
have the opportunity to play, symmetrically, both “patient” and “therapist” roles 
towards each other.
(iii) Influences exerted on a subject’s choices by his or her biological (genetic, 
hormonal etc) constitution. Such influences might have to do, for example, with 
one’s being left- or right-handed, with deep-seated personality traits such as 
extroversion or introversion, with one’s sexual orientation, and, with one’s desires, 
or felt needs, in general. Again, (theoretical) knowledge about influences of this 
kind can play a significant role in certain ethical discourses.
The above analysis makes it clear that ethical discourses cannot be divorced from 
theoretical and other non-ethical forms of discourse, including purposive ones, 
concerning means-ends relationships.
3.7.1.2 Purposive and Ethical Discourses
Let us now look at the structure of discourses concerned with finding and justifying 
the choice of means to given ends. Through an example, it will be shown that the 
selection of the “best” or “most efficient” means to a certain end is inseparable
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from ethical choices over and above those involved in selecting the end in 
question.
A certain City Council has taken a policy decision to establish a new link across 
the river that flows in the outskirts of the city. The new link would be within a given 
stretch of the river and would be constructed with the aim of providing to a 
specified number of daily commuters easier access than now available to the city 
centre. The Council -  having determined this goal -  asks the relevant branch of 
the city administration to develop and assess alternative technical solutions to the 
problem, that is, alternative sets of means to the given goal, and select among 
them the one that would best/most efficiently realize the goal.
The following six types of solution seemed initially technically feasible: (a) a 
railway bridge, (b) a road bridge, (c) a rail and road bridge, (d) a railway tunnel, (e) 
a road tunnel and (f) a rail and road tunnel. In order to devise and comparatively 
assess specific solutions of each type, questions such as the following need to be 
asked and answered: (a) What are the advantages and disadvantages of building 
a tunnel rather than a bridge? E.g, which type is likely to be more costly? Which is 
likely to be safer? How would each type of solution affect the landscape and 
cityscape aesthetically? Which is likely to be more environmentally friendly, in 
terms of materials, energy, pollution? How would a bridge affect the economically 
important boat-traffic along the river? (b) What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of a road solution (bridge or tunnel) compared to a rail one, again in 
terms of criteria such as cost, safety, aesthetics, environmental impact, economic 
activity, etc.? How would the city decision-makers compare evaluatively the effect 
of the greater influx of cars into the city centre in the case of a bridge solution, to 
the inconvenience and cost to be suffered by commuters in case of a rail solution, 
according to which commuters would have to leave their motor vehicles in car
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parks outside the city and make their way to the city centre by train? (c) Within 
each type of solution, how would different particular solutions, considered in all 
their specificity down to the smallest detail, compare in terms of the same, and 
perhaps more, evaluative criteria? For example, how would a bicycle lane on a 
road bridge be evaluated? Or, would a more costly but impressive suspension 
bridge -  displaying architectural ingenuity, and adding prestige, and perhaps 
tourist income, to the city -  be preferable to a more humble and functional, but 
less costly construction? (d) Would there be any differences between the various 
options with regard to jobs created (for realizing the option), thus with regard to 
easing the city’s unemployment problem? (From a morally and legally permissive 
point of view -  non-permissible within the communicative perspective -  even more 
questions might arise; for example, which private companies are likely to benefit 
from each option? How close are such companies to the various political parties 
represented in the City Council? What -  illegal -  contributions have they made, or 
are likely to make to them?)
It is obvious that questions such as the above, concerning the development and 
comparative evaluative assessment of the various possible means to the end 
under consideration (with a view to selecting the best one), involve the clarification 
and assessment of goals, interests, values, other than those implicated in setting 
the initial goal. Means are thus value-laden through and through. Each alternative 
means-option, by virtue of its various technical characteristics, constitutes a 
complex value-ensemble (with evaluatively positive/desirable, but perhaps also 
negative/undesirable elements) which, when employed, includes -  if it is an 
effective means at all -  the initially given goal as only one of its elements.
The question “Which is the best means to the given end?” is thus not an entirely, 
even mainly, technical value-neutral question, reducible to one of theoretical
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rationality. “Best means”, in this context, means “the most (evaluatively) preferable 
among effective means”, and not that which more closely approaches, in a 
factual/quantitative sense, a pre-given yardstick -  the goal in question. Similarly, 
“most efficient”, if it has a meaning other than “best”, in the above general sense, 
means, “best with regard to certain evaluative parameters”, e.g. energy 
consumption, or (financial) cost, which are presupposed to evaluatively/ethically 
override other relevant parameters such as beauty, environmental impact, safety, 
etc.
What is evident in the above example applies to all issues concerning the choice 
of means to ends; from the broadest questions of social policy (e.g. designing and 
managing an “effective” national pension scheme), to the most trivial everyday 
instrumental choices (e.g. whether to take a lift to our office or walk up the stairs); 
it applies, not least, to all technical-economic decisions concerned with designing, 
mass-marketing and using technological objects such as computers, motor cars, 
the internet, genetically modified crops, etc. All means are thoroughly value-laden. 
All purposive, i.e. means-ends decisions are inseparable from ethical choices.
This inseparability of purposive issues from ethical ones obtains not only when 
there is more than one effective option -  each of them being a value-ensemble, as 
seen above -  in which case we need to choose between them on 
evaluative/ethical grounds. It happens also when only one option is offered as a 
technically effective means to a given end. In such a case it might seem, on the 
face of it, that the facts of the matter, value-neutrally “force” that solitary option on 
us. Yet, since that means-option, just like any other, is a value-ensemble including 
positive elements, such as the realization of the end in question, but possibly also 
negative ones, i.e. costs/losses, the question necessarily arises whether, as a 
whole, that option is worth adopting; whether the relevant end justifies that
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particular -  one and only -  means-option; or, more generally, whether the gains 
offered by that option -  including the initial end -  outweigh the losses (to be) 
suffered because of it. And that, surely, is an evaluative/ethical question -  one that 
can be answered either positively or negatively. Thus, even a single means-option 
to a given end is not value-neutrally binding on us. In fact, the evaluative/ethical 
decision to give up an end altogether due to the unacceptability of the means 
available for its realization, is open not only when there is only one possible 
means-option but also when there are several. For the cost of even the most 
preferable among them may be judged to outweigh the value of the end to be 
achieved.
In our discussion on the structure of ethical discourses, above, it has been 
suggested that these discourses, with a view to eliciting authentic ethical choices, 
might involve questions of biological and socialization influences on one’s choices, 
of consistency between one’s choices and one’s overt behaviour, and of internal 
coherence of one’s set of choices with regard, in particular, to such parameters as 
relations of generality and specificity, preference-ordering and purposive (means- 
ends) relations between the different items chosen. Now, the discussion of 
purposive discourses shows that the development and selection of means to an 
end, far from being a value-neutral process, necessarily involves ethical 
discourses, possibly of the high complexity indicated above.
The internal structure of a subject’s conception of the good -  in particular the 
means-ends relations between elements of this conception -  in conjunction with 
the necessary involvement of ethical discourses in purposive ones, has an 
additional implication for efforts to develop and select means to ends -  an 
implication especially important, as we shall see, for negotiation processes. That 
is, the purposive search for a means need not terminate the moment it is decided
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that no effective or acceptable means exists or can be devised to the given end. 
The search may continue in terms of questions such as the following: What higher 
goals or values was the initial end intended to fulfill? Can alternative ends be set 
which could satisfy those same higher goals or values at least to the same degree, 
and for which acceptable means can be found? And if yes, which of those 
alternative ends-means combinations is the most preferable? The City Council in 
our earlier example, for instance, might reject as unacceptable all the river 
crossing solutions proposed by its technical services; but then conclude -  on the 
basis of further technical and political consideration of the problem -  that the wider 
interests which were explicitly or implicitly intended to be served by the initial goal 
of constructing a river crossing could, instead, and even better, be served by 
moving a number of industries and offices from the central areas of the city to its 
outskirts, on the other side of the river; and that for this alternative goal acceptable 
means were possible.
The analysis so far has demonstrated mainly an one-way dependence of the 
(technical) development of appropriate means upon the choice of ends as well as 
on other evaluative decisions. Such a dependence exists within specifically 
purposive contexts -  where the development of means is guided at every step and 
in every aspect by evaluative choices -  as well as within specifically ethical 
contexts where elements not valued in themselves are determined according to 
their role as means to elements which are valued in themselves. Elements valued 
in themselves tend to be abstract values (health, beauty, security, convenience, 
economy, etc.) which can be realized as properties of concrete things (states of 
affairs, objects, actions), and, by extension, through purposive relations of the 
latter with other concrete things. Thus, the dependence of the purposive on the 
ethical is, by and large, also a dependence of concrete on abstract evaluative 
judgements.
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However, further elucidation of the relations between the development of 
appropriate means on the one hand, and the adoption of goals and values, on the 
other, reveals also a reverse dependence. Every means to an end, every technical 
solution to a problem (e.g. a suspension bridge of a specific design and method of 
construction, in our example), embodies -  as suggested above -  a certain value- 
ensemble: the realization of a unique combination of specific degrees of different 
(positive and negative) values, including those corresponding to the end in 
question (e.g. the construction of a river crossing). The specific suspension bridge 
under consideration would thus realize, for example, X degree of convenience to 
the commuters, Y degree of aesthetic value, Z degree of environmental burden, 
etc. -  a value-ensemble unique to that specific bridge; a different technical option 
(a tunnel, a different kind of bridge, or even the same bridge constructed at a 
different point along the river) would realize its own (different and also unique) 
value-ensemble.
Now, the evaluative assessment of a value-ensemble is dependent on the 
technically developed concrete means embodying it. The value ensemble 
embodied by the above mentioned suspension bridge would be cognitively 
unimaginable, and at any rate intuitively impossible to evaluate -  either in absolute 
terms or in comparison to other value ensembles -  in abstraction from and thus 
prior to technically developing the specific bridge-option itself. In fact, according to 
the explicit or implicit logic of purposive rationality processes, the value-ensemble 
embodied in a means-option is constructed and evaluatively assessed step by 
step -  beginning with the relevant goal -  in reciprocal relation to the process of 
designing, or, if ready-made, of technically assessing, the means-option in 
question; each stage in the process of designing or technically assessing a means 
-  a process initiated by a given goal -  throws up evaluative questions answering 
which adds new elements to the relevant value-ensemble and at the same time
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guides the design, or assessment process to its next stage, which, in turn, raises 
new evaluative questions, and so on until the design or technical assessment of 
the means, on the one hand and the construction and evaluation of the value- 
ensemble embodied in it on the other, are completed simultaneously.
Thus, the clarification and adoption of values, interests, preferences, etc. -  in 
short, of elements of a subject’s conception of the good -  depends on what the 
subject perceives as possible means to their realization as much as the latter 
depends on the former; ethical discourses feed on purposive discourses as much 
as purposive discourses feed on ethical ones. This rational, reciprocal relationship 
of mutual dependence between what we value and what means we have and 
develop is, perhaps, the core of what the early Habermas -  in important essays 
advocating the mediation between technical progress and the social lifeworld, and 
the cooperative interaction between science and politics, technical experts and 
interested parties -  refers to as the “dialectic of potential and will”, and, even more 
aptly, the “dialectic of enlightened will and self-conscious potential” (Habermas, 
1971: 61, 73).4
The above considerations direct our attention back to a -  still important -  major 
early Habermasian theme, referred to in Part One: the theme of technocracy, 
technocratic consciousness and technocratic ideology. Technocratic 
consciousness is blind to the evaluative/ethical aspects of purposive problem­
solving, reducing the latter to a value-free technical process best left to those who 
have the know-how. Such an illusory, ideological consciousness tends to 
depoliticize citizens and undermine the role of politicians, leaving effective social 
power in the hands of technical experts -  “technocrats” -  whose “technical” 
deliberations and decisions conceal, usually also from the technocrats themselves, 
the evaluative choices necessarily implicit in them.
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To be sure, decisions made by technical experts (engineers, doctors, accountants, 
etc.) embody values/evaluative choices that can legitimately be considered 
internal to the relevant technical disciplines and professions (e.g. precision; 
economy of energy, materials, time; minimum safety standards; professional 
ethics). Some are adopted directly from within the technical disciplines and 
professions, others are internalised by them in the form of legally binding norms 
originating from outside. And, they are legitimately considered internal insofar as 
there is social awareness and acceptance of their presence; in other words, 
insofar as they are, in a sense, “delegated” to the technical disciplines and 
professions by society. To that extent, society’s self-consciously standing back 
and allowing experts to make decisions involving such (“internal”) values 
autonomously does not betray technocratic consciousness. However, not all the 
values embodied in purposive decisions, concerning the development of means, 
are, or -  as argued above -  can be internal in this sense, that is, adopted in 
advance. Some evaluative issues are, and cannot but be, raised and settled in the 
course, and up to the very end, of purposive deliberations. Thus, the idea that all 
means-ends discourses are, at least from the moment the relevant end is 
determined, value-free, or value-neutral processes -  exclusively the province of 
technical expertise -  does constitute a technocratic illusion.
Technocratic consciousness, in the above sense, is by no means exclusive to 
advocates of technocratic society. It often has a strong hold on its opponents too. 
For example, it is perhaps exhibited nowhere as clearly as in Jacques Ellul’s, 
undoubtedly critical, The Technological Society (1964). In that work, a most 
thoroughgoing technological determinist interpretation of modern society is 
essentially founded on the argument that the “best” or “most efficient” means -  the 
pursuit of which is taken to be the hallmark of modernity -  are determined in an 
“automatic” way that leaves no room for human evaluations ( ibid.: 79-80).
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Technocratic thinking can also be said to underlie Max Weber’s view that 
purposive rationality, though hard to do without due to its effectiveness, eventually 
leads to such evils of modern rationalization as “mechanized petrificaition”, 
“dehumanization” and the entrapment of humanity in an “iron cage”. As shown in 
Appendix III, entitled “Max Weber and the Discontents of Modern Rationalization”, 
Weber is led to his pessimistic verdict on rationalization by conceiving purposive 
rationality not as a process defined by its pursuit -  through a thoroughgoing 
dialectic of technical and evaluative considerations -  of the maximum technically 
feasible realization of what human beings consider ultimately valuable, but as a 
formalistic procedure whose engagement with the substantively evaluative is 
severely truncated by being limited to taking for granted arbitrarily posited ends.
3.7.1.3 Ethical. Purposive and prima facie Normative Discourses
Norms are rules which regulate actions, i.e. specify -  for certain sets of people and 
within certain contexts -  which actions are obligatory, prohibited or permissible. It 
can be argued that communicative purposive discourses (i.e. communicative 
negotiations) concerned with determining norms, are reciprocally dependent on 
ethical and purposive discourses.
As explained in preceding sections of this Part, the communicative determination 
of moral norms is understood in Habermasian theory as taking place through 
applications of the Universalization Principle, processes which we have interpreted 
as universal communicative negotiations. Thus, moral discourses -  those of 
justification but also the dependent discourses of application -  are normative only 
prima facie. According to the Universalization Principle, a rule of action, proposed 
as universally applicable, is judged to be a valid moral norm if -  in a (potential) 
universal human discourse where everyone’s interests are equally taken into 
consideration -  all can accept (and prefer to alternatives) the consequences
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(including the side effects) which its universal observance can be anticipated to 
have on their interests. The choice of moral norms, therefore, depends on the one 
hand on the interests of all those involved -  i.e. the interests of all human beings -  
and on the other hand on how possible applications of the norm being considered 
will relate, as means to ends, to those interests. Thus, discursive considerations 
about the determination of moral norms depend both on ethical considerations, 
concerning interests, and on purposive ones, concerning means-ends relations. 
Conversely, once a rule is recognised as a valid moral norm, it, in its turn, sets 
limits both on the ends/interests/ethical values that is morally permissible to 
pursue and on the (necessarily value-laden) means that it is morally permissible to 
employ. Thus, ethical and purposive discourses are, in turn, dependent on moral 
ones.
This reciprocal dependence between moral discourses on the one hand and 
ethical and purposive ones on the other exists, mutatis mutandis, also with regard 
to non-moral normative discources, legal, organizational or other.
3.7.2 Communicative Negotiation
3.7.2.1 Introductory ideas
Communicative Negotiation, as defined earlier in this Part, is coordination of action 
between two or more agents which is at once communicative (i.e. oriented to 
reaching understanding) and purposive, or success-oriented (i.e. oriented to 
finding means to ends believed by the agents concerned to be egocentric, that is 
not genuinely regulated by shared norms or values). When discursively rational, 
communicative negotiation is communicatively fully rational, while it is also 
purposively rational to the maximum degree attainable by communicative means,
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though this may often fall short of full purposive rationality, i.e. of the maximum 
purposive rationality attainable by any means, communicative or strategic.
The concept of communicative negotiation, which has been developed in order to 
fill an important gap in Habermas’s conceptual framework and grounded in terms 
of a revised Universal Pragmatics, can be applied, in both a prescriptive and a 
descriptive sense, to a wide range of social interaction situations: from simple 
everyday cases of issuing and responding to (egocentric) imperatives, including 
requests, to economic exchanges, administrative interactions as well as complex 
processes of collective policy and law making.
As a field of academic study, negotiation analysis belongs, together with the study 
of individual decision making and Game Theory, to the broader discipline of 
Decision Theory. Scientific work in all the fields of Decision Theory is carried out 
within the paradigm of Rational Choice, that is from the perspective of (fully) 
purposive action and rationality. Game Theory and Negotiation Analysis -  both 
areas of study of group decision making -  are normally distinguished on the 
grounds that the former deals with separate though interacting decisions, whereas 
the latter is largely concerned with jointly taken decisions. However, the two have 
a great deal in common. Many decisions taken within a negotiation context are 
lone decisions, taken without knowing with any certainty what the other(s) will do. 
Conversely, lone game decisions are taken on the basis of reciprocal assumptions 
about each other’s intentions, and lead to jointly produced results. For this reason, 
work done in Game Theory is often relevant to the study of negotiations, research 
on the Prisoner’s Dilemma being a prominent example.
In a negotiation two or more parties, through communication (among themselves -  
and possibly their advisors -  alone, or also with the participation of neutral, third 
parties such as facilitators, mediators, arbitrators, etc) try to reach an agreement
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out of which each party would gain more than (or at the very least as much as) it 
would have gained in some alternative way. Such alternative ways might be (i) 
terminating the negotiation and leaving things as they were before, (ii) successfully 
negotiating with another party, or (iii) making some other (unilateral) efforts of its 
own. Thus, negotiating parties, aim to use each other -  more precisely, each 
other’s actions, services, consent -  as means to the realization of some of their 
ends. To the extent that this can be achieved, the parties can be said to be 
interdependent with regard to realizing their relevant ends.
If any of the parties, at any point during a negotiation, comes to believe that its 
relevant ends cannot be satisfactorily realized in the context of that negotiation -  
i.e. that they cannot be realized to a greater, or at least equal, degree as they 
would in the most beneficial of the said party’s alternatives -  that party can, and 
rationally should, withdraw from the negotiation and pursue its best alternative; 
whereas if any party believed beforehand that an alternative approach better than 
the prospective negotiation was available to it, it could, and rationally it should, 
refuse to enter the negotiation in the first place. In some of the literature on 
negotiation, a party’s best alternative is technically referred to by the term Best 
Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement, for short BATNA (see Raiffa, 2002: 110; 
Fisher etal, 1991: 101ff).
The above applies to both Rational Choice negotiations and communicative ones. 
The two differ, though, in that communicative negotiations, unlike Rational Choice 
ones, do not allow themselves strategic, i.e. causal-manipulative, behavour such 
as deception or coercion, either in the actual negotiation itself or in the 
(hypothetical) negotiations or other actions considered as possible alternatives to 
it, especially in what they take to be their party’s BATNA. Despite this evidently 
important difference, however, communicative negotiation can learn a great deal
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from Rational Choice negotiation analysis. And this is so not only due to the 
considerable common ground between the two, but also because Rational Choice 
theorists have come to recognize that very often in negotiations it makes good 
Rational Choice sense to adopt approaches and methods akin to those we would 
characterize as communicative.
Below, we shall look -  in a highly condensed fashion -  into some elements of 
Rational Choice negotiation analysis which can be used profitably to clarify and 
elaborate our concept of communicative negotiation. These elements are of 
particular importance when they link up with the revised model of practical 
rationality explained in earlier parts of this study, especially with the concepts of 
ethical and purposive discourses and their interdependencies.
3.72.2 Elements of Rational Choice Negotiation Analysis
In the relevant scholarly literature, two aspects of negotiations are normally 
distinguished: the integrative and the distributive (Raiffa et al, 2002: 97, 191).The 
first aspect is concerned with developing, through the integrated efforts of the 
negotiating parties, potential agreement options which would leave the parties 
better off than they would be without agreement. The second aspect is about how 
the parties will share -  distribute among themselves -  the total benefit, or value, 
thus produced. These two aspects are often referred to by the terms “creating 
value” and “claiming value”, respectively (see ibid., and Lax and Sebenius, 1986: 
129ff).
In some cases, the total value to be created in the negotiation is considered by the 
negotiating parties to be fixed, or constant, regardless of how it is eventually 
shared among them. In these cases the parties concentrate their efforts on 
claiming and securing as big a share or the “fixed pie” -  another metaphor used -
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as they can. They are then said to be involved in a “zero-sum game”, (Raiffa et al, 
2002: 97, 279) in the sense that the difference in the total value that results from 
different outcomes of the claiming and sharing game is zero; or, put differently, 
they are involved in a “constant-sum game”, in the sense that the total value 
secured (the sum of the values that each secures) in the game is constant 
regardless of its distribution among the parties: “what you gain the other side loses 
and vice versa” ( ibid.). Often, however, the total value that can be created through 
negotiation is variable; more precisely, it is higher than what is initially visible to the 
parties. The “pie” is not fixed; it can be enlarged. The challenge for the negotiating 
parties in these cases is to envisage this potential and try to actualise it, by 
creating through a “variable-sum game” as much total value as possible before 
sharing it among themselves.
Let us consider two examples (both borrowed, with modifications and enrichments, 
from Fisher et al, 1991). The first is a well known simple story -  though highly 
instructive in its simplicity -  of two young sisters who were claiming the same 
orange ( ibid.: 59). Each of the sisters, perceiving the problem as a fixed-pie, or 
zero-sum one, first insisted on getting the whole orange, and then claimed a 
disproportionately large portion of it for herself, using alternatingly, threats, 
promises, emotional appeals and even arguments such as “I was the first to ask 
for the orange” or “I have priority because I am older”, evidently based on 
principles presumed to be valid. But finally -  neither of the two being able to 
overpower, outwit or rationally convince the other -  they settled reluctantly on a 
fifty-fifty compromise solution, taking half of the orange each. On this 
understanding of the problem, no matter how the two sisters agreed to divide the 
orange between them -  including the extreme option of one sister getting the 
whole orange and the other getting nothing -  the total value created and 
distributed would remain constant: one whole orange.
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But when the orange was cut into two and each girl got her own half, to their 
mutual astonishment, this happened: The first girl, as might be expected, peeled 
her half of the orange, ate the flesh and threw the peel away; the second girl, 
however, peeled her own half, threw the flesh away and used the peel as an 
ingredient of the cake she was baking. They then of course realized, belatedly, 
that both would have been better off by far had the first got all the flesh of the 
orange and the second all the peel, neither of them throwing anything away. In 
such a solution, the total value created in the negotiation and shared by the two 
sisters would have been twice as much as the one actually created: Each would 
have got twice as much of what she wanted and nothing of what she did not want. 
To achieve such a feat, the two young negotiators would have to approach their 
problem as a potentially variable-pie/variable-sum game. To do that -  and this is of 
crucial importance for our argument -  they would have to engage in two 
simultaneous and interrelated processes: on the one hand, a process of asking 
and telling each other the reasons (the underlying concerns, needs, desires -  in 
general, the interests) because of which each so insistently claimed the whole 
orange for herself; and on the other hand, the process of trying to devise means 
by which those underlying interests of both (rather than their initial positions, i.e. 
their claim to the whole orange) could be satisfied as much as possible.
Of course, had the two sisters both wanted the flesh of the whole orange, or if they 
both wanted its peel, rather than different parts of the orange, the total value 
available for distribution would have been fixed, and no negotiation technique 
could yield extra value. On the other hand, in the event that the two sisters, in 
addition to wanting the flesh and the peel of the orange, respectively, also shared 
an interest -  one inspired, for instance, by their botany teacher -  in planting seeds 
and nurturing the sprouting plants, yet more value could be creatively conjured up, 
for both, this time out of the orange pips.
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The second example is analogous to the first, but this time it is taken from the real 
world of international politics and diplomacy. It concerns the 1978 negotiations 
between Egypt and Israel on the status of the Sinai Peninsula which led to the 
peace treaty agreed at Camp David. A lengthy quote is here appropriate:
When Egypt and Israel sat down together in 1978 to 
negotiate a peace, their positions were incompatible. Israel 
insisted on keeping some of the Sinai. Egypt, on the other 
hand, insisted that every inch of the Sinai be returned to 
Egyptian sovereignty. Time and again, people drew maps 
showing possible boundary lines that would divide the Sinai 
between Egypt and Israel. Compromising in this way was 
wholly unacceptable to Egypt. To go back to the situation 
as it was in 1967 was equally unacceptable to Israel.
Looking to their interests instead of their positions made it 
possible to develop a solution. Israel’s interest lay in 
security; they did not want Egyptian tanks poised on their 
border ready to roll across at any time. Egypt’s interest lay 
in sovereignty; the Sinai had been part of Egypt since the 
time of the Pharaohs...
At Camp David, President Sadat of Egypt and Prime 
Minister Begin of Israel agreed to a plan that would return 
the Sinai to complete Egyptian sovereignty and, by 
demilitarizing large areas, would still assure Israel’s 
security. The Egyptian flag would fly everywhere, but 
Egyptian tanks would be nowhere near Israel (Fisher et al:
42-3).
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Here, again, as in the orange example, the negotiation began as a constant-sum 
game, on the assumption of a fixed total value. The perceived fixed total value -  
possession of the Sinai -  was from the beginning claimed in its entirety by both 
parties. No compromise sharing of that total value between the two was 
acceptable to either. However, the total value was considerably enlarged when the 
parties moved to a variable-sum form of negotiation. On that approach, they 
engaged in the twin process of (a) exploring with each other the deeper interests 
(needs, etc.) behind their positions, and (b) creatively inventing solutions that 
would satisfy those deeper interests sufficiently. Through this process -  in which, it 
must be said, a very significant role was played by skillful mediators -  the parties 
were able to create sufficient additional value.
To be sure, in this case, unlike the earlier example, it can be justifiably argued that 
the eventual total value did not satisfy the relevant needs fully. Each of the two 
sisters got one hundred per cent of what she wanted -  clearly, each was totally 
disinterested in the part of the orange that went to the other sister. The same, 
however, cannot safely be said about the Sinai case. Egypt would most likely 
prefer not to have any restrictions on the extent of militarization of -  thus on its 
sovereignty over -  the peninsula; while Israel would most probably feel more 
secure if the Sinai was under its own control, or at least if the whole of it was 
demilitarized, even if under Egyptian sovereignty. Thus, though what each side 
eventually got was far more than fifty per cent of the value initially claimed, (which 
would be what they could expect in an equitable compromise in the context of a 
constant-sum negotiation) it was still below one hundred per cent. Therefore, in 
addition to creating extra value, the two sides, unlike the two sisters in the orange 
example, also had to play a difficult claiming game over a part of the eventual total 
value. One might venture to say that one reason why they concluded that game 
successfully was that agreement between them meant yet more value, for both,
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over and above the value accruing from the (partial) satisfaction of their interest in 
sovereignty and security, respectively: namely, the value resulting from the 
fulfillment of their common desire for peace between them; a factor not explicitly 
thematized in the streamlined description quoted above.
One might visualize, furthermore, (and here we are admittedly taking a flight from 
the real negotiation into the realm of the purely hypothetical) the creation of yet 
more (common) value, had those involved been even more creative, inventing 
ways of satisfying also other interests of the two countries. Such ways might be, 
pooling their (presumably, separately insufficient) resources, to explore and 
commonly exploit possible oil reserves in the Sinai, or to irrigate and make fertile 
certain parts of the peninsula.
But although it is the aim of all negotiations to create value, whether fixed or 
variable, not every negotiation does so. It is perfectly possible, and in practice 
often the case, that a negotiation does not produce any value at all. Such an 
outcome occurs when the negotiation does not lead to an agreement, leaving 
things as they were before. In some such cases this outcome is deliberately 
chosen by one or more of the parties because they have, or believe they can 
achieve, a better alternative than any feasible agreement achieved in the present 
negotiation would secure. In other such cases, however, the lack of agreement is 
not chosen, but results from incompetent negotiating by one or more of the parties, 
and deprives the parties of the opportunity to create more value for themselves 
than any of the alternatives available to them. Failure of the two sisters to agree on 
what to do with the orange, for example, would leave the needs of both totally 
unsatisfied in the absence of an alternative, whereas even a straightforward, 
equitable zero-sum compromise could have left both of them satisfied. And, if the 
“negotiation” led to a quarrel, the orange might even end up squashed on the floor. 
Similarly the (hypothetical) inability of Israel and Egypt to reach a negotiated
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agreement on Sinai would have perpetuated the status quo and left unfulfilled the 
interests (in security and sovereignty, respectively) for the sake of which they had 
entered the negotiations in the first place.
But worse still, a badly handled negotiation may not only fail to produce any new 
value, it may even result in the destruction of existing value. A rowdy dispute over 
the orange, might not only deprive the two sisters of any part of the orange, it 
might, in addition, provoke their mother’s punishment and/or cause lasting 
resentment between them. Similarly, a failure of the Egypt-lsrael negotiations, 
accompanied by reciprocal public recriminations, could lead the two countries into 
another, mutually destructive war. Thus, in all negotiations value needs to be 
produced, or at least preserved, as well as claimed. And the extent to which in a 
negotiation the combination of value creation and value-claiming succeeds in 
satisfying the negotiating parties, either through an agreement, or through a 
deliberate non-agreement in view of a better alternative, depends on two factors: 
Firstly, it depends on the potential offered by the particular situation. The most 
important factor, in this respect, is whether we have a zero-sum situation or a 
potentially positive-sum one. Secondly, it depends on how skillfully the negotiation 
is carried out; in particular, on the ability of the negotiators to actualize the value- 
creating potential inherent in the situation.
With regard to the latter point -  concerning effective negotiation approaches and 
methods -  Rational Choice negotiation theorists identify a tension between 
creating value and claiming value, the techniques most suitable for successful 
value claiming being inappropriate for -  indeed working against -  successful value 
creation, and vice versa. So much so that certain theorists consider the effective 
handling of this tension, or “negotiator’s dilemma”, as the heart of the science and 
art of negotiation (see Lax and Sebenius, 1986: 38ff; Raiffa et al, 2002: 95).
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Value creation (in a broad sense, including preserving existing value, securing 
value visible and claimable ahead of the negotiation and generating extra value in 
the course of the negotiation) is best facilitated by a cooperative, mutually 
respectful and open approach, one of collaborative common-problem solving. In 
particular, the creation of extra value -  based on the above mentioned twin 
processes of (a) exploring possible, situationally relevant, deeper interests 
underlying the parties’ initial positions/claims and (b) inventing ways of satisfying 
the parties’ deeper interests to an optimal degree -  requires firstly that the parties, 
through mutual questioning and prompting, delve deep into themselves and 
honestly share information about their authentic subjective states and secondly 
that they pool their creative energies together to devise imaginative, situationally 
feasible solutions. Raiffa et al speak, in this respect, of a “Full, Open, Truthful 
Exchange” (FOTE) (2002: 83, 86-7). It is obvious that these requirements for 
value creation are very close to our own Habermasian communicative discourse.
The circumstances of value-claiming, however, call for a more differentiated 
approach. For there is a whole set of possible situations that differ with regard to 
the ways in which the respective total value available for claiming satisfies the 
requirements of the parties. Below, I shall provide a schematic presentation of this 
spectrum, taking, for the sake of clarity, the simplest case of a two-party 
negotiation between A and B, the argument being applicable, with suitable 
adjustments, to more complex negotiations.
In all the diagrams in Figures 7 to 9, the areas enclosed within the outer line 
represents the total value, Vj, which at a given phase in the negotiation is believed 
by agents A and B to be of interest to them and available for sharing between 
them. V j is at the same time considered to be permissible according to norms 
shared by A and B in the context of the given situation. The area outside the outer
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line, on the other hand, represents non-required, non-available, or non-normatively 
permissible value.
In these diagrams, areas designated Va represent value which is required by 
agent A alone and areas VB represent value required by B alone. Areas VA and b 
represent value required by both A and B and capable of satisfying both 
requirements, whereas areas VA or b represent value required by both agents but 
capable of satisfying only one or the other fully, or both of them only in 
complementary parts. Areas VA- and VB* represent values required by both agents 
but recognized, according to norms shared by them in the given situation, as 
rightfully belonging to (i.e. as normatively sanctioned entitlements of) A or B, 
respectively.
The diagram in Figure 7 represents a simple and rather extreme member of the 
set of possible value-claiming situations: the purely antagonistic, zero-sum 
situation, where all the value available, Vj, is of the type VAor b. This is the case of 
the two sisters claiming the whole orange, each for herself; or the case of Egypt 
and Israel each claiming, as they did initially, unrestricted sovereignty with full 
militarization rights over the Sinai peninsula.
A or B
Figure 7
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Another paradigmatic member of the set of possible value-claiming situations, and 
also extreme, though in the opposite way to the previous one, is the situation 
where the value available satisfies fully all the situationally relevant requirements 
of both parties. Here, two different versions can be discerned. In the first version 
(Figure 8a) there are no conflicting requirements of the parties, no zero-sum 
aspects to the negotiation. The requirements are simply different. Here V j is equal 
to the sum of Va and Vb. An example would be that of one of the two sisters 
claiming only the orange flesh and the other claiming only its peel. The second 
version (Figure 8b) combines requirements that are not conflicting but are 
different, in the above sense, with identical requirements all of which can be 
satisfied. Here the total available value V j is the sum of Va, Vb and VAand b-
(a)
V a  and B
(b) 
Figure 8
29 7
A case in point would be the two sisters claiming, each for herself, the orange 
flesh and the peel, respectively, and at the same time both of them (together) 
wanting the orange seeds for their joint botany experiments.
The diagram in Figure 9 is a generic representation, where all the possible value- 
claiming situations, including the two described above, can be obtained by varying 
the magnitude of the different types of value involved, down to nil and up to the 
total available value Vj. In this generic diagram, where all the different types of 
value are present, the total value is the sum of Va, Vb, VAandB, VA or b, Va> and VB\
A or B
A and B
Figure 9
Such a maximally composite value-claiming situation, in other words, combines (i) 
conflicting requirements, (ii) requirements that are different but not conflicting, (iii) 
coinciding and jointly satisfiable requirements, as well as (iv) a conflict of 
requirements which is normatively resolved. Examples of VA- and VB- would be, (a) 
the whole orange, had the two sisters shared a norm such as “Priority goes to the 
one who asks first”, and (b) the status of the whole or parts of the Sinai, had there 
been binding law for settling international disputes such as the one in question.
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Evidently, in these situations, values V a , V b , V * and V b ’ (Figures 8 and 9) are not 
contentious, and their claiming can, in principle, be pursued in a 
cooperative/communicative manner. Values V a  or b (Figures 7 and 9), on the other 
hand, are contentious, creating situations of zero-sum claiming: the more one 
party gets, the less will remain for the other. Here, the (contentious, zero-sum) 
claiming may have to be competitive/non-communicative, though not necessarily 
so, as we shall see.
Situations of genuinely conflicting requirements, thus the need for some zero-sum 
value claiming, can be expected to arise in the great majority of negotiations; for 
cases such as those represented in Figure 8 (a and b), where the situation is 
entirely non-contentious, are rare. And even those rare cases cannot be known 
until the final stages of a negotiation are reached. For these reasons, all 
negotiations need to be conducted on the assumption that in them some degree of 
contentious value claiming is likely to be called for.
Nonetheless, even contentious value-claiming need not require, from a 
purposively-rational point of view, competitive claiming methods. To begin with, 
even in cases where competitive claiming is not expected to impair value creating 
ability, it is often prudent to seek a cooperatively reached fair compromise rather 
than risk getting a smaller share as a result of a competitive process. This is true 
for negotiating parties that believe or suspect that they are not strong enough (i.e. 
that they do not possess sufficient capacity for deception and/or coercion to be 
able to secure for themselves a better deal than they would achieve by 
cooperative means).
But in many cases, the reason why it is purposive-rationally preferable, even for 
the party that feels stronger, to pursue contentious claiming cooperatively, rather 
than competitively, is the danger that competitive value claiming will have a
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seriously adverse effect on value creation -  that is, keep the total value eventually 
available for claiming and sharing to unacceptably low levels. If it were possible in 
a negotiation, first, through cooperative methods, to create maximum value and do 
all the non-contentious claiming, and only then use competitive methods to do the 
unavoidable contentious claiming, this danger might be considerably reduced; 
there might be much less tension between cooperative and competitive 
approaches. However, this is not possible; for the processes of value creation and 
value claiming (contentious and non-contentious) are necessarily intertwined. 
From the very beginning, while having to cultivate mutual trust and engage in an 
open, honest dialogue in order to create more value, the parties also need to be in 
some respects deceitful and even coercive in an effort to secure a bigger share of 
the value created. In this connection, Raiffa et al refer to “bluffing, threats, trickery, 
exaggeration, concealment, half-truths and outright lies” (2002: 83). Such means, 
however, can seriously damage trust and cooperation, and thus reduce the 
negotiators’ ability to create value, and even to successfully claim value that is of 
interest only to themselves, or value that could be enjoyed by the two parties 
jointly, or indeed value which could be shown to be rightfully theirs. Heavy 
handedness for the sake of better share of the eventual total value, may not only 
obstruct the creation of new value; it may also result in destroying existing value 
too, as pointed out in our preceding discussion of the two examples.
It is also noteworthy that excessively competitive methods, even when beneficial in 
the short run to those who employ them, (particularly in securing a better deal in 
the negotiation underway) can seriously harm their interests in the long run: they 
may, for example, impair their ability to engage in successful negotiations (with 
respect to both value-creating and value-claiming) or other exchanges with the 
same parties, not excluding those exchanges necessary for the implementation of 
the (beneficial) agreement reached in the negotiation in question. Furthermore,
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excessively competitive methods may cause, for those who use them, loss of 
reputation and credibility among third parties (colleagues, potential customers or 
business associates, significant other countries, etc); which will damage future 
negotiations, or other relations, with them.
To be sure, the tension exists also in the opposite direction: Too much openness 
and honesty may in some cases diminish one’s value-claiming ability. However, 
the value-creating potential of cooperation and the value-undermining potential of 
competitiveness are such that, more often than not, one can benefit more from 
getting a (cooperatively agreed) fair share of a larger (cooperatively enhanced) 
pie, than a disproportionally big (competitively achieved) share of a pie that has 
remained smaller due to interference from competitive claiming methods. This is 
particularly the case in situations where the balance of power -  even though 
possibly in favour of one party, thus tempting that party to employ competitive 
value claiming methods -  is not so one-sided that would enable the stronger party 
to secure a sufficiently disproportionate share of the eventual value to make up for 
the smaller size of the total value that would result from the interference of the 
competitive methods with value creation. It is also true in situations where much of 
the value at stake for a (currently) strong negotiating party lies in that party’s future 
relations with its current negotiating counterparts and/or third onlookers, while its 
present comparative strength (possibly justifying a competitive approach now) 
cannot be assumed to last. Such circumstances are by no means rare in real 
social life. On the contrary, it can be said that they are part and parcel of much of 
it.
For these reasons it is very often preferable, from a purely purposively rational 
point of view, to resolve the above mentioned tension between cooperative value 
creation and competitive value claiming not through a delicate balancing act
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between the two but by consistently employing throughout a negotiation -  both for 
value creation and for value claiming -  an exclusively cooperative approach such 
as Raiffa’s “Full, Open, Truthful Exchange”.
3.7.2.3 From Rational Choice Negotiation Analysis to Communicative
The similarity between what, within the Rational Choice paradigm, is called 
cooperative, or, collaborative, negotiation and what we have termed 
communicative negotiation is obvious. Thus, whatever support Rational Choice 
Theory provides for cooperative negotiation (which, of course, though 
considerable, does not amount to a justification for its universal use, as we have 
seen) can be said to apply also to communicative negotiation; which, in addition, is 
rationally fully grounded in terms of the communicative paradigm, as argued 
earlier in this Part. The support coming from the perspective of purely purposive 
rationality is important for communicative negotiation, as it can have a powerful 
influence on the will to employ in practice the communicative mode of negotiating. 
For this support -  though admittedly partial -  is accompanied by the strong 
motivational force of interests, which greatly enhances what Habermas calls “the 
weak motivational force of good reasons” (1996: 164), which comes with the (full) 
rational support provided to communicative negotiation from within the 
communicative paradigm. This strong motivational force of interests, in the context 
of a communicative negotiation is directly proportional to the value expected to be 
created (and equitably shared) in that context.
Below, we shall try to develop the concept of communicative negotiation a little 
further, through comparing and contrasting it with the Rational Choice conception 
of negotiation outlined above, and linking it with aspects of communicative 
practical rationality, discussed in the previous section. A major concern will be to
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enhance as far as possible the value creating capacity -  and thus the purposive 
rationality and the concomitant motivating power -  of purely communicative 
negotiation.
According to the preceding analysis, negotiations are mutually purposive 
interactions into which two or more parties enter, seeking to use each other -  
strictly speaking, each other’s actions or consent -  as means to what at first sight 
seem to them to be egocentric goals of theirs, that is goals that are for them 
normatively or evaluatively permissible but not obligatory; goals that are, therefore, 
considered conflicting or at least at variance with each other. Negotiation 
situations typically arise -  to remain with the simple, bilateral model -  when one 
agent addresses to another what appears to at least one of them as an egocentric 
request (i.e. a request not regulated for them either normatively or evaluatively) 
which is normally accompanied, explicitly or implicitly with a reference to 
corresponding rewards or other addressee-relative reasons for fulfilling the 
request. A negotiation process gets properly underway when the addressee 
makes a counter-proposal which the former agent finds unsatisfactory but not a 
sufficient reason for not pursuing the particular interaction further.
Rational Choice negotiation, by definition, aims, overall, to be fully purposively 
rational, and is cooperative only insofar as this serves that aim. Communicative 
negotiation, by contrast, aims to be on the one hand, and primarily, fully 
communicatively rational, and on the other hand purposively rational to the 
maximum degree compatible with communicative rationality. This maximum 
possible degree of purposive rationality sometimes amounts to full purposive 
rationality, but sometimes falls short of it. Once engaged with each other in a 
negotiation over goals initially considered egocentric, in our sense of the term, 
communicative agents try to devise a solution -  a negotiation “deal” -  which they
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can convince each other communicatively (i.e. by means of raising and redeeming 
validity claims) that it is for both, from a purposive-rational point of view, the best 
achievable by communicative means, either within the present negotiation or 
outside it, not excluding the possibility of a fully purposively rational outcome. Such 
a communicatively optimal solution, or deal, can be achieved according to our 
earlier analysis, by means of two analytically distinct processes. These are, in the 
terminology used earlier, (1) the communicative creation of maximum value to be 
available for sharing among the parties, and (2) the communicative claiming (and 
thus the equitable, or “fair” sharing) of that value. This section will conclude with 
some additional remarks on these two processes.
1) The twin-process of communicative value creation.
As we have seen, in the discussion of the orange and Sinai examples, value 
creation is achieved through a two-pronged communicative process: (a) the 
process of exploring (i) the interests (including -  shared or divergent -  values, 
principles, needs) underlying the parties’ initial positions/negotiation claims, (ii) 
other relevant interests of the parties (i.e. interests which, by being brought into 
the negotiation, could facilitate its successful resolution) and (iii) relevant shared 
norms; and (b) the process of inventing means (i.e. possible negotiation solutions 
or deals) by which to satisfy as much as possible the relevant underlying interests 
of the parties. The invention of such means involves the analysis of the negotiation 
“stake” (i.e. the contentious object which the negotiation is mainly about -  the 
orange, the Sinai peninsula) into constituent elements which can satisfy the 
parties’ underlying interests either separately (e.g. the orange flesh, the orange 
peel) or together (e.g. the orange seeds). It also involves the mutual exploration 
and communicative influencing of those factual beliefs held by the parties which 
might have a role in the parties’ linking the means devised, and proposed, with
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their interests (e.g. in linking the partial demilitarization of a Sinai that nevertheless 
is under Egyptian sovereignty, with Israel’s fundamental interest in security). Such 
beliefs might include prejudices, false expectations, or fears, which can either be 
rectified or, if this is not possible, accepted and taken into account in the 
negotiation. Consider, for example, Egypt’s and Israel’s beliefs about each other 
and about the other’s likely future attitudes and behaviour towards them.
The point of this twin-process is to translate the initial, apparently conflicting 
goals/positions/claims of the parties into requirements (that is, required elements 
of the invented means) that are as reconcilable as possible. In terms of Figures 7, 
8 and 9, above, the aim of the twin value-creating process is to move from initial 
situations often approaching that in Figure 7 to situations as close as possible to 
those in Figures 8a and 8b, or, more generally to situations where (in terms of 
Figure 9 )  V a ,  V b ,  V a  and b , V *  and V b -  are maximized and V A 0r b is kept to a 
minimum.
The appropriate form of this twin-process of value creation is described by 
Rational Choice negotiation analysts in terms such as Raiffa’s “Full, Open, Truthful 
Exchange”. This notion, however, can be greatly enriched, as well as gain in 
philosophical depth and justification, by drawing on the considerable body of 
Habermasian ideas on the conditions and characteristics of communicative 
discourse: ideas -  summed up in such concepts as “ideal speech situation” and 
“unrestricted communication community” as well as in Habermas’s theory of 
argumentation -  which specify the meaning of a discourse in which the only 
influencing factor is the “force of the better argument”.
With regard to the substantive aspect of the value creating process (that is, the 
mutual exploration and critical, including self-critical, examination of values, 
principles, interests, needs, desires, goals, preferences, attitudes, concerns,
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beliefs, prejudices, fears, etc., on the one hand, and the creative invention of 
means that maximally satisfy the genuine requirements of the parties involved, on 
the other) we can, similarly, draw on the dimensions of practical rationality 
discussed earlier, in section 3.7.1; more precisely, on the ideas concerning ethical, 
purposive-rational and (prima facie) normative discourses and the necessary 
interdependence between them.
2) The process of communicative value claiming.
The various alternative solutions, or deals, proposed in a negotiation are likely to 
differ with regard to how much each satisfies the requirements of each party. In 
the best of cases the solutions invented manage to resolve all the normatively 
resolvable issues (concerning prohibitions, obligations and entitlements) and 
reconcile all the reconcilable remaining requirements. Such solutions, therefore, 
differ only in the extent to which they can satisfy each party with regard to 
normatively non-regulated and irreducibly non-reconcilable requirements.
The sharing among the parties of the total value available is effected through 
reaching agreement on one of the proposed alternative solutions, and thereby 
determining the degree of satisfaction of each party. In negotiations intended to be 
fully communicative, the tension identified within the Rational Choice paradigm 
between the twin-process of value creation (which needs to be 
cooperative/communicative), on the one hand, and the process of value claiming 
(which may need to be non-cooperative/non-communicatively), on the other, does 
not exist; for within the communicative paradigm, the option of using non- 
cooperative/non-communicative claiming methods for the sake of securing for 
one’s own party, at the expense of the other(s), a better share of the value 
available, is not open.
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Non-communicative methods -  in our Habermasian terminology, “strategic” 
methods -  of making others accept a less than fair deal, largely consist of forms of 
deception (including self-deception) and coercion. By contrast, communicative 
methods of reaching agreement on how to share the value available -  including, of 
course, value of type V a  0r b> i.e. value with regard to which requirements are non- 
reconcilable, and where the main value-claiming problems therefore lie -  are 
limited to methods based on raising and redeeming validity claims; and these 
exclude both deception and coercion. When Rational Choice negotiation analysts 
consider it more purposively rational to refrain from using non-cooperative/non- 
communicative methods of value claiming, they propose approaches such as that 
of “Full, Open, Truthful Exchange”, which, as we have seen, they propose also for 
value creation and which, as suggested above, can be greatly enhanced by being 
linked to the Habermasian communicative conceptual apparatus.
Concerning the exclusion of coercion from communicative value claiming, some 
further clarification is in order. In (non-communicative) negotiation -  as opposed to 
open conflict -  coercion is not exercised directly; if enters the process mainly 
through credible “threats” and “promises” of a certain kind. The use of threats and 
promises is indeed, for Habermas himself, the way in which power is exercised in 
negotiations, that is, how bargaining -  even fair bargaining -  is for him 
differentiated from communicative interaction (see section 3.3, above). Thus, one 
can make another party accept an otherwise unattractive deal by “promising” to 
offer something additional that would render the overall exchange more appealing; 
or by “threatening” to resort to one of three alternatives: (i) to withdraw from the 
negotiation and seek satisfaction of its relevant requirements independently of its 
present negotiating counterpart leaving the latter in an even more unattractive 
position, or (ii) to withdraw from the negotiation and in addition take away 
something the other party has, or (iii) to withdraw from the negotiation and use
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methods other than negotiating to achieve with the (same) other party, an 
exchange which is even better for itself and worse for the other than the best 
negotiated deal under consideration.
However, the credible appeal to resources other than the negotiation at hand, or 
other than those expected to be used within the negotiation, in an effort to make 
the other party accept a deal less favourable to itself, need not be non- 
communicative, or strategic; i.e., it need not amount to coercion. Some forms of 
“threatening” -  better called forms of warning, cautioning, notifying, informing -  or 
promising, can be means to what can be called “communicative influencing”, 
rather than coercion or causal influencing more generally. To be sure, the (non­
legitimate) promise made by A to B, to the effect that A will return to B -  if only B 
agrees to a certain negotiated deal -  an object which A had stolen from B, or 
taken from B by force or deception, clearly constitutes a non-communicative 
negotiation method; as is the offer of any bribes. Similarly, non-communicative are 
threats to use physical strength, underground connections, or military might to get 
what one wants and the other refuses to give within a negotiation context; and/or 
to punish the other for that refusal. But this is not so with (legitimate) promises to 
offer, in a negotiation context, what is rightfully ours (that is, what we have a right 
to dispose of at will); or with (legitimate) warnings -in case of non-acceptance of a 
certain proposal by the other -  (i) that we shall break off the negotiation and 
conclude a (communicative) agreement with another negotiating partner who is 
prepared to accept the proposal in question, or (ii) that we would break off the 
negotiation and try to get what we believe we are entitled to by legal means (i.e. by 
appealing to a shared normative framework), or (iii) that we shall take away from 
the other party an established, though voluntarily granted favour. Such methods 
“of threatening” and promising, because they are legitimate, that is,
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communicatively justifiable, are clearly admissible in a communicative value 
claiming process.
Thus, the notion of communicative negotiation -  i.e. of (reciprocal) success 
oriented communicative action -  and its rationality, can be conceptually clarified 
and elaborated, as well as methodologically enriched, to a considerable degree, 
by drawing on both Rational Choice negotiation analysis and Habermasian 
discourse theory, including such elements of the revised model of practical 
rationality as those concerning the interdependencies between ethical, purposive 
and normative discourses discussed in section 3.7.1, above. At the same time, 
however, the notions of “Full, Open, Truthful Exchange” and “cooperative”, or 
“collaborative” negotiation, which refer to an important, though not the only, 
approach to negotiation within the Rational Choice paradigm, could, I believe, 
significantly benefit from the essentially Habermasian, communicative concept of
5
negotiation outlined in this study.
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3.8 TOWARDS A PRACTICABLE IDEA OF A COMMUNICATIVELY 
RATIONAL SOCIETY: PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS ON THE 
SOCIAL APPLICATION OF THE REVISED CONCEPTION OF 
PRACTICAL RATIONALITY
3.8.1 The problem of the revised concept’s practical application in modern 
society
As indicated in section 2.5, the later Habermas considers it unavoidable that, 
under conditions of modern complexity, the huge societal spheres of economic 
and state-administrative action will continue to be organized in the way he believes 
them to be organized at present, that is, as media-steered subsystems of strategic 
action. He is convinced that a modern society which is thoroughly integrated by 
means of action orientations -  thus potentially integrated solely in terms of 
communicative, and communicatively rational, action -  is not viable in practice.
It has been one of the main theses of this study that Habermas does not have 
adequate conceptual means for working out purely communicative models of 
society. Above all, he lacks a concept of social interaction and rationality that 
combines a communicative/dialogical process and a purposive/success/means- 
ends orientation, which would enable him to give at least a prima facie 
communicative account of the enormous volume and variety of social encounters 
where agents pursue through other agents goals that are not regulated either by 
shared norms or by shared values. And such encounters have a pervasive 
presence in all the fields of social activity, including those considered by 
Habermas to belong to the lifeworld, private and public. Interactions which are at 
once communicative and purposive are categorially ruled out by the early and late 
Habermasian dichotomy between communicative and purposive action and
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rationality; a conceptual divide according to which the communicative is 
necessarily oriented to values and norms (and never to success concerning the 
use of means for the attainment of ends) while the purposive necessarily involves 
a causal relationship (and never a dialogical one). They are also excluded by his 
tripartite conception of practical rationality, consisting of moral, ethical and 
pragmatic discourses. Finally, they are left unaccounted for by the Universal- 
Pragmatic analysis of linguistic communication in terms of the validity claims to 
truth, truthfulness and normative rightness.
To be sure, the notion of fair bargaining, which, though essentially strategic in 
character, plays a central role in the later Habermas’s idea of rational political, and 
in particular legal, decision making, comes sufficiently close to a discursive form of 
communicative purposive interaction. And as such, it could have been used by him 
to explore -  and carry out well-grounded assessments of the practical viability of -  
possible forms of societal organization that were free from media-steered systemic 
social integration and almost free from strategic action itself. Nonetheless, he has 
chosen not to undertake such a task in any systematic way.
In an attempt to fill the gap identified in Habermas’s conceptual framework 
regarding action and its rationality, and also address the corresponding 
shortcomings at the deeper level of the rational reconstruction of the universal 
pragmatics of language, I have developed, and provided an alternative rational- 
reconstructive justification for the concept of restrictedly purposive communicative 
action and a revised model of practical rationality that includes the discursive 
equivalent of that concept, namely communicative negotiation. In so doing, I have 
drawn on Habermas’s own idea of weak communicative action. At the same time I 
have suggested -  without, however, going into it in any detail -  that the potent 
early Habermasian idea of depth-hermeneutical, emancipatory self-reflection, is
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developed in a dialogical direction so as to be usable as an aspect of 
communicative negotiation and communicative practical discourse in general -  a 
move that the later Habermas is distinctly reluctant to make.
In what follows, I shall put forward some preliminary, tentative ideas on how the 
revised model of practical rationality, in particular the concept of communicative 
negotiation, can be made in practice applicable to the complex, modern social 
reality: what practical forms might its employment take so as to render media- 
steered systems, and causal-manipulative, strategic action as such, unnecessary, 
or at least needed in as limited and as communicatively controlled areas of social 
action as possible?
To begin with, let us delimit the in principle scope of social applicability of the 
concept of communicative negotiation. According to our previous analysis, that 
scope is enormous, extending over all social interactions that involve the use of 
others as means for what are, immediately or in the last analysis, actor-relative 
reasons. There are three large categories of such interactions: a) Interactions 
pursuing through others goals that are -  in the context of these interactions -  
egocentric. This category includes “lone” social actions that do not directly require 
others in order to realize their goals -  and do not therefore prima facie constitute 
interactions -  but do so indirectly by having to be permitted by norms already 
consented to by others; b) Interactions pursuing through others goals regulated by 
contextually shared norms; for such norms, as has been argued, ultimately 
depend on universal or other large-scale communicative negotiations; 
c) Interactions pursuing through other agents goals regulated by interests/values 
that are contextually shared (not spontaneously, but) as a result of communicative 
negotiation. The concept of communicative negotiation, therefore, is applicable
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both to the interactions not covered by Habermas’s conceptual framework at all, 
and to those covered by it only prima facie.
There are, in fact, only the following types of interactions that do not involve the 
use of others as means for actor-relative reasons, and to which, therefore, 
communicative negotiation is not applicable: interactions in which (a) an agent 
asks one or more other agents to act in a way that is in accordance or at odds with 
interests/values shared spontaneously, i.e. prior to any negotiation between them;
(b) an agent exhorts one or more agents to act in a way that is in accordance or at 
odds with the latter’s interests/values; and (c) agents help each other to 
identify/determine their own interests, values, self-identities -  their conceptions of 
the ethically good, in general.
It goes without saying that communicative negotiation in the precise sense used 
here is not appropriate for non-interactive activities such as the self-reflective 
processes through which agents identify/determine their ethical preferences. The 
forms of practical rationality appropriate for these types of cases are, of course, 
varieties of ethical discourse.
Similarly, communicative negotiation is not appropriate for practical (as distinct 
from aesthetic or playful) relations of human beings to nature, or more precisely to 
objects or objective processes. Actions involved in such relations must be at once 
oriented to success and causal-manipulative; they are thus amenable to the 
instrumental (as distinct from the strategic) aspect of the pragmatic form of 
practical rationality. To be sure, these actions, and the corresponding rationality, 
can be and need to be internally differentiated, according to the possibilities of 
“interaction” offered by different types of objects and objectified processes, e.g. by 
inanimate objects, biological organisms of different levels of complexity and, 
especially, consciousness, and ecological systems. However, such internal
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differentiation and respective development of the concept of instrumental action 
and rationality, though important and challenging, is beyond the scope of this 
study.
Having delimited the scope of the in principle applicability to social interaction of 
the concept of communicative negotiation, and thereby appreciated its truly 
enormous dimensions, we may return to the question of the concept’s applicability 
and usefulness in practice. The problem arises as three major obstacles to the 
concept’s direct application to every specific interaction that lies within the range of 
its applicability become apparent: (1) Its deficiencies with regard to the overall 
long-term interest-satisfaction of agents; (2) its social costliness; and (3) its 
motivational deficit.
1) As shown in section 3.5, the direct employment of the discursive method of 
communicative negotiation fails to secure the maximum communicatively 
attainable overall interest-satisfaction of agents with regard to a certain type of 
interests, those which we have termed “universalizable” or “generalizable” 
interests. These are interests whose maximum long-term (communicative) 
satisfaction for each agent requires that in the short term they must not be 
satisfied equitably, as would be demanded by a direct communicative negotiation; 
instead, interactions which involve such interests must always -  within given 
contexts -  be resolved in a standardized, norm-guided way that is fully in favour of 
the one who asserts them and at the expense of the other.
2) The discussion in section 3.7 makes abundantly clear how costly, in terms of 
social time and effort, is rational, value-maximizing, communicative (and often 
non-communicative) negotiation. For as we have seen, negotiation aiming to 
exhaust its value-creating potential for all parties is an extremely complex and 
demanding discursive undertaking, involving interpenetrating ethical and
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pragmatic processes; namely, processes concerning the hermeneutic, including 
depth-hermeneutic, determination of the parties’ relevant interests, on the one 
hand, and the creative development of means that optimally satisfy those 
interests, on the other. If communicative negotiation of this kind were to be 
employed with regard to every social interaction to which it is in principle 
applicable, there is little doubt that society would be led to paralysis.
3) For a negotiation to be conducted in a communicative, rather than a strategic, 
mode, all the parties involved must be sufficiently motivated in that way. Even if 
only one party decides to negotiate strategically, the negotiation will not be 
communicative. Very often, however, at least one of the parties is convinced that 
by negotiating strategically it would gain more than its equitable share, which 
would be allocated to it as a result of communicative negotiation. For that party, in 
other words, it would be fully purposively rational to negotiate strategically, and 
only restrictedly purposively rational -  though fully rational from a communicative 
point of view -  to negotiate communicatively. Thus, that party would be motivated 
by what Habermas calls the strong motive force of interests to negotiate 
strategically; while at the same time it would be motivated by what Habermas 
refers to as the weak motive force of (communicative) reason to negotiate 
communicatively. Evidently, the balance of motive forces would be in favour of 
strategic negotiation; hence, the motivational deficit with regard to employing 
communicative negotiation, in practice, in all the interaction situations where it is in 
principle applicable.
But of course, to be fully appreciated, the problem of applying communicative 
negotiation in practice must be seen in its true context, that of modern society. For 
certain fundamental features of modernity make the problem indeed formidable:
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1) The great variety of interactive situations/coordination problems which are 
potentially open to negotiation
2) The complexity of each potential negotiation, owing to the modern forms of its 
two major, interrelated, component processes, the ethical and the purposive; 
owing, more precisely, to the enhanced reflexivity of the modern individual and 
collective subject, and the sophistication of modern technical/pragmatic issues.
3) The plurality of stakeholders in any modern interaction situation, and the 
complex ways in which each stakeholder is affected by different possible solutions 
to such a situation.
4) The increased pluralism of values and interests, in comparison to pre-modern 
societies, which in turn creates a greater demand for a negotiated resolution of 
interactive situations.
5) A sharply reduced stock of traditional, ready-made, unreflectively used solutions 
to interactive situations, thus yet more need for explicitly negotiated deals. This 
social reflexivity is in a relationship of continuous mutual reinforcement with 
process or social change.
3.8.2 Towards overcoming obstacles to the revised concept’s practical 
application
Efforts to make the social application of the revised model of practical rationality -  
communicative negotiation in particular -  more feasible can move in two 
directions:
1) Reducing the need for the direct employment of communicative negotiation and 
other complex forms of practical discourse by replacing them, to an optimal 
degree, with simpler, time- and effort-economical, indirect ways. This can be
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achieved by using devices that structure social actions, and interactions, by 
“storing up” within themselves the outcomes of a manageable range of 
generalized communicative negotiations or other complex discourses, and then 
“releasing” these outcomes, in relatively simple, standardized ways, into large 
classes of specific (interaction situations emerging over time, which would 
otherwise have to be tackled by means of the costly, complex methods.
2) Creating motivational, competence and other conditions that make possible (a) 
the development and proper functioning of the above mentioned social action- 
structuring devices, and (b) the direct application of the complex forms of practical 
discourse in the still extensive range of situations which remain outside the scope 
of the structuring devices, and thus need to be dealt with in terms of such direct 
application.
3.8.2.1 Social Structuring Devices
Modern societies meet many of their truly immense coordination and integration 
needs by structuring social interactions and decision making processes in various 
ways, among them the ones Habermas interprets as media-steered subsystems. 
Although existing structuring methods are anything but free from the strategic 
mode of action, in many cases they can, nonetheless, be drawn upon in order to 
develop, in theory as well as in fact, communicative devices that would facilitate 
the application in practice of the idea of communicative negotiation, and more 
generally of the revised conception of practical rationality. Some such devices are 
sketched below.
1) Communicatively established normative frameworks
In section 3.5 we have referred to the possibility of communicatively developing 
contextually binding sets, or frameworks, of norms, over and above the framework
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of moral norms, which is binding in the context of universal human interactions. 
Examples of non-moral normative frameworks can be the laws of a state, the rules 
and regulations of an economic political, administrative, educational or other 
organization, the charter of an association of states or other organizations, etc. 
These frameworks are binding for agents insofar as the latter act in a respective, 
contextually determined capacity: moral norms are binding for agents in their 
capacity as (abstractly conceived) human beings; the laws of a state are binding 
for the citizens of that state; the rules of a school are binding (differentially) for the 
pupils, the teachers, other staff, and the school’s governing bodies; the charter of 
an association of organizations or states is binding for the association’s members, 
etc. For a normative framework to be communicatively determined it must be 
validated in terms of a respective generalization principle, applied with the 
participation, in principle, of all the stakeholders, that is, all those affected by the 
norms’ general observance. In this way, their standardized general observance 
replaces -  as a “condensed” equivalent of -  a multitude of specific, situational, 
communicative negotiations.
As argued in section 3.5, such normative frameworks are possible only insofar as 
there exist, in a given context, what have been referred to as generalizable 
interests; that is, interests which, for each agent, are communicatively better 
satisfiable, in the long run, in terms of a generalized observance of a particular 
norm rather than by means of communicatively negotiating directly every specific 
relevant case. Context-relative sets of norms, however, can, if established and 
observed, go a good way towards overcoming two of the three major obstacles to 
applying communicative negotiation in practice: its lower levels of overall 
satisfaction of generalizable interests, and its forbidding costliness in terms of 
social time and effort.
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Societies, or indeed the international community, can be furnished with 
comprehensive sets of communicatively established normative frameworks, 
structuring a sizable portion of interactions in each of the corresponding social 
contexts.
The frameworks belonging to such a society-wide or global set can be interlocking, 
in the sense that they stand to each other in relations of inclusion, exclusion or 
overlap.
2) Communicatively negotiated collective interests
A normative framework specifies what are, within its context of application, 
obligatory, prohibited or optional (i.e. permissible but not obligatory) actions/goals. 
Sometimes, some of the optional goals are regulated by a narrower normative 
framework, subsumed in the original one; as, for example, goals which are 
optional within the context of a certain state but become obligatory or prohibited in 
the context of an educational institution operating within that state. Otherwise, 
optional goals -  insofar as they need to be (communicatively) realized by means 
of others, and if not spontaneously shared by those others -  must be pursued in 
terms of communicative negotiations.
However, certain clusters of such optional goals can be found to follow from or be 
ruled out by relatively enduring interests or ethical choices (values, policies, 
projects) which, following communicative negotiation are collectively shared by a 
sub-group -  or in some cases by the total group- of those for whom the said goals 
are optional. In those cases, the interactions through which those goals are 
pursued can be structured around those collective interests. Instead of being 
arduously coordinated by means of a multitude of individualized communicative 
negotiations, they can be, much more simply, regulated in terms of collective
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interests, which are determined each by a generalized communicative negotiation 
among those concerned. The latter process is comparable to the large scale 
negotiations comprising the application of the universalization/generalization 
principle for determining norms which represent universalizable/generalizable (as 
distinct from collective) interests and serve to regulate -  more generally and more 
enduringly in their case -  certain other categories of goals and thus actions.
3) Communicatively developed and pre-evaluated means-packages
As argued in section 3.7.1.2, each proposed solution to a means-ends problem -  
i.e., each “means-option” -  is value-laden through and through. It constitutes what 
we have called a “value-ensemble”. This is true of solutions to all purposive- 
rationality problems, including those involving purely causal-manipulative relations 
to objects/objectified processes, as well as those involving communicative 
interactions with other agents (thus communicative negotiations) in which causal- 
manipulative relationships, when significantly involved, constitute only one aspect 
of the means-ends problem.
As value-ensembles, solutions to purposive problems (i.e. means-options) must be 
acceptable to the agents concerned in the light of their relevant interests: the 
relevant interests of a single, individual or collective, agent, in cases of 
instrumental, subject-object problems, or the relevant interests of all the interacting 
agents concerned, in cases of communicative negotiations. Usually, as parts of 
means-options are included whole, ready-made objects or processes: tools, 
machines, computer software and other technological items; sociotechnical and 
other processes, such as manufacturing assembly lines and standardized 
customer service or back-office procedures; or suitably adjusted objects of nature, 
such as domesticated animals and plants, or other natural resources. Seen from 
this angle, even whole organizations, or institutions, with the normative
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frameworks embodied in them, can be construed as parts of means to realizing 
(large scale collective and other) interests.
Such objects and processes constituting ready-made parts of means-options -  let 
us refer to them as means-packages, for short -  can normally be employed in 
diverse, optional ways in order to produce diverse sets of results. Nonetheless, 
they are only partly neutral with respect to the results their uses produce. For on 
the one hand, there are results none of their uses can produce; while on the other 
hand, and more importantly, there are results which are unavoidably produced by 
any of their (optional) uses. A routine office procedure, for example, cannot be 
used as a means to developing the innovative abilities or the initiative of staff. On 
the other hand, irrespective of whether such a procedure will be followed to deal 
with case A, B, or C (with regard to which the procedure is neutral), it will haves 
certain more or less invariable effects; e.g. a certain expenditure of materials, 
certain telephone costs, and certain degrees of staff fatigue, boredom, etc. 
Similarly, a saloon car cannot fulfill the professional requirements of a plumber, but 
it could probably be used equally well (i.e. neutrally) for a family outing or as a 
robbery getaway vehicle. In the latter two cases, however, it would consume 
equivalent amounts of fuel and emit equivalent amounts of polluting gases into the 
atmosphere. Thus, means-packages are characterized by a combination of value- 
ladenness and value-neutrality. In a way that is interestingly analogous to the 
functioning of normative frameworks and collective interests, they necessitate or 
rule out certain results, while leaving others open.
Now, as we have seen in 3.7.1.2, in cases of communicative negotiations, as well 
as in other kinds of purposive discourses, means-options are developed and 
assessed in a deliberative process involving a complex interplay of values and 
interests on the one hand, and technical possibilities on the other; a process which
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has been referred to -  after the early Habermas -  as a “dialectic of potential and 
will”. The social costliness of communicative negotiations or other discursive 
processes involving the creation and evaluative assessment of means-options 
could be reduced to a considerable degree, if ready-made means-packages that 
can be used as integral parts of large numbers of specific means-options, over 
substantial lengths of time, were communicatively evaluated and approved in 
advance, and then their value-profiles taken for granted and integrally incorporated 
in the relevant deliberations. An extensive stock of such communicatively 
developed and value-profiled objects and processes would greatly enhance the 
social efficiency of practical discourses.
If comprehensively set up and utilized, structuring devices of the three forms 
discussed above -  (i) normative frameworks, (ii) collective interests, and (iii) pre­
evaluated means-packages -  would go a long way towards addressing difficulties 
with regard to the practical application of the revised model of practical rationality 
in conditions of modernity. More precisely, normative frameworks would overcome 
direct communicative negotiations’ ineffectiveness concerning the overall 
satisfaction of generalizable interests; whereas devices of all three types would 
contribute considerably to the social efficiency of communicative discourse.
To be sure, such devices, by virtue of their action-structuring nature, introduce at 
the same time a certain rigidity in social action. This rigidity, however, can be kept 
to levels which ensure that it is amply compensated for by the added social 
practicality. Moreover, it is unavoidable that society’s multiform discursive activities 
are constantly in a self-propelled, dynamic process of evolution; their subject- 
matter always being renewed and enriched; their outcomes being always 
revocable. This, surely, applies also to discourses about structuring devices; that 
is, discourses concerning the endorsement of a specific norm, a collective interest,
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or a value-profile, as well as discourses that might concern the level of the social 
flexibility that should be allowed by the totality of society’s structuring devices at 
any given time.
3.8.2.2 Enabling Conditions
The existence and proper functioning of social action-structuring devices -  and 
therefore their above mentioned social effectiveness and efficiency benefits -  
continue, of course, to rely on communicative discourses, even though fewer and 
less varied, or of simpler forms. The establishment of norms and collective 
interests depend, as we have seen, on complex communicative negotiations, 
whereas the creation and evaluation of objects and processes in the form of 
ready-made means-packages require complexly interrelated ethical and pragmatic 
discourses. Both these kinds of communicative discourses, insofar as their 
practical applicability is concerned, would still face social costliness as well as 
motivational impediments. Motivational problems would arise also with regard to 
the functioning of the first two kinds of structuring devices; that is, with regard to 
the general observance of norms, and to conformity with communicatively 
negotiated collective interests.
In addition, the use of structuring devices, though it considerably narrows down 
the range of specific (inter)action situations that are amenable to direct 
communicative negotiation or other complex forms of discourse, it by no means 
does away with it entirely. Goals not governed either by norms or by values, 
including spontaneously shared or communicatively negotiated collective interests, 
still need to be (communicatively) pursued in either of two ways: through others, 
by employing complex, direct communicative negotiations; or through causal- 
manipulatively relating to objects or objectified processes, on the basis of specific 
pragmatic discourses involving the complex development of means-options, of
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which pre-existing and pre-evaiuated means-packages are only parts. All these 
complex forms of discourse, which continue to be needed for dealing with the 
social actions and interactions that would remain “unstructured” by structuring 
devices are, surely, still open to social costliness problems; whereas those of them 
that are of a communicative nature would face motivation problems as well.
For all the above reasons, the practical applicability, in modern society, of the 
revised model of practical rationality would depend on the existence of certain 
conditions; namely, conditions that would sufficiently reduce the social costliness 
of, and reinforce the motivation for, the discourses (communicative or pragmatic, 
as the case might be) which are needed on the one hand for the establishment 
and functioning of an optimal set of social structuring devices, and on the other 
hand for dealing with social situations left unstructured by such devices. Some 
conditions of this kind are tentatively outlined below:
1) Institutionalized sanctions
The often serious motivational problem of adherence to communicatively agreed 
normative frameworks can, at least in part, be dealt with -  as it in fact is, with 
regard to existing social norms -  with the introduction of positive and negative 
incentives or sanctions, i.e. rewards for adhering to norms and penalties for 
violating them. Sanctions are normally equipped with means of enforcement, 
based on institutionalized authority. Systems of sanctions, together with their 
means of enforcement can take stronger or milder, stricter or looser forms. These 
vary between different normative contexts (e.g. national state, international 
organization, economic enterprise, educational institution) as well as within each 
such context, according to the gravity and sharpness of the relevant norms.
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Needless to say, the institutionalization of sanctions, like the establishment of 
normative frameworks, must be effected through communicative deliberation 
processes, with the participation of all the relevant groups of stakeholders.
2) Shortcuts to decision making
One way of reducing the time and effort expended on discourses, and thus 
increasing their social efficiency, is by introducing certain accelerated ways of 
concluding argumentation, or “shortcuts” to reaching discursive decisions. Three 
such shortcuts -  already widely used -  can be referred to:
a) Having decisions taken by majorities rather than on the basis of unanimous 
agreement, or consensus, as would be required, in principle, by the concept of 
unconstrained discourse
b) Limiting participation in certain discourses to representatives of the different 
groups of stakeholders rather than extending them to every individual agent 
affected.
c) Adopting the first option considered satisfactory, rather than searching for the 
best possible option. This so called “satisficing1’ approach to decision making is 
considered to be an aspect of what is sometimes referred to as “bounded
g
rationality”.
3) Individual competences
An important prerequisite for the social application of practical rationality is the 
possession by individual agents of well developed competences for 
communicative negotiations and other forms of discourse. These competences 
include self-reflective, hermeneutic and technical/pragmatic skills, a creative 
imagination, and, more generally, postconventional cognitive and moral abilities.
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With regard to communicative negotiation, in particular, such advanced 
competences will not only enhance the efficiency of the process, and its 
effectiveness in relation to the optimum satisfaction of the interests of all the 
parties; by virtue of the latter, they will also mobilize the strong, interest-based 
motivational forces of the parties to negotiate in the communicative mode, rather 
than resort to strategic techniques in an effort to secure greater interest 
satisfaction for themselves.
4) Equality
(a) Deliberative equality among participants is of course an essential part of the 
definition of communicative discourse. It is a presupposition of a discourse’s 
rationality and legitimacy. This issue, however, and the great difficulties in 
establishing true deliberative equality in practice, lie beyond the scope of this 
study.7 Here, suffice it to say that equal treatment in the context of negotiation and 
other discourses -  in the sense of an equal opportunity to contribute to the 
discourse, to be taken seriously and to have an effect -  provides participants with 
a sense of ownership, and boosts their motivation both to participate in the 
discourse itself and to abide by its resolutions.
(b) Another aspect of equal treatment which is important from the point of view of 
agent’s motivation to act communicatively, is the fairness with which observance 
of norms is monitored and respective sanctions applied. Such fairness depends on 
the effective and unbiased functioning as well as the non-corrupt character of the 
state or other institutions invested with the relevant authority.
(c) A factor that strongly tempts participants to adopt a strategic approach in a 
negotiation is their belief that the balance of power (in the form of physical or 
military strength, economic resources, connections or alliances, information, 
persuasive ability, etc) is sufficiently in their favour to enable them to coerce or
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deceive the other participants into accepting a deal which in a communicative 
negotiation they would reject as inequitable. Thus, the more equality of negotiating 
power there is in a society, or on the global stage, the more motivationally feasible 
becomes the employment of communicative negotiation.
5) Socialization into social structuring devices
According to our proposal regarding action-structuring devices, a sizable 
proportion of everyday social action situations could require agents to observe 
norms, respect commitments to collective interests or appropriately employ objects 
and processes as means to ends. In every situation of this kind, agents have to 
recognize that a certain structuring device is implicated, decide what the 
appropriate response to it is and act accordingly. It is obvious that carrying out 
these operations in an explicitly deliberative manner -  though admittedly much 
simpler than considering every such case afresh, without the help of structuring 
devices -  would be so inefficient as to bring society to a standstill. It would indeed 
be equivalent to a pianist playing a sonata -  even though not having to compose it 
in the process -  by focusing attention on every individual note and every 
necessary movement of the fingers. Evidently, these activities would be impossible 
if they did not rely heavily on agents’ intuitive capacities -  ones that need to be 
purposely developed through prior learning.
Thus, it is a prerequisite of (communicative) social life that agents are properly 
socialized into the world of the action-structuring devices which society considers 
well established at any given time. This will provide them with the intuitive ability 
necessary for dealing with situations involving those devices in a rather 
spontaneous, unmediated way. However, such a socialization must by no means 
amount to the inculcation of an unreflective, uncritically traditionalist attitude to the 
existing set of structuring devices. It has to remain compatible with the
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development of agents’ postconventional, critically-reflective stance towards 
existing social reality; of their readiness to reopen issues and revise previous 
decisions. For such a stance is a necessary aspect of practical rationality, albeit in 
a sense of the term not entailing constant explicit deliberation.
3.8.2.3 Lines of Further Research
The “structuring devices” and “enabling conditions” -  which we have tentatively 
sketched above -  constitute only a few generic elements of a practicable model of 
society based on a conception of practical rationality that crucially incorporates the 
notion of communicative negotiation. These elements, however, indicate the 
directions in which further research needs to move if such a model is to be 
adequately developed.
To begin with, each type of generic structuring device and enabling condition 
referred to requires considerable elaboration. At the same time, additional 
structuring devices, enabling conditions or other generic elements might be 
explored. But most importantly, these generically applicable elements need to be 
specifically applied to each particular area of social life in order to create 
communicative “sub-models” of these areas. Sub-models of this kind must be 
developed for all the fields of social activity which Habermas considers as parts of 
the lifeworld: family life, education, the political public sphere, etc; but they must 
also be developed for the two major sectors of society ceded by Habermas to 
media-steered subsystems of strategic action: state administration and the 
economy. With regard to the latter two, in particular, the challenge is to construct 
models which avoid systemic-strategic solutions, while at the same time not being 
communicative versions of historically failed, excessively structured and rigid 
forms of social organization; that is, models which efficiently coordinate and 
integrate the immense range of relevant social activity through an optimal
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combination of communicatively developed, and adhered to, structures, on the one 
hand, and non-structured, direct communicative negotiation and other discourse, 
on the other. Such models might optimally combine, in the case of state 
administrative organizations, communicatively developed formal elements and 
post-bureaucratic, participative aspects, while in the case of the economy, 
communicative planning with “communicative market” elements.
The work of elaborating practically feasible models of communicatively rational 
social action -  sectoral and societal -  would have to be carried out in dialogue 
with descriptive as well as normative/prescriptive social theory: both the general 
theory of society and disciplines that specialize on particular sectors of social life, 
such as economic theory, organization theory, etc. Through such a dialogue, our 
model-construction will meet reality “halfway”, to use a favourite Habermasian 
expression. Existing social reality and its developmental trends will thereby be 
interpreted in the light of the communicative conception of social action -  at a 
given stage of its development -  in search of elements consistent with that 
conception, while that conception will, in return, be enriched by drawing on the 
elements thus identified. We shall, therefore, have a dynamic process of reciprocal 
reinforcement between -  or a “dialectic” of -  describing social reality on the one 
hand, and developing practically applicable communicative models of it, on the 
other.
It is of course conceivable that this dialectic does not yield a practically applicable 
model of a fully communicatively rational modern society; i.e. a model that is able 
to address with a sufficient degree of success the effectiveness, efficiency and 
motivational impediments to such a society. It may indicate that the practically 
feasible conception of modern society that comes nearest to the communicatively 
rational ideal will have to include pockets of strategic action -  perhaps even of 
ones akin to what Habermas describes as media-steered subsystems, -  for
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example in parts of economic life. But now, owing to systematic explorations in the 
form of the above mentioned dialectic of interpretation and model-construction, it 
will be more likely that such unavoidable pockets of strategic action are kept to a 
minimum and are, communicatively, “anchored” and controlled as tightly as 
possible.
Furthermore, those unavoidable strategic pockets might, with time, become more 
and more restricted and communicatively controllable, as social reality itself, and 
its inherent potential, evolves. For the dialectic of interpretation and model- 
construction can be dynamic in an additional sense: it can involve the 
interpretation of a social reality which is itself changing through a similar reciprocal 
relationship to model-construction. This is so, because the communicatively 
rational models of social reality, over and above their interpretative/descriptive 
social-theoretic role, can also function as normative/prescriptive standards for a 
critical social theory intent on rationally legitimized social improvement, in the 
broad Frankfurt School tradition, including Habermas’s own work. Such a critical 
theory, in addition to developing its normative/prescriptive standards, is surely 
interested in exploring political and other practical means for promoting social 
change in the directions specified by those standards. And to that end, critical 
social theory needs to be in a continuous process of dialogue and mutual learning 
with kindred political and social movements. On this understanding of the vocation 
of critical social theory, one might, in fact, even entertain the hope that society 
could reach a stage when social interaction is, for all intents and purposes, 
communicatively rational; strategic action being retained only in areas in which it is 
deemed not unavoidable but desirable, as for example, in competitive games like 
football and chess.
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CONCLUSIONS
1. The theme of practical rationality and its context
In the last few centuries, Western societies, and increasingly non-western ones 
too, have relied on the human capacity for reason as their dominant source of 
guidance for action in its different forms, individual and collective, private and 
public. Through a long process of European historical development, beginning for 
all intents and purposes in ancient Greece and, after the lengthy medieval 
interlude, culminating in the 18th century enlightenment movement, rationality has 
gradually come to discredit and overshadow alternative action-steering sources, 
primarily sacred texts, divine revelation and unreflective traditionalism. Thus 
rationality became the hallmark of modernity and the core of what was claimed to 
be modern humanity’s potential for a continuous progress towards happiness, 
justice and freedom.
However, starting in the very age of enlightenment itself and to an increasing 
degree since, rationality, and modernity in general, have come under severe 
criticism from diverse quarters. Rationality is charged with lacking the capability to 
deliver what was promised, and for being in fact responsible for serious, 
specifically modern problems, such as the ecological crisis, loss of meaning, and 
novel, subtler, forms of domination. At the same time, the growing complexity of 
social conditions makes decisions ever more difficult and creates an ever greater 
demand for action-steering capacity. It looks, therefore, as if we are facing what 
can be called a “guidance-deficit” for human action.
On the basis of this diagnosis, and on the further assumption that pre- or non­
modern action-steering principles cannot credibly be turned to for meeting today’s 
challenges, this study has been intended as a contribution to the rich ongoing 
inquiries and debates that aim to explore rationality’s potential, as well as its
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limitations, for providing guidance to human action, in principle as well as in 
practice. This task is approached mainly through a critical examination and partial 
revision of Habermas’s outstandingly important and fertile work on practical 
rationality, both in its early, 1960’s phase and in its later communicative stages.
2. Habermas on practical rationality
The early Habermas rejects his Frankfurt School mentors’ views encapsulated in 
their “Dialectic of Enlightenment” thesis. According to those views, modern reason 
is instrumental reason and cannot take any other form. As such, it turns everything 
it is applied to, as well as the human beings who use it, into objects of domination. 
Thus, modern, instrumental^ rationalized society is a totally administered, reified 
society. Habermas maintains that the phenomena of reification and domination in 
modern society -  which are for him far less widespread than Horkheimer, Adorno 
and Marcuse believe -  are not due to inherent properties of instrumental rationality 
but rather due to its being used beyond its proper domain, essentially that of the 
practical interchange between human beings and nature. The illegitimate 
extension of the application of instrumental rationality into the field of purely social 
interaction -  including the development of social science on the methodological 
model of the natural sciences -  is a symptom of technocratic consciousness, a 
way of thinking that confuses ethical-moral issues with technical ones.
Moreover, Habermas insists that in addition to instrumental rationality, which is 
appropriate to instrumental action, or techne, a second form of practical rationality 
is possible, appropriate to human interaction, or praxis, and referred to in this 
study as “praxial”. Praxial rationality is concerned with determining values and 
norms that must guide the ethically and morally imbued domain of praxis. In his 
early work Habermas develops a conception of praxial rationality whose most 
important component is a form of “depth-hermeneutic” self-reflection, on the model
332
of Marx’s critique of ideology and Freud’s therapeutic method of psychoanalysis. 
Depth-hermeneutics combined causal-explanatory analysis and ordinary 
hermeneutic methods of self-understanding. This type of self-reflection could 
enable individual and collective subjects to emancipate themselves from self- 
deception and unconsciously self-imposed bondage, and to discover their 
authentic interests, values and identities. It could not, though, provide objective 
foundations for values or norms.
Habermas grew dissatisfied with this first version of non-instrumental, praxial 
rationality. In particular, he considered untenable the image of society as a kind of 
undifferentiated macro-subject capable reflecting upon itself, an image that was 
implicit in that first version. In addition, he took careful notice of critics’ fears that 
the power-asymmetry inherent in the therapist/patient model on which the 
relationship between emancipator and emancipated-to-be was based, could have 
sinister political implications; especially, given what he acknowledged as being 
another shortcoming of his idea of social self-reflection: an insufficient distance 
between critical theory and political action. Thus, he eventually abandoned the 
concept of critical-emancipatory self-reflection, together with the philosophy of 
consciousness, which he held responsible for that concept’s major shortcomings. 
In its place, he developed an alternative version of praxial rationality, worked out 
within an entirely new, intersubjectivist, communicative paradigm.
The communicative paradigm is based on the rational reconstruction of universal 
and inescapable features implicit in all linguistic communication. Habermas 
understands linguistic communication as action primarily oriented to 
understanding, or as communicative action. The rational-reconstructive method is 
said to establish normative commitments that are universally binding on all 
language users, thus on all human beings. According to Habermas, implicit in 
every speech act are three rationally redeemable validity claims: the claims to truth
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about an objective, external world, to truthfulness concerning the speaker’s own 
subjective world, and to rightness with regard to legitimate -  ultimately moral -  
norms.
Implicit in each type of validity claim are the conditions for its justification. These 
conditions constitute rules of a corresponding form of rationality. Some of these 
rules are common to all the three forms of rationality implicit in the three types of 
validity claim. The three-fold rationality that Habermas reconstructs from 
communicative action is referred to as communicative rationality. Communicative 
rationality is not a process of deliberation carried out merely in the heads of 
separate subjects. It is a process of (potentially universal) intersubjective 
argumentation, or discourse, oriented to (potentially universal) agreement, or 
consensus.
Thus, in Habermas’s view, the rational reconstruction of linguistic communication 
establishes three forms of rationality, or discourse: (1) Theoretical rationality, 
concerning factual truth. When employed in questions regarding the use of means 
in order to causally bring about an end, theoretical rationality becomes the 
foundation of “pragmatic” rationality. Pragmatic rationality itself is subdivided into 
instrumental and strategic rationality and corresponds, respectively, to 
instrumental and strategic action. The former type of action is about the causal 
manipulation of objects (that do not have purposes of their own) by purposive 
subjects. The latter concerns the causally effected manipulation of subjects (who 
are themselves purposive) by other purposive subjects. Such causal manipulation 
involves the use of deception and/or coercion. (2) Ethical rationality. It concerns 
the clarification of an individual or collective agent’s authentic and sincerely 
expressed subjective states, including values (or conceptions of the good) and 
self-identity (who one is and who one wants to be). (3) Moral rationality. It
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concerns the application of Habermas’s version of the universalization principle to 
test the validity of universally binding moral norms.
The conception of practical communicative rationality that emerges from this 
scheme includes (1) the old instrumental type (internally differentiated into 
instrumental in a narrower sense and strategic), now termed “pragmatic”, and (2) a 
new two-fold version of praxial rationality consisting of an ethical and a moral 
dimension. Ethical discourses cannot establish rationally valid identities or values. 
Their function -  just like that of the early, critical-emancipatory self-reflection -  is 
to clarify the subject’s authentic values and identity, though now by using only 
ordinary hermeneutic methods, since Habermas has given up the depth- 
hermeneutic methodology which was available to the early version. Moral 
discourses, however, are intended by Habermas to be strongly normative, in the 
sense of providing rational justification for universal moral norms.
Habermas employs the new conceptual framework, principally the distinction 
between communicative and strategic action and rationality, to develop a new 
critical theory of modern society. He begins by distinguishing between lifeworld 
and system. The lifeworld consists of the domains of (private or public) social 
activity mainly concerned with the production of meaning and identity: family life, 
education, the political and legislative sphere. Social action in these domains 
ought to be predominantly communicative, and coordinated in terms of 
agreements based on the action orientations of agents. Domains of social life 
concerned primarily with the reproduction of material life -  mainly the economy 
and state administration -  cannot, according to Habermas, under conditions of 
modern complexity realistically rely on communicative action and communicative 
modes of action coordination. The domains of economy and state administration 
must, instead, be organized as systems of strategic action steered by the media of
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money and power, respectively, which is said to be the way they are in fact 
organized in modern societies.
The problem with modern societies, according to Habermas, is that the media- 
steered systems of the market economy and state administration are not as tightly 
controlled by the communicative powers of the lifeworld as they ought to, and tend 
to turn back upon the lifeworld in a “colonizing” manner. They encroach on its 
different domains and increasingly turn them into fields of media-steered strategic 
activity, in their own image. Thus, critical social theory, and critical political 
practice, should concentrate on securing the communicative character of the 
lifeworld, by reversing and stemming its colonization by the systems, and keeping 
the systems themselves institutionally well anchored to the lifeworld and firmly 
under its communicative control.
3. Critical and constructive contribution
The present study largely remains within the broad framework of Habermas’s 
communicative paradigm, taking it to form a sufficiently sound and fertile basis 
from which to explore the central issues concerning practical rationality. It is thus 
accepted that the application of Habermas’s rational-reconstructive method on 
linguistic communication can, via the identification of implicit, universal validity 
claims, yield normatively binding conclusions regarding the nature of rationality, 
theoretical and practical. It is also accepted that the kind of rationality thus 
specified is a process of potentially universal, communicative discourse, oriented 
to reaching agreement, or consensus, and carried out on the basis of the equal 
treatment of everyone’s relevant contributions, and the exclusion of all coercion 
and deception, and generally of all force other than that of the better argument.
But at the same time, this study identifies, internal to this general framework, 
certain flaws in Habermas’s work relating to practical rationality, and proposes
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suitable remedies. The weaknesses mainly concern the typology of action and 
rationality, the classification of validity claims, and the implications of those for 
moral and social theory.
To begin with, an important conceptual gap is located in Habermas’s typology of 
action and its rationality. The dualism of techne and praxis, or of strategic and 
communicative action/rationality, which is present in both his early and later work, 
categorially excludes action and rationality which concern the pursuit by means of 
other agents, in a communicative, agreement-oriented way, of agent-relative, or 
“egocentric”, goals -  i.e. goals not governed by shared norms or values. This is 
due to the assumptions that means-using (or purposive, or success-oriented) 
action is ipso facto causal-manipulative, and that communicative action is ipso 
facto oriented solely to shared norms or values. In view of these assumptions, the 
pursuit of agents’ egocentric goals through using other agents as means, can only 
be conceptualized by Habermas in strategic terms.
A corresponding lacuna is found at the level of validity claims. None of the three 
types of validity claim seems to cater for requests, or imperatives, not governed by 
shared norms or values, or more generally, for bargaining-related or other speech 
acts whose rational redemption would require an appeal to the compatibility 
between the egocentric interests of different agents. Thus, such speech acts 
cannot be part of linguistic communication in its Habermasian interpretation as 
primarily communicative, oriented to understanding. They can only be primarily 
strategically oriented utterances, in contradiction to that interpretation.
The significance of these conceptual gaps cannot be overestimated; for a very 
large proportion of social interactions, in all fields of social life, including the ones 
belonging to what Habermas describes as the lifeworld, are unavoidably of the 
kind that these gaps conceptually ban from the realm of potentially communicative
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action, thus condemning them to be strategic, i.e. necessarily based on forms of 
coercion and/or deception.
In some writings that followed his initial comprehensive presentation of the 
communicative paradigm, Habermas puts forward certain ideas which move in the 
direction of addressing the above deficiency. These ideas are mainly encapsulated 
in the notions of “fair bargaining” and “weak communicative action”. Both these 
notions remain, in different ways, insufficient to the task. Fair bargaining is capable 
of covering the whole range of interactions kept out of the communicative realm by 
the above mentioned lacuna; however, though linked to moral, thus 
communicative, principles, -  hence “fair” -  it does so indirectly, continuing in the 
last analysis to rely on the balance of forces, thus being strategic. “Weak” 
communicative action, on the other hand, while being interpretable as genuinely 
communicative (despite Habermas unjustifiably treating it as communicative action 
of an inferior kind) is capable of covering only some of the interactions in question: 
those interactions which all agents involved would be fully justified, with respect to 
their egocentric interests alone, to pursue without the use of coercion or deception. 
Moreover, the interactions treated previously as non-communicative and now as 
weakly communicative are still not accounted for by Habermas’s system of validity 
claims, which remains unchanged.
In order to render potentially communicative the entire range of interactions which 
have been excluded from that category by the conceptual gap in question, this 
study has developed, and justified in terms of a revised system of validity claims, 
the concept of communicative negotiation.
A communicative negotiation is a social interaction in the form of a bargaining 
process which is carried out by purely communicative means -  i.e., without the 
use of any coercion or deception -  and which aims at a resolution, or deal, which
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is acceptable to all parties as satisfying their relevant egocentric interests, not 
necessarily fully, but to the greatest degree achievable by those, communicative, 
means. It is, in other words, a restrictedly purposive communicative interaction, 
with its own distinctive form of rationality. The concept has been elaborated -  
partly by drawing on Rational Choice negotiation theory -  with a view to explaining 
how to enhance as much as possible the communicatively achieved interest- 
satisfaction of the negotiating parties. Such a communicative maximization of 
interest-satisfaction, over and above its intrinsic value, could render the strategic 
pursuit of those interests unnecessary, or at any rate less attractive, and thus 
minimize agents’ temptation to resort to it.
In the light of the concept of communicative negotiation, Habermas’s 
understanding of morality has also been reconsidered. In particular, applications of 
Habermas’s universalization principle to test moral norms have been interpreted 
as multiple, large scale ‘ communicative negotiations. Thus, like any other 
negotiations -  indeed like any other specific social interactions -  they are not 
necessitated by the rationally reconstructive structure of linguistic communication. 
Also contingent with regard to language -  and depending on the existence of 
universalizable interests -  are moral norms, in the sense of norms validated by the 
universalization principle, as distinct from similar, (akin to moral), rules of 
argumentation reconstructively found to be inherent in linguistic communication.
In the same way as in the case of morality, communicative negotiation is 
understood to underlie also communicative ways of establishing non-moral norms, 
valid for contexts in which agents participate in capacities other than the abstractly 
conceived human, which applies to the moral context. Such non-moral norms are, 
for example, the laws of a state, which are binding on agents in their capacity as 
that state’s citizens, or the rules and regulations of an organization which are 
binding for that organization’s members. The justifiability of non-moral norms in
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any given non-moral context is contingent upon the existence of interests that are 
generalizable within that context.
On the basis of the concept of communicative negotiation and the subordination to 
it of the concept of moral and non-moral normative rightness discourses and moral 
and non-moral norms, Habermas’s conception of practical rationality as a whole 
has been revised. The tripartite model of pragmatic, ethical and moral 
employments of practical rationality, later supplemented with fair bargaining, has 
been replaced by a model consisting of pragmatic, ethical and communicative 
negotiation discourses, the latter including processes of negotiated constitution of 
collective values and collective subjects, and also subsuming moral and non-moral 
discourses. The revised model acknowledges the mutual dependence and 
interpenetration between the different types of discourse, most notably the 
complex interrelationship between values and the means to their realization, an 
interrelationship referred to, after the early Habermas, as a “dialectic of potential 
and will”. It is also suggested that depth-hermeneutics, which has been largely 
abandoned by the later Habermas, is reintroduced as part of ethical discourses, 
provided that it has been developed in a communicative direction and freed from 
power-asymmetry.
In addition to the revised model of practical rationality, the study has developed, as 
that model’s rationally reconstructed linguistic underpinning, a correspondingly 
revised system of validity claims. More specifically, the validity claim to (ultimately 
moral) normative rightness has been replaced by the validity claim to 
intersubjective acceptability. This new type of validity claim caters both for speech 
acts directly oriented to the communicative pursuit of egocentric goals through 
other agents, and for speech acts that are indirectly so oriented, via appealing to 
moral or non-moral norms or to negotiated collective values, which depend on the 
former kind.
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Habermas has defended his much criticized “surrendering” of two hugely important 
domains of social activity, namely the economy and state administration, to media- 
steered systems of strategic action, by arguing that coordinating and integrating 
these domains in purely communicative ways would be, under conditions of 
modern complexity, impossible in practice. However, given firstly the fact that 
much of the interaction in these domains concerns the pursuit of egocentric 
success through others, and secondly the absence from Habermas’s model of 
action and practical rationality of means by which to conceptualize such 
interactions in communicative terms, a communicative economy and state 
administration would be for him impossible not just in practice but also in theory. 
Furthermore, it would also be in principle impossible to have a fully communicative 
lifeworld. For a great deal of lifeworld activity, from politics to family life, also 
heavily involves, inescapably, success-oriented interactions.
The revised conception of action and practical rationality proposed here, by 
contrast, makes a fully communicative society in principle possible. However, the 
impediments to the practical application of this conception in conditions of 
modernity are admittedly great. There are two main kinds of such impediments: 
firstly the high social cost, in terms of time and effort, of inefficient, communicative 
discourses, communicative negotiations in particular; secondly the weak 
motivational force of purposively restrained communicative action and rationality, 
as opposed to the strong motivational force of strategic forms of action and 
rationality, which are oriented to the maximization of egocentric-interest- 
satisfaction.
The study explores, in a preliminary and tentative manner, ways in which the 
practical applicability of the revised conception of action and rationality, in 
conditions of modernity, can be facilitated. Proposals, in this respect, move in two 
directions. On the one hand they concern the creation of “social structuring
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devices”, which are means of reducing the need for the most complex and 
inevitably less efficient forms of communicative discourse by replacing them with 
simpler, more efficient ones. Such devices include (i) communicatively established 
normative frameworks, (ii) communicatively negotiated collective interests and 
(iii) communicatively developed and pre-evaluated means-packages. On the other 
hand, proposals concern (communicatively created) “enabling conditions”. These 
are conditions for making the creation and functioning of social structuring devices 
as well as the undertaking of the remaining complex discourses (those which 
cannot be replaced by structuring devices) as motivating and as socially efficient 
as possible. Suggested enabling conditions are, (i) institutionalized positive and 
negative incentives regarding the observance of agreed norms; (ii) shortcuts to 
communicative decision making; (iii) developed competences regarding 
communicative negotiation and other complex forms of discourse; (iv) as much 
equality as possible among participants in communicative negotiations; and (v) the 
effective socialization of individuals into the world of the agreed social structuring 
devices.
4. Some directions for further research
Further theoretical work is no doubt required in order to elaborate the revised 
conception of communicative action and practical rationality. Particularly 
challenging, in this respect, would be efforts in the direction of developing a 
communicative form of depth-hermeneutical, critical-emancipatory self-reflection. 
Very important would also be further analysis of communicative negotiation, 
especially in cross-fertilizing dialogue with Rational Choice work in this field. Of 
particular mutual interest would be further exploration of the nature and role in 
communicative negotiations of ethical and pragmatic discourses and their 
interpenetration.
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But beyond work on different dimensions of the pure concept of practical 
rationaltiy, much additional research is of course needed also in order to develop 
adequate practically applicable communicative models of modern society and its 
different specific domains, especially those of the economy and state 
administration. Such model-construction cannot, surely, rule out the possibility 
that, at any given time, certain pockets of strategic action -  even of media-steered 
strategic action -  would be deemed practically inescapable, though now being 
more amenable to communicative control and kept to the minimum necessary. But 
even such a need for strategic action does not have to be static. There can always 
be efforts to reduce it further. The process of designing practically applicable, 
communicative social models can develop, not just through theoretical analysis but 
by continuously seeking and drawing ideas from a rich and constantly changing 
modern social reality, which, in spite of being still extensively strategic, already 
incorporates considerable communicatively oriented elements, as Habermas 
would be the first to stress. After all, the process of communicative model- 
construction can be -  as it must -  in a two-fold relationship with existing social 
reality: that of interpreting and describing reality from a communicative angle, and 
that of evaluating reality and helping it transform in rationally justifiable ways.
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APPENDIX I
HUME’S SUBJECTIVE-INSTRUMENTAL CONCEPTION OF PRACTICAL 
RATIONALTIY
The classical presentation of the Subjective-Instrumental conception of practical 
rationality is found in David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1978), first 
published in 1739, and Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and 
Concerning the Principles of Morals (1975), first published in 1748-1751.
In his deeply sceptical epistemological and ontological speculations, Hume 
demolishes fundamental categories such as those of self (1978: 252), substance ( 
ibid.: 635) and causality ( ibid.: 91-2), destroying thereby the foundations of the 
very instrument of this demolition, reason itself:
the understanding, [which Hume -  unlike Kant -  does not 
distinguish from reason] when it acts alone, and according 
to its most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and 
leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, 
either in philosophy or common life ( ibid.: 267-8).
On that account, one could justifiably count Hume as an important anti- 
Enlightenment figure. However, when Hume comes to philosophical issues that 
are more directly related to the conduct of everyday life -  issues such as those 
concerning morality, politics, religion, or the explanation of natural phenomena -  
he suspends his "cold and strained" speculations which lead to "philosophical 
melancholy" (1978: 269), and operates, by and large, with common sense 
assumptions about the self, the external world and causality. Indeed, in these 
practice-oriented discourses Hume, as Ayer aptly points out (1980: 75), conceives 
of the world in entirely deterministic terms. Hume knows that human beings must
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make such common sense assumptions if they are to carry out their lives as "real" 
selves in a "real" world. These, after all, are the assumptions he himself makes in 
his everyday life, not least when he merrily dines, plays back-gammon and 
converses with his friends (1978: 269). Radical scepticism cannot be sustained; 
for if it were, "[a]ll discourse, all action would immediately cease" (1975: 160). For 
good or ill, such is the "whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason 
and believe" ( ibid.: 160).
In addition to these pragmatic considerations, Hume provides another, perhaps 
more philosophically respectable, reason for suspending his destructive 
metaphysical radicalism: The consistent sceptic cannot follow the path of rational 
doubt in a non-sceptical manner.
A true sceptic will be diffident of his philosophical doubts, 
as well as of his philosophical convictions (1978: 273).
The impossibility of consistently doubting the possibility of reason is thus affirmed. 
But the precise nature of Hume's conception of reason's action-guiding role must 
be seen in the light of a negotiation between a self-constrained but nonetheless 
live scepticism on the one hand, and the imperatives of human existence on the 
other.
The outcome of this negotiation is encapsulated in the famous dictum:
Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, 
and can never pretend to any other office than to serve 
and obey them (1978: 415).
The idea that reason is the slave of passions has two main aspects. On the one
hand it denies that reason can determine the ultimate ends of life, assigning that
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master-role to the passions (1). On the other hand it affirms that reason does have 
the capacity to be of service to the passions in their drive to attain those ends, by 
providing guidance concerning appropriate means to their realization (2).
1) For Hume reason has only two kinds of objects: "Relations of ideas" and 
"matters of fact" (1975: 25, 287). The former, the prime example of which is 
mathematical relations, constitute the province of formal, a priori reason. They are 
"discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is 
anywhere existent in the universe" ( ibid.: 25). The latter are based on the 
evidence of the senses. Reason is able to make matters of fact its objects, and 
thus go beyond the evidence of the senses, only on the basis of the "relation of 
Cause and Effecf -  the principle that every event has a cause ( ibid.: 26). In 
contrast to the objective-substantive conception of practical rationality, Hume is 
convinced that in neither of these two areas of competence (its only ones) does 
reason have the capacity to make judgements about ultimate ends and values -  
about "right and wrong", "good and evil", "vice and virtue", "beauty and deformity":
The ultimate ends of human action can never, in any case,
be accounted for by reason (1975: 293).
Ultimate ends and values (and Hume is interested above all in questions of 
morality) neither consist in nor can be rationally derived from either formal 
relations or matters of fact (1978: 468-9. See also 1975: 285-94)); for ends and 
values are "entirely different" from formal relations and facts.
A fundamental difference between them, according to Hume, is that ends and 
values are inherently linked to motivation, whereas formal relations and matters of 
fact are not. Ends and values have an internal relation with volition, inclination to
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action being an essential aspect of adhering to them. Speaking specifically of 
morality, Hume makes the point abundantly clear:
Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions...
If morality had naturally no influence on human passions 
and actions, 'twere in vain to take such pains to inculcate it 
(1978:457).
On the other hand, knowledge of facts and relations of ideas -  which is the sole 
business of reason -  is dispassionate, not inherently linked with motivation:
Reason being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action 
(1975: 294).
Abstract or demonstrative reasoning... never influences 
any of our actions (1978: 414).
Reason is perfectly inert...wholly inactive ( ibid.: 458).
Reason of itself is utterly impotent ( ibid.: 457)
Another important difference, according to Hume, between relations of ideas and 
matters of fact on the one hand and ultimate ends and values on the other, is that 
the former are susceptible of truth and falsehood, whereas the latter are not. This 
makes reason -  which "is the discovery of truth and falsehood" -  unqualified to 
make pronouncements about ultimate ends and values (1978: 458).
Ultimate ends and values are, for Hume, exclusively the province of affective 
faculties -  "passions", "sentiments", "feelings", "emotions" -  which alone have the 
capacity to motivate.
[T]he ultimate ends of human actions... recommend 
themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of
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mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual 
faculties (1975: 293).
A true child of the Age of Enlightenment, Hume considers sentiments concerning 
moral and aesthetic matters to be uniform throughout humankind, due to "the 
structure of human nature". Such a universalism, however, is not a necessary 
component of the subjective-instrumental conception of practical rationality; it is in 
fact rejected by most other adherents to this conception.
Reason, for Hume, does nonetheless have an important role in guiding action. 
Though not in itself sufficient for determining ultimate ends, it can be of great 
service in specifying the most effective means to those ends. Through ordinary 
experience and, even more, through systematic scientific inquiry, "reason instructs 
us in the several tendencies of action" (1975: 286). It shows us, in other words, the 
consequences of different actual or possible courses of action -  "it directs our 
judgement concerning causes and effects" (1978: 414). In this way, we can know 
the extent to which a particular course of action can bring about a particular state 
which is independently identified as desirable by sentiment. And it is precisely this 
sentiment which provides -  indirectly, so to speak -  the necessary motivation for 
undertaking whatever course of action reason specifies as an effective means to a 
desired end: "the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it" ( ibid.: 
414).
Hume, in typically Enlightenment fashion, is thoroughly optimistic about the effects 
of systematically employing reason as an instrument of sentiment. He derived this 
positive attitude, firstly from his belief in the goodness of human nature -  not least 
the benign character of our "moral sense" -  and secondly from his high regard for 
science.
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This optimism is shared by many who have since espoused the Humean 
conception of practical rationality, even if they do not agree with Hume's diagnosis 
of the universality and goodness of human sentiments. Most notable among the 
optimists are the advocates of economic liberalism, beginning with Hume's good 
friend Adam Smith. Such thinkers are confident that the mechanism of the market 
will ensure that the combined effect of the multitude of diverse economic actions of 
instrumentally rational individuals -  however antagonistic their pursuits -  is on the 
whole socially beneficial. Most 20th century non-cognitivist moral philosophers are 
also relatively sanguine.
There are, however, also important anti-Enlightenment adherents to the 
subjective-instrumental conception of practical rationality: thinkers who make a 
darkly pessimistic diagnosis of what they see as a modern world dominated 
precisely by the (Humean) instrumentally rational pursuit of non-rationally chosen 
ends.
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APPENDIX II
KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL CONCEPTION OF PRACTICAL RATIONALITY
This, transcendental conception of practical rationality has received its original and 
purest formulation in the works of Immanuel Kant -  above all the Groundwork of 
The Metaphysics of Morals (1948), first published in 1785, and the Critique of 
Practical Reason (1996), first published in 1788 -  and has since been greatly 
influential.
Prominent among English-speaking moral and political philosophers whose work 
incorporates strong Kantian elements are John Rawls and R.M.Hare. More 
importantly, from the point of view of this study, Habermas’s own discourse theory 
of morality is a broadly Kantian one, albeit situated within an intersubjective, 
“communicative” philosophical paradigm rather than in Kant’s subject-centred 
paradigm of the “philosophy of consciousness”.
Here, I shall outline the main aspects of Kant’s own conception of practical 
rationality, his own version of the view that reason can provide guidance both with 
regard to means and with regard to the ultimate ends or, more precisely, norms of 
action.
For Kant, action and the will are inherently linked to reason; the key element in 
their relationship being what he variously refers to as laws, principles, or maxims.
Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only 
a rational being has the power to act in accordance with 
his idea of laws -  that is, in accordance with principles -  
and only so has he a will. Since reason is required in order
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to derive actions from laws, the will is nothing but practical 
reason (1948: 76).
Thus, events in nature, including animal behaviour, happen in accordance with 
“laws” in the sense of cause-and-effect regularities. This is how involuntary human 
bodily movements also are experienced by human beings. Those modes of 
behaviour of human or other agents, however, which we call actions are not 
understood as events that (causally) happen to those agents; they are viewed as 
being brought about by the agents themselves in accordance with the agents’ 
understanding of a practical law, or principle, that is, as instances of general ideas 
of what one is doing. It is by virtue of this ability to bring about acts which come 
under principles that agents are, for Kant, said to have a will.
This subsumption of individual actions under general principles is, for Kant, the 
work of reason in its practical capacity, just as the subsumption of objects under 
concepts in sense experience is the work of reason in its theoretical capacity. In 
this way, the will is identified with practical reason. Thus, all actions -  that is, all 
willed behaviours -  are, by definition, rational in the minimal sense of being 
derived from principles.
However, actions can, according to Kant, be rational also in another, stronger 
sense. To appreciate this, we must first look into Kant’s distinctions between 
subjective principles, or maxims, objective principles, or practical laws, and 
imperatives.
A maxim is a subjective principle of action and must be 
distinguished from an objective principle -  namely a 
practical law. The former contains a practical rule 
determined by reason in accordance with the condition of
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the subject (his ignorance or again his inclination): it is 
thus a principle on which the subject acts. A law, on the 
other hand, is an objective principle valid for every rational 
being; and it is a principle on which he ought to act -  that 
is, an imperative (1948: 84. See also, 1948: 66 and 1996:
31-2).
Thus, the principle on which an agent actually acts in a particular situation is that 
agent’s subjective principle, or maxim, for that particular action. Principles of 
action, on the other hand, which are valid for all rational beings regardless of 
whether or not they are actually acted upon, are objective principles or practical 
laws.1
A purely rational being, a being whose actions are motivated only by reason, 
would always -  and effortlessly, so to speak -  act in accordance with objective 
principles. In any action of such a being, in other words, the operative subjective 
principle would always be none other than the objective principle applicable to the 
situation. Human beings, however, are not purely rational in this sense. Their 
actions are subject, over and above objective principles, to two additional sources 
of influence, not present in the case of purely rational beings: these sources of 
influence are -  to use the terms employed by Kant in the above-quoted passage -  
inclination and ignorance.
Inclinations (Kant refers also to desires, impulses, etc, as having a close affinity to 
them) are psychological states which have motivating power over human action 
and which often come into conflict with objective principles by motivating agents 
towards courses of action that are at variance with the ones specified by them.
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Because of the possibility of such a conflict, in the case of non-purely-rational 
beings such as humans, objective principles take on the status of commands of 
reason or imperatives: they acquire the character of statements that specify duties, 
that prescribe what ought to be done.
To be sure, imperatives, or commands of reason, are not always obeyed, despite 
being recognized as valid, and thus as binding for human and other rational 
beings. In cases of inner conflict between imperatives and inclinations human 
beings can, and often do, act on maxims which accord with the latter.
What is important for Kant, however, is that commands of reason, or imperatives, 
do have motivating power. We always have the option to follow the imperative 
rather than the competing inclination. What we cannot do is exercise choice as to 
the nature, strength or object of our inclinations. These simply happen to us. As 
MacIntyre (in his A Short History of Ethics) puts it,
Inclination belongs to our determined physical and 
psychological nature; we cannot in Kant’s view choose our 
inclinations. What we can do is to choose between our 
inclination and our duty (1966:192-3).
Human actions can follow maxims that are at variance with objective principles -  
imperatives or commands of reason — not only because of the force of opposing 
inclinations but also due to ignorance of the appropriate imperative; whether this 
ignorance is known to the agent at the time of the action, or not, and whether it 
amounts to complete lack of knowledge about the appropriate imperative or is 
mere uncertainty or ambivalence about it. In any case, Kant is confident that 
human beings do have ample scope for reducing it. How they can reduce this 
ignorance -  the way in which they can get to know the right imperative of reason
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applicable to any given situation -  varies with the type of imperative the situation 
calls for.
Objective practical principles, according to Kant, are of two kinds, conditioned and 
unconditioned, corresponding to two types of imperatives, hypothetical and 
categorical.
All imperatives command either hypothetically or 
categorically. Hypothetical imperatives declare a possible 
action to be practically necessary as a means to the 
attainment of something else that one wills (or that one may 
will). A categorical imperative would be one which 
represented an action as objectively necessary in itself 
apart from its relation to a further end (1948: 78).
That among reason’s practical imperatives there are some which are binding on 
the will unconditionally, or “categorically”, is the central, and by far the most 
important, claim of Kant’s theory of practical rationality. Before looking into this 
claim more closely however, let us consider briefly what he has to say about 
hypothetical imperatives, especially his further subdivision of them into two distinct 
kinds; for apart from its undeniable intrinsic interest, this distinction proves to be 
also of considerable consequence for Habermas’s tri-partite conception of 
practical rationality, more specifically for his distinction between “pragmatic” and 
“ethical” discourse.
Kant identifies two different kinds of hypothetical imperatives: “rules of skill” and 
“counsels of prudence” (1948: 80). Rules of skill specify means to well-defined 
ends which an agent might seek, or as a matter of fact does seek. These ends can 
be entirely arbitrary. In so far as hypothetical imperatives are concerned, “there is
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absolutely no question about the rationality or goodness of the end, but only about 
what must be done to attain it” ( ibid.: 79).
Counsels of prudence, on the other hand, propose various means to a special kind 
of end, namely “happiness” or “well-being”. Happiness differs from other ends in 
that it is not arbitrary. As an end happiness is “given” -  it is actually pursued by 
every human or other rational being though the content of happiness -  the totality 
of the elements that constitute it -  differs from one such being to another. 
However, what warrants the separate classification of the imperatives that concern 
means to this end is another characteristic of happiness, one that is more 
important with regard to the logic of imperatives: this is the inherent indeterminacy 
of happiness -  the impossibility for any human or other finite being to specify at 
any given moment what his or her happiness might consist in, happiness being a 
property that applies to one’s whole existence, past, present and future.
Unfortunately...happiness is so indeterminate a concept 
that although every man wants to attain happiness, he can 
never say definitely and in unison with himself what it 
really is that he wants and wills. There is required for the 
idea of happiness an absolute whole, a maximum of well­
being in my present and in every future state. Now, it is 
impossible for the most intelligent, and at the same time 
most powerful, but nevertheless finite, being to form here 
a determinate concept of what he really wills ( ibid.: 81).
Interestingly, Kant assigns the task of forming the idea of happiness for any 
human being primarily to imagination rather than to reason (“happiness is an ideal, 
not of reason, but of imagination”, ibid.: 82). Reason, on the other hand -  here in 
the form of practical wisdom, or “prudence” -  is restricted to the role of providing
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not strict commands, but only recommendations, or “counsels”, concerning how to 
attain happiness; hence, “counsels of prudence”.
Despite the considerable differences between rules of skill and counsels of 
prudence, however, they both, as hypothetical imperatives, have the same logical 
structure: “Do A if you will B (under circumstance C)”. Each such imperative is 
premised on a theoretical judgement of the form “Action A (under circumstance C) 
leads to B”.
Kant raises the question as to how a hypothetical imperative of either kind -  even 
though it might be overpowered by a competing inclination -  can be necessary or 
binding for a rational will; and he finds the answer to it relatively unproblematic: the 
necessity involved is analytic -  one regarding the logical self-consistency of the 
will.
Who wills the end, wills (so far as reason has decisive 
influence on his actions) also the means which are 
indispensably necessary and in his power. So far as willing 
is concerned, this proposition is analytic (1948: 80-1).
Thus, all hypothetical imperatives presuppose the higher level (analytic) principle 
“To will the end is to will the means”, and derive their legitimacy and binding force 
for the rational will from the combination of that principle with the prior adoption of 
an end by the will and the relevant theoretical proposition(s) linking that end with 
the means prescribed by the hypothetical imperative in question.
So far Kant has in essence remained within the Humean-instrumentalist 
conception of practical rationality, despite having formulated his views primarily in 
the logical language of imperatives of reason and bindingness on a rational will, 
rather than in Hume’s predominantly psychological language of passions,
356
emotions, etc. The decisive break with instrumentalism -  and also with the 
naturalism of the objectivist-substantive conception -  comes with the idea that 
there are also “categorical imperatives” of reason.
In contrast to hypothetical imperatives, which are conditional upon the prior willing 
of an end, and thus have the form “Do (or do not do) A, if you will B”, categorical 
imperatives are not conditioned by anything beyond the actions prescribed by 
them. Their form is simply “Do (or do not do) A”. They specify actions that ought, 
or ought not to be performed -  duties that ought to be fulfilled -  for their own sake, 
not for the sake of something else. Categorical imperatives are the imperatives of 
morality. They specify what is morally impermissible to do or impermissible not to 
do (i.e., obligatory). Categorical imperatives (with small “c” and small “i”) can be 
rationally derived, Kant maintains, from a single principle, the Categorical 
Imperative (with capital “C” and “I”), which is itself in no need of any further rational 
justification. Kant famously offered several formulations of the Categorical 
Imperative. The most representative of them -  for it best captures their common 
core idea, that of Universalizability -  is the first formulation:
Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same
time will that it should become a universal law (1948: 84).
The Categorical Imperative can be seen as a procedure for testing maxims (and 
the actions that follow from them); as a criterion for distinguishing morally 
impermissible from morally permissible actions. As such, it is an entirely formal 
principle. It is independent of the substance of any possible maxims that might be 
tested by it, of any interests, needs, desires, etc, that might be expressed in the 
maxim or with reference to the consequences that would result from applying the 
maxim. The Categorical Imperative cannot itself produce any maxims of action, it
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can only test maxims that are already formulated and which do involve substantive 
issues. Korner rightly compares the Categorical Imperative with the laws of logic:
Just as the formal principles of syllogistic reasoning divide 
all syllogisms clearly into two classes, the valid and the 
invalid, so, Kant believes, the formal principle of morality 
divides all maxims, and consequently all actions based on 
them, into those which are moral and those which are not 
(1955: 135).
According to Kant’s above-quoted criterion of universalisability, an action is 
morally permissible only when it is based on a maxim which a human, or other 
rational being “can will” that it becomes a universal law, i.e., that it is applicable to 
him or herself as well as to all other rational beings at all times; and it is morally 
impermissible if one “cannot will” its maxim to become universal law in this sense. 
Kant clarifies the key phrase “can/cannot will” as follows:
We must be able to will that a maxim of our action should 
become a universal law -  this is the general canon for all 
moral judgement of action. Some actions are so 
constituted that their maxim cannot even be conceived as 
a universal law of nature without contradiction, let alone be 
willed as what ought to become one. In the case of others 
we do not find this inner impossibility, but it is still 
impossible to will that their maxim should be raised to the 
universality of a law of nature, because such a will would 
contradict itself (1948: 86-7).
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Thus, a maxim fails to pass the test of universalizabilty -  that is, cannot be willed 
by a rational being to become a universal law -  in one of two circumstances. 
Firstly it fails the test when becoming a law is conceptually self-contradictory, 
therefore impossible to realize. Kant illustrates this point by reference to the 
practice of promising. A maxim such as “You may break a promise if it is in your 
interest to do so” is non-universalizable in this sense. For if everyone were entitled 
to break their promises whenever it were in their interest to do so, promising would 
become pointless and cease to be practised; consequently, breaking promises 
would become impossible, not only under the circumstances the maxim 
presumably allows, but under any circumstances whatsoever.
Secondly, a maxim fails the test when its becoming universal law, though not 
conceptually self-contradictory and thus impossible to realize, as in the previous 
case, is nonetheless a state of affairs which a rational being cannot will without 
self-contradiction. A maxim such as “Do not help others promote their well-being” 
is, for Kant, non-universalizable, in this second sense. For no rational being would 
want to give up all prospect of ever receiving help from others.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that certain theoretical categories, 
such as the category of causality (that every event has a cause), necessarily 
underlie our experience of events in the world, In a similar way, in his moral 
writings Kant tries to demonstrate that the Categorical Imperative is implicit in the 
everyday moral consciousness of humankind.
Despite the similarity, however, there is a fundamental difference between the two 
cases: whereas the “transcendental” argument linking the theoretical categories 
with our ordinary experience of events in the world is believed by Kant to establish 
the validity of those categories, in the practical sphere Kant insists that the
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analogous argument leading from ordinary moral judgements to the Categorical 
Imperative does not amount to a justification of the latter.
For with regard to the former case, ordinary experience is “given” and must be 
taken for granted -  it cannot be chosen or altered; thus, the theoretical categories 
are valid as long as they can “explain” ordinary experience as it presents itself. In 
the practical sphere, Kant recognizes that ordinary moral consciousness is often 
misled by inclinations to make judgements that are at odds with the prescriptions 
of the Categorical Imperative; but this is not why the Categorical Imperative cannot 
be justified in terms of ordinary moral consciousness. After all -  Kant maintains -  a 
systematic philosophical clarification of the Categorical Imperative in its different 
versions -  such as the one he himself undertakes -  would significantly enhance 
the ability of our moral consciousness to match its judgements with the Categorical 
Imperative, achieving a an appreciable measure of harmony between the two.
The point however is different. The Categorical Imperative -  unlike the theoretical 
categories in their relation to ordinary experience -  is supposed not to explain but 
to establish ordinary moral judgements (the words in italics are Kant’s own). It is 
supposed to determine what such judgements ought to be, to provide, in other 
words, justification for them. It cannot, therefore, at the same time derive its own 
validity from them, no matter how well the two match each other. If the whole 
edifice of morality is not to remain groundless, relying on a logic which circularly 
tries to justify morality’s two poles -  ordinary moral judgements and the 
Categorical Imperative -  in terms of each other, if, in Kant’s own vivid metaphors, 
morality is to avoid being “merely a chimerical Idea without truth” or “a mere 
phantom of the brain” (1948: 106), the Categorical Imperative must derive its 
validity independently of ordinary moral judgements, only thus becoming 
competent to confer validity upon them.
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Kant’s arguments aiming to establish the validity of the Categorical Imperative are 
extremely complex, and admit of alternative interpretations, especially if one 
considers both of the major works in which they are put forward, the Groundwork 
and the Critique of Practical Reason. A thorough, sympathetic but not uncritical, 
discussion of them is presented in H.J. Paton’s The Categorical Imperative (1948). 
The essentials of Kant’s argument, along the lines of Paton’s interpretation, can be 
put as follows (at the risk of oversimplification):
The Categorical Imperative is a principle at once practical, a priori, and synthetic. It 
is a practical principle in the sense that it is not simply cognitively binding, but is 
binding on the will to initiate action of a certain kind. It is a priori in that it is not 
conditioned by anything empirical, indeed by anything outside of itself, such as 
human needs, inclinations, preferences or ends, or even the will of God. Finally, it 
is synthetic, as opposed to analytic, in that its negation is not self-contradictory, or, 
its truth does not result from the meaning of its terms.
The Categorical Imperative, therefore, must be rationally justifiable as a 
principlethat is binding on the will, and this must be so not by reference to anything 
external to it and not by mere clarification of the meaning of its terms. Kant 
maintains that the Categorical Imperative is indeed justifiable in this way. His point 
is that practical reason, by reflecting on itself, recognizes the Categorical 
Imperative as its own principle of operation; we might say, as a kind of principle of 
“practical self-consistency” or “practical non-contradiction” in the sense of self- 
consistency and non-contradiction with regard to actions willed rather than to 
propositions held. Put another way, The Categorical Imperative is recognized by 
the rational will -  which for Kant is identical with practical reason -  as its own law. 
The will, therefore, is justified in abiding by the Categorical Imperative, for in doing 
so it is obeying a self-imposed law; it is, in other words, exercising autonomy.
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APPENDIX III
MAX WEBER AND THE DISCONTENTS OF MODERN RATIONALIZATION
Weber considers certain forms of "rationalization", that is, the application of certain 
forms of rationality, to be the most pervasive feature of modern civilization. The 
term "rationality", and its several cognates, are used by Weber in a great and often 
bewildering variety of ways (see Brubaker, 1984: 2). It is, however, possible to 
extract from his writings a sufficiently systematic and consistent set of concepts 
that will enable us to grasp what he has to say about processes of rationalization 
in various domains of modern life, and how he links rationality with what he 
diagnoses as the main negative consequences of these rationalization processes 
-  namely, the loss of meaning and the loss of freedom.
Types of Action and Rationality
In his well known four-fold typology of action Weber distinguishes two forms of 
non-rational and two forms of rational action. The non-rational action types are 
affectual action, which is action "determined by the actor's specific affects and 
feeling states", (Weber, 1968: 25) and traditional action, that is action "determined 
by ingrained habituation" ( ibid.: 25). Both affectual and traditional action lack the 
property that, for Weber, constitutes the defining characteristic of rational action: 
the deliberate control of action by conscious ideas (see Swindler, 1973), often 
expressed, alternatively, as control of action "by the intellect". The two types of 
rational action identified by Weber are "value-rational" (wertrationai) and 
purposively rational (zweckrational, often translated rather misleadingly as 
instrumentally rational) action. They are differentiated from each other according to 
the way in which they are controlled by conscious ideas.
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Value-Rational and Purposivelv Rational Action
Value-rational action is defined as action which is
determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own 
sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other form of 
behaviour, independently of its prospects of success 
(Weber, 1968: 25).
Action of this type is characterized by "its clearly self-conscious formulation of the 
ultimate values governing the action", the latter taking the form of "unconditional 
demands" on "persons who, regardless of possible cost to themselves, act to put 
into practice their convictions", (p. 25) examples of which are those that "seem to 
them to be required by duty, honour, the pursuit of beauty, a religious call, 
personal loyalty, or the importance of some cause" ( ibid.: 25).
Thus, a particular value-rational action does not aim at a "result ulterior to it", but 
has intrinsic value itself, as it constitutes an example -  an instance, a particular 
realization -  of the general idea of the ultimate value by which it is governed. 
Furthermore, the intrinsic value of any particular value-rational action is, at least 
implicitly, considered as overriding with respect to the action's consequences; and 
it is so considered a priori, that is, independently of any calculation of such 
consequences
Purposively rational action, on the other hand, is defined as action which is
determined by expectations as to the behaviour of objects 
in the environment and of other human beings; these 
expectations are used as "conditions" or "means" for the 
attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and 
calculated ends ( ibid.: 24).
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In these calculations
the end, the means, and the secondary results are all 
rationally taken into account and weighed. This involves 
rational consideration of alternative means to the end, of 
the relations of the end to the secondary consequences, 
and finally of the relative importance of different possible 
ends ( ibid.: 26).
It is widely agreed among commentators -  and Weber's own remarks on the 
matter seem to justify this view -  that for Weber purposively rational action is more 
rational than value-rational action. Indeed, according to the above definition 
purposively rational action is more comprehensively controlled by conscious ideas 
-  absolute as well as comparative ideas regarding ends, means, and 
consequences -  than value-rational action, which is controlled only by ideas 
concerning ultimate values. Nevertheless, this interpretation needs to be qualified. 
As already mentioned, it can be said that in cases of value-rational action, 
alternative ends, alternative means and the relevant consequences are also taken 
into consideration, in a particular sense: they are a priori judged to be collectively 
overridden -  even if they are not known -  by the particular realization of the 
ultimate value which governs the value-rational action in question. The degree of 
rationality possessed by value-rational action seems to depend on how 
consciously this judgement is made in any particular case.
An important question arising with regard to Weber's conception of purposively 
rational action concerns the rationality of the choice between alternative and 
conflicting ends. Weber identifies two ways in which such a choice can be made.
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Firstly,
the actor may... take them as given subjective wants and 
arrange them in a scale of consciously assessed relative 
urgency. He may then orient his action to this scale in 
such a way that they are satisfied as far as possible in 
order of urgency, as formulated in the principle of 
"marginal utility" ( ibid.: 26).
Here, choices regarding ends are rational to the extent that such choices are 
governed by conscious assessments of relative urgency, but no further, for these 
assessments are themselves non-rational, expressing "subjective wants" that are 
taken as "given" rather than being brought under the conscious control of any 
further ideas.
The second way in which choices regarding ends might be made, according to 
Weber, is "in terms of a rational orientation to a system of values" ( ibid.: 26). 
Thus, in this case -  unlike the previous one -  the ordering of priorities is itself 
carried out in a rational way, by being brought under the conscious control of ideas 
regarding values. It is worth noting, however, that Weber describes such choices 
as being "determined in a value-rational manner" ( ibid.: 26), which, according to 
his own definition of "value-rational", means that choices are determined by 
treating the relevant ends as possessing intrinsic value, that is as relating in a non­
mediated way to some absolute and overriding values (or unconditional 
commands). This way of understanding the "rational orientation to a system of 
values" raises, of course, the question how a choice between conflicting ends is 
possible if more than one of them is related to values in such a value-rational 
manner.
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There is, however, a more important point that needs to be made with regard to 
this interpretation of the relation between ends and values. By construing the 
relation in terms of value-rationality, Weber seems to disregard another likely way 
in which -  in terms of his own conceptual schema -  ends might be brought under 
the conscious control of ultimate value; namely, by means of purposive rationality. 
According to this interpretation, ends would be treated as means to other 
("ulterior", i.e. external) ends, which might themselves be means to other ends, 
and so on, until the chains of means and ends reach some ultimate value, or 
values, where they terminate.
This apparent capacity of (Weberian) purposive rationality to follow means-ends 
chains right through to ultimate values is of considerable significance, and will be 
revisited in later sections. For now, we shall turn to Weber's views on ultimate 
values themselves and on the capacity of rationality with regard to their adoption.
Rationality and Ultimate Values
Weberian rational action, whether of the value-rational or the purposively rational 
type, evidently does not involve the rational choice of ultimate rational values, or 
any other rational value judgement. The rationality of action lies only in the ways in 
which the action is related to ideas, often including ideas of ultimate values. It 
involves (a) understanding -  and making understandable, i.e. clarifying -  ideas, 
such as concepts of values, (b) making logical inferences, and (c) making 
judgements of a factual nature, such as those concerning relations of cause and 
effect; but it does not involve making value judgements.
However, Weber goes beyond merely saying that for an action to be rational it is 
not necessary that the values involved in it are chosen rationally. Under the strong 
influence of Nietzsche, and in a manner reminiscent also of Hume, he rejects the
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very possibility that value judgements can, under any circumstances, be made in a 
rational, or "scientific", way, affirming the inescapability of "irrational" ethical and 
other value choices and commitments, and the fundamentally irrational springs of 
human motivation.
For Weber, as Giddens puts it, "[statements of fact, and judgements of value are 
separated by an absolute logical gulf" (Giddens, 1972: 42) In his renowned public 
lecture "Science as a Vocation", he points out that
it is one thing to state facts, to determine mathematical or 
logical relations or the internal structure of cultural values, 
while it is another thing to answer questions of the value of 
culture and its individual contents and the question of how 
one should act in the cultural community and its political 
associations (Gerth and Wright Mills [henceforth G & M],
1970: 146).
and speaks of 'the impossibility of "scientifically" pleading for practical and 
interested stands -  except in discussing the means for a firmly given and 
presupposed end' (G & M, 1970: 147). To quote Giddens, once more, 'in Weber's 
thought, the notion of "value" becomes synonymous with (irrational) conviction' 
(Giddens, 1972: 57).
Closely associated with these views is Weber's firm belief in the existence of a 
plurality of fundamental values, value spheres, or attitudes to life, which are, and 
will always be, in constant and unresolvable conflict -  a "polytheism" of 
unceasingly struggling "gods and demons"; and his consequent belief in the need 
to choose between them non-rationally.
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[Y]he ultimately possible attitudes toward life are 
irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be 
brought to a final conclusion. Thus it is necessary to make 
a decisive choice (G & M, 1970: 152).
Theoretical Rationality
In addition to the forms of rationality that pertain to action -  which might be 
referred to as forms of "practical" rationality -  we also find in Weber's work the 
notion of a "theoretical" or "intellectual" rationality, a rationality that is appropriate 
to "the intellectual comprehension of reality" (G & M, 1970: 293). It involves
the kind of rationalization the systematic thinker performs 
on the image of the world: an increasing theoretical 
mastery of reality by means of increasingly precise and 
abstract concepts (G & M, 1970: 293).
It can be said that theoretical rationality is characterized by the deliberate, 
methodical, logical linking of beliefs about reality to other consciously held relevant 
ideas and beliefs, in the same way as practical rationality is characterized by the 
establishment of such a relationship between action and ideas. Thus, theoretical 
rationality tends to create consistent and coherent networks, or systems, of 
concepts and propositions about different domains of reality and experience 
including not only aspects of the natural world but also areas of social and cultural 
life. Weber, indeed, discusses processes of theoretical rationalization, or 
intellectualization, with regard to such domains as the natural and social sciences, 
religions, ethics, law, and music. From a motivational point of view, whereas 
practical rationality is based on the desire to realize certain valued ends,
368
theoretical rationality, as Kalberg points out, is anchored in the "cognitive need of 
intellectuals" (Kalberg, 1994:135).
Apart from its role in the "intellectual comprehension of reality", theoretical 
rationality can also serve practical purposes, by being incorporated in processes of 
practical rationality. A major example is the integration of science and technology. 
"Natural science gives us an answer to the question of what we must do if we wish 
to master life technically" (G & M, 1970: 144). And more generally, "science 
contributes to the technology of controlling life by calculating external objects as 
well as man's activities" (G & M, 1970: 150). Scientific knowledge of the natural 
world can contribute to the rationalization of technical action by rendering technical 
means more calculable, predictable and controllable, while social scientific 
knowledge can have an analogous function in the field of economic activity as well 
as in other areas of social action.
A close union of theoretical and practical forms of rationality can also exist in legal 
and administrative systems (whose importance for Weber's work cannot be 
overestimated). For such systems, when rationalized, constitute internally 
consistent and coherent networks of conceptually clear and precise propositions, 
and at the same time -  these propositions being rules of conduct -  they are also 
devices for the regulation of action in a calculable, predictable, controllable 
manner. As we shall see, this form of regulation of action lies at the heart of his 
theory of bureaucracy.
Formal and Substantive Rationality
Another conceptual distinction that figures prominently in Weber's studies of 
rationalization processes in the West is that between formal and substantive 
rationality. In a nutshell, an activity is formally rational to the extent that it involves
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calculability, and substantively rational to the extent that it is oriented to the 
attainment of ultimate values.
Two of the main areas in relation to which Weber draws this conceptual distinction 
are (a) economic action and (b) law.
(a) On the one hand, '[t]he term "formal rationality of economic action" will be 
used to designate the extent of quantitative calculation or accounting which is 
technically possible and which is actually applied' (Weber, 1968: 85). And, in 
somewhat more concrete terms,
A system of economic activity will be called "formally" 
rational according to the degree in which the provision for 
needs, which is essential to every rational economy, is 
capable of being expressed in numerical, calculable terms, 
and is so expressed ( ibid.).
On the other hand,
[t]he "substantive rationality"... is the degree to which the 
provisioning of given groups of persons...with goods is 
shaped by economically oriented social action under some 
criterion... of ultimate values...( ibid.).
Such ultimate values might be "ethical, political, utilitarian, hedonistic, feudal... 
egalitarian..." ( ibid.).
(b) In the area of law, formal rationality is understood as the kind of calculability of 
decisions and actions that is present when "only unambiguous general 
characteristics of the facts of the case are taken into account" ( ibid.: 656-7), which 
is possible to the extent that we have "the collection and rationalization by logical
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rmeans of all the several rules recognized as legally valid into an internally 
consistent complex of abstract legal propositions" ( ibid.: 657). On the other hand, 
legal activity is substantively rational to the degree that decisions and actions are 
influenced by fundamental norms such as "ethical imperatives, utilitarian and other 
experimental rules, and political maxims” ( ibid.).
It must be emphasized that in formally rational action, calculability goes hand in 
hand with predictability and controllability, thus with efficacy; what is calculable is 
not just any imagined outcomes (including ends, means and possible secondary 
effects) of action, but its real outcomes -  the outcomes that actually obtain, or 
would obtain if the action were undertaken. What formal rationality is not 
concerned with is whether what is calculable, predictable, controllable, is also 
desired or desirable. These points are made abundantly clear in what Weber says 
about "technical rationality", a term which can be understood as more or less 
equivalent to "formal rationality" but reserved by Weber for use in connection with 
certain domains of activity. Thus,
[f]or purposes of the definition of technical rationality, it is 
wholly indifferent whether the product of a technical 
process is in any sense useful... we can conceive of a 
rational technique for achieving ends which no one 
desires. It would, for instance, be possible, as a kind of 
technical amusement, to apply all the most modern 
methods to the production of atmospheric air. And no one 
could take the slightest exception to the purely technical 
rationality of the action ( ibid.: 67).
In terms of the above definitions, there is an evident affinity, on the one hand 
between formal and purposive rationality (as well as a close association between
371
rboth and theoretical rationality), and on the other hand between substantive and 
value-rationality.
Let us, however, look a little more closely into the conceptual relationships 
between these forms of rationality.
Relationships between Types of Rationality
Theoretical and Formal Rationality
The calculability of the results of an action, which would be the hall-mark of the 
action's formal rationality, evidently presupposes the existence of a relevant field 
of theoretical rationality, that is, the existence of a consistent and coherent system 
of concepts and propositions about the domain of reality within which the action in 
question is to take place.
However, the mere presence of theoretical rationality does not guarantee its 
practical use, i.e. its utilization for rendering relevant actions formally rational. It 
can be said, therefore, that theoretical rationality is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for formal (practical) rationality.
Formal and Purposive Rationality
An analogous relationship can be discerned between formal and purposive 
rationality. The calculability of the results of following a certain course of action -  
i.e., that action's formal rationality -  is a prerequisite for making means-ends 
calculations with regard to that action, i.e. for the action's purposive rationality. But 
for the exercise of such purposive rationality, there must also be -  in addition to 
the possibility of the requisite formal rationality -  an intended end which is among 
the calculable results of the formally rational action. Let it be made clear, though,
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that the degree of formal rationality -  i.e. calculability -  necessary for the 
rationality of any purposive action, is never greater than that required by the 
degree of precision with which the action's ends are specified. The same, of 
course, applies in the case of theoretical rationality.
Theoretical. Formal and Value-Rationalitv
The value-rationality of a particular action consists in the logical subsumption of 
that action under a concept of an ultimate value, that is, its linking with the ultimate 
value in question without the mediation of causal (i.e. means-ends) relationships. 
The action would be formally rational if the logical relationship between the 
particular action and the relevant concept were calculable irrespective of whether 
the agent held the concept as an (ultimate) value. Similarly, the clarity and 
coherence of the concepts involved would signify the presence of theoretical 
rationality, regardless of whether those concepts were used for any practical 
purposes.
Thus, (a certain kind of) theoretical rationality is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for (a certain kind of) formal rationality, and the latter is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for value-rationality.
Substantive. Value- and Purposive Rationality
On the basis of Weber's definitions, value-rationality always (by conceptual 
necessity) amounts to substantive rationality, as it involves the linking of action to 
some ultimate value, as substantive rationality requires. The latter, however, need 
not always be of the value-rational variety, that is, involving the linking of action to 
an ultimate value not in a causally-mediated, but in a logically subsumptive 
manner.
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Substantive rationality may, conceptually speaking, be of a purposive type, in the 
sense that it involves relating an action to an ultimate vaiue via a chain of means 
and ends. In that case, of course, substantive rationality would also have to be 
formal in ways and to the extent necessitated by the respective purposive 
rationality.
One of the most crucial questions arising out of Weber's work concerns the degree 
to which -  in the above terms -  substantive rationality of the purposive, but also of 
the value-rational form can be practically realized in modern society. In other 
words, when the costs of formalization are taken into consideration, is it feasible 
for modern society to attain the formal rationality necessary for achieving as fully 
developed a substantive rationality as socially needed; or is it necessary to 
compromise, either
(a) by opting for a sufficient formalization of purposive action with respect to 
specific ends but without sufficiently linking those ends to ultimate values, ending 
up with what can be called a sufficiently formalized but substantively truncated 
purposive rationality; or,
(b) by pursuing a less than adequately formalized, less than fully developed, 
substantive rationality, where an effort is made to optimize the relationship 
between formal and substantive rationality in favour of maximizing the realization 
of ultimate values?
With the above conceptual analysis in mind, let us now turn to Weber's diagnosis 
of modernity in terms of the important idea of rationalization.
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i
Western Rationalization
The idea that widespread and growing rationalization is the dominant 
characteristic of western or occidental civilization -  and the main feature 
distinguishing this civilization from all others in history -  is justifiably considered to 
be one of the central tenets defining Weber's sociological understanding of 
modernity.
Three preliminary qualifications, however, must be made in order to protect this 
immensely important Weberian idea from likely misinterpretations.
Firstly, western rationalization does not consist in the undifferentiated spread of 
rationality in all its forms -  as these have been identified by Weber -  but in the 
dominance of some of its forms at the expense of others.
The precise character of the forms of rationality that, according to Weber, prevail 
in modernity will be discussed later. For the moment, suffice it to say that they are 
akin to the purposive, formal and theoretical forms, as opposed to the value- and 
substantive forms, which are becoming less and less influential.
Secondly, Weber is not postulating a determination or teleology inherent in 
rationality. Rationalization (in the specific forms in which it has occurred) has not 
been historically inevitable, but depended on the existence of particular sets of 
conditions, which happened to arise at certain times and not at others, and in 
certain regions of the world and not in others. Such conditions include economic 
interests, power relations, religious and cultural movements, etc. Indeed, much of 
Weber's work is concerned with identifying, and explaining the emergence of, 
conditions that were conducive to the development of modern civilization, and 
ultimately with explaining why the phenomena of modernity appeared in the West
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and not in the context of other civilizations such as those of China or India. Most 
elaborate, in this respect, is his thesis developed in The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism (Weber, 1958), that the emergence of capitalism, and 
consequently of modernity, in the West was significantly facilitated by certain 
religious beliefs, and associated attitudes and practices with regard to work and 
consumption, that were adopted by certain protestant sects. While rejecting the 
historical inevitability of rationalization, however, Weber insists that once the forms 
of rationality characteristic of modernity do take root, they become -  due to what 
Weber calls their technical superiority -  virtually irresistible. Their application 
therefore acquires a strong tendency towards irreversibility as well as towards 
intensification and further expansion.
Thirdly, modern rationalization is not understood by Weber as a blanket 
phenomenon covering uniformly and simultaneously all aspects of social life; but 
rather as a set of processes which take place in different domains of social activity 
(economic, political, scientific, legal, artistic, etc.), and which -  while exhibiting 
strong family resemblances -  might differ in several respects, such as the specific 
mix of rationality types involved, the intensity of application of each rationality type, 
the stage of development of the rationalization process, the rhythm of its 
development, etc. The specific character of a process of rationalization is shaped 
by the particular set of conditions in which it occurs.
Keeping these qualifications in mind, we shall now turn to Weber's account of 
rationalization and its consequences in three domains of modern social activity: (1) 
science, (2) the capitalist market, and (3) organizations.
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Science
Modern science, according to Weber, is the result of a process of 
intellectualization — that is, of the growth of what we have earlier referred to as 
theoretical rationality. This process has gone on in the West for millennia but has 
sharply intensified in modern times.
For Weber, science, in addition to providing a "theoretical mastery of reality", is
practically valuable mainly in three ways (G & M, 1970: 150-2): Firstly, it is a
$
powerful technical instrument, making possible the technological control of natural 
as well as socio-cultural objects and thus the adoption of effective means to 
chosen ends. Secondly, science serves as a good exercise for the mind; it 
provides "methods of thinking, the tools and the training for thought". Thirdly, it 
enables us to attain self-clarification with respect to our evaluative standpoints.
What science cannot do, however, -  and what it has, by and large, given up all 
ambition of doing -  is to provide justification for evaluative standpoints of any sort. 
In this context, Weber approvingly quotes Tolstoi's claim that science 'gives no 
answer to our question, the only question important for us: 'What shall we do and 
how shall we live?"' (G & M, 1970: 143).
More specifically, the very value of science's own theoretical or practical 
attainments -  the very value of science itself -  cannot be scientifically proved; it 
must simply be presupposed:
Science... presupposes that what is yielded by scientific 
work is important in the sense that it is "worth being 
known"... this presupposition cannot be proved by 
scientific means. It can only be interpreted with reference 
to... our ultimate position towards life ( ibid.).
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Similarly science
leaves quite aside, or assumes for its purposes, whether 
we should and do wish to master life technically and 
whether it ultimately makes sense to do so ( ibid.: 144).
Furthermore, science cannot discover any meaning in the objects it studies, nor 
can it demonstrate that those objects have any value. For science, as opposed to 
religious or other modes of comprehending reality,
there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into 
play... one can, in principle, master all things by 
calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted ( 
ibid.: 139).
This disenchanted world -  which includes the artificial, man-made world of 
technology just as much as nature and society -  is one about which it cannot be 
scientifically proved that it is *worth while, that it has any "meaning", or that it 
makes sense to live in...' ( ibid.: 144)
Disenchantment and meaninglessness are, thus, necessary concomitants of 
modern science's rational mode of relating to the world. And since this mode has 
displaced the earlier, religious one from its position of dominance, disenchantment 
and meaninglessness have become pervasive characteristics of our experience -  
the price our civilization has to pay for the theoretical and technological mastery 
over reality.
Thus, for Weber, science's unsurpassed theoretical rationality, and -  through it -  
its great and indispensable contribution to the formal and purposive rationality of 
technological action, go hand in hand with definite substantive irrationalities,
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associated, above all, with the undermining of such a paramount ultimate value as 
the meaningfulness of life and the world.
Market-Oriented Economic Activity
Capitalist economic activity, oriented to a competitive market is, for Weber, 
another major field of increasing rationalization.
Weber refers to "consociation through exchange in the market" as "the archetype 
of all rational social action" (Weber, 1968: 635). Market-oriented action is 
(formally) rational in that it is based on the strict, quantitative calculation of all the 
factors involved in the action, that is the factors relevant to the pursuit of the 
agent’s interests ( ibid.: 85-7).
For a capitalist economic unit, such relevant factors that need to be subjected to 
calculation might include the prices at which raw materials can be purchased and 
products sold, as well as technological and social processes of production, 
administration and management.
The highest degree of quantitative calculability is achieved, in Weber's view, when 
every relevant factor can be accounted for in monetary terms:
From a purely technical point of view, money is the most 
"perfect" means of economic calculation. That is, it is 
formally the most rational means of orienting economic 
activity ( ibid.: 86).
In modern market-oriented economic activity, the calculability of all the relevant 
factors in terms of money goes hand in hand with the market's orientation to these 
factors solely as commodities. What is common to money and commodities is their 
"abstract" nature : money is an abstraction from all particular qualitative and
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quantitative criteria for evaluating things, whereas the commodification of things 
constitutes the exclusive focussing on their market-exchangeability, in abstraction 
from all their specific qualities; on their "exchange-value" as opposed to their "use- 
value", as Marx would have put it.
The calculability of commodities in terms of money, which characterizes modern 
economic action and makes it formally rational, facilitates the purposively rational 
pursuit of specific market-oriented goals on the part of economic agents. Indeed, 
any failure by an economic agent to be rational in this way can be very costly, 
incurring even the ultimate penalty of economic extinction ( ibid.: 1186). The 
substantive rationality of such action, however, is another matter altogether. To 
begin with, monetary calculability is not inherently linked, positively or negatively, 
to any form of social distribution of goods, or to the satisfaction of real wants, or to 
any such socio-economic values, though it may coincide as a matter of fact with 
the satisfaction of some such value. Thus,
Formal and substantive rationality, no matter by what 
standard the latter is measured, are always in principle 
separate things, no matter that in many (and under certain 
very artificial assumptions even in all) cases they may 
coincide empirically... [I]f the standard used is that of the 
provision of a certain minimum of subsistence for the 
maximum size of population, the experience of the last few 
decades would seem to show that formal and substantive 
rationality coincide to a relatively high degree (1968:108-9).
However, this (alleged) independence of substantive from formal rationality seems 
to exist, for Weber, only if substantive rationality is defined in a very restrictive
way, merely in terms of socio-economic values. For Weber considers the
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monetary calculability of market-oriented economic action -  thus, its formal 
rationality -  to be inherently at odds with a whole range of other substantive 
values:
Money is the most abstract and "impersonal" element that 
exists in human life. The more the world of the modern 
capitalist economy follows its own immanent laws, the less 
accessible it is to any imaginable relationship with a 
religious ethic of brotherliness (G & M, 1970: 331).
And,
The market community as such is the most impersonal 
relationship of practical life into which humans can enter 
with one another... The reason for the impersonality of the 
market is its matter-of-factness, its orientation to the 
commodity and only to that. Where the market is allowed to 
follow its own autonomous tendencies, its participants do 
not look toward the persons of each other but only toward 
the commodity; there are no obligations of brotherliness or 
reverence, and none of those spontaneous human relations 
that are sustained by personal unions... Market behaviour is 
influenced by rational, purposeful pursuit of interests... Such 
absolute depersonalization is contrary to all the elementary 
forms of human relationship... The "free" market is an 
abomination to every system of fraternal ethics (Weber,
1968: 636-7).
In these, as in many other similar passages, Weber, with considerable eloquence 
and hardly restrained passion, depicts what he sees as the heavy, albeit
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necessary costs of the process of rationalization in the field of modern, market- 
oriented economic action; costs that can be summarized by the phrase 
"depersonalization of human relations".
Thus, the kind of rationalization that, according to Weber, is taking place in the 
realm of maket-oriented activity can be described as (a) highly formal, (b) 
purposive in a restricted way -  namely, only with regard to a narrow range of ends, 
and neglectful of, and often in direct conflict with ultimate values -  and (c) 
insufficiently substantive, not only in a purposive way but also in value-rational 
one.
Bureaucratic Organizations
The third field of occidental rationalization to be discussed -  the most important 
one for Weber -  is that of modern organizational life.
Weber analyzes organizational rationality in terms of the crucial concept (the "ideal 
type") of "bureaucracy", maintaining that modern organizations are becoming 
increasingly bureaucratic, and that bureaucratic organizations are coming to 
dominate more and more areas of modern social life.
Among modern organizations that, according to Weber, are rationalized through 
bureaucratization are such varied institutions as economic enterprises of all kinds, 
public administration organizations, political parties, voluntary associations, 
armies, hospitals, trade unions, churches, schools, universities and scientific 
research centres.
Bureaucracy, for Weber, is "the means of transforming social action into rationally 
organized action" (1968: 987). It constitutes a form of organization where action is 
regulated by a legally legitimated system of general, impersonal, precise, 
calculable rules ( ibid.: 220-1, 966-8).
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Using the term "rules" in its most abstract sense to include laws as well as all 
types of regulations (state and private, administrative and technical), we can say 
that bureaucratic rules first of all define — in an impersonal way -  all the role- 
positions in an organization. These role-positions -  which in the most advanced, 
"monocratic" ( ibid.: 223), form of bureaucracy are occupied by individuals, as 
opposed to collectivities -  are arranged in a pyramid-like, multi-layered 
hierarchical structure. A bureaucratic organizational structure has two distinct but 
closely associated aspects, which can even be thought of as two different but 
superimposed pyramids, which might be referred to as the "task-pyramid" and the 
"authority-pyramid".
The "task-pyramid" concerns the allocation of technical tasks that need to be 
carried out at every role-position. This allocation is based on the hierarchical 
division and subdivision of the total work of the organization into smaller and 
smaller parts down to quite narrow, specialized task-areas. These narrowest, most 
specialized task-areas are assigned to the role-positions at the bottom of the 
pyramid, whereas to hierarchically higher positions are assigned correspondingly 
more encompassing task-areas, with the (technical) responsibility for determining 
or clarifying, offering technical advice on, supervising, coordinating and fitting 
together the work of those occupying the positions hierarchically below them. 
Thus, the individual holding the top-position in the pyramid has this kind of 
responsibility with regard to the entire work of the organization.
The "authority pyramid" is a hierarchical structure of command and control. It 
concerns the allocation of rights to issue instructions of certain kinds and duties to 
obey instructions of certain kinds to "authority positions" which coincide with the 
"task-positions" that belong to the "task-pyramid", as explained above. The higher 
we go in the pyramid -  thus, the more encompassing a position's task-area -  the
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greater the authority belonging to the position, with those at the bottom of the 
pyramid having only duties to obey instructions coming from above, and the one at 
the top having only rights to issue instructions to those below (being, though, 
accountable to bodies outside the bureaucratic pyramid, such as government 
ministers, shareholders, etc.).
In addition to the rules defining this double-aspect bureaucratic organizational 
structure, there are, for every roie-position in the structure (in both its task and 
authority aspects), further administrative and technical regulations setting out 
precise, calculable methods and procedures for carrying out the normal tasks of 
the position and for tackling special situations that might arise within its area of 
jurisdiction.
Members of such bureaucratic organizations -  that is, individuals who occupy the 
various role-positions in them -  are appointed or promoted to their respective 
position on the grounds that they possess the specialized knowledge necessary 
for successfully handling the task and authority responsibilities of that position. 
Members must have the legal, administrative and technical expertise necessary 
for interpreting and following the whole body of rules applying to their specific 
position, as well as for working out within the framework of the relevant rules 
effective ways of fulfilling the tasks belonging to that position. So central does 
Weber consider the place of expert knowledge in bureaucracy that he goes as far 
as to maintain that "[bjureaucratic administration means fundamentally domination 
through knowledge" (1968: 225).
Organizational rules, for Weber, are obeyed because they are considered 
legitimate. Without such an attribution of legitimacy to its rules, an organization 
would simply not function. Now, it is one of the central properties of Weberian 
bureaucracy that it possesses a particular form of legitimacy, namely "legality"; or,
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alternatively, Weberian bureaucratic organizations function on the basis of a 
particular form of authority (herrschaft, translated also as "domination", or 
"rulership"), namely, "legal", or "legal-rational" authority. In Weber's words, "the 
purest type of legal authority is that which employs a bureaucratic administrative 
s ta r  ( ibid.: 220).
Weber distinguishes legal authority from two other pure types of authority, 
"traditional" and "charismatic". "Traditional" is the type of authority that "[rests] on 
an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of 
those exercising authority under them" (1968: 215), whereas "charismatic" is 
authority "resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary 
character of an individual person, and on the normative patterns or order revealed 
or ordained by him" ( ibid.: 225). Legal authority on the other hand is based neither 
on traditional nor on charismatic, but on "rational grounds -  resting on a belief in 
the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such 
rules to issue commands" ( ibid.: 215).
Thus, in bureaucratic organizations obedience is owed to rules in so far as they 
have been enacted in a legally proper manner, and to individuals' commands in so 
far as the individuals concerned derive authority to issue commands of that kind 
from legally enacted rules. The legal enactment of its system of rules is, therefore, 
the ultimate foundation of every bureaucratic organizational order. It must be 
added, however, that Weber leaves wide open both the formal requirements for 
legal enactments and their substantive grounds. Thus, "any given legal norm may 
be established by agreement or by imposition, on grounds of expediency or value- 
rationally or both" (1968: 217). Therefore, a bureaucratic order may be established 
and kept in motion by an individual entrepreneur, a group of shareholders, a 
charismatic religious leader, a dictator, a democratic political leader, or a
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parliament; and it may be created in order to promote private economic interests, 
national interests, spiritual or social values, etc.
Whatever the mode and ultimate goals of its enactment, a system of bureaucratic 
rules regulates the conduct of those subject to its authority in a strict manner, 
rendering their decisions and actions -  thus the results of a bureaucratic 
organization's operations -  calculable, predictable and controllable.
Weber firmly believes that bureaucracy has unsurpassable technical advantages 
over other forms of organization, which, to his mind, explains what he sees as "the 
irresistibly expanding bureaucratization of all public and private relations of 
authority" ( ibid.: 1002) and justifies such sweeping and daring statements on his 
part as "[t]he future belongs to bureaucratization" ( ibid.: 1401).
Telling, in respect of this positive aspect of Weber's estimation of bureaucracy, is 
the following passage:
The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic 
organization has always been its purely technical 
superiority over any other form of organization. The fully 
developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other 
organizations exactly as does the machine with the non­
mechanical mode of production. Precision, speed, 
unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, 
unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of 
material and personal costs -  these are raised to the 
optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration....
(1968: 973)
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rAs a result of its technical superiority, "bureaucracy is among those social 
structures which are the hardest to destroy" ( ibid.: 987).
There is, however, also a deeply negative and pessimistic side to Weber's 
evaluation of bureaucracy. Its machine-like character, which he so often points out 
with unconcealed admiration, is at the same time a source of grave concern for 
him. Bureaucracy, while being an extremely efficient and powerful social machine, 
is also a frightful force of dehumanization and enslavement.
Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is 
"dehumanized", the more completely it succeeds in 
eliminating from official business, love, hatred, and all 
purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which 
escape calculation ( ibid.: 975).
As bureaucracy operates inexorably 'according to calculable rules and "without 
regard for persons"' ( ibid.),
the professional bureaucrat is chained to his activity in his 
entire economic and ideological existence. In the great 
majority of cases he is only a small cog in a ceaselessly 
moving mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially 
fixed route of march ( ibid.: 988).
Thus, through its dehumanizing, yet irresistible effects, bureaucracy is, according 
to Weber, increasingly becoming a "shell of bondage" (1968: 1402) or an "iron 
cage" (1958: 181), for modern humanity and a force leading society to a state of 
"mechanized petrification" (1958: 182). (For a collection of Weber's "melancholy 
metaphors" about our modern predicament see Kontos, 1994: 233).
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Bureaucratization is thus for Weber a major -  in fact the single most important -  
strand of rationalization in Western society; and its far reaching consequences -  
both for good and evil -  are products of the particular forms of rationality embodied 
in bureaucracy. On the basis of the preceding account, how can these forms of 
rationality be characterized, in Weberian terms?
In the first place, bureaucracy possesses a high degree of formal rationality. 
Weber stresses, time and again, the calculability, as well as the predictability and 
controllability, of bureaucratic action, which is achieved through obedience to rules 
and instructions and reliance on specialized knowledge. Calculability is made 
possible by bureaucracy for three categories of stakeholders:
(a) its extra-bureaucratic creators and/or superiors, those who set its goals,
design and enact its system of rules, and/or overview its operation;
(b) its members, who carry out the day to day work of a bureaucratic
organization along narrowly determined paths and on the basis of a 
reliable anticipation of the actions of all others involved;
(c) its clients, whose interaction with the organization takes place within well
defined limits and on the basis of a specified range of expectations.
Over and above formal rationality, bureaucracy is, according to Weber, 
purposively rational with regard to the system of ends embodied in the tasks 
carried out by its members and expressing the goals of its external superiors and 
its clients. It is precisely its purposive rationality -  its ability not only to calculate 
the results of action but to bring about intended results through the employment of 
appropriate means -  that makes it "technically superior", and hence "irresistible".
Where, however, bureaucracy is severely lacking is in substantive rationality. To 
begin with, there is no guarantee that the ends pursued in the bureaucratic context
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are rationally, or indeed in any other way, linked with ultimate values, though its 
"technical superiority" and "irresistibility" may testify to a certain degree of 
substantive rationality in respect of those ends.
But the real problems with regard to substantive rationality lie not so much with the 
ends as with the means and side effects of bureaucratic action. They concern the 
substantive irrationalities produced by bureaucratic formalization, those captured 
by terms such as "dehumanization", "iron cage", "mechanized petrification" and all 
the other "melancholy metaphors".
Thus, using terminology suggested earlier in this section, we can say that 
Weberian bureaucracy exhibits a formally well developed but substantively 
severely truncated purposive rationality.
Concluding Remarks
The above account of Weber's understanding of rationalization in connection with 
three major domains of modern social life -  those of science, market-oriented 
action, and bureaucratic organizations -  has shown that, for Weber, modern 
society is dominated by a particular kind of rationality : a formally extremely 
advanced but substantively highly deficient purposive rationality; one that involves 
the systematic use of sophisticated quantitative and logical calculation for the 
achievement of well defined, specific ends by the most efficient means, but which 
is, at the same time, seriously inadequate with regard to relating those ends and 
means to the realization of ultimate human values.
Weber is deeply ambivalent about this rationality, recognizing both great virtues 
and great vices in it, and staring unflinchingly at both these aspects at once, 
refusing to succumb to a facile choice between them. He is, however, also certain 
that this is the only rationality that can be had.
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Weber flatly rejected any suggestion that problems of modernity such as the ones 
he had identified could be overcome by means of more rationality. As is well 
known, he vehemently repudiated socialist claims that a "rationally" planned 
economy would cater for fundamental human needs left unsatisfied by capitalism. 
He insisted that, on the contrary, "socialism would... require a still higher degree of 
formal bureaucratization than capitalism" (1968: 225), thus broadening and 
strengthening the "shell of bondage".
At the same time, he clearly conceives the (partial) remedies to the evils of 
rationalization which he proposes at times as non-rational, or even irrational. First 
and foremost among these is the creative force of charisma (see Mommsen, 1974: 
82), which paradigmatically can be displayed at the political level by the great 
leader and at the economic level by the innovative entrepreneur.
Thus, Weber raised, and answered affirmatively, two questions: Firstly, whether 
western society is dominated by a highly formalized but substantively deficient 
purposive rationality; and secondly, whether that rationality is the only conceivable 
form of rationality.
There have been many serious challenges to Weber with regard to these 
questions, both on conceptual and on empirical grounds. Here it may suffice to 
make two interrelated points, while remaining within a Weberian conceptual 
framework: Firstly, it seems that it may be possible to have a substantively more 
satisfactory purposive (and in some areas also value-oriented) rationality than 
Weber allows. This could be achieved in large part by reducing formalism -  the 
culprit, according to Weber, for the evils of rationalization -  to levels that ensure 
the optimum realization of ultimate values. Secondly, certain developments since 
Weber's lifetime seem to support not only the possibility of a substantively more 
adequate (and less formalistic) rationality but also its empirical realization. Among
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the most important of these developments is the considerable scientific and 
practical interest in less bureaucratic private, and more recently also public, 
organizational life.
To that we may add a definite movement in the direction of developing holistic 
(e.g. ecological) forms of science and technology, and even -  despite the counter­
evidence provided primarily by Soviet-type socialism, but also in large measure by 
the (considerably bureaucratized) welfare state -  the emergence of economic 
forms where political, social, environmental and other non-market considerations 
based on ultimate values play a significant role.
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NOTES
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1) Despite this view, Kant was to become an enthusiast for the French 
Revolution, at least in its early stages.
2) Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972.
3) Horkheimer, 1974.
4) Marcuse, 1964.
6) Adorno, 1973.
PART ONE
1) This usage is of course narrower than the one I have adopted throughout the 
thesis whereby “practical rationality” concerns all action-related questions 
including both the “practical and the “technical” in the above narrower 
senses. This broad, inclusive sense of “practical” is employed also by the 
later Habermas, as for example in the important essay “On the Pragmatic, 
the Ethical and the Moral Employments of Practical Reason” (in Habermas, 
1993), which we shall discuss in Part Two. In this study I shall use the term 
“praxial”, to correspond to praxis, as distinct from “practical”, corresponding 
to practice in the broad sense that covers both praxis and techne.
2) In Aristotle’s words “the rational faculty exercized in doing is quite distinct 
form that which is exercised in making” (1955: 175).
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3) I first came across this passage in Georgia Warnke’s discussion of Gadamer 
on the same issue (Warnke, 1987: 92-4).
4) See Habermas’s essay “Labour and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel’s Jena 
Philosophy of Mind”, 1974: 142-169.
5) (a) In Habermas’s own words, “Hegel is able to resolve [sublate] scientifically 
based social philosophy into a dialectical theory of society, and thereby 
select and develop the categories in such a way that this theory at every step 
is guided and permeated by the self-consciousness of its own relationship to 
praxis”. (1974: 81)
(b) Referring, again, to Hegelian dialectics, Habermas speaks of “the 
dangerous potential of a theory which still understood its own critical 
relationship to praxis” (1974:131).
(c) In discussing Marxist theory as critique and its relations to capitalist 
contradictions -  in this case sufficiently deep to have acquired the character 
of crisis -  Habermas maintains: “...critique becomes conscious of its own 
peculiar involvement in the object of its criticism. The objective complex of 
relations, which critique, although also encompassed within it, reflects as a 
totality and which, just by means of this, it wants to drive to the conclusion of 
the crisis, is obdurate. Consequently all efforts are equally condemned to 
remain without consequences, if they do not go beyond critique and 
intervene in the crisis, employing the means of the crisis itself, namely, 
practically... [Ojnly by the success of this praxis can the critique itself 
become valid” (Habermas, 1973: 214).
6) This is analogous to (but drawn by Marx without knowledge of) the distinction 
between labour and interaction which Hegel works out in his early Jena
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philosophy but later gives up (see “Labour and Interaction: Remarks on 
Hegel’sJena Philosophy of Mind”, in Habermas, 1974:142-169).
7) In this regard, Habermas also draws, though to a lesser degree, on another 
main exemplification of the method, namely Marx’s critique of commodity 
fetishism and of the ideology of equal exchange (see Habermas, 1974: 
Chapter 6).
8) “In technical control over nature we get nature to work for us through our
knowledge of causal connections. Analytic insight, however, affects the 
causality of the unconscious as such. Psychoanalytic therapy is not based, 
like somatic medicine, which is ‘caused’ in the narrower sense, on making 
use of known causal connections. Rather, it owes its efficacy to overcoming 
causal connections themselves” (1972: 271).
9) Habermas expresses his appreciation for McCarthy’s contribution to the 
analysis of these concepts (Habermas, 1979: 224, n.31).
10) See Taylor, 1947. For a critical analysis of 20th century work processes 
Honneth refers us to Braverman (1974).
11) Giddens also refers approvingly to, and to some extent recapitulates, 
McCarthy’s above-mentioned discussion of ambiguities in the concept of 
labour and interaction.
12) For an interesting attempt to reconcile the two positions, see Ricoeur, 1990. 
See also Ricoeur, 1970. For further discussions of the Habermas-Gadamer 
debate, and issues dealt with here in particular, see Mandelson, 1979, 
Warnke, 1987: Chapter 4, and Holub, 1991: Chapter 3.
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PART TWO
1) It should be remembered that Habermas’s new paradigm was being 
developed in a philosophical climate characterized by concerted onslaughts 
on the philosophy of the subject and philosophy of consciousness in both 
analytic and continental contexts: critiques of this kind came, most 
prominently, from the followers of Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein as 
well as from neo-pragmatism and poststructuralism.
2) These core ideas of Habermas’s Universal Pragmatics are clearly prefigured 
in earlier writings such as the “Appendix” and “Postscript” to Knowledge and 
Human Interests (1972: 314, 363); Legitimation Crisis (1976:107-8); and the 
“Introduction” to Theory and Practice (1974: 25). The following is a 
particularly telling passage:
What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose 
nature we can know: language. Through its structure, 
autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. Our first 
sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of 
universal and unconstrained consensus (1972: 314).
3) For a critical perspective on this point, see Schnadelbach, 1991; for 
Habermas’s response see Habermas, 1991: 228ff.
4) For a list of rules of rational argumentation, which Habermas puts forward in 
the context of his discussion of moral discourse, though they are applicable 
to discourse in general, see Habermas, 1990: 87-9.
5) A notable exception, though one focusing on a particular aspect of the issue 
-  that of human genetic engineering -  is his The Future of Human Nature 
(Habermas, 2003a).
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6) For a critical discussion of Habermas’s relevant arguments in Knowledge 
and Human Interests, see Part One, above.
7) See Christian F. Rostboll, 2008.
8) For a brief discussion by Habermas of the possible moral status of our
natural environment, and more particularly of possible duties towards 
animals, within a deontological perspective which distinguishes sharply 
between the ethical and the more narrowly moral, see Habermas, 1993: 
105-111.
9) For Habermas, a substantive theory of justice such as Rawls’s is permissible
only “as a contribution to a discourse among citizens” (1990: 94). Rawls is
able to propose it as a view possessing universal validity only after he has 
essentially rendered his perspective -wrongly, for Habermas -  monological, 
through the device of the veil of ignorance, which eliminates all differences 
between potential participants in moral discourse and makes the position 
from which they would judge substantative norms identical (see Habermas, 
1990: 66).
10) More precisely, Habermas distinguishes three forms of abstraction involved 
in the perspective of morality;
In fact, the moral point of view requires a threefold 
abstraction: (1) abstraction from the motives required of 
those involved, (2) abstraction from the particular 
situation, and (3) abstraction from existing institutions 
and forms of life (1993:118).
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Y11) For Gunther’s presentation of the principle of appropriateness, see Gunther, 
1993, especially, pp 221-245; for Habermas’s discussion of the principle, 
see, Habermas, 1993: 35-39, and Habermas, 1996: 217-19.
12) In analyzing the rules of argumentation Habermas draws on the work of 
Robert Alexy. See Alexy (1990) in Benhabib and Dallmayr (1990).
13) For Habermas’s fuller definitions of these terms, see his 1987:138.
14) “Both aspects of society, which are initially introduced merely as different 
perspectives adopted in observing the same phenomena, also acquire 
essentialist connotations for modern societies and open up a view of 
differently structured domains of social reality itself (Habermas, 1991: 255).
15) Habermas points out that systems theory -  unlike communicative theory 
which possesses the evaluative standards of communicative action and 
communicative rationality -  is not equipped with the conceptual tools that 
would enable it to comprehend any form of erosion of the lifeworld “as cost” 
(Habermas, 1987:186).
16) See, for example, Blau, P.M. (1963).
PART THREE
1) These considerations show at the same time that when Habermas, in the 
theory of Universal Pragmatics, maintains that every speech act implies three 
distinct and communicatively redeemable validity claims -  the claims to truth, 
truthfulness and rightness -  what he can consistently mean by rightness is 
ultimately moral rightness. For a claim to rightness with respect to shared 
non-moral norms is neither entirely distinct (for it involves the other two 
claims, together with the moral one), nor necessarily redeemable in a purely
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communicative way (for the sharing of the norms in question may well depend 
on strategic bargaining processes).
2) Examples of concepts akin to those of success-oriented communicative action 
and communicative negotiation (fully or restrictedly purposive-rational) are (a) 
Rawls’s “overlapping consensus” (Rawls, 1993, 1996: 133ff); (b) Bohman’s 
“moral compromise” (Bohman, 1996: 89ff); and (c) Aristotle’s idea of imperfect 
friendship, which refers to a relationship into which people enter not because 
they “love one another for their personal qualities” but “only so far as they are 
useful to one another” (Aristotle, 1955: 231).
3) The complexity and costliness, in terms of time and effort, of negotiation 
processes will become clearer in the next section, where the process of 
communicative negotiation will be further clarified.
4) In this respect, Habermas refers to John Dewey’s similar “pragmatistic model” 
of decision making, warning, though, against the model’s direct application to 
decision making processes in modern mass democracies, because of the risk 
of ideologically “short-circuiting the connection between technical expertise 
and a public that can be influenced by manipulation” (1971: 69-70).
5) Joseph Heath’s Communicative Action and Rational Choice (2001) represents 
an important effort to bring the Habermasian and Rational Choice views of 
practical rationality into dialogue with each other. Heath, unlike the present 
study, rejects a Habermasian rational-reconstructive justification of 
communicative rationality. He does, however, in line with this study, draw 
considerable support for cooperative modes of interaction and decision 
making from within Rational Choice Theory. Studies within the latter paradigm 
are shown to demonstrate that from a purely instrumental/purposive point of 
view, a cooperative approach is very often more advantageous than a
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strategic-manipulative one -  which is found to be beset by problems and 
antinomies.
6) For classic accounts of the “satisficing” method of reaching decisions, and of 
“bounded rationality”, see Simon, 1997: 88-9, 118-22. See also, Simon, 
1957.
7) For a very interesting discussion of “deliberative inequalities” see Bohman, 
1996: chapter 3.
APPENDIX II
1) Kant seems to be using the term “practical law” in three different senses,
according to context: (a) in the sense of “principles” in general, in 
contradistinction to inclinations, impulses, etc; (b) in the sense of “objective 
principles”, in contradistinction to subjective principles; and (c) in the sense of 
“unconditional (objective) principles” in contradistinction to conditional ones.
2) In doing so, Kant exhibits a profound faith in the natural goodness of the
ordinary person, one which many commentators trace to the influence of 
Rousseau as well as to Kant’s pietist family background.
APPENDIX III
1) For a comprehensive presentation of Weber’s life and work, see Bendix, 
1962.
399
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adorno, Theodor W. (1973). Negative Dialectics. New York: The Seabury Press.
Adorno, Theodor, et al (1976), The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology. 
London: Heinemann.
Alexy, Robert (1990J.A Theory of Practical Discourse. See Benhabib and Dallmayr
(1990), 151-190.
Apel, Karl-Otto (1987). The Problem of Philosophical Foundations in Light of a 
Transcendental Pragmatics of Language. See Baynes, Bohman and 
McCarthy (Eds) (1987), 250-295.
Arendt, Hannah (1958). The Human Condition. Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press.
Aristotle (1955). The Nichomachean Ethics. London: Penguin.
Axelrod, Robert (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New Work: Basic Books.
Ayer, A.J. (1980). Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baynes, K., Bohman, J. and McCarthy, T. (Eds). After Philosophy: End or 
Transformation?. Cambridge, MA, and London : The MIT Press.
Bendix, Reinhard (1962). Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. London : Methuen.
Benhabib, S. and Cornell, D. (Eds) (1987). Feminism as Critique. Minneapolis : 
University of Minnesota Press.
400
Benhabib, Seyla (1987). The Generalised and the Concrete Other: The 
Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory. See Benhabib and Cornell 
(Eds) (1987), 77-96.
Benhabib, Seyla (1992). Autonomy, Modernity and Community: 
Communitarianism and Critical Social Theory in Dialogue. See Honneth, 
McCarthy, Offe and Wellmer (Eds) (1992), 39-59.
Benhabib, Seyla and Dallmayr, Fred (Eds) (1990). The Communicative Ethics 
Controversy. Cambridge, MA and London, England : The MIT Press.
Berger, Johannes (1991). The Linguistification of the Sacred and the 
Delinguistification of the Economy. See Honneth and Joas (Eds) (1991): 
165-180.
Berlin, Isaiah (1979,). Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas. 
London: The Hogarth Press.
Blau, P. M. (1963). The Dynamics of Bureaucracy. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press.
Bohman, James (1996). Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and 
Democracy. Cambridge, MA, and London, England: The MIT Press.
Bohman, James (2000). Distorted Communication: Formal Pragmatics as a 
Critical Theory. See Hahn, (Ed) (2000), 3-20.
Braverman, H. (1974). Labour and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in 
the Twentieth Century. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Brubaker, Rogers (1984). The Limits of Rationality. London : Allen & Unwin.
401
Burns, Tom and Stalker, G. M. (1961). The Management of Innovation. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Calhoun, Craig (ed) (1992). Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA 
and London: The MIT Press.
Cook, Maeve (1999). Habermas, feminism and the question of autonomy. See 
Dews, P. (Ed) (1999), 178-210.
Crozier, Michel (1964). The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press.
Dews, Peter (1993). “Agreeing what is Right: Review of Faktizitat und Geltung by 
Jurgen Habermas”, in London Review of Books, Vol. 15: 25-26.
Dews, Peter (Ed) (1999). Habermas: A Critical Reader. Oxford : Blackwell.
Ellul, Jacques (1964). The Technological Society. New York: Vintage Books.
Fisher, Roger, et al; (1991). Getting to Yes: Negotiating An Agreement Without 
Giving In. London: Century Business Books.
Fishkin, J. S. and Laslett, P. (Eds) (2003). Debating Deliberative Democracy. 
Oxford : Backwell.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1967). On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical 
Reflection. See Gadamer (,1976>).
Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1975). Truth and Method. New York: Seabury Press.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1976). Philosophical Hermeneutics. University of 
California Press: Berkeley.
402
Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1981). Reason in the Age of Science. Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press
Gerth, H. H. and Wright Mills, C. (eds.) (1970). From Max Weber : Essays in 
Sociology. London : Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Giddens, Anthony (1972). Politics and Sociology in the Thought of Max Weber. 
London : Macmillan.
Gilligan, Carol (1982). In a Different Voice : Psychological Theory and Women’s 
Development. Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press.
Gouldner, A. W. (1954). Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy. New York: The Free 
Press.
Gunter, Klaus (1993). The Sense of Appropriateness: Application Discourses in 
Morality and Law. Albany: State University of New York.
Habermas, Jurgen (1970). “On Systematically Distorted Communication”, in 
Inquiry, vol. 13, 1970: 205-18.
Habermas, Jurgen (1971). Toward a Rational Society. London: Heinemann.
Habermas, Jurgen (1972), Knowledge and Human Interests (Second Edition), 
Heineman : London.
Habermas, Jurgen (1974), Theory and Practice, Heineman: London.
Habermas, Jurgen (1976). Legitimation Crisis. London : Heinemann.
Habermas, Jurgen (1979). Communication and the Evolution of Society. London: 
Heinemann.
403
Habermas, Jurgen (1982). A Reply to my Critics. See Thomson and Held (Eds) 
(1982), 219-283.
Habermas, Jurgen (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action (Volume One): 
Reason and the Rationalization of Society. London: Heinemann.
Habermas, Jurgen (1987). The Theory of Communicative Action (Volume Two): 
The Critique of Functionalist Reason. Cambridge, UK : Polity, Press.
Habermas, Jurgen (1988), On the Logic of the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press.
Habermas, Jurgen (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. 
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Habermas, Jurgen (1990). Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. 
Cambridge, UK : Polity Press.
Habermas, Jurgen (1991). A Reply. See Honneth and Joas (Eds) (1991), 214-64.
Habermas, Jurgen (1992). Postmetaphysical Thinking. Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press.
Habermas, Jurgen (1993). Justification and Application. Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press.
Habermas, Jurgen (1996). Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press.
Habermas, Jurgen (1998a). On the Pragmatics of Communication. Cambridge, 
UK: Polity Press.
404
Habermas, Jurgen (1998b). The Inclusion of the Other. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press.
Habermas, Jurgen (2001). On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction : Preliminary 
Studies on the Theory of Communicative Action. Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press.
Habermas, Jurgen (2003a). The Future of Human Nature. Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press.
Habermas, Jurgen (2003b). Truth and Justification. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press.
Hahn, Lewis Edwin (Ed) (2000). Perspectives on Habermas. Chicago and La 
Salle, Illinois: Open Court.
Heath, Joseph (2001). Communicative Action and Rational Choice. Cambridge, 
MA and London, UK: The MIT Press.
Heidegger, Martin (1993). The Question Concerning Technology. See Krell (Ed) 
(1993).
Heller, Agnes (1982). Habermas and Marxism. See Thompson and Held (Eds) 
(1982), 21-41.
Hobbes, Thomas (1962). Leviathan. UK: Fontana.
Holub, Robert (1991). Jurgen Habermas: Critic in the Public Sphere. London and 
New York: Routledge
405
Honneth, A., McCarthy, T., Offe, C. and Wellmer, A. (Eds) (1992). Cultural-Political 
Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment Cambridge, MA, and 
London: The MIT Press.
Honneth, Axel (1982), “Work and Instrumental Action”, in New German Critique, 
No 25, pp31-54.
Honneth, Axel and Joas, Hans (Eds) (1991). Communicative Action : Essays on 
Jurgen Habermas’s The Theory of Communicative Action”. Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press.
Horkheimer Max and Adorno, Theodor W. (1972). Dialectic of Enlightenment New 
York: The Seabury Press.
Horkheimer, Max (1972). Critical Theory: Selected Essays. New York: Herder and 
Herder.
Horkheimer, Max (1974). Eclipse of Reason. New York: The Seabury Press.
Horowitz, A. and Malley T. (eds.) (1994). The Barbarism of Reason : Max Weber 
and the Twilight of Enlightenment Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Hume, David (1975). Enquires Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning 
the Principles of Morals. (Edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch). 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hume, David (1978). A Treatise of Human Nature (Edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge 
and P.H. Nidditch). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Joas, Hans (1991). The unhappy Marriage of Hermeneutics and Functionalism. 
See Honneth and Joas (Eds) (1991): 97-118.
406
Kalberg, Stephen (1994). Max Weber’s Comparative-Historical Sociology. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Kant, Immanuel (1948). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Translated and 
analysed by H.J. Paton). London: Hutchinson.
Kant, Immanuel (1983). “An Answer to the Question: What is 
Enlightenment”, in Kant, Immanuel, Perpetual Peace and Other 
Essays. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
Kant, Immanuel (1996). Critique of Practical Reason (Transalted by T.F. Abbott). 
New York: Prometheus Books.
Kontos, Alkis (1994). The World Disenchanted, and the Return of Gods and 
Demons. See Horowitzh, A. and Maley, T. (eds.): 223 -  247.
Korner, S. (1955). Kant. London: Penguin.
Krell, David Farrell (Ed) (1993). Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, Second Edition. 
New York: Harper Collins.
Lax, David, A. and Sebenius, James, K. (1986). The Manager As Negotiator: 
Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain. New York: The Free Press, 
Macmillan.
Locke, John (1988). Two Treatises of Government (Edited by Peter Laslett). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Luk£cs, Georg (1971). History and Class Consciousness. London: Merlin.
Lyotard, Jean-Francois (1984). The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge. Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press.
407
MacIntyre, Alasdair (1996). A Short History of Ethics. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul.
Marcuse, Herbert (1964). One-Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press.
McCarthy, Thomas (1978). The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas. Cambridge, 
MA and London, UK: The MIT Press
McCarthy, Thomas (1982). Rationality and Relativism : Habermas’s “Overcoming” 
of Hermeneutics. See Thomson and Held (Eds) (1982), 55-78.
McCarthy, Thomas ( 1 9 9 1 Complexity and Democracy: or the Seducements of 
Systems Theory. See Honneth and Joas (Eds) (1991): 119-139.
Mendelson, Jack (1979), “The Habermas-Gadamer Debate” in New German 
Critique, 1979, no. 18, pp. 44-73.
Merton, R. K. (1957). “Bureaucratic Structure and Personality”, in Social Theory 
and Social Structure, pp 195-206. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe.
Mommsen, Wolfgang J. (1974). The Age of Bureaucracy : Perspectives on the 
Political Sociology of Max Weber. London : Harper and Row.
Ormiston, G.L. and Schrift, A.D. (Eds) (1990), The Hermeneutic Tradition: From 
Ast to Ricoeur. State University of New York Press: Albany.
Ottmann, Henning (1982). Cognitive Interests and Self-Reflection. See Thomson 
and Held (Eds) (1982): 79-97.
Paton, H.J. (1948). The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant’s Moral 
Philosophy. Philadelphia: University of Pensylvania Press.
408
Raiffa, Howard, et al (2002). Negotiation Analysis: The Science and Art of 
Collaborative Decision Making. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard 
University Press.
Rawls, John (1993, 1996). Politifcal Liberalism. New York: Columbia University 
Press.
Ricoeur, Paul (1970). Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation. New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Ricoeur, Paul (1990). Hermeneutic and the Critique of Ideology. See Ormiston and 
Schrift (Eds) (1990): 298:334.
Rostboll, Christian F. (2008). Emancipation or Accommodation: Habermasian vs 
Rawlsian deliberative democracy, in Philosophy and Social Criticism vol. 34, 
(2000) no. 7, pp 707-736.
Schnadelbach, Herbert (1991). The Transformation of Critical Theory. See 
Honneth and Joas (Eds) (1991), 7 -22.
Simon, Herbert (1967). Models of Man: Social and Rational. New York: John 
Wiley.
Simon, Herbert (1997). Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making 
Processes in Administrative Organizations (Fourth Edition). New York: The 
Free Press.
Swindler, Ann (1973). “The Concept of Rationality in the Work of Max Weber”, in 
Sociological Inquiry 43 : 35-42.
Taylor, Charles (1991). Language and Society. See Honneth and Joas (Eds)
(1991), 23-35.
409
Taylor, Frederick (1947). Scientific Management, London: Harper and Row.
Thomson, J. B. and Held, D. (Eds) (1982). Habermas: Critical Debates. London 
and Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Warnke, Georgia (1987). Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason. 
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Weber, Max (1958). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Weber, Max (1968). Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 2 
vols., edited by Gunther Roth and Claus Wittich. London: University of 
California Press.
Wellmer, Albrecht (1971). Critical Theory of Society. New York: Continuum, The 
Seabury Press.
Young, Iris Marion (2003). Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy. See 
Fishkin and Laslett (Eds) (2003), 102-120.
410
